BOOK IV

1

Let us speak next of liberality. It seems to be the mean with regard
to wealth; for the liberal man is praised not in respect of military
matters, nor of those in respect of which the temrate man is praised,
nor of judicial decisions, but with regard to the giving and taking
of wealth, and especially in respect of giving. Now by ‘wealth’ we
mean all the things whose value is measured by money. Further, prodigality
and meanness are excesses and defects with regard to wealth; and meanness
we always impute to those who care more than they ought for wealth,
but we sometimes apply the word ‘prodigality’ in a complex sense;
for we call those men prodigals who are incontinent and spend money
on self-indulgence. Hence also they are thought the poorest characters;
for they combine more vices than one. Therefore the application of
the word to them is not its proper use; for a ‘prodigal’ means a man
who has a single evil quality, that of wasting his substance; since
a prodigal is one who is being ruined by his own fault, and the wasting
of substance is thought to be a sort of ruining of oneself, life being
held to depend on possession of substance.

This, then, is the sense in which we take the word ‘prodigality’.
Now the things that have a use may be used either well or badly; and
riches is a useful thing; and everything is used best by the man who
has the virtue concerned with it; riches, therefore, will be used
best by the man who has the virtue concerned with wealth; and this
is the liberal man. Now spending and giving seem to be the using of
wealth; taking and keeping rather the possession of it. Hence it is
more the mark of the liberal man to give to the right people than
to take from the right sources and not to take from the wrong. For
it is more characteristic of virtue to do good than to have good done
to one, and more characteristic to do what is noble than not to do
what is base; and it is not hard to see that giving implies doing
good and doing what is noble, and taking implies having good done
to one or not acting basely. And gratitude is felt towards him who
gives, not towards him who does not take, and praise also is bestowed
more on him. It is easier, also, not to take than to give; for men
are apter to give away their own too little than to take what is another’s.
Givers, too, are called liberal; but those who do not take are not
praised for liberality but rather for justice; while those who take
are hardly praised at all. And the liberal are almost the most loved
of all virtuous characters, since they are useful; and this depends
on their giving.

Now virtuous actions are noble and done for the sake of the noble.
Therefore the liberal man, like other virtuous men, will give for
the sake of the noble, and rightly; for he will give to the right
people, the right amounts, and at the right time, with all the other
qualifications that accompany right giving; and that too with pleasure
or without pain; for that which is virtuous is pleasant or free from
pain-least of all will it be painful. But he who gives to the wrong
people or not for the sake of the noble but for some other cause,
will be called not liberal but by some other name. Nor is he liberal
who gives with pain; for he would prefer the wealth to the noble act,
and this is not characteristic of a liberal man. But no more will
the liberal man take from wrong sources; for such taking is not characteristic
of the man who sets no store by wealth. Nor will he be a ready asker;
for it is not characteristic of a man who confers benefits to accept
them lightly. But he will take from the right sources, e.g. from his
own possessions, not as something noble but as a necessity, that he
may have something to give. Nor will he neglect his own property,
since he wishes by means of this to help others. And he will refrain
from giving to anybody and everybody, that he may have something to
give to the right people, at the right time, and where it is noble
to do so. It is highly characteristic of a liberal man also to go
to excess in giving, so that he leaves too little for himself; for
it is the nature of a liberal man not to look to himself. The term
‘liberality’ is used relatively to a man’s substance; for liberality
resides not in the multitude of the gifts but in the state of character
of the giver, and this is relative to the giver’s substance. There
is therefore nothing to prevent the man who gives less from being
the more liberal man, if he has less to give those are thought to
be more liberal who have not made their wealth but inherited it; for
in the first place they have no experience of want, and secondly all
men are fonder of their own productions, as are parents and poets.
It is not easy for the liberal man to be rich, since he is not apt
either at taking or at keeping, but at giving away, and does not value
wealth for its own sake but as a means to giving. Hence comes the
charge that is brought against fortune, that those who deserve riches
most get it least. But it is not unreasonable that it should turn
out so; for he cannot have wealth, any more than anything else, if
he does not take pains to have it. Yet he will not give to the wrong
people nor at the wrong time, and so on; for he would no longer be
acting in accordance with liberality, and if he spent on these objects
he would have nothing to spend on the right objects. For, as has been
said, he is liberal who spends according to his substance and on the
right objects; and he who exceeds is prodigal. Hence we do not call
despots prodigal; for it is thought not easy for them to give and
spend beyond the amount of their possessions. Liberality, then, being
a mean with regard to giving and taking of wealth, the liberal man
will both give and spend the right amounts and on the right objects,
alike in small things and in great, and that with pleasure; he will
also take the right amounts and from the right sources. For, the virtue
being a mean with regard to both, he will do both as he ought; since
this sort of taking accompanies proper giving, and that which is not
of this sort is contrary to it, and accordingly the giving and taking
that accompany each other are present together in the same man, while
the contrary kinds evidently are not. But if he happens to spend in
a manner contrary to what is right and noble, he will be pained, but
moderately and as he ought; for it is the mark of virtue both to be
pleased and to be pained at the right objects and in the right way.
Further, the liberal man is easy to deal with in money matters; for
he can be got the better of, since he sets no store by money, and
is more annoyed if he has not spent something that he ought than pained
if he has spent something that he ought not, and does not agree with
the saying of Simonides.

