The role and powers of the Prime Minister

Written evidence submitted by the Green Party of England and Wales

Introduction

On 24 January 2011 the Green Party of England and Wales was invited to submit evidence to the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee of the House of Commons. The invitation included an ‘Issues and Questions’ paper, which set out some general observations and some specific questions. This response follows the same format.

The Role and Powers of the Prime Minister

The Committee’s paper sums up many of the concerns around the lack of clarity about the roles and powers of the Prime Minister and of the Prime Minister’s Office. The current position is in effect that “…the roles, including the exercise of power under the Royal prerogative, have evolved over many years, drawing on convention and usage, and it is not possible precisely to define them. The Government has no plans to introduce legislation in this area.” (Tony Blair MP, written answer, 15 October 2001).

The position of the Green Party is that this situation, while convenient to successive Prime Ministers, is deeply harmful to the way the United Kingdom is governed. It is no coincidence that in the same year that Tony Blair stated his opposition to codifying or limited Prime Ministerial power, he also used the Royal prerogative to take the UK to war in Iraq: a decision he took alone and against the advice of senior Cabinet colleagues and the government’s legal advisers.

The Royal prerogative gives rise to many concerns: the power to declare war is the most far-reaching, but there are ‘secondary’ powers such as the ability to restructure government departments without consultation (and which can lead to the efficiency and accountability of Departments being sacrificed to the whims of ministerial colleagues, as with the creation of the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister in 2001). But it is the cumulative effect of concentrating so much power in the hands of one individual that is most damaging to good governance, particularly when linked to the growing capacity of the Prime Minister’s Office to intervene across Whitehall and the potential for the politicisation of the civil service or the undermining of its capacity and willingness to provide impartial advice.

Further, the dangers in the concentration of powers in the hands of one individual – the Prime Minister – are made worse by other failings in the UK’s political structures. They are:

Centralisation: the more that power is concentrated in Westminster and Whitehall, the more scope for the Prime Minister to use power unwisely and with greater consequences.

Disenfranchisement: the unrepresentative electoral system means that governments and Prime Ministers can stay in power with the support of relatively narrow sections of the population (above all, swing voters in marginal constituencies)

Patronage: the power of patronage inside and outside Parliament, including the ability to reward followers and supporters financially or with status or access, adds to the Prime Minister’s powers and the scope for corruption.

Accountability: the Prime Minister’s power has become more pervasive through the increase in the size of the Prime Minister’s Office; but without an equivalent extension of scrutiny or accountability over how staff are recruited or how they act in post.

Constitution: the flexibility of an unwritten constitution was traditionally balanced by a presumption that governments would avoid using a simple Parliamentary majority to change the constitution but instead seek a wider consensus; but this convention has itself been undermined by recent Prime Ministers, so that many checks and balances on the Prime Minister’s powers are becoming ineffective.

In terms of remedies, we would highlight:

The ending of the Royal prerogative: the reasons produced by the last government to excuse inaction and cited in the issues paper are entirely unconvincing.

A clear definition of the Prime Minister’s powers to prevent their creeping extension (such as the chilling suggestion that prerogative powers could be used “…to tackle exceptional urgency or disruption outside the framework of the Civil Contingencies Act”).

Reducing as far as possible the Prime Minister’s role in patronage (for example, appointments of the House of Lords) and widening the role of Parliament in ratifying senior appointments to public bodies

Ending the Prime Minister’s role as head of the Civil Service.

Reforming the Prime Minister’s Office, to make its role clearer and more accountable and to ensure it operates according to the values and traditions of the civil service.

Exploring the potential for more radical reforms, such as separating the Prime Minister’s role of Chair of Cabinet from the role of head of Government, with the former exercised in rotation by cabinet colleagues.

Specific Questions

1. Is there sufficient clarity as to the Prime Minister’s role and powers?

No. The roles themselves lack clarity and there is not sufficient understanding of how powers interact or the cumulative effect of the growing concentration of powers.

Should the Prime Minister’s role and powers be codified?

Yes, ideally as part of a written constitution, but as a minimum in a clear and binding statement of their nature and boundaries.

2. How has the role of the Prime Minister changed in recent years?

The most significant change is probably the way Prime Ministers have become more interventionist in the running of Departments and their individual policies. Rather than intervening only on major issues of policy or strategy, or where Departments were in disagreement, the Prime Minister (or those acting in his or her name) routinely comment on or change policies that are solely matters for a single Department. Several units have been set up over the years to carry out intervention and scrutiny ion different forms (Policy Unit, Delivery Unit, Strategic Communications Unit, and so on) but these remain unaccountable, overlap with the Cabinet Office and Treasury and collectively risk undermining the effectiveness of individual Departments.

Another significant change has been the growing willingness under successive Prime Ministers to use a majority in the House of Commons to over-ride checks and balances established by constitutional convention; for example, successive moves to curtail the independence of local government since the 1980s, or changes to civil liberties such as detention without trial. This links to the UK’s lack of a written constitution: such fundamental changes can be carried by a simple majority in the Commons, while countries with a written constitution would usually require a higher threshold for ‘constitutional’ changes. Combined with the extreme concentration of power in the hands of the Prime Minister, this creates the risk – and in some cases the reality – of a dictatorship of the majority.

A further change has been the role of the Prime Minister in party fund-raising, particularly from major donors, as elections have become more expensive and income from ‘rank and file’ members has become a smaller proportion of the total. Though hard to measure (for obvious reasons), it appears that this role has become more significant since the 1980s and could perhaps be compared to the situation prior to the Honours (Prevention of Abuses) Act 1925. The risk of this development is that the decisions of the Prime Minister are, or are seen to be, influenced by donors.

3. What is the impact of coalition government on the role and powers of the Prime Minister?

Though it is too early to be certain, the effects appear to be minor and temporary.

4. Are there sufficient checks and balances on the powers of the Prime Minister?

No, and those that exist – notably constitutional convention or judicial review – are weak.

If no, what additional or improved checks and balances are required?

As a minimum, the role and powers of the Prime Minister should be defined in statute; the Royal prerogative should be ended; and the Prime Minister and his or her Office should be open to greater scrutiny and accountability.

Is any further change required with regard to specific powers currently exercised under the royal prerogative, by transferring them to statute or otherwise?

Yes. All powers exercised under the Royal prerogative should be transferred to statue or extinguished. Specifically, the power to wage war should be Parliament’s responsibility. If the Prime Minister or Cabinet is empowered by Parliament to declare war in the case of an attack on the UK, this should still require immediate ratification by Parliament. The power of a single individual to declare war on another country, as happened in Iraq, should be ended.

5. Is the Prime Minister sufficiently accountable personally to the electorate, to Parliament, and otherwise?

No. The electoral system currently used in the UK means that a Prime Minister is neither elected by a majority of the people or selected by MPs representing a majority of the people. (This would remain the case even under the Alternative Vote electoral system). This reduces the legitimacy of the Prime Minister, makes it easier for a Prime Minister to rule by favouring one or other section of the public rather than for the nation as a whole, and can free the Prime Minister from the necessity to take strong negative impacts on minority interests into account.

9 March 2011