BOOK V

1

With regards to justice and injustice we must (1) consider what kind
of actions they are concerned with, (2) what sort of mean justice
is, and (3) between what extremes the just act is intermediate. Our
investigation shall follow the same course as the preceding discussions.

We see that all men mean by justice that kind of state of character
which makes people disposed to do what is just and makes them act
justly and wish for what is just; and similarly by injustice that
state which makes them act unjustly and wish for what is unjust. Let
us too, then, lay this down as a general basis. For the same is not
true of the sciences and the faculties as of states of character.
A faculty or a science which is one and the same is held to relate
to contrary objects, but a state of character which is one of two
contraries does not produce the contrary results; e.g. as a result
of health we do not do what is the opposite of healthy, but only what
is healthy; for we say a man walks healthily, when he walks as a healthy
man would.

Now often one contrary state is recognized from its contrary, and
often states are recognized from the subjects that exhibit them; for
(A) if good condition is known, bad condition also becomes known,
and (B) good condition is known from the things that are in good condition,
and they from it. If good condition is firmness of flesh, it is necessary
both that bad condition should be flabbiness of flesh and that the
wholesome should be that which causes firmness in flesh. And it follows
for the most part that if one contrary is ambiguous the other also
will be ambiguous; e.g. if ‘just’ is so, that ‘unjust’ will be so
too.

Now ‘justice’ and ‘injustice’ seem to be ambiguous, but because their
different meanings approach near to one another the ambiguity escapes
notice and is not obvious as it is, comparatively, when the meanings
are far apart, e.g. (for here the difference in outward form is great)
as the ambiguity in the use of kleis for the collar-bone of an animal
and for that with which we lock a door. Let us take as a starting-point,
then, the various meanings of ‘an unjust man’. Both the lawless man
and the grasping and unfair man are thought to be unjust, so that
evidently both the law-abiding and the fair man will be just. The
just, then, is the lawful and the fair, the unjust the unlawful and
the unfair.

Since the unjust man is grasping, he must be concerned with goods-not
all goods, but those with which prosperity and adversity have to do,
which taken absolutely are always good, but for a particular person
are not always good. Now men pray for and pursue these things; but
they should not, but should pray that the things that are good absolutely
may also be good for them, and should choose the things that are good
for them. The unjust man does not always choose the greater, but also
the less-in the case of things bad absolutely; but because the lesser
evil is itself thought to be in a sense good, and graspingness is
directed at the good, therefore he is thought to be grasping. And
he is unfair; for this contains and is common to both.

Since the lawless man was seen to be unjust and the law-abiding man
just, evidently all lawful acts are in a sense just acts; for the
acts laid down by the legislative art are lawful, and each of these,
we say, is just. Now the laws in their enactments on all subjects
aim at the common advantage either of all or of the best or of those
who hold power, or something of the sort; so that in one sense we
call those acts just that tend to produce and preserve happiness and
its components for the political society. And the law bids us do both
the acts of a brave man (e.g. not to desert our post nor take to flight
nor throw away our arms), and those of a temperate man (e.g. not to
commit adultery nor to gratify one’s lust), and those of a good-tempered
man (e.g. not to strike another nor to speak evil), and similarly
with regard to the other virtues and forms of wickedness, commanding
some acts and forbidding others; and the rightly-framed law does this
rightly, and the hastily conceived one less well. This form of justice,
then, is complete virtue, but not absolutely, but in relation to our
neighbour. And therefore justice is often thought to be the greatest
of virtues, and ‘neither evening nor morning star’ is so wonderful;
and proverbially ‘in justice is every virtue comprehended’. And it
is complete virtue in its fullest sense, because it is the actual
exercise of complete virtue. It is complete because he who possesses
it can exercise his virtue not only in himself but towards his neighbour
also; for many men can exercise virtue in their own affairs, but not
in their relations to their neighbour. This is why the saying of Bias
is thought to be true, that ‘rule will show the man’; for a ruler
is necessarily in relation to other men and a member of a society.
For this same reason justice, alone of the virtues, is thought to
be ‘another’s good’, because it is related to our neighbour; for it
does what is advantageous to another, either a ruler or a copartner.
Now the worst man is he who exercises his wickedness both towards
himself and towards his friends, and the best man is not he who exercises
his virtue towards himself but he who exercises it towards another;
for this is a difficult task. Justice in this sense, then, is not
part of virtue but virtue entire, nor is the contrary injustice a
part of vice but vice entire. What the difference is between virtue
and justice in this sense is plain from what we have said; they are
the same but their essence is not the same; what, as a relation to
one’s neighbour, is justice is, as a certain kind of state without
qualification, virtue.

2

But at all events what we are investigating is the justice which is
a part of virtue; for there is a justice of this kind, as we maintain.
Similarly it is with injustice in the particular sense that we are
concerned.

