BOOK II

1

Virtue, then, being of two kinds, intellectual and moral, intellectual
virtue in the main owes both its birth and its growth to teaching
(for which reason it requires experience and time), while moral virtue
comes about as a result of habit, whence also its name (ethike) is
one that is formed by a slight variation from the word ethos (habit).
From this it is also plain that none of the moral virtues arises in
us by nature; for nothing that exists by nature can form a habit contrary
to its nature. For instance the stone which by nature moves downwards
cannot be habituated to move upwards, not even if one tries to train
it by throwing it up ten thousand times; nor can fire be habituated
to move downwards, nor can anything else that by nature behaves in
one way be trained to behave in another. Neither by nature, then,
nor contrary to nature do the virtues arise in us; rather we are adapted
by nature to receive them, and are made perfect by habit.

Again, of all the things that come to us by nature we first acquire
the potentiality and later exhibit the activity (this is plain in
the case of the senses; for it was not by often seeing or often hearing
that we got these senses, but on the contrary we had them before we
used them, and did not come to have them by using them); but the virtues
we get by first exercising them, as also happens in the case of the
arts as well. For the things we have to learn before we can do them,
we learn by doing them, e.g. men become builders by building and lyreplayers
by playing the lyre; so too we become just by doing just acts, temperate
by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts.

This is confirmed by what happens in states; for legislators make
the citizens good by forming habits in them, and this is the wish
of every legislator, and those who do not effect it miss their mark,
and it is in this that a good constitution differs from a bad one.

Again, it is from the same causes and by the same means that every
virtue is both produced and destroyed, and similarly every art; for
it is from playing the lyre that both good and bad lyre-players are
produced. And the corresponding statement is true of builders and
of all the rest; men will be good or bad builders as a result of building
well or badly. For if this were not so, there would have been no need
of a teacher, but all men would have been born good or bad at their
craft. This, then, is the case with the virtues also; by doing the
acts that we do in our transactions with other men we become just
or unjust, and by doing the acts that we do in the presence of danger,
and being habituated to feel fear or confidence, we become brave or
cowardly. The same is true of appetites and feelings of anger; some
men become temperate and good-tempered, others self-indulgent and
irascible, by behaving in one way or the other in the appropriate
circumstances. Thus, in one word, states of character arise out of
like activities. This is why the activities we exhibit must be of
a certain kind; it is because the states of character correspond to
the differences between these. It makes no small difference, then,
whether we form habits of one kind or of another from our very youth;
it makes a very great difference, or rather all the difference.

2

Since, then, the present inquiry does not aim at theoretical knowledge
like the others (for we are inquiring not in order to know what virtue
is, but in order to become good, since otherwise our inquiry would
have been of no use), we must examine the nature of actions, namely
how we ought to do them; for these determine also the nature of the
states of character that are produced, as we have said. Now, that
we must act according to the right rule is a common principle and
must be assumed-it will be discussed later, i.e. both what the right
rule is, and how it is related to the other virtues. But this must
be agreed upon beforehand, that the whole account of matters of conduct
must be given in outline and not precisely, as we said at the very
beginning that the accounts we demand must be in accordance with the
subject-matter; matters concerned with conduct and questions of what
is good for us have no fixity, any more than matters of health. The
general account being of this nature, the account of particular cases
is yet more lacking in exactness; for they do not fall under any art
or precept but the agents themselves must in each case consider what
is appropriate to the occasion, as happens also in the art of medicine
or of navigation.

But though our present account is of this nature we must give what
help we can. First, then, let us consider this, that it is the nature
of such things to be destroyed by defect and excess, as we see in
the case of strength and of health (for to gain light on things imperceptible
we must use the evidence of sensible things); both excessive and defective
exercise destroys the strength, and similarly drink or food which
is above or below a certain amount destroys the health, while that
which is proportionate both produces and increases and preserves it.
So too is it, then, in the case of temperance and courage and the
other virtues. For the man who flies from and fears everything and
does not stand his ground against anything becomes a coward, and the
man who fears nothing at all but goes to meet every danger becomes
rash; and similarly the man who indulges in every pleasure and abstains
from none becomes self-indulgent, while the man who shuns every pleasure,
as boors do, becomes in a way insensible; temperance and courage,
then, are destroyed by excess and defect, and preserved by the mean.