The prodigal errs in these respects also; for he is neither pleased
nor pained at the right things or in the right way; this will be more
evident as we go on. We have said that prodigality and meanness are
excesses and deficiencies, and in two things, in giving and in taking;
for we include spending under giving. Now prodigality exceeds in giving
and not taking, while meanness falls short in giving, and exceeds
in taking, except in small things.

The characteristics of prodigality are not often combined; for it
is not easy to give to all if you take from none; private persons
soon exhaust their substance with giving, and it is to these that
the name of prodigals is applied- though a man of this sort would
seem to be in no small degree better than a mean man. For he is easily
cured both by age and by poverty, and thus he may move towards the
middle state. For he has the characteristics of the liberal man, since
he both gives and refrains from taking, though he does neither of
these in the right manner or well. Therefore if he were brought to
do so by habituation or in some other way, he would be liberal; for
he will then give to the right people, and will not take from the
wrong sources. This is why he is thought to have not a bad character;
it is not the mark of a wicked or ignoble man to go to excess in giving
and not taking, but only of a foolish one. The man who is prodigal
in this way is thought much better than the mean man both for the
aforesaid reasons and because he benefits many while the other benefits
no one, not even himself.

But most prodigal people, as has been said, also take from the wrong
sources, and are in this respect mean. They become apt to take because
they wish to spend and cannot do this easily; for their possessions
soon run short. Thus they are forced to provide means from some other
source. At the same time, because they care nothing for honour, they
take recklessly and from any source; for they have an appetite for
giving, and they do not mind how or from what source. Hence also their
giving is not liberal; for it is not noble, nor does it aim at nobility,
nor is it done in the right way; sometimes they make rich those who
should be poor, and will give nothing to people of respectable character,
and much to flatterers or those who provide them with some other pleasure.
Hence also most of them are self-indulgent; for they spend lightly
and waste money on their indulgences, and incline towards pleasures
because they do not live with a view to what is noble.

The prodigal man, then, turns into what we have described if he is
left untutored, but if he is treated with care he will arrive at the
intermediate and right state. But meanness is both incurable (for
old age and every disability is thought to make men mean) and more
innate in men than prodigality; for most men are fonder of getting
money than of giving. It also extends widely, and is multiform, since
there seem to be many kinds of meanness.

For it consists in two things, deficiency in giving and excess in
taking, and is not found complete in all men but is sometimes divided;
some men go to excess in taking, others fall short in giving. Those
who are called by such names as ‘miserly’, ‘close’, ‘stingy’, all
fall short in giving, but do not covet the possessions of others nor
wish to get them. In some this is due to a sort of honesty and avoidance
of what is disgraceful (for some seem, or at least profess, to hoard
their money for this reason, that they may not some day be forced
to do something disgraceful; to this class belong the cheeseparer
and every one of the sort; he is so called from his excess of unwillingness
to give anything); while others again keep their hands off the property
of others from fear, on the ground that it is not easy, if one takes
the property of others oneself, to avoid having one’s own taken by
them; they are therefore content neither to take nor to give.

Others again exceed in respect of taking by taking anything and from
any source, e.g. those who ply sordid trades, pimps and all such people,
and those who lend small sums and at high rates. For all of these
take more than they ought and from wrong sources. What is common to
them is evidently sordid love of gain; they all put up with a bad
name for the sake of gain, and little gain at that. For those who
make great gains but from wrong sources, and not the right gains,
e.g. despots when they sack cities and spoil temples, we do not call
mean but rather wicked, impious, and unjust. But the gamester and
the footpad (and the highwayman) belong to the class of the mean,
since they have a sordid love of gain. For it is for gain that both
of them ply their craft and endure the disgrace of it, and the one
faces the greatest dangers for the sake of the booty, while the other
makes gain from his friends, to whom he ought to be giving. Both,
then, since they are willing to make gain from wrong sources, are
sordid lovers of gain; therefore all such forms of taking are mean.

And it is natural that meanness is described as the contrary of liberality;
for not only is it a greater evil than prodigality, but men err more
often in this direction than in the way of prodigality as we have
described it.

