24.231 Ethics – Handout 3 Ayer’s Emotivism
Emotivism: Moral judgments are not truth-apt, but rather, are expressions of sentiments
of approval or disapproval: e.g., saying “Murder is wrong” amounts to saying “Boo to
murder!”:
“[I]f I say to someone ‘You acted wrongly in stealing that money’, I am not stating
anything more than if I had simply said, ‘You stole that money.’ In adding that
this action is wrong, I am not making any further statement about it, I am simply
evincing my moral disapproval about it. It is as if I had said, ‘You stole that
money,’ in a peculiar tone of horror, or written with the addition of some special
exclamation marks. The tone, or the exclamation marks, adds nothing to the
literal meaning of the sentence. It merely serves to show that the expression of it
is attended by certain feelings in the speaker.
“If now I generalise my previous statement and say, ‘Stealing money is
wrong,’ I produce a sentence which has no factual meaning – that is, expresses no
proposition which can be either true or false. It is as if I had written ‘Stealing
money!!’ – where the shape and thickness of the exclamation marks show, by a
suitable convention, that a special sort of moral disapproval is the feeling which is
being expressed.” (Ayer, “The Emotive Theory of Ethics,” p. 124)
(c) Alfred Jules Ayer. All rights reserved. This content is excluded from our Creative Commons license.
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Ayer, A. J. “The Emotive Theory of Ethics.” Chapter 10 in Moral Philosophy: Selected Readings. 2nd ed.
Edited by George Sher. Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt-Brace, 1996, pp. 120-128. ISBN: 9780155017559.
Ayer’s argument for emotivism:
(1) The Verification Principle: A synthetic proposition is meaningful, and hence
can be true or false, only if it is empirically verifiable. All literally
meaningful propositions are either analytic – true by definition – or else
empirically verifiable. (bottom of p. 123)
(2) Ethical statements cannot be translated into statements of empirical fact – that
is, no natural reduction of ethical concepts is possible. (pp. 122-123) So they
are not empirically verifiable.
(3) Ethical statements are synthetic, not analytic – that is, they aren’t true by
definition.
(4) Non-cognitivism: Therefore (from 1, 2, and 3) ethical statements are not
literally meaningful, and can be neither true nor false.
Emotivism is one version of non-cognitivism – Ayer’s preferred version. According to
emotivism, to make a moral judgment is to express an emotion. But there are other
versions of non-cognitivism (the view that moral judgments are not truth-evaluable
propositions), and some of these may avoid some of the worries raised by Ayer’s
emotivism.1

1 Another prominent version of non-cognitivism is prescriptivism, according to which moral judgments are
really commands, and “murder is wrong” should be understood as equivalent to “don’t murder!” (R.M.
Hare was a leadig prescriptivist.) More recent non-cognitivists, calling themselves quasi-realists, have
tried to develop versions of the view that explain why we are entitled to act as if our moral judgments are
truth-apt despite the fact they strictly-speaking aren’t (leading quasi-realists are Simon Blackburn and Allan
Gibbard).
1
Evaluating Ayer’s argument:
(1) We might question the Verification Principle. Is it true that only analytic or
empirically verifiable statements are meaningful or truth-apt?
• It seems like we can think of some synthetic propositions that seem both truth-apt
and not empirically verifiable: e.g., there are some species that will never be
discovered; Caesar sneezed at noon on the 1st day of the 1st month of 50 B.C.
• Mathematical statements might be both synthetic (not true in virtue of meaning)
and non-empirical
• Some philosophers (notably Quine) have called into question the legitimacy of the
analytic-synthetic distinction on which the principle relies
• If we accept that ethical statements are not literally meaningful because they are
synthetic and not empirically verifiable, then we’ll also have to judge a lot of
other statements as not meaningful or truth-apt: e.g., every event has a cause, or
the future will behave like the past…
• The Verification Principle itself seems to be synthetic but not empirically
verifiable. So should we conclude that it is meaningless and not truth-apt?
