Quality of life

The quality of life view allows the value of life to vary with its quality and may factor in
the immanence of death, constancy of pain, an ability to think, an ability to enjoy life and
make rational choices. Proponents of a quality of life view argue that decisions about
abortion must take into account quality of life. Therefore, decisions must be made on a
case by case basis.

Peter Singer and Helga Kuhse both argue that it would be better to drop the sanctity of
life teaching and work out a quality of life ethic instead.

In his work, Rethinking Life and Death: The Collapse of our Traditional Ethics (1995),
Singer argues that developments in law and medicine necessitate a movement towards an
ethic where ‘quality of life’ distinctions trump the traditional ‘sanctity of life’ positions.
Singer argues for consideration that all life is not equal, and should not have equal footing
in determining their right to live. For example, he applauds those cultures that choose
infanticide to control rising birth rates. While he argues that all precautions should be
taken not to have unwanted or disabled children, he sees no harm in choosing to cause the
death of an infant at birth should its disability or presence not be wanted. He favors a 28-
day period post birth for parents to decide whether their child should be allowed to live or
die. Singer says that he is not inhumane. He does not feel it is acceptable to cause
suffering. All who chose or are chosen to die, should be allowed to do so in the least
painful way as possible. His argument is that we must embrace a new ethos in terms of life
and death, as the old one is no longer viable.

In her work, The Sanctity-of-Life Doctrine in Medicine: A Critique (1987), Helga Kuhse
examines the ideas and assumptions behind the sanctity-of-life view on ethical issues such
as abortion. Kuhse argues against the traditional view that allowing someone to die is
morally different from killing, and shows that quality-of-life judgments are ubiquitous.
Refuting the sanctity-of-life view, she provides a sketch of a quality-of-life ethics based
on the belief that there is a profound difference between merely being alive and life being
in the patient’s interest.

Thinking point: when using quality of life to make a decision about abortion, whose benefits
and whose quality of life is being judged: that of the foetus, the parents or society as a
whole? Is there a danger of ‘playing God’? Could an emphasis on ‘quality of life’
considerations lead down a slippery slope to the Holocaust?