So much, then, for liberality and the opposed vices.

2

It would seem proper to discuss magnificence next. For this also seems
to be a virtue concerned with wealth; but it does not like liberality
extend to all the actions that are concerned with wealth, but only
to those that involve expenditure; and in these it surpasses liberality
in scale. For, as the name itself suggests, it is a fitting expenditure
involving largeness of scale. But the scale is relative; for the expense
of equipping a trireme is not the same as that of heading a sacred
embassy. It is what is fitting, then, in relation to the agent, and
to the circumstances and the object. The man who in small or middling
things spends according to the merits of the case is not called magnificent
(e.g. the man who can say ‘many a gift I gave the wanderer’), but
only the man who does so in great things. For the magnificent man
is liberal, but the liberal man is not necessarily magnificent. The
deficiency of this state of character is called niggardliness, the
excess vulgarity, lack of taste, and the like, which do not go to
excess in the amount spent on right objects, but by showy expenditure
in the wrong circumstances and the wrong manner; we shall speak of
these vices later.

The magnificent man is like an artist; for he can see what is fitting
and spend large sums tastefully. For, as we said at the begining,
a state of character is determined by its activities and by its objects.
Now the expenses of the magnificent man are large and fitting. Such,
therefore, are also his results; for thus there will be a great expenditure
and one that is fitting to its result. Therefore the result should
be worthy of the expense, and the expense should be worthy of the
result, or should even exceed it. And the magnificent man will spend
such sums for honour’s sake; for this is common to the virtues. And
further he will do so gladly and lavishly; for nice calculation is
a niggardly thing. And he will consider how the result can be made
most beautiful and most becoming rather than for how much it can be
produced and how it can be produced most cheaply. It is necessary,
then, that the magnificent man be also liberal. For the liberal man
also will spend what he ought and as he ought; and it is in these
matters that the greatness implied in the name of the magnificent
man-his bigness, as it were-is manifested, since liberality is concerned
with these matters; and at an equal expense he will produce a more
magnificent work of art. For a possession and a work of art have not
the same excellence. The most valuable possession is that which is
worth most, e.g. gold, but the most valuable work of art is that which
is great and beautiful (for the contemplation of such a work inspires
admiration, and so does magnificence); and a work has an excellence-viz.
magnificence-which involves magnitude. Magnificence is an attribute
of expenditures of the kind which we call honourable, e.g. those connected
with the gods-votive offerings, buildings, and sacrifices-and similarly
with any form of religious worship, and all those that are proper
objects of public-spirited ambition, as when people think they ought
to equip a chorus or a trireme, or entertain the city, in a brilliant
way. But in all cases, as has been said, we have regard to the agent
as well and ask who he is and what means he has; for the expenditure
should be worthy of his means, and suit not only the result but also
the producer. Hence a poor man cannot be magnificent, since he has
not the means with which to spend large sums fittingly; and he who
tries is a fool, since he spends beyond what can be expected of him
and what is proper, but it is right expenditure that is virtuous.
But great expenditure is becoming to those who have suitable means
to start with, acquired by their own efforts or from ancestors or
connexions, and to people of high birth or reputation, and so on;
for all these things bring with them greatness and prestige. Primarily,
then, the magnificent man is of this sort, and magnificence is shown
in expenditures of this sort, as has been said; for these are the
greatest and most honourable. Of private occasions of expenditure
the most suitable are those that take place once for all, e.g. a wedding
or anything of the kind, or anything that interests the whole city
or the people of position in it, and also the receiving of foreign
guests and the sending of them on their way, and gifts and counter-gifts;
for the magnificent man spends not on himself but on public objects,
and gifts bear some resemblance to votive offerings. A magnificent
man will also furnish his house suitably to his wealth (for even a
house is a sort of public ornament), and will spend by preference
on those works that are lasting (for these are the most beautiful),
and on every class of things he will spend what is becoming; for the
same things are not suitable for gods and for men, nor in a temple
and in a tomb. And since each expenditure may be great of its kind,
and what is most magnificent absolutely is great expenditure on a
great object, but what is magnificent here is what is great in these
circumstances, and greatness in the work differs from greatness in
the expense (for the most beautiful ball or bottle is magnificent
as a gift to a child, but the price of it is small and mean),-therefore
it is characteristic of the magnificent man, whatever kind of result
he is producing, to produce it magnificently (for such a result is
not easily surpassed) and to make it worthy of the expenditure.