That there is such a thing is indicated by the fact that while the
man who exhibits in action the other forms of wickedness acts wrongly
indeed, but not graspingly (e.g. the man who throws away his shield
through cowardice or speaks harshly through bad temper or fails to
help a friend with money through meanness), when a man acts graspingly
he often exhibits none of these vices,-no, nor all together, but certainly
wickedness of some kind (for we blame him) and injustice. There is,
then, another kind of injustice which is a part of injustice in the
wide sense, and a use of the word ‘unjust’ which answers to a part
of what is unjust in the wide sense of ‘contrary to the law’. Again
if one man commits adultery for the sake of gain and makes money by
it, while another does so at the bidding of appetite though he loses
money and is penalized for it, the latter would be held to be self-indulgent
rather than grasping, but the former is unjust, but not self-indulgent;
evidently, therefore, he is unjust by reason of his making gain by
his act. Again, all other unjust acts are ascribed invariably to some
particular kind of wickedness, e.g. adultery to self-indulgence, the
desertion of a comrade in battle to cowardice, physical violence to
anger; but if a man makes gain, his action is ascribed to no form
of wickedness but injustice. Evidently, therefore, there is apart
from injustice in the wide sense another, ‘particular’, injustice
which shares the name and nature of the first, because its definition
falls within the same genus; for the significance of both consists
in a relation to one’s neighbour, but the one is concerned with honour
or money or safety-or that which includes all these, if we had a single
name for it-and its motive is the pleasure that arises from gain;
while the other is concerned with all the objects with which the good
man is concerned.

It is clear, then, that there is more than one kind of justice, and
that there is one which is distinct from virtue entire; we must try
to grasp its genus and differentia.

The unjust has been divided into the unlawful and the unfair, and
the just into the lawful and the fair. To the unlawful answers the
afore-mentioned sense of injustice. But since unfair and the unlawful
are not the same, but are different as a part is from its whole (for
all that is unfair is unlawful, but not all that is unlawful is unfair),
the unjust and injustice in the sense of the unfair are not the same
as but different from the former kind, as part from whole; for injustice
in this sense is a part of injustice in the wide sense, and similarly
justice in the one sense of justice in the other. Therefore we must
speak also about particular justice and particular and similarly about
the just and the unjust. The justice, then, which answers to the whole
of virtue, and the corresponding injustice, one being the exercise
of virtue as a whole, and the other that of vice as a whole, towards
one’s neighbour, we may leave on one side. And how the meanings of
‘just’ and ‘unjust’ which answer to these are to be distinguished
is evident; for practically the majority of the acts commanded by
the law are those which are prescribed from the point of view of virtue
taken as a whole; for the law bids us practise every virtue and forbids
us to practise any vice. And the things that tend to produce virtue
taken as a whole are those of the acts prescribed by the law which
have been prescribed with a view to education for the common good.
But with regard to the education of the individual as such, which
makes him without qualification a good man, we must determine later
whether this is the function of the political art or of another; for
perhaps it is not the same to be a good man and a good citizen of
any state taken at random.

Of particular justice and that which is just in the corresponding
sense, (A) one kind is that which is manifested in distributions of
honour or money or the other things that fall to be divided among
those who have a share in the constitution (for in these it is possible
for one man to have a share either unequal or equal to that of another),
and (B) one is that which plays a rectifying part in transactions
between man and man. Of this there are two divisions; of transactions
(1) some are voluntary and (2) others involuntary- voluntary such
transactions as sale, purchase, loan for consumption, pledging, loan
for use, depositing, letting (they are called voluntary because the
origin of these transactions is voluntary), while of the involuntary
(a) some are clandestine, such as theft, adultery, poisoning, procuring,
enticement of slaves, assassination, false witness, and (b) others
are violent, such as assault, imprisonment, murder, robbery with violence,
mutilation, abuse, insult.

3

(A) We have shown that both the unjust man and the unjust act are
unfair or unequal; now it is clear that there is also an intermediate
between the two unequals involved in either case. And this is the
equal; for in any kind of action in which there’s a more and a less
there is also what is equal. If, then, the unjust is unequal, just
is equal, as all men suppose it to be, even apart from argument. And
since the equal is intermediate, the just will be an intermediate.
Now equality implies at least two things. The just, then, must be
both intermediate and equal and relative (i.e. for certain persons).
And since the equall intermediate it must be between certain things
(which are respectively greater and less); equal, it involves two
things; qua just, it is for certain people. The just, therefore, involves
at least four terms; for the persons for whom it is in fact just are
two, and the things in which it is manifested, the objects distributed,
are two. And the same equality will exist between the persons and
between the things concerned; for as the latter the things concerned-are
related, so are the former; if they are not equal, they will not have
what is equal, but this is the origin of quarrels and complaints-when
either equals have and are awarded unequal shares, or unequals equal
shares. Further, this is plain from the fact that awards should be
‘according to merit’; for all men agree that what is just in distribution
must be according to merit in some sense, though they do not all specify
the same sort of merit, but democrats identify it with the status
of freeman, supporters of oligarchy with wealth (or with noble birth),
and supporters of aristocracy with excellence.