But not only are the sources and causes of their origination and growth
the same as those of their destruction, but also the sphere of their
actualization will be the same; for this is also true of the things
which are more evident to sense, e.g. of strength; it is produced
by taking much food and undergoing much exertion, and it is the strong
man that will be most able to do these things. So too is it with the
virtues; by abstaining from pleasures we become temperate, and it
is when we have become so that we are most able to abstain from them;
and similarly too in the case of courage; for by being habituated
to despise things that are terrible and to stand our ground against
them we become brave, and it is when we have become so that we shall
be most able to stand our ground against them.

3

We must take as a sign of states of character the pleasure or pain
that ensues on acts; for the man who abstains from bodily pleasures
and delights in this very fact is temperate, while the man who is
annoyed at it is self-indulgent, and he who stands his ground against
things that are terrible and delights in this or at least is not pained
is brave, while the man who is pained is a coward. For moral excellence
is concerned with pleasures and pains; it is on account of the pleasure
that we do bad things, and on account of the pain that we abstain
from noble ones. Hence we ought to have been brought up in a particular
way from our very youth, as Plato says, so as both to delight in and
to be pained by the things that we ought; for this is the right education.

Again, if the virtues are concerned with actions and passions, and
every passion and every action is accompanied by pleasure and pain,
for this reason also virtue will be concerned with pleasures and pains.
This is indicated also by the fact that punishment is inflicted by
these means; for it is a kind of cure, and it is the nature of cures
to be effected by contraries.

Again, as we said but lately, every state of soul has a nature relative
to and concerned with the kind of things by which it tends to be made
worse or better; but it is by reason of pleasures and pains that men
become bad, by pursuing and avoiding these- either the pleasures and
pains they ought not or when they ought not or as they ought not,
or by going wrong in one of the other similar ways that may be distinguished.
Hence men even define the virtues as certain states of impassivity
and rest; not well, however, because they speak absolutely, and do
not say ‘as one ought’ and ‘as one ought not’ and ‘when one ought
or ought not’, and the other things that may be added. We assume,
then, that this kind of excellence tends to do what is best with regard
to pleasures and pains, and vice does the contrary.

The following facts also may show us that virtue and vice are concerned
with these same things. There being three objects of choice and three
of avoidance, the noble, the advantageous, the pleasant, and their
contraries, the base, the injurious, the painful, about all of these
the good man tends to go right and the bad man to go wrong, and especially
about pleasure; for this is common to the animals, and also it accompanies
all objects of choice; for even the noble and the advantageous appear
pleasant.

Again, it has grown up with us all from our infancy; this is why it
is difficult to rub off this passion, engrained as it is in our life.
And we measure even our actions, some of us more and others less,
by the rule of pleasure and pain. For this reason, then, our whole
inquiry must be about these; for to feel delight and pain rightly
or wrongly has no small effect on our actions.

Again, it is harder to fight with pleasure than with anger, to use
Heraclitus’ phrase’, but both art and virtue are always concerned
with what is harder; for even the good is better when it is harder.
Therefore for this reason also the whole concern both of virtue and
of political science is with pleasures and pains; for the man who
uses these well will be good, he who uses them badly bad.

That virtue, then, is concerned with pleasures and pains, and that
by the acts from which it arises it is both increased and, if they
are done differently, destroyed, and that the acts from which it arose
are those in which it actualizes itself- let this be taken as said.

4

The question might be asked,; what we mean by saying that we must
become just by doing just acts, and temperate by doing temperate acts;
for if men do just and temperate acts, they are already just and temperate,
exactly as, if they do what is in accordance with the laws of grammar
and of music, they are grammarians and musicians.

Or is this not true even of the arts? It is possible to do something
that is in accordance with the laws of grammar, either by chance or
at the suggestion of another. A man will be a grammarian, then, only
when he has both done something grammatical and done it grammatically;
and this means doing it in accordance with the grammatical knowledge
in himself.

Again, the case of the arts and that of the virtues are not similar;
for the products of the arts have their goodness in themselves, so
that it is enough that they should have a certain character, but if
the acts that are in accordance with the virtues have themselves a
certain character it does not follow that they are done justly or
temperately. The agent also must be in a certain condition when he
does them; in the first place he must have knowledge, secondly he
must choose the acts, and choose them for their own sakes, and thirdly
his action must proceed from a firm and unchangeable character. These
are not reckoned in as conditions of the possession of the arts, except
the bare knowledge; but as a condition of the possession of the virtues
knowledge has little or no weight, while the other conditions count
not for a little but for everything, i.e. the very conditions which
result from often doing just and temperate acts.