Such, then, is the magnificent man; the man who goes to excess and
is vulgar exceeds, as has been said, by spending beyond what is right.
For on small objects of expenditure he spends much and displays a
tasteless showiness; e.g. he gives a club dinner on the scale of a
wedding banquet, and when he provides the chorus for a comedy he brings
them on to the stage in purple, as they do at Megara. And all such
things he will do not for honour’s sake but to show off his wealth,
and because he thinks he is admired for these things, and where he
ought to spend much he spends little and where little, much. The niggardly
man on the other hand will fall short in everything, and after spending
the greatest sums will spoil the beauty of the result for a trifle,
and whatever he is doing he will hesitate and consider how he may
spend least, and lament even that, and think he is doing everything
on a bigger scale than he ought.

These states of character, then, are vices; yet they do not bring
disgrace because they are neither harmful to one’s neighbour nor very
unseemly.

3

Pride seems even from its name to be concerned with great things;
what sort of great things, is the first question we must try to answer.
It makes no difference whether we consider the state of character
or the man characterized by it. Now the man is thought to be proud
who thinks himself worthy of great things, being worthy of them; for
he who does so beyond his deserts is a fool, but no virtuous man is
foolish or silly. The proud man, then, is the man we have described.
For he who is worthy of little and thinks himself worthy of little
is temperate, but not proud; for pride implies greatness, as beauty
implies a goodsized body, and little people may be neat and well-proportioned
but cannot be beautiful. On the other hand, he who thinks himself
worthy of great things, being unworthy of them, is vain; though not
every one who thinks himself worthy of more than he really is worthy
of in vain. The man who thinks himself worthy of worthy of less than
he is really worthy of is unduly humble, whether his deserts be great
or moderate, or his deserts be small but his claims yet smaller. And
the man whose deserts are great would seem most unduly humble; for
what would he have done if they had been less? The proud man, then,
is an extreme in respect of the greatness of his claims, but a mean
in respect of the rightness of them; for he claims what is accordance
with his merits, while the others go to excess or fall short.

If, then, he deserves and claims great things, and above all the great
things, he will be concerned with one thing in particular. Desert
is relative to external goods; and the greatest of these, we should
say, is that which we render to the gods, and which people of position
most aim at, and which is the prize appointed for the noblest deeds;
and this is honour; that is surely the greatest of external goods.
Honours and dishonours, therefore, are the objects with respect to
which the proud man is as he should be. And even apart from argument
it is with honour that proud men appear to be concerned; for it is
honour that they chiefly claim, but in accordance with their deserts.
The unduly humble man falls short both in comparison with his own
merits and in comparison with the proud man’s claims. The vain man
goes to excess in comparison with his own merits, but does not exceed
the proud man’s claims.

Now the proud man, since he deserves most, must be good in the highest
degree; for the better man always deserves more, and the best man
most. Therefore the truly proud man must be good. And greatness in
every virtue would seem to be characteristic of a proud man. And it
would be most unbecoming for a proud man to fly from danger, swinging
his arms by his sides, or to wrong another; for to what end should
he do disgraceful acts, he to whom nothing is great? If we consider
him point by point we shall see the utter absurdity of a proud man
who is not good. Nor, again, would he be worthy of honour if he were
bad; for honour is the prize of virtue, and it is to the good that
it is rendered. Pride, then, seems to be a sort of crown of the virtues;
for it makes them greater, and it is not found without them. Therefore
it is hard to be truly proud; for it is impossible without nobility
and goodness of character. It is chiefly with honours and dishonours,
then, that the proud man is concerned; and at honours that are great
and conferred by good men he will be moderately Pleased, thinking
that he is coming by his own or even less than his own; for there
can be no honour that is worthy of perfect virtue, yet he will at
any rate accept it since they have nothing greater to bestow on him;
but honour from casual people and on trifling grounds he will utterly
despise, since it is not this that he deserves, and dishonour too,
since in his case it cannot be just. In the first place, then, as
has been said, the proud man is concerned with honours; yet he will
also bear himself with moderation towards wealth and power and all
good or evil fortune, whatever may befall him, and will be neither
over-joyed by good fortune nor over-pained by evil. For not even towards
honour does he bear himself as if it were a very great thing. Power
and wealth are desirable for the sake of honour (at least those who
have them wish to get honour by means of them); and for him to whom
even honour is a little thing the others must be so too. Hence proud
men are thought to be disdainful.

The goods of fortune also are thought to contribute towards pride.
For men who are well-born are thought worthy of honour, and so are
those who enjoy power or wealth; for they are in a superior position,
and everything that has a superiority in something good is held in
greater honour. Hence even such things make men prouder; for they
are honoured by some for having them; but in truth the good man alone
is to be honoured; he, however, who has both advantages is thought
the more worthy of honour. But those who without virtue have such
goods are neither justified in making great claims nor entitled to
the name of ‘proud’; for these things imply perfect virtue. Disdainful
and insolent, however, even those who have such goods become. For
without virtue it is not easy to bear gracefully the goods of fortune;
and, being unable to bear them, and thinking themselves superior to
others, they despise others and themselves do what they please. They
imitate the proud man without being like him, and this they do where
they can; so they do not act virtuously, but they do despise others.
For the proud man despises justly (since he thinks truly), but the
many do so at random.