The just, then, is a species of the proportionate (proportion being
not a property only of the kind of number which consists of abstract
units, but of number in general). For proportion is equality of ratios,
and involves four terms at least (that discrete proportion involves
four terms is plain, but so does continuous proportion, for it uses
one term as two and mentions it twice; e.g. ‘as the line A is to the
line B, so is the line B to the line C’; the line B, then, has been
mentioned twice, so that if the line B be assumed twice, the proportional
terms will be four); and the just, too, involves at least four terms,
and the ratio between one pair is the same as that between the other
pair; for there is a similar distinction between the persons and between
the things. As the term A, then, is to B, so will C be to D, and therefore,
alternando, as A is to C, B will be to D. Therefore also the whole
is in the same ratio to the whole; and this coupling the distribution
effects, and, if the terms are so combined, effects justly. The conjunction,
then, of the term A with C and of B with D is what is just in distribution,
and this species of the just is intermediate, and the unjust is what
violates the proportion; for the proportional is intermediate, and
the just is proportional. (Mathematicians call this kind of proportion
geometrical; for it is in geometrical proportion that it follows that
the whole is to the whole as either part is to the corresponding part.)
This proportion is not continuous; for we cannot get a single term
standing for a person and a thing.

This, then, is what the just is-the proportional; the unjust is what
violates the proportion. Hence one term becomes too great, the other
too small, as indeed happens in practice; for the man who acts unjustly
has too much, and the man who is unjustly treated too little, of what
is good. In the case of evil the reverse is true; for the lesser evil
is reckoned a good in comparison with the greater evil, since the
lesser evil is rather to be chosen than the greater, and what is worthy
of choice is good, and what is worthier of choice a greater good.

This, then, is one species of the just.
4

(B) The remaining one is the rectificatory, which arises in connexion
with transactions both voluntary and involuntary. This form of the
just has a different specific character from the former. For the justice
which distributes common possessions is always in accordance with
the kind of proportion mentioned above (for in the case also in which
the distribution is made from the common funds of a partnership it
will be according to the same ratio which the funds put into the business
by the partners bear to one another); and the injustice opposed to
this kind of justice is that which violates the proportion. But the
justice in transactions between man and man is a sort of equality
indeed, and the injustice a sort of inequality; not according to that
kind of proportion, however, but according to arithmetical proportion.
For it makes no difference whether a good man has defrauded a bad
man or a bad man a good one, nor whether it is a good or a bad man
that has committed adultery; the law looks only to the distinctive
character of the injury, and treats the parties as equal, if one is
in the wrong and the other is being wronged, and if one inflicted
injury and the other has received it. Therefore, this kind of injustice
being an inequality, the judge tries to equalize it; for in the case
also in which one has received and the other has inflicted a wound,
or one has slain and the other been slain, the suffering and the action
have been unequally distributed; but the judge tries to equalize by
means of the penalty, taking away from the gain of the assailant.
For the term ‘gain’ is applied generally to such cases, even if it
be not a term appropriate to certain cases, e.g. to the person who
inflicts a woundand ‘loss’ to the sufferer; at all events when the
suffering has been estimated, the one is called loss and the other
gain. Therefore the equal is intermediate between the greater and
the less, but the gain and the loss are respectively greater and less
in contrary ways; more of the good and less of the evil are gain,
and the contrary is loss; intermediate between them is, as we saw,
equal, which we say is just; therefore corrective justice will be
the intermediate between loss and gain. This is why, when people dispute,
they take refuge in the judge; and to go to the judge is to go to
justice; for the nature of the judge is to be a sort of animate justice;
and they seek the judge as an intermediate, and in some states they
call judges mediators, on the assumption that if they get what is
intermediate they will get what is just. The just, then, is an intermediate,
since the judge is so. Now the judge restores equality; it is as though
there were a line divided into unequal parts, and he took away that
by which the greater segment exceeds the half, and added it to the
smaller segment. And when the whole has been equally divided, then
they say they have ‘their own’-i.e. when they have got what is equal.
The equal is intermediate between the greater and the lesser line
according to arithmetical proportion. It is for this reason also that
it is called just (sikaion), because it is a division into two equal
parts (sicha), just as if one were to call it sichaion; and the judge
(sikastes) is one who bisects (sichastes). For when something is subtracted
from one of two equals and added to the other, the other is in excess
by these two; since if what was taken from the one had not been added
to the other, the latter would have been in excess by one only. It
therefore exceeds the intermediate by one, and the intermediate exceeds
by one that from which something was taken. By this, then, we shall
recognize both what we must subtract from that which has more, and
what we must add to that which has less; we must add to the latter
that by which the intermediate exceeds it, and subtract from the greatest
that by which it exceeds the intermediate. Let the lines AA’, BB’,
CC’ be equal to one another; from the line AA’ let the segment AE
have been subtracted, and to the line CC’ let the segment Cd have
been added, so that the whole line DCC’ exceeds the line EA’ by the
segment CD and the segment CF; therefore it exceeds the line Bb’ by
the segment CD. (See diagram.)

These names, both loss and gain, have come from voluntary exchange;
for to have more than one’s own is called gaining, and to have less
than one’s original share is called losing, e.g. in buying and selling
and in all other matters in which the law has left people free to
make their own terms; but when they get neither more nor less but
just what belongs to themselves, they say that they have their own
and that they neither lose nor gain.

Therefore the just is intermediate between a sort of gain and a sort
of loss, viz. those which are involuntary; it consists in having an
equal amount before and after the transaction.