Actions, then, are called just and temperate when they are such as
the just or the temperate man would do; but it is not the man who
does these that is just and temperate, but the man who also does them
as just and temperate men do them. It is well said, then, that it
is by doing just acts that the just man is produced, and by doing
temperate acts the temperate man; without doing these no one would
have even a prospect of becoming good.

But most people do not do these, but take refuge in theory and think
they are being philosophers and will become good in this way, behaving
somewhat like patients who listen attentively to their doctors, but
do none of the things they are ordered to do. As the latter will not
be made well in body by such a course of treatment, the former will
not be made well in soul by such a course of philosophy.

5

Next we must consider what virtue is. Since things that are found
in the soul are of three kinds- passions, faculties, states of character,
virtue must be one of these. By passions I mean appetite, anger, fear,
confidence, envy, joy, friendly feeling, hatred, longing, emulation,
pity, and in general the feelings that are accompanied by pleasure
or pain; by faculties the things in virtue of which we are said to
be capable of feeling these, e.g. of becoming angry or being pained
or feeling pity; by states of character the things in virtue of which
we stand well or badly with reference to the passions, e.g. with reference
to anger we stand badly if we feel it violently or too weakly, and
well if we feel it moderately; and similarly with reference to the
other passions.

Now neither the virtues nor the vices are passions, because we are
not called good or bad on the ground of our passions, but are so called
on the ground of our virtues and our vices, and because we are neither
praised nor blamed for our passions (for the man who feels fear or
anger is not praised, nor is the man who simply feels anger blamed,
but the man who feels it in a certain way), but for our virtues and
our vices we are praised or blamed.

Again, we feel anger and fear without choice, but the virtues are
modes of choice or involve choice. Further, in respect of the passions
we are said to be moved, but in respect of the virtues and the vices
we are said not to be moved but to be disposed in a particular way.

For these reasons also they are not faculties; for we are neither
called good nor bad, nor praised nor blamed, for the simple capacity
of feeling the passions; again, we have the faculties by nature, but
we are not made good or bad by nature; we have spoken of this before.
If, then, the virtues are neither passions nor faculties, all that
remains is that they should be states of character.

Thus we have stated what virtue is in respect of its genus.

6

We must, however, not only describe virtue as a state of character,
but also say what sort of state it is. We may remark, then, that every
virtue or excellence both brings into good condition the thing of
which it is the excellence and makes the work of that thing be done
well; e.g. the excellence of the eye makes both the eye and its work
good; for it is by the excellence of the eye that we see well. Similarly
the excellence of the horse makes a horse both good in itself and
good at running and at carrying its rider and at awaiting the attack
of the enemy. Therefore, if this is true in every case, the virtue
of man also will be the state of character which makes a man good
and which makes him do his own work well.

How this is to happen we have stated already, but it will be made
plain also by the following consideration of the specific nature of
virtue. In everything that is continuous and divisible it is possible
to take more, less, or an equal amount, and that either in terms of
the thing itself or relatively to us; and the equal is an intermediate
between excess and defect. By the intermediate in the object I mean
that which is equidistant from each of the extremes, which is one
and the same for all men; by the intermediate relatively to us that
which is neither too much nor too little- and this is not one, nor
the same for all. For instance, if ten is many and two is few, six
is the intermediate, taken in terms of the object; for it exceeds
and is exceeded by an equal amount; this is intermediate according
to arithmetical proportion. But the intermediate relatively to us
is not to be taken so; if ten pounds are too much for a particular
person to eat and two too little, it does not follow that the trainer
will order six pounds; for this also is perhaps too much for the person
who is to take it, or too little- too little for Milo, too much for
the beginner in athletic exercises. The same is true of running and
wrestling. Thus a master of any art avoids excess and defect, but
seeks the intermediate and chooses this- the intermediate not in the
object but relatively to us.