He does not run into trifling dangers, nor is he fond of danger, because
he honours few things; but he will face great dangers, and when he
is in danger he is unsparing of his life, knowing that there are conditions
on which life is not worth having. And he is the sort of man to confer
benefits, but he is ashamed of receiving them; for the one is the
mark of a superior, the other of an inferior. And he is apt to confer
greater benefits in return; for thus the original benefactor besides
being paid will incur a debt to him, and will be the gainer by the
transaction. They seem also to remember any service they have done,
but not those they have received (for he who receives a service is
inferior to him who has done it, but the proud man wishes to be superior),
and to hear of the former with pleasure, of the latter with displeasure;
this, it seems, is why Thetis did not mention to Zeus the services
she had done him, and why the Spartans did not recount their services
to the Athenians, but those they had received. It is a mark of the
proud man also to ask for nothing or scarcely anything, but to give
help readily, and to be dignified towards people who enjoy high position
and good fortune, but unassuming towards those of the middle class;
for it is a difficult and lofty thing to be superior to the former,
but easy to be so to the latter, and a lofty bearing over the former
is no mark of ill-breeding, but among humble people it is as vulgar
as a display of strength against the weak. Again, it is characteristic
of the proud man not to aim at the things commonly held in honour,
or the things in which others excel; to be sluggish and to hold back
except where great honour or a great work is at stake, and to be a
man of few deeds, but of great and notable ones. He must also be open
in his hate and in his love (for to conceal one’s feelings, i.e. to
care less for truth than for what people will think, is a coward’s
part), and must speak and act openly; for he is free of speech because
he is contemptuous, and he is given to telling the truth, except when
he speaks in irony to the vulgar. He must be unable to make his life
revolve round another, unless it be a friend; for this is slavish,
and for this reason all flatterers are servile and people lacking
in self-respect are flatterers. Nor is he given to admiration; for
nothing to him is great. Nor is he mindful of wrongs; for it is not
the part of a proud man to have a long memory, especially for wrongs,
but rather to overlook them. Nor is he a gossip; for he will speak
neither about himself nor about another, since he cares not to be
praised nor for others to be blamed; nor again is he given to praise;
and for the same reason he is not an evil-speaker, even about his
enemies, except from haughtiness. With regard to necessary or small
matters he is least of all me given to lamentation or the asking of
favours; for it is the part of one who takes such matters seriously
to behave so with respect to them. He is one who will possess beautiful
and profitless things rather than profitable and useful ones; for
this is more proper to a character that suffices to itself.

Further, a slow step is thought proper to the proud man, a deep voice,
and a level utterance; for the man who takes few things seriously
is not likely to be hurried, nor the man who thinks nothing great
to be excited, while a shrill voice and a rapid gait are the results
of hurry and excitement.

Such, then, is the proud man; the man who falls short of him is unduly
humble, and the man who goes beyond him is vain. Now even these are
not thought to be bad (for they are not malicious), but only mistaken.
For the unduly humble man, being worthy of good things, robs himself
of what he deserves, and to have something bad about him from the
fact that he does not think himself worthy of good things, and seems
also not to know himself; else he would have desired the things he
was worthy of, since these were good. Yet such people are not thought
to be fools, but rather unduly retiring. Such a reputation, however,
seems actually to make them worse; for each class of people aims at
what corresponds to its worth, and these people stand back even from
noble actions and undertakings, deeming themselves unworthy, and from
external goods no less. Vain people, on the other hand, are fools
and ignorant of themselves, and that manifestly; for, not being worthy
of them, they attempt honourable undertakings, and then are found
out; and tetadorn themselves with clothing and outward show and such
things, and wish their strokes of good fortune to be made public,
and speak about them as if they would be honoured for them. But undue
humility is more opposed to pride than vanity is; for it is both commoner
and worse.

Pride, then, is concerned with honour on the grand scale, as has been
said.

