The Advent of Coalition Government

The first-and, almost certainly, the most significant – implications of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition, formed in 2010, was that it led to the creation of a majority government despite the election of a “hung” Parliament. The coalition’s official majority of 77 seats amounted, in practice, to an effective majority of 83, due to the fact that some Northern Ireland MPs never take up their seats. Once the idea of a possible Labour-Liberal Democrat coalition had been abandoned as unfeasible (as it would have still produced a minority government), the only realistic alternative to a Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition was a minority Conservative government. As the Conservatives were 19 seats short of a majority, such a government would have been vulnerable to pressure in Parliament, both from other parties, and, almost as important, from its own backbenchers. Previous minority governments in the UK, such as the minority Labour administrations elected in 1924, 1929 and October 1974, have been weak and short-lived. Not only did the formation of a coalition create the possibility of an effective government, able to resist parliamentary pressures, but the government also speedily committed itself to the introduction of fixed-term Parliaments, demonstrating the coalitions’ determination to serve out a full five-year term.

However, there is also a general expectation that the coalition government will rejuvenate Parliament. This is based on the belief that a coalition will radically alter the dynamics of executive-Parliament relations in the UK. Single-party majority governments (the norm in the UK since 1945) are able to control the Commons as long as they maintain party unity and, if their majorities are substantial, even backbench revolts may have a marginal significance. By contrast, coalitions are forced to manage the Commons not simply by maintaining a single party, but by establishing and maintaining unity across two or more parties. The process of inter-party debate, negotiation and conciliation that this inevitably involves is widely believed to make the legislature an important focus of policy debate. In short, the coalition government means that the support of backbench MPs for government policy cannot simply be taken for granted. The key factor here is the degree of unity and cohesion amongst the coalition partners in Parliament, and the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition inevitably lacks the ideological and tribal unity that is normally associated with a single-party government. Particular concern has focused on Liberal Democrat MPs, whose support may be difficult to maintain because, being the smaller party, they have the least to gain, and perhaps, the most to lose from the coalition. Experience across continental Europe suggests that smaller coalition parties tend to suffer from a loss of political identity, straining the loyalty of their supporters both in the legislature and beyond. The strains that this may generate could be evident in a growing pattern of Liberal Democrat backbench disloyalty. This was evident in December 2010, when a majority of Liberal Democrat MPs either voted against the government or abstained on the issue of increasing university tuition fees, despite the fact that the policy had been proposed by a Liberal Democrat minister, Vince Cable. Misgivings amongst Liberal Democrat MPs over the pace and shape of NHS reforms also contributed in April 2011 to the announcement of a period of further review and consultation.

Alternatively, the Liberal Democrats may exploit their position as a pivotal party (a party that is capable, potentially, of entering a coalition with either major party) to exert disproportionate influence within the coalition. This would occur if Cameron and the Conservative leadership became increasingly anxious about ‘keeping the Liberal Democrats on board’. In these circumstances, Liberal Democrat assertiveness may stimulate disaffection, and possibly disloyalty, from the ranks of the Conservative right. This would be particularly destabilizing given the ideological divide between many left-leaning Liberal Democrats and right wing Conservatives.

In other respects, coalition government may be a recipe for a weak Parliament. As we have already seen, the coalition’s majority means that in practice 42 Liberal Democrat or Conservative MPs would have to vote against the government in order to threaten it with defeat. Even in the case of university tuition fees, when 21 Liberal Democrats and 6 Conservatives voted against the government, the policy still passed the Commons with a majority of 21. It is also significant that the process of inter-party consultation and negotiation that coalition government involves is more likely to take place within the executive itself, and often at its highest levels, rather than in Parliament. In fact, most coalitions involve the centralisation, no the decentralisation of decision-making processes. There are also a number of reasons for believing that the coalition will be able to maintain its unity in the Commons, or at least keep levels of disunity relatively small:

• In rapidly producing a detailed programme for government before the end of May 2010, which was presented to both parliamentary parties for debate and approval, the coalition resolved many of the policy issues that may otherwise have dogged the government, and perhaps, even threatened its existence.
• Where policy differences have not been resolved, the coalition has made extensive use of independent commissions and forums, allowing sensitive issues to be effectively ‘buried’ or to be resolved through a ‘neutral’ process.
• The support of Liberal Democrat MPs for the coalition tends to be upheld by their prominent representation in government. Most importantly, the Liberal Democrat leader, Nick Clegg, is deputy prime minister, and he serves alongside four other Liberal Democrats in the Cabinet. The Liberal Democrats are also marginally ‘over-represented’ in government – the balance between Conservatives and Liberal Democrats in the government is 5:1, compared to 6:1 amongst MPs.
• Ideological shifts in both coalition parties in the years leading up to 2010 means that the range of policy difference between the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats has been significantly reduced, especially amongst party leaders and MPs.
• Having entered into a coalition, there may be a significant electoral cost for any party that pulls out, or for both parties should the coalition be seen to fail. In that sense, the coalition may be a one-way street, in that MPs from both the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats may believe they have no realistic option other than to make the coalition work.