If it is thus, then, that every art does its work well- by looking
to the intermediate and judgling its works by this standard (so that
we often say of good works of art that it is not possible either to
take away or to add anything, implying that excess and defect destroy
the goodness of works of art, while the mean preserves it; and good
artists, as we say, look to this in their work), and if, further,
virtue is more exact and better than any art, as nature also is, then
virtue must have the quality of aiming at the intermediate. I mean
moral virtue; for it is this that is concerned with passions and actions,
and in these there is excess, defect, and the intermediate. For instance,
both fear and confidence and appetite and anger and pity and in general
pleasure and pain may be felt both too much and too little, and in
both cases not well; but to feel them at the right times, with reference
to the right objects, towards the right people, with the right motive,
and in the right way, is what is both intermediate and best, and this
is characteristic of virtue. Similarly with regard to actions also
there is excess, defect, and the intermediate. Now virtue is concerned
with passions and actions, in which excess is a form of failure, and
so is defect, while the intermediate is praised and is a form of success;
and being praised and being successful are both characteristics of
virtue. Therefore virtue is a kind of mean, since, as we have seen,
it aims at what is intermediate.

Again, it is possible to fail in many ways (for evil belongs to the
class of the unlimited, as the Pythagoreans conjectured, and good
to that of the limited), while to succeed is possible only in one
way (for which reason also one is easy and the other difficult- to
miss the mark easy, to hit it difficult); for these reasons also,
then, excess and defect are characteristic of vice, and the mean of
virtue;

For men are good in but one way, but bad in many.

Virtue, then, is a state of character concerned with choice, lying
in a mean, i.e. the mean relative to us, this being determined by
a rational principle, and by that principle by which the man of practical
wisdom would determine it. Now it is a mean between two vices, that
which depends on excess and that which depends on defect; and again
it is a mean because the vices respectively fall short of or exceed
what is right in both passions and actions, while virtue both finds
and chooses that which is intermediate. Hence in respect of its substance
and the definition which states its essence virtue is a mean, with
regard to what is best and right an extreme.

But not every action nor every passion admits of a mean; for some
have names that already imply badness, e.g. spite, shamelessness,
envy, and in the case of actions adultery, theft, murder; for all
of these and suchlike things imply by their names that they are themselves
bad, and not the excesses or deficiencies of them. It is not possible,
then, ever to be right with regard to them; one must always be wrong.
Nor does goodness or badness with regard to such things depend on
committing adultery with the right woman, at the right time, and in
the right way, but simply to do any of them is to go wrong. It would
be equally absurd, then, to expect that in unjust, cowardly, and voluptuous
action there should be a mean, an excess, and a deficiency; for at
that rate there would be a mean of excess and of deficiency, an excess
of excess, and a deficiency of deficiency. But as there is no excess
and deficiency of temperance and courage because what is intermediate
is in a sense an extreme, so too of the actions we have mentioned
there is no mean nor any excess and deficiency, but however they are
done they are wrong; for in general there is neither a mean of excess
and deficiency, nor excess and deficiency of a mean.

7

We must, however, not only make this general statement, but also apply
it to the individual facts. For among statements about conduct those
which are general apply more widely, but those which are particular
are more genuine, since conduct has to do with individual cases, and
our statements must harmonize with the facts in these cases. We may
take these cases from our table. With regard to feelings of fear and
confidence courage is the mean; of the people who exceed, he who exceeds
in fearlessness has no name (many of the states have no name), while
the man who exceeds in confidence is rash, and he who exceeds in fear
and falls short in confidence is a coward. With regard to pleasures
and pains- not all of them, and not so much with regard to the pains-
the mean is temperance, the excess self-indulgence. Persons deficient
with regard to the pleasures are not often found; hence such persons
also have received no name. But let us call them ‘insensible’.

With regard to giving and taking of money the mean is liberality,
the excess and the defect prodigality and meanness. In these actions
people exceed and fall short in contrary ways; the prodigal exceeds
in spending and falls short in taking, while the mean man exceeds
in taking and falls short in spending. (At present we are giving a
mere outline or summary, and are satisfied with this; later these
states will be more exactly determined.) With regard to money there
are also other dispositions- a mean, magnificence (for the magnificent
man differs from the liberal man; the former deals with large sums,
the latter with small ones), an excess, tastelessness and vulgarity,
and a deficiency, niggardliness; these differ from the states opposed
to liberality, and the mode of their difference will be stated later.
With regard to honour and dishonour the mean is proper pride, the
excess is known as a sort of ’empty vanity’, and the deficiency is
undue humility; and as we said liberality was related to magnificence,
differing from it by dealing with small sums, so there is a state
similarly related to proper pride, being concerned with small honours
while that is concerned with great. For it is possible to desire honour
as one ought, and more than one ought, and less, and the man who exceeds
in his desires is called ambitious, the man who falls short unambitious,
while the intermediate person has no name. The dispositions also are
nameless, except that that of the ambitious man is called ambition.
Hence the people who are at the extremes lay claim to the middle place;
and we ourselves sometimes call the intermediate person ambitious
and sometimes unambitious, and sometimes praise the ambitious man
and sometimes the unambitious. The reason of our doing this will be
stated in what follows; but now let us speak of the remaining states
according to the method which has been indicated.