4

There seems to be in the sphere of honour also, as was said in our
first remarks on the subject, a virtue which would appear to be related
to pride as liberality is to magnificence. For neither of these has
anything to do with the grand scale, but both dispose us as is right
with regard to middling and unimportant objects; as in getting and
giving of wealth there is a mean and an excess and defect, so too
honour may be desired more than is right, or less, or from the right
sources and in the right way. We blame both the ambitious man as am
at honour more than is right and from wrong sources, and the unambitious
man as not willing to be honoured even for noble reasons. But sometimes
we praise the ambitious man as being manly and a lover of what is
noble, and the unambitious man as being moderate and self-controlled,
as we said in our first treatment of the subject. Evidently, since
‘fond of such and such an object’ has more than one meaning, we do
not assign the term ‘ambition’ or ‘love of honour’ always to the same
thing, but when we praise the quality we think of the man who loves
honour more than most people, and when we blame it we think of him
who loves it more than is right. The mean being without a name, the
extremes seem to dispute for its place as though that were vacant
by default. But where there is excess and defect, there is also an
intermediate; now men desire honour both more than they should and
less; therefore it is possible also to do so as one should; at all
events this is the state of character that is praised, being an unnamed
mean in respect of honour. Relatively to ambition it seems to be unambitiousness,
and relatively to unambitiousness it seems to be ambition, while relatively
to both severally it seems in a sense to be both together. This appears
to be true of the other virtues also. But in this case the extremes
seem to be contradictories because the mean has not received a name.

5

Good temper is a mean with respect to anger; the middle state being
unnamed, and the extremes almost without a name as well, we place
good temper in the middle position, though it inclines towards the
deficiency, which is without a name. The excess might called a sort
of ‘irascibility’. For the passion is anger, while its causes are
many and diverse.

The man who is angry at the right things and with the right people,
and, further, as he ought, when he ought, and as long as he ought,
is praised. This will be the good-tempered man, then, since good temper
is praised. For the good-tempered man tends to be unperturbed and
not to be led by passion, but to be angry in the manner, at the things,
and for the length of time, that the rule dictates; but he is thought
to err rather in the direction of deficiency; for the good-tempered
man is not revengeful, but rather tends to make allowances.

The deficiency, whether it is a sort of ‘inirascibility’ or whatever
it is, is blamed. For those who are not angry at the things they should
be angry at are thought to be fools, and so are those who are not
angry in the right way, at the right time, or with the right persons;
for such a man is thought not to feel things nor to be pained by them,
and, since he does not get angry, he is thought unlikely to defend
himself; and to endure being insulted and put up with insult to one’s
friends is slavish.

The excess can be manifested in all the points that have been named
(for one can be angry with the wrong persons, at the wrong things,
more than is right, too quickly, or too long); yet all are not found
in the same person. Indeed they could not; for evil destroys even
itself, and if it is complete becomes unbearable. Now hot-tempered
people get angry quickly and with the wrong persons and at the wrong
things and more than is right, but their anger ceases quickly-which
is the best point about them. This happens to them because they do
not restrain their anger but retaliate openly owing to their quickness
of temper, and then their anger ceases. By reason of excess choleric
people are quick-tempered and ready to be angry with everything and
on every occasion; whence their name. Sulky people are hard to appease,
and retain their anger long; for they repress their passion. But it
ceases when they retaliate; for revenge relieves them of their anger,
producing in them pleasure instead of pain. If this does not happen
they retain their burden; for owing to its not being obvious no one
even reasons with them, and to digest one’s anger in oneself takes
time. Such people are most troublesome to themselves and to their
dearest friends. We call had-tempered those who are angry at the wrong
things, more than is right, and longer, and cannot be appeased until
they inflict vengeance or punishment.

To good temper we oppose the excess rather than the defect; for not
only is it commoner since revenge is the more human), but bad-tempered
people are worse to live with.

What we have said in our earlier treatment of the subject is plain
also from what we are now saying; viz. that it is not easy to define
how, with whom, at what, and how long one should be angry, and at
what point right action ceases and wrong begins. For the man who strays
a little from the path, either towards the more or towards the less,
is not blamed; since sometimes we praise those who exhibit the deficiency,
and call them good-tempered, and sometimes we call angry people manly,
as being capable of ruling. How far, therefore, and how a man must
stray before he becomes blameworthy, it is not easy to state in words;
for the decision depends on the particular facts and on perception.
But so much at least is plain, that the middle state is praiseworthy-
that in virtue of which we are angry with the right people, at the
right things, in the right way, and so on, while the excesses and
defects are blameworthy- slightly so if they are present in a low
degree, more if in a higher degree, and very much if in a high degree.
Evidently, then, we must cling to the middle state.- Enough of the
states relative to anger.

