Case Study: Case Studies of Prime Ministerial Styles

by peped

18th August 2015

Case Studies of Prime Ministerial Styles

Thatcher as PM

Mrs Thatcher made less use of cabinet than her predecessors. Instead, detailed policy work was increasingly done in cabinet committees or in bilateral meetings with the head of a department. Thatcher often began cabinet discussions by announcing the government’s policy and kept come issues away from the cabinet. Senior ministers such as Nigel Lawson accused her of paying greater attention to her advisers than to cabinet ministers.

Early in her premiership, Thatcher’s skilful management of the cabinet enabled her to cement her authority at a time when many ministers doubted her policies. Her refusal to bow to pressure to tone down the monetarist budget of 1981 – and her colleagues’ unwillingness to flex their muscles seriously – proved decisive. Thatcher was then able to construct a cabinet of ideological allies.

By 1990 though, Thatcher had few loyal allies in the cabinet. Chancellor John Major exploited her relative weakness to persuade Thatcher to agree to UK entry into the ERM – a policy she had previously opposed. Within weeks, Thatcher had failed to win on the first ballot of the Conservative leadership election. She then met her cabinet ministers one by one, but few offered their full support and Thatcher resigned. Economic problems, unpopular policies, cabinet divisions and the Conservative Party’s low opinion poll ratings were all factors in Thatcher’s downfall. However, Thatcher was in part of the author of her own misfortune. By ignoring the concerns of ministers and bypassing cabinet, she had not strengthened her position but weakened it, alienating colleagues whose support she needed. When Thatcher was vulnerable, ministers struck back.

Major as PM

Major John Major adopted a more collegiate style. Cabinet once again discussed government policy and exercised greater influence over the direction of policy than had been the case under Thatcher. Major has been portrayed as a weak prime minister. He failed to put across a clear vision of what he wanted to achieve, was unable to set the political agenda and appeared overwhelmed by events. But Major recognised the limitations of his authority, managing his cabinet in a way that ensured he stayed in office for over 6 years, despite never appearing totally secure. Although he undoubtedly made mistakes, Major could also be tactically astute. He used cabinet meetings to bind both pro-European and Eurosceptic ministers to government policy on Europe. By working closely with senior figures such as Michael Heseltine and Kenneth Clarke, he lessened the chances of a serious rival for his job emerging.

Blair as PM

Seasoned observers of prime ministerial power, such as Peter Hennessy, Dennis Kavanagh and Michael Foley, depict Blair as a more dominant prime minister than Major and even Thatcher. For Hennessy, Blair’s is a ‘command premiership’ while Kavanagh describes Blair’s leadership style as ‘Napoleonic’. Foley argues that the Blair era offers confirmation of the ‘presidentialisation’ of the office of prime minister. As well as Blair taking the key decisions in government, the political and media spotlight was focused firmly on the prime minister. Blair was communicator in-chief for the government and party, and for the country.

Blair had little time for cabinet government, preferring to conduct government business through bilateral meetings in which he agreed policy objectives with individual ministers. Key decisions were reached in informal meetings of Blair’s inner circle of advisers, a style of government that has been dubbed ‘sofa government’. This informality and neglect of the cabinet system was criticised by the former head of the home civil service, Lord Butler.

The Prime Minister’s Office was strengthened and parts of the Cabinet Office were brought under the prime minister’s remit. Blair sought to command swathes of government policy from Downing Street and improve policy coordination and delivery. Numerous task forces and special units were created to do this, and the number of special advisers doubled. But devolution, European integration and decision to grant the Bank of England the power to set interest rates removed some policy issues from the core executive.

In his first two terms in office, Blair enjoyed a number of advantages that eluded Major; large parliamentary majorities, a strong position within his party and a largely quiescent cabinet. But he faced large-scale rebellions by Labour MPs on Iraq, foundation hospitals and tuition fees. Labour’s reduced majority after the 2005 election and his announcement that he would step down also weakened his position.

Brown as PM

Brown effectively established a “dual monarchy” with Blair, establishing extensive power within the Treasury and even some areas that were not normally the remit of the Chancellor. His influence extended from welfare reform and control over the UK’s entry into the European single currency to pensions and anti-poverty strategies. Having decided not to stand for the party leadership in 1994, Brown’s uneasy relationship with Blair became increasingly strained, particularly after the 2005 election. Brown eventually achieved his long-standing ambition to become prime minister in June 2007, when Blair stepped down. His key priorities as prime minister were to re-establish Labour’s popularity, damaged in particular by the war in Iraq, and to convince voters that a change in prime minister had effectively brought about a change in government. His attempts to do these things, and to present himself as a ‘serious’ politician (uninterested in spin and presentation) were badly damaged on October 2007 by dithering over a possible early general election. Brown’s attempts to distinguish himself from ‘Blairism’ are hampered by the extent to which he helped to create ‘New Labour’.