5

Some think that reciprocity is without qualification just, as the
Pythagoreans said; for they defined justice without qualification
as reciprocity. Now ‘reciprocity’ fits neither distributive nor rectificatory
justice-yet people want even the justice of Rhadamanthus to mean this:

Should a man suffer what he did, right justice would be done -for
in many cases reciprocity and rectificatory justice are not in accord;
e.g. (1) if an official has inflicted a wound, he should not be wounded
in return, and if some one has wounded an official, he ought not to
be wounded only but punished in addition. Further (2) there is a great
difference between a voluntary and an involuntary act. But in associations
for exchange this sort of justice does hold men together-reciprocity
in accordance with a proportion and not on the basis of precisely
equal return. For it is by proportionate requital that the city holds
together. Men seek to return either evil for evil-and if they cana
not do so, think their position mere slavery-or good for good-and
if they cannot do so there is no exchange, but it is by exchange that
they hold together. This is why they give a prominent place to the
temple of the Graces-to promote the requital of services; for this
is characteristic of grace-we should serve in return one who has shown
grace to us, and should another time take the initiative in showing
it.

Now proportionate return is secured by cross-conjunction. Let A be
a builder, B a shoemaker, C a house, D a shoe. The builder, then,
must get from the shoemaker the latter’s work, and must himself give
him in return his own. If, then, first there is proportionate equality
of goods, and then reciprocal action takes place, the result we mention
will be effected. If not, the bargain is not equal, and does not hold;
for there is nothing to prevent the work of the one being better than
that of the other; they must therefore be equated. (And this is true
of the other arts also; for they would have been destroyed if what
the patient suffered had not been just what the agent did, and of
the same amount and kind.) For it is not two doctors that associate
for exchange, but a doctor and a farmer, or in general people who
are different and unequal; but these must be equated. This is why
all things that are exchanged must be somehow comparable. It is for
this end that money has been introduced, and it becomes in a sense
an intermediate; for it measures all things, and therefore the excess
and the defect-how many shoes are equal to a house or to a given amount
of food. The number of shoes exchanged for a house (or for a given
amount of food) must therefore correspond to the ratio of builder
to shoemaker. For if this be not so, there will be no exchange and
no intercourse. And this proportion will not be effected unless the
goods are somehow equal. All goods must therefore be measured by some
one thing, as we said before. Now this unit is in truth demand, which
holds all things together (for if men did not need one another’s goods
at all, or did not need them equally, there would be either no exchange
or not the same exchange); but money has become by convention a sort
of representative of demand; and this is why it has the name ‘money’
(nomisma)-because it exists not by nature but by law (nomos) and it
is in our power to change it and make it useless. There will, then,
be reciprocity when the terms have been equated so that as farmer
is to shoemaker, the amount of the shoemaker’s work is to that of
the farmer’s work for which it exchanges. But we must not bring them
into a figure of proportion when they have already exchanged (otherwise
one extreme will have both excesses), but when they still have their
own goods. Thus they are equals and associates just because this equality
can be effected in their case. Let A be a farmer, C food, B a shoemaker,
D his product equated to C. If it had not been possible for reciprocity
to be thus effected, there would have been no association of the parties.
That demand holds things together as a single unit is shown by the
fact that when men do not need one another, i.e. when neither needs
the other or one does not need the other, they do not exchange, as
we do when some one wants what one has oneself, e.g. when people permit
the exportation of corn in exchange for wine. This equation therefore
must be established. And for the future exchange-that if we do not
need a thing now we shall have it if ever we do need it-money is as
it were our surety; for it must be possible for us to get what we
want by bringing the money. Now the same thing happens to money itself
as to goods-it is not always worth the same; yet it tends to be steadier.
This is why all goods must have a price set on them; for then there
will always be exchange, and if so, association of man with man. Money,
then, acting as a measure, makes goods commensurate and equates them;
for neither would there have been association if there were not exchange,
nor exchange if there were not equality, nor equality if there were
not commensurability. Now in truth it is impossible that things differing
so much should become commensurate, but with reference to demand they
may become so sufficiently. There must, then, be a unit, and that
fixed by agreement (for which reason it is called money); for it is
this that makes all things commensurate, since all things are measured
by money. Let A be a house, B ten minae, C a bed. A is half of B,
if the house is worth five minae or equal to them; the bed, C, is
a tenth of B; it is plain, then, how many beds are equal to a house,
viz. five. That exchange took place thus before there was money is
plain; for it makes no difference whether it is five beds that exchange
for a house, or the money value of five beds.

We have now defined the unjust and the just. These having been marked
off from each other, it is plain that just action is intermediate
between acting unjustly and being unjustly treated; for the one is
to have too much and the other to have too little. Justice is a kind
of mean, but not in the same way as the other virtues, but because
it relates to an intermediate amount, while injustice relates to the
extremes. And justice is that in virtue of which the just man is said
to be a doer, by choice, of that which is just, and one who will distribute
either between himself and another or between two others not so as
to give more of what is desirable to himself and less to his neighbour
(and conversely with what is harmful), but so as to give what is equal
in accordance with proportion; and similarly in distributing between
two other persons. Injustice on the other hand is similarly related
to the unjust, which is excess and defect, contrary to proportion,
of the useful or hurtful. For which reason injustice is excess and
defect, viz. because it is productive of excess and defect-in one’s
own case excess of what is in its own nature useful and defect of
what is hurtful, while in the case of others it is as a whole like
what it is in one’s own case, but proportion may be violated in either
direction. In the unjust act to have too little is to be unjustly
treated; to have too much is to act unjustly.