6

In gatherings of men, in social life and the interchange of words
and deeds, some men are thought to be obsequious, viz. those who to
give pleasure praise everything and never oppose, but think it their
duty ‘to give no pain to the people they meet’; while those who, on
the contrary, oppose everything and care not a whit about giving pain
are called churlish and contentious. That the states we have named
are culpable is plain enough, and that the middle state is laudable-
that in virtue of which a man will put up with, and will resent, the
right things and in the right way; but no name has been assigned to
it, though it most resembles friendship. For the man who corresponds
to this middle state is very much what, with affection added, we call
a good friend. But the state in question differs from friendship in
that it implies no passion or affection for one’s associates; since
it is not by reason of loving or hating that such a man takes everything
in the right way, but by being a man of a certain kind. For he will
behave so alike towards those he knows and those he does not know,
towards intimates and those who are not so, except that in each of
these cases he will behave as is befitting; for it is not proper to
have the same care for intimates and for strangers, nor again is it
the same conditions that make it right to give pain to them. Now we
have said generally that he will associate with people in the right
way; but it is by reference to what is honourable and expedient that
he will aim at not giving pain or at contributing pleasure. For he
seems to be concerned with the pleasures and pains of social life;
and wherever it is not honourable, or is harmful, for him to contribute
pleasure, he will refuse, and will choose rather to give pain; also
if his acquiescence in another’s action would bring disgrace, and
that in a high degree, or injury, on that other, while his opposition
brings a little pain, he will not acquiesce but will decline. He will
associate differently with people in high station and with ordinary
people, with closer and more distant acquaintances, and so too with
regard to all other differences, rendering to each class what is befitting,
and while for its own sake he chooses to contribute pleasure, and
avoids the giving of pain, he will be guided by the consequences,
if these are greater, i.e. honour and expediency. For the sake of
a great future pleasure, too, he will inflict small pains.

The man who attains the mean, then, is such as we have described,
but has not received a name; of those who contribute pleasure, the
man who aims at being pleasant with no ulterior object is obsequious,
but the man who does so in order that he may get some advantage in
the direction of money or the things that money buys is a flatterer;
while the man who quarrels with everything is, as has been said, churlish
and contentious. And the extremes seem to be contradictory to each
other because the mean is without a name.

7

The mean opposed to boastfulness is found in almost the same sphere;
and this also is without a name. It will be no bad plan to describe
these states as well; for we shall both know the facts about character
better if we go through them in detail, and we shall be convinced
that the virtues are means if we see this to be so in all cases. In
the field of social life those who make the giving of pleasure or
pain their object in associating with others have been described;
let us now describe those who pursue truth or falsehood alike in words
and deeds and in the claims they put forward. The boastful man, then,
is thought to be apt to claim the things that bring glory, when he
has not got them, or to claim more of them than he has, and the mock-modest
man on the other hand to disclaim what he has or belittle it, while
the man who observes the mean is one who calls a thing by its own
name, being truthful both in life and in word, owning to what he has,
and neither more nor less. Now each of these courses may be adopted
either with or without an object. But each man speaks and acts and
lives in accordance with his character, if he is not acting for some
ulterior object. And falsehood is in itself mean and culpable, and
truth noble and worthy of praise. Thus the truthful man is another
case of a man who, being in the mean, is worthy of praise, and both
forms of untruthful man are culpable, and particularly the boastful
man.

Let us discuss them both, but first of all the truthful man. We are
not speaking of the man who keeps faith in his agreements, i.e. in
the things that pertain to justice or injustice (for this would belong
to another virtue), but the man who in the matters in which nothing
of this sort is at stake is true both in word and in life because
his character is such. But such a man would seem to be as a matter
of fact equitable. For the man who loves truth, and is truthful where
nothing is at stake, will still more be truthful where something is
at stake; he will avoid falsehood as something base, seeing that he
avoided it even for its own sake; and such a man is worthy of praise.
He inclines rather to understate the truth; for this seems in better
taste because exaggerations are wearisome.

He who claims more than he has with no ulterior object is a contemptible
sort of fellow (otherwise he would not have delighted in falsehood),
but seems futile rather than bad; but if he does it for an object,
he who does it for the sake of reputation or honour is (for a boaster)
not very much to be blamed, but he who does it for money, or the things
that lead to money, is an uglier character (it is not the capacity
that makes the boaster, but the purpose; for it is in virtue of his
state of character and by being a man of a certain kind that he is
boaster); as one man is a liar because he enjoys the lie itself, and
another because he desires reputation or gain. Now those who boast
for the sake of reputation claim such qualities as will praise or
congratulation, but those whose object is gain claim qualities which
are of value to one’s neighbours and one’s lack of which is not easily
detected, e.g. the powers of a seer, a sage, or a physician. For this
reason it is such things as these that most people claim and boast
about; for in them the above-mentioned qualities are found.

