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Harman, “What Is Moral Relativism?”

Three Kinds of Moral Relativism

Normative Moral Relativism: Different people, as agents, can be subject to different ultimate
moral requirements. More formally:
There can be two people A and B and a moral demand D such that
(1) A is subject to D
(2) B is not subject to D
(3) B is subject to some moral demands
(4) There is no demand D’ to which A and B are both subject which accounts for (1)
and (2) given the differences in situation between A and B.

Moral Judgment Relativism: All moral judgments make implicit reference to the speaker or
some other person or to some group or to one or another set of moral standards, etc…
Examples? Subjectivism…

Meta-Ethical Relativism: There can be conflicting moral judgments about a particular case that
are both fully correct.

Harman notes that none of these relativist theses entail the others: we could hold any one of
them while rejecting the other two.

Harman’s examples: Emotivists, he says, might accept meta-ethical relativism while
rejecting normative relativism and moral judgment relativism; existentialists, who think that
people are subject only to the principles that they themselves accept, accept normative
relativism, but reject meta-ethical and moral judgment relativism; and relativistic ideal
observer theorists can accept moral judgment relativism while rejecting meta-ethical and
normative relativism.

Harman himself wants to accept versions of all three relativist theses.

Three Objections to Moral Relativism

1. An objection to normative moral relativism
Something must explain why A is subject to some moral demand D when B is not, for this surely
cannot just be an arbitrary fact. But if some principle explains the difference (e.g., the principle,
which underlies existentialism, that each person is should act in accordance with the basic
principles she accepts), isn’t that then some more fundamental principle, D’, that accounts for the
different demands on A and B? So doesn’t this show there is no coherent version of normative
moral relativism, as we’ve defined it, after all?

2. An objection to moral judgment relativism
Moral judgment relativism implausibly implies that what appear to be genuine moral
disagreements are not really disagreements.

3. An objection to meta-ethical relativism
One version of meta-ethical relativism claims that two genuinely conflicting, not borderline-case
moral judgments can both be true. For example, it could be true that abortion is wrong, and true
that abortion is not wrong. But that can’t be right – it violates the law of non-contradiction!
Abortion can’t be both wrong and not wrong!

Another version of meta-ethical relativism claims that two genuinely conflicting moral
judgments might both be justified. What might this mean? Perhaps it means we should be
judgment relativists about justification, and conclude that to say a moral judgment is justified is,
implicitly, to say it is justified for the person who makes it. A is justified-for-A in saying
“abortion is wrong” and B is justified-for-B in saying “abortion is not wrong.” But, Harman
says, that seems to fall prey to the same worry as moral judgment relativism: when two people
disagree about the morality of abortion, they will also disagree about whether the judgment that
abortion is wrong is justified. But this account makes real disagreement about this matter
impossible.

Harman’s Argument for Moral Relativism

(1) A moral demand applies to a person only if it is rational for her to accept that
demand.
(2) It can be rational for different people to accept different demands ‘all the way
down.’

Therefore
(3) Different moral demands can apply to different people ‘all the way down.’

Assumption (1) reflects a particular view of reasons: roughly, that we can have reason to do
something only if we could have reasoned our way to doing it. If we always have reason to
comply with any moral demands that apply to us, then they can apply to us only if we could have
reasoned our way towards complying with them. Does this assumption rest on confusing
justifying and motivating reasons? Is it plausible?

Assumption (2) reflects a view about what our ability to reason our way towards some decision
depends on: does what we can reason our way towards doing depend on what are commitments
are going in? And if it does, does that mean that we wouldn’t all reason our way to the same
decisions, even if we were reasoning perfectly?

Whether we find either assumption plausible will depend a lot on what we think counts as
reasoning well. Are the standards of rationality all procedural – a matter of consistency and
coherence? If yes, is assumption (1), and the view of reasons that underlies it, still plausible? If
no, is assumption (2) still plausible?

Harman is mainly defending a version of normative moral relativism. But he says his version of
relativism entails moral judgment relativism about moral judgments made by relativists, who
make moral judgments in relation to a morality they accept, and presuppose the same morality is
accepted by their audience and the agents referred to in the judgment.

And he says his version of relativism also entails meta-ethical relativism about the judgments made by non-relativists:
relativists will count a moral judgment made by a non-relativist as right whenever the corresponding relativistic moral judgment is right made in relation to the morality accepted by the person making that judgment; and two really conflicting non-relativistic moral judgments might both be right in this sense.

But Harman argues that his version of relativism avoids all three objections that appeared to
threaten the three relativist theses:

• His relativism avoids the worry raised about normative judgment relativism, because it allows
  that there is a principle that explains why a demand may apply to A but not to B, but that
  principle is not a moral principle – it’s a principle of rationality.
• His relativism partially avoids the worry raised by moral judgment relativism, because it
  explains how people employing moral judgments relativistically can nonetheless be taken to
  genuinely disagree – when they presuppose that they are making judgments in relation to the
  same relevant moral demands. But Harman’s view has the significant disadvantage that it must
  (perhaps implausibly) characterize many non-relativistic moral judgments as misuses of moral
  language.
• His relativism may avoid the worry raised about meta-ethical relativism – that it violates the
  law of non-contradiction. This is because when his relativism labels two conflicting nonrelativistic
  judgments are both correct, that “correctness” in this case does not entail literal truth.
  For a non-relativistic judgment to count as correct, according to Harman, is just for the
  corresponding relativistic judgment to be true when it’s made in relation to the morality of the
  speaker. And when two non-relativistic judgments conflict, the corresponding relativistic
  judgments might not conflict, even when they are both true.