Let this be taken as our account of the nature of justice and injustice,
and similarly of the just and the unjust in general.

6

Since acting unjustly does not necessarily imply being unjust, we
must ask what sort of unjust acts imply that the doer is unjust with
respect to each type of injustice, e.g. a thief, an adulterer, or
a brigand. Surely the answer does not turn on the difference between
these types. For a man might even lie with a woman knowing who she
was, but the origin of his might be not deliberate choice but passion.
He acts unjustly, then, but is not unjust; e.g. a man is not a thief,
yet he stole, nor an adulterer, yet he committed adultery; and similarly
in all other cases.

Now we have previously stated how the reciprocal is related to the
just; but we must not forget that what we are looking for is not only
what is just without qualification but also political justice. This
is found among men who share their life with a view to selfsufficiency,
men who are free and either proportionately or arithmetically equal,
so that between those who do not fulfil this condition there is no
political justice but justice in a special sense and by analogy. For
justice exists only between men whose mutual relations are governed
by law; and law exists for men between whom there is injustice; for
legal justice is the discrimination of the just and the unjust. And
between men between whom there is injustice there is also unjust action
(though there is not injustice between all between whom there is unjust
action), and this is assigning too much to oneself of things good
in themselves and too little of things evil in themselves. This is
why we do not allow a man to rule, but rational principle, because
a man behaves thus in his own interests and becomes a tyrant. The
magistrate on the other hand is the guardian of justice, and, if of
justice, then of equality also. And since he is assumed to have no
more than his share, if he is just (for he does not assign to himself
more of what is good in itself, unless such a share is proportional
to his merits-so that it is for others that he labours, and it is
for this reason that men, as we stated previously, say that justice
is ‘another’s good’), therefore a reward must be given him, and this
is honour and privilege; but those for whom such things are not enough
become tyrants.

The justice of a master and that of a father are not the same as the
justice of citizens, though they are like it; for there can be no
injustice in the unqualified sense towards thing that are one’s own,
but a man’s chattel, and his child until it reaches a certain age
and sets up for itself, are as it were part of himself, and no one
chooses to hurt himself (for which reason there can be no injustice
towards oneself). Therefore the justice or injustice of citizens is
not manifested in these relations; for it was as we saw according
to law, and between people naturally subject to law, and these as
we saw’ are people who have an equal share in ruling and being ruled.
Hence justice can more truly be manifested towards a wife than towards
children and chattels, for the former is household justice; but even
this is different from political justice.

7

Of political justice part is natural, part legal, natural, that which
everywhere has the same force and does not exist by people’s thinking
this or that; legal, that which is originally indifferent, but when
it has been laid down is not indifferent, e.g. that a prisoner’s ransom
shall be a mina, or that a goat and not two sheep shall be sacrificed,
and again all the laws that are passed for particular cases, e.g.
that sacrifice shall be made in honour of Brasidas, and the provisions
of decrees. Now some think that all justice is of this sort, because
that which is by nature is unchangeable and has everywhere the same
force (as fire burns both here and in Persia), while they see change
in the things recognized as just. This, however, is not true in this
unqualified way, but is true in a sense; or rather, with the gods
it is perhaps not true at all, while with us there is something that
is just even by nature, yet all of it is changeable; but still some
is by nature, some not by nature. It is evident which sort of thing,
among things capable of being otherwise, is by nature, and which is
not but is legal and conventional, assuming that both are equally
changeable. And in all other things the same distinction will apply;
by nature the right hand is stronger, yet it is possible that all
men should come to be ambidextrous. The things which are just by virtue
of convention and expediency are like measures; for wine and corn
measures are not everywhere equal, but larger in wholesale and smaller
in retail markets. Similarly, the things which are just not by nature
but by human enactment are not everywhere the same, since constitutions
also are not the same, though there is but one which is everywhere
by nature the best. Of things just and lawful each is related as the
universal to its particulars; for the things that are done are many,
but of them each is one, since it is universal.

There is a difference between the act of injustice and what is unjust,
and between the act of justice and what is just; for a thing is unjust
by nature or by enactment; and this very thing, when it has been done,
is an act of injustice, but before it is done is not yet that but
is unjust. So, too, with an act of justice (though the general term
is rather ‘just action’, and ‘act of justice’ is applied to the correction
of the act of injustice).

Each of these must later be examined separately with regard to the
nature and number of its species and the nature of the things with
which it is concerned.