With regard to anger also there is an excess, a deficiency, and a
mean. Although they can scarcely be said to have names, yet since
we call the intermediate person good-tempered let us call the mean
good temper; of the persons at the extremes let the one who exceeds
be called irascible, and his vice irascibility, and the man who falls
short an inirascible sort of person, and the deficiency inirascibility.

There are also three other means, which have a certain likeness to
one another, but differ from one another: for they are all concerned
with intercourse in words and actions, but differ in that one is concerned
with truth in this sphere, the other two with pleasantness; and of
this one kind is exhibited in giving amusement, the other in all the
circumstances of life. We must therefore speak of these too, that
we may the better see that in all things the mean is praise-worthy,
and the extremes neither praiseworthy nor right, but worthy of blame.
Now most of these states also have no names, but we must try, as in
the other cases, to invent names ourselves so that we may be clear
and easy to follow. With regard to truth, then, the intermediate is
a truthful sort of person and the mean may be called truthfulness,
while the pretence which exaggerates is boastfulness and the person
characterized by it a boaster, and that which understates is mock
modesty and the person characterized by it mock-modest. With regard
to pleasantness in the giving of amusement the intermediate person
is ready-witted and the disposition ready wit, the excess is buffoonery
and the person characterized by it a buffoon, while the man who falls
short is a sort of boor and his state is boorishness. With regard
to the remaining kind of pleasantness, that which is exhibited in
life in general, the man who is pleasant in the right way is friendly
and the mean is friendliness, while the man who exceeds is an obsequious
person if he has no end in view, a flatterer if he is aiming at his
own advantage, and the man who falls short and is unpleasant in all
circumstances is a quarrelsome and surly sort of person.

There are also means in the passions and concerned with the passions;
since shame is not a virtue, and yet praise is extended to the modest
man. For even in these matters one man is said to be intermediate,
and another to exceed, as for instance the bashful man who is ashamed
of everything; while he who falls short or is not ashamed of anything
at all is shameless, and the intermediate person is modest. Righteous
indignation is a mean between envy and spite, and these states are
concerned with the pain and pleasure that are felt at the fortunes
of our neighbours; the man who is characterized by righteous indignation
is pained at undeserved good fortune, the envious man, going beyond
him, is pained at all good fortune, and the spiteful man falls so
far short of being pained that he even rejoices. But these states
there will be an opportunity of describing elsewhere; with regard
to justice, since it has not one simple meaning, we shall, after describing
the other states, distinguish its two kinds and say how each of them
is a mean; and similarly we shall treat also of the rational virtues.

8

There are three kinds of disposition, then, two of them vices, involving
excess and deficiency respectively, and one a virtue, viz. the mean,
and all are in a sense opposed to all; for the extreme states are
contrary both to the intermediate state and to each other, and the
intermediate to the extremes; as the equal is greater relatively to
the less, less relatively to the greater, so the middle states are
excessive relatively to the deficiencies, deficient relatively to
the excesses, both in passions and in actions. For the brave man appears
rash relatively to the coward, and cowardly relatively to the rash
man; and similarly the temperate man appears self-indulgent relatively
to the insensible man, insensible relatively to the self-indulgent,
and the liberal man prodigal relatively to the mean man, mean relatively
to the prodigal. Hence also the people at the extremes push the intermediate
man each over to the other, and the brave man is called rash by the
coward, cowardly by the rash man, and correspondingly in the other
cases.

These states being thus opposed to one another, the greatest contrariety
is that of the extremes to each other, rather than to the intermediate;
for these are further from each other than from the intermediate,
as the great is further from the small and the small from the great
than both are from the equal. Again, to the intermediate some extremes
show a certain likeness, as that of rashness to courage and that of
prodigality to liberality; but the extremes show the greatest unlikeness
to each other; now contraries are defined as the things that are furthest
from each other, so that things that are further apart are more contrary.

To the mean in some cases the deficiency, in some the excess is more
opposed; e.g. it is not rashness, which is an excess, but cowardice,
which is a deficiency, that is more opposed to courage, and not insensibility,
which is a deficiency, but self-indulgence, which is an