Mock-modest people, who understate things, seem more attractive in
character; for they are thought to speak not for gain but to avoid
parade; and here too it is qualities which bring reputation that they
disclaim, as Socrates used to do. Those who disclaim trifling and
obvious qualities are called humbugs and are more contemptible; and
sometimes this seems to be boastfulness, like the Spartan dress; for
both excess and great deficiency are boastful. But those who use understatement
with moderation and understate about matters that do not very much
force themselves on our notice seem attractive. And it is the boaster
that seems to be opposed to the truthful man; for he is the worse
character.

8

Since life includes rest as well as activity, and in this is included
leisure and amusement, there seems here also to be a kind of intercourse
which is tasteful; there is such a thing as saying- and again listening
to- what one should and as one should. The kind of people one is speaking
or listening to will also make a difference. Evidently here also there
is both an excess and a deficiency as compared with the mean. Those
who carry humour to excess are thought to be vulgar buffoons, striving
after humour at all costs, and aiming rather at raising a laugh than
at saying what is becoming and at avoiding pain to the object of their
fun; while those who can neither make a joke themselves nor put up
with those who do are thought to be boorish and unpolished. But those
who joke in a tasteful way are called ready-witted, which implies
a sort of readiness to turn this way and that; for such sallies are
thought to be movements of the character, and as bodies are discriminated
by their movements, so too are characters. The ridiculous side of
things is not far to seek, however, and most people delight more than
they should in amusement and in jestinly. and so even buffoons are
called ready-witted because they are found attractive; but that they
differ from the ready-witted man, and to no small extent, is clear
from what has been said.

To the middle state belongs also tact; it is the mark of a tactful
man to say and listen to such things as befit a good and well-bred
man; for there are some things that it befits such a man to say and
to hear by way of jest, and the well-bred man’s jesting differs from
that of a vulgar man, and the joking of an educated man from that
of an uneducated. One may see this even from the old and the new comedies;
to the authors of the former indecency of language was amusing, to
those of the latter innuendo is more so; and these differ in no small
degree in respect of propriety. Now should we define the man who jokes
well by his saying what is not unbecoming to a well-bred man, or by
his not giving pain, or even giving delight, to the hearer? Or is
the latter definition, at any rate, itself indefinite, since different
things are hateful or pleasant to different people? The kind of jokes
he will listen to will be the same; for the kind he can put up with
are also the kind he seems to make. There are, then, jokes he will
not make; for the jest is a sort of abuse, and there are things that
lawgivers forbid us to abuse; and they should, perhaps, have forbidden
us even to make a jest of such. The refined and well-bred man, therefore,
will be as we have described, being as it were a law to himself.

Such, then, is the man who observes the mean, whether he be called
tactful or ready-witted. The buffoon, on the other hand, is the slave
of his sense of humour, and spares neither himself nor others if he
can raise a laugh, and says things none of which a man of refinement
would say, and to some of which he would not even listen. The boor,
again, is useless for such social intercourse; for he contributes
nothing and finds fault with everything. But relaxation and amusement
are thought to be a necessary element in life.

The means in life that have been described, then, are three in number,
and are all concerned with an interchange of words and deeds of some
kind. They differ, however, in that one is concerned with truth; and
the other two with pleasantness. Of those concerned with pleasure,
one is displayed in jests, the other in the general social intercourse
of life.

9

Shame should not be described as a virtue; for it is more like a feeling
than a state of character. It is defined, at any rate, as a kind of
fear of dishonour, and produces an effect similar to that produced
by fear of danger; for people who feel disgraced blush, and those
who fear death turn pale. Both, therefore, seem to be in a sense bodily
conditions, which is thought to be characteristic of feeling rather
than of a state of character.

The feeling is not becoming to every age, but only to youth. For we
think young people should be prone to the feeling of shame because
they live by feeling and therefore commit many errors, but are restrained
by shame; and we praise young people who are prone to this feeling,
but an older person no one would praise for being prone to the sense
of disgrace, since we think he should not do anything that need cause
this sense. For the sense of disgrace is not even characteristic of
a good man, since it is consequent on bad actions (for such actions
should not be done; and if some actions are disgraceful in very truth
and others only according to common opinion, this makes no difference;
for neither class of actions should be done, so that no disgrace should
be felt); and it is a mark of a bad man even to be such as to do any
disgraceful action. To be so constituted as to feel disgraced if one
does such an action, and for this reason to think oneself good, is
absurd; for it is for voluntary actions that shame is felt, and the
good man will never voluntarily do bad actions. But shame may be said
to be conditionally a good thing; if a good man does such actions,
he will feel disgraced; but the virtues are not subject to such a
qualification. And if shamelessness-not to be ashamed of doing base
actions-is bad, that does not make it good to be ashamed of doing
such actions. Continence too is not virtue, but a mixed sort of state;
this will be shown later. Now, however, let us discuss justice.

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