The second point is that there is no reason at all to suppose that Hume is in general right to claim that "every miracle . . . pretended to have been wrought in any . . . (religion) . . . as its direct scope is to establish the particular system to which it is attributed; so has it the same force, though more indirectly, to overthrow every other system. In destroying a rival system it likewise destroys the credit of those miracles on which that system was established." (6) If Hume were right to claim that evidence for the miracles of one religion was evidence against the miracles of any other, then indeed evidence for miracles in each would be poor. But in fact evidence for a miracle "wrought in one religion" is only evidence against the occurrence of a miracle "wrought in another religion" if the two miracles, if they occurred, would be evidence for propositions of the two religious systems incompatible with each other. It is hard to think of pairs of alleged miracles of this type. If there were evidence for a Roman Catholic miracle which was evidence for the doctrine of transubstantiation and evidence for a Protestant miracle which was evidence against it, here we would have a case of the conflict of evidence which, Hume claims, occurs generally with alleged miracles. But it is enough to give this example to see that most alleged miracles do not give rise to conflicts of this kind. Most alleged miracles, if they occurred, would only show the power of god or gods and their concern for the needs of men, and little else.

My main conclusion, to repeat it, is that there are no logical difficulties in supposing that there could be strong historical evidence for the occurrence of miracles. Whether there is such evidence is, of course, another matter.

Notes

1. David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford, 2nd ed., 1902), p. 115, footnote. 
2. Ninian Smart, Philosophers and Religious Truth (London, 1964), Ch. ll. 
3. Op. cit., p. lll. 
4. Op. cit., p. 116. 
5. Antony Flew, Hume's Philosophy of Belief (London, 1961), pp. 207 ff. 
6. Op. cit., pp. 121ff.

Richard Swinburne, a Greek Orthodox Christian, is perhaps the most significant proponent of argumentative theism today, studied philosophy and theology at Oxford University. After teaching at the University of Hull (1963-72) and the University of Keele (1972-84), he recently assumed the position of Nolloth Professor of the Philosophy of the Christian Religion at Oxford University. He was selected to deliver the prestigious Gifford Lectures in 1982-83 and 1983-84. Among his many books are:

View all books by Richard Swinburne.

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