8

Acts just and unjust being as we have described them, a man acts unjustly
or justly whenever he does such acts voluntarily; when involuntarily,
he acts neither unjustly nor justly except in an incidental way; for
he does things which happen to be just or unjust. Whether an act is
or is not one of injustice (or of justice) is determined by its voluntariness
or involuntariness; for when it is voluntary it is blamed, and at
the same time is then an act of injustice; so that there will be things
that are unjust but not yet acts of injustice, if voluntariness be
not present as well. By the voluntary I mean, as has been said before,
any of the things in a man’s own power which he does with knowledge,
i.e. not in ignorance either of the person acted on or of the instrument
used or of the end that will be attained (e.g. whom he is striking,
with what, and to what end), each such act being done not incidentally
nor under compulsion (e.g. if A takes B’s hand and therewith strikes
C, B does not act voluntarily; for the act was not in his own power).
The person struck may be the striker’s father, and the striker may
know that it is a man or one of the persons present, but not know
that it is his father; a similar distinction may be made in the case
of the end, and with regard to the whole action. Therefore that which
is done in ignorance, or though not done in ignorance is not in the
agent’s power, or is done under compulsion, is involuntary (for many
natural processes, even, we knowingly both perform and experience,
none of which is either voluntary or involuntary; e.g. growing old
or dying). But in the case of unjust and just acts alike the injustice
or justice may be only incidental; for a man might return a deposit
unwillingly and from fear, and then he must not be said either to
do what is just or to act justly, except in an incidental way. Similarly
the man who under compulsion and unwillingly fails to return the deposit
must be said to act unjustly, and to do what is unjust, only incidentally.
Of voluntary acts we do some by choice, others not by choice; by choice
those which we do after deliberation, not by choice those which we
do without previous deliberation. Thus there are three kinds of injury
in transactions between man and man; those done in ignorance are mistakes
when the person acted on, the act, the instrument, or the end that
will be attained is other than the agent supposed; the agent thought
either that he was not hiting any one or that he was not hitting with
this missile or not hitting this person or to this end, but a result
followed other than that which he thought likely (e.g. he threw not
with intent to wound but only to prick), or the person hit or the
missile was other than he supposed. Now when (1) the injury takes
place contrary to reasonable expectation, it is a misadventure. When
(2) it is not contrary to reasonable expectation, but does not imply
vice, it is a mistake (for a man makes a mistake when the fault originates
in him, but is the victim of accident when the origin lies outside
him). When (3) he acts with knowledge but not after deliberation,
it is an act of injustice-e.g. the acts due to anger or to other passions
necessary or natural to man; for when men do such harmful and mistaken
acts they act unjustly, and the acts are acts of injustice, but this
does not imply that the doers are unjust or wicked; for the injury
is not due to vice. But when (4) a man acts from choice, he is an
unjust man and a vicious man.

Hence acts proceeding from anger are rightly judged not to be done
of malice aforethought; for it is not the man who acts in anger but
he who enraged him that starts the mischief. Again, the matter in
dispute is not whether the thing happened or not, but its justice;
for it is apparent injustice that occasions rage. For they do not
dispute about the occurrence of the act-as in commercial transactions
where one of the two parties must be vicious-unless they do so owing
to forgetfulness; but, agreeing about the fact, they dispute on which
side justice lies (whereas a man who has deliberately injured another
cannot help knowing that he has done so), so that the one thinks he
is being treated unjustly and the other disagrees.

But if a man harms another by choice, he acts unjustly; and these
are the acts of injustice which imply that the doer is an unjust man,
provided that the act violates proportion or equality. Similarly,
a man is just when he acts justly by choice; but he acts justly if
he merely acts voluntarily.

Of involuntary acts some are excusable, others not. For the mistakes
which men make not only in ignorance but also from ignorance are excusable,
while those which men do not from ignorance but (though they do them
in ignorance) owing to a passion which is neither natural nor such
as man is liable to, are not excusable.

9

Assuming that we have sufficiently defined the suffering and doing
of injustice, it may be asked (1) whether the truth in expressed in
Euripides’ paradoxical words:

I slew my mother, that’s my tale in brief.
Were you both willing, or unwilling both?

Is it truly possible to be willingly treated unjustly, or is all suffering
of injustice the contrary involuntary, as all unjust action is voluntary?
And is all suffering of injustice of the latter kind or else all of
the former, or is it sometimes voluntary, sometimes involuntary? So,
too, with the case of being justly treated; all just action is voluntary,
so that it is reasonable that there should be a similar opposition
in either case-that both being unjustly and being justly treated should
be either alike voluntary or alike involuntary. But it would be thought
paradoxical even in the case of being justly treated, if it were always
voluntary; for some are unwillingly treated justly. (2) One might
raise this question also, whether every one who has suffered what
is unjust is being unjustly treated, or on the other hand it is with
suffering as with acting. In action and in passivity alike it is possible
to partake of justice incidentally, and similarly (it is plain) of
injustice; for to do what is unjust is not the same as to act unjustly,
nor to suffer what is unjust as to be treated unjustly, and similarly
in the case of acting justly and being justly treated; for it is impossible
to be unjustly treated if the other does not act unjustly, or justly
treated unless he acts justly. Now if to act unjustly is simply to
harm some one voluntarily, and ‘voluntarily’ means ‘knowing the person
acted on, the instrument, and the manner of one’s acting’, and the
incontinent man voluntarily harms himself, not only will he voluntarily
be unjustly treated but it will be possible to treat oneself unjustly.
(This also is one of the questions in doubt, whether a man can treat
himself unjustly.) Again, a man may voluntarily, owing to incontinence,
be harmed by another who acts voluntarily, so that it would be possible
to be voluntarily treated unjustly. Or is our definition incorrect;
must we to ‘harming another, with knowledge both of the person acted
on, of the instrument, and of the manner’ add ‘contrary to the wish
of the person acted on’? Then a man may be voluntarily harmed and
voluntarily suffer what is unjust, but no one is voluntarily treated
unjustly; for no one wishes to be unjustly treated, not even the incontinent
man. He acts contrary to his wish; for no one wishes for what he does
not think to be good, but the incontinent man does do things that
he does not think he ought to do. Again, one who gives what is his
own, as Homer says Glaucus gave Diomede