• We might think Ayer assumes to quickly that because we can’t empirically verify
ethical statements, and because moral intuitions disagree, there is no reasoned
way of disputing about ethics.
(2) Ayer argues against the possibility of naturalistic reductions of ethical concepts
by arguing against a few influential attempts at such reductions: two versions of
subjectivism and one version of utilitarianism.
• He argues that any attempt to reduce normative concepts like “right” to natural
ones like “generally approved of” or “approved of by me” or “pleasuremaximizing”
fails because is wrongly implies that someone who acknowledges
that an act has the natural property in question but denies it has the normative
property is contradicting himself. Ayer says that while someone who says “I
approve of that, but it’s not right” or “That’s pleasant, but it’s not good” may be
making a mistaken moral judgment, he is not contradicting himself, as the
subjectivist or the utilitarian would have to say.2
• It’s important to recognize the difference between subjectivism and Ayer’s
emotivism: subjectivism might translate “Murder is wrong” as “I disapprove of
murder; this is a truth-evaluable statement. Emotivism translates “Murder is
wrong” as an emotive expression of the disapproval itself: e.g., “Boo for

2
Ayer is here taking utilitarianism to be a naturalistic meta-ethical theory offering a reductive account of
what our moral terms mean: e.g., “right” means “happiness-maximizing”. But many defenders of
utilitarianism defend it not as an account of what our moral terms mean, but rather as a first-order account
of what makes actions right; such utilitarians needn’t think that “right” means “happiness-maximizing” –
rather, they think that all and only those actions that maximize happiness have the (separate) property of
being right.
2
3
murder!” ; the statement doesn’t express a proposition and so cannot be true or
false.
Evaluating Ayer’s emotivism – strengths and worries:
(1) We might accept Ayer’s emotivism even if we don’t accept his argument for it. It
might have independent strengths:
• Emotivism appeals to many philosophers because it fits into a naturalistic worldview:
it doesn’t posit the existence of any non-natural properties like goodness
which cannot be empirically discovered
• Emotivism helps explain the apparently strong link between making a moral
judgment and being motivated to act accordingly: unlike changes in our other
purely descriptive beliefs, a change in someone’s moral beliefs seems on its own
enough to predict a change in his motivations (even if we know nothing else about
his aims and motivations). Emotivism explains this, since emotions, unlike
beliefs, plausibly have motivational force on their own.
(2) But emotivism also raises certain worries:
• Ayer claims that when we make moral judgments, what we’re doing is expressing
our emotional reactions to the thing we’re judging. But it seems possible to judge
something is morally wrong without having any emotional reaction to it, or even
feeling positive about it. Examples: the “amoralist” – a person who knows what’s
right and wrong but doesn’t care – seems imaginable; we’re sometimes amused
by other people’s misfortunes even though we know they’re bad (Kasey); children
learn to recognize things as right and wrong before the learn the appropriate
emotional responses to them (Will).
• Ayer has trouble accounting for the apparent prevalence of moral disagreement
and dispute – if moral judgments are in fact just expressions of emotion, they
can’t contradict each other, and we can’t reason about them, so why argue? Ayer
argues that we stop engaging in such disputes once all matters of empirical fact
have been settled. Does that seem right? And in any case, it still seems to us,
even if we can’t settle our disputes about moral judgments, that we are
contradicting each other when, for example, we argue about the morality of
abortion. But emotivism has difficulty accounting for that seeming contradiction.
• Finally, our practice of making moral judgments treats such judgments as
propositional in a number of ways – we use them in logical arguments and draw
inferences from them, we “embed” them in other kinds of statements and use
them in un-asserted context. It’s not clear whether the emotivist account of the
nature of such judgments can explain why we can do this. We’ll talk a lot more
about this problem when we discuss Brink.
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24.231 Ethics
Fall 2009