Armour of gold for brazen, the price of a hundred beeves for nine,
is not unjustly treated; for though to give is in his power, to be
unjustly treated is not, but there must be some one to treat him unjustly.
It is plain, then, that being unjustly treated is not voluntary.

Of the questions we intended to discuss two still remain for discussion;
(3) whether it is the man who has assigned to another more than his
share that acts unjustly, or he who has the excessive share, and (4)
whether it is possible to treat oneself unjustly. The questions are
connected; for if the former alternative is possible and the distributor
acts unjustly and not the man who has the excessive share, then if
a man assigns more to another than to himself, knowingly and voluntarily,
he treats himself unjustly; which is what modest people seem to do,
since the virtuous man tends to take less than his share. Or does
this statement too need qualification? For (a) he perhaps gets more
than his share of some other good, e.g. of honour or of intrinsic
nobility. (b) The question is solved by applying the distinction we
applied to unjust action; for he suffers nothing contrary to his own
wish, so that he is not unjustly treated as far as this goes, but
at most only suffers harm.

It is plain too that the distributor acts unjustly, but not always
the man who has the excessive share; for it is not he to whom what
is unjust appertains that acts unjustly, but he to whom it appertains
to do the unjust act voluntarily, i.e. the person in whom lies the
origin of the action, and this lies in the distributor, not in the
receiver. Again, since the word ‘do’ is ambiguous, and there is a
sense in which lifeless things, or a hand, or a servant who obeys
an order, may be said to slay, he who gets an excessive share does
not act unjustly, though he ‘does’ what is unjust.

Again, if the distributor gave his judgement in ignorance, he does
not act unjustly in respect of legal justice, and his judgement is
not unjust in this sense, but in a sense it is unjust (for legal justice
and primordial justice are different); but if with knowledge he judged
unjustly, he is himself aiming at an excessive share either of gratitude
or of revenge. As much, then, as if he were to share in the plunder,
the man who has judged unjustly for these reasons has got too much;
the fact that what he gets is different from what he distributes makes
no difference, for even if he awards land with a view to sharing in
the plunder he gets not land but money.

Men think that acting unjustly is in their power, and therefore that
being just is easy. But it is not; to lie with one’s neighbour’s wife,
to wound another, to deliver a bribe, is easy and in our power, but
to do these things as a result of a certain state of character is
neither easy nor in our power. Similarly to know what is just and
what is unjust requires, men think, no great wisdom, because it is
not hard to understand the matters dealt with by the laws (though
these are not the things that are just, except incidentally); but
how actions must be done and distributions effected in order to be
just, to know this is a greater achievement than knowing what is good
for the health; though even there, while it is easy to know that honey,
wine, hellebore, cautery, and the use of the knife are so, to know
how, to whom, and when these should be applied with a view to producing
health, is no less an achievement than that of being a physician.
Again, for this very reason men think that acting unjustly is characteristic
of the just man no less than of the unjust, because he would be not
less but even more capable of doing each of these unjust acts; for
he could lie with a woman or wound a neighbour; and the brave man
could throw away his shield and turn to flight in this direction or
in that. But to play the coward or to act unjustly consists not in
doing these things, except incidentally, but in doing them as the
result of a certain state of character, just as to practise medicine
and healing consists not in applying or not applying the knife, in
using or not using medicines, but in doing so in a certain way.

Just acts occur between people who participate in things good in themselves
and can have too much or too little of them; for some beings (e.g.
presumably the gods) cannot have too much of them, and to others,
those who are incurably bad, not even the smallest share in them is
beneficial but all such goods are harmful, while to others they are
beneficial up to a point; therefore justice is essentially something
human.

10
Our next subject is equity and the equitable (to epiekes), and their
respective relations to justice and the just. For on examination they
appear to be neither absolutely the same nor generically different;
and while we sometime praise what is equitable and the equitable man
(so that we apply the name by way of praise even to instances of the
other virtues, instead of ‘good’ meaning by epieikestebon that a thing
is better), at other times, when we reason it out, it seems strange
if the equitable, being something different from the just, is yet
praiseworthy; for either the just or the equitable is not good, if
they are different; or, if both are good, they are the same.

These, then, are pretty much the considerations that give rise to
the problem about the equitable; they are all in a sense correct and
not opposed to one another; for the equitable, though it is better
than one kind of justice, yet is just, and it is not as being a different
class of thing that it is better than the just. The same thing, then,
is just and equitable, and while both are good the equitable is superior.
What creates the problem is that the equitable is just, but not the
legally just but a correction of legal justice. The reason is that
all law is universal but about some things it is not possible to make
a universal statement which shall be correct. In those cases, then,
in which it is necessary to speak universally, but not possible to
do so correctly, the law takes the usual case, though it is not ignorant
of the possibility of error. And it is none the less correct; for
the error is in the law nor in the legislator but in the nature of
the thing, since the matter of practical affairs is of this kind from
the start. When the law speaks universally, then, and a case arises
on it which is not covered by the universal statement, then it is
right, where the legislator fails us and has erred by oversimplicity,
to correct the omission-to say what the legislator himself would have
said had he been present, and would have put into his law if he had
known. Hence the equitable is just, and better than one kind of justice-not
better than absolute justice but better than the error that arises
from the absoluteness of the statement. And this is the nature of
the equitable, a correction of law where it is defective owing to
its universality. In fact this is the reason why all things are not
determined by law, that about some things it is impossible to lay
down a law, so that a decree is needed. For when the thing is indefinite
the rule also is indefinite, like the leaden rule used in making the
Lesbian moulding; the rule adapts itself to the shape of the stone
and is not rigid, and so too the decree is adapted to the facts.

It is plain, then, what the equitable is, and that it is just and
is better than one kind of justice. It is evident also from this who
the equitable man is; the man who chooses and does such acts, and
is no stickler for his rights in a bad sense but tends to take less
than his share though he has the law oft his side, is equitable, and
this state of character is equity, which is a sort of justice and
not a different state of character.

11

Whether a man can treat himself unjustly or not, is evident from what
has been said. For (a) one class of just acts are those acts in accordance
with any virtue which are prescribed by the law; e.g. the law does
not expressly permit suicide, and what it does not expressly permit
it forbids. Again, when a man in violation of the law harms another
(otherwise than in retaliation) voluntarily, he acts unjustly, and
a voluntary agent is one who knows both the person he is affecting
by his action and the instrument he is using; and he who through anger
voluntarily stabs himself does this contrary to the right rule of
life, and this the law does not allow; therefore he is acting unjustly.
But towards whom? Surely towards the state, not towards himself. For
he suffers voluntarily, but no one is voluntarily treated unjustly.
This is also the reason why the state punishes; a certain loss of
civil rights attaches to the man who destroys himself, on the ground
that he is treating the state unjustly.

Further (b) in that sense of ‘acting unjustly’ in which the man who
‘acts unjustly’ is unjust only and not bad all round, it is not possible
to treat oneself unjustly (this is different from the former sense;
the unjust man in one sense of the term is wicked in a particularized
way just as the coward is, not in the sense of being wicked all round,
so that his ‘unjust act’ does not manifest wickedness in general).
For (i) that would imply the possibility of the same thing’s having
been subtracted from and added to the same thing at the same time;
but this is impossible-the just and the unjust always involve more
than one person. Further, (ii) unjust action is voluntary and done
by choice, and takes the initiative (for the man who because he has
suffered does the same in return is not thought to act unjustly);
but if a man harms himself he suffers and does the same things at
the same time. Further, (iii) if a man could treat himself unjustly,
he could be voluntarily treated unjustly. Besides, (iv) no one acts
unjustly without committing particular acts of injustice; but no one
can commit adultery with his own wife or housebreaking on his own
house or theft on his own property,

In general, the question ‘can a man treat himself unjustly?’ is solved
also by the distinction we applied to the question ‘can a man be voluntarily
treated unjustly?’

(It is evident too that both are bad, being unjustly treated and acting
unjustly; for the one means having less and the other having more
than the intermediate amount, which plays the part here that the healthy
does in the medical art, and that good condition does in the art of
bodily training. But still acting unjustly is the worse, for it involves
vice and is blameworthy-involves vice which is either of the complete
and unqualified kind or almost so (we must admit the latter alternative,
because not all voluntary unjust action implies injustice as a state
of character), while being unjustly treated does not involve vice
and injustice in oneself. In itself, then, being unjustly treated
is less bad, but there is nothing to prevent its being incidentally
a greater evil. But theory cares nothing for this; it calls pleurisy
a more serious mischief than a stumble; yet the latter may become
incidentally the more serious, if the fall due to it leads to your
being taken prisoner or put to death the enemy.)

Metaphorically and in virtue of a certain resemblance there is a justice,
not indeed between a man and himself, but between certain parts of
him; yet not every kind of justice but that of master and servant
or that of husband and wife. For these are the ratios in which the
part of the soul that has a rational principle stands to the irrational
part; and it is with a view to these parts that people also think
a man can be unjust to himself, viz. because these parts are liable
to suffer something contrary to their respective desires; there is
therefore thought to be a mutual justice between them as between ruler
and ruled.

Let this be taken as our account of justice and the other, i.e. the
other moral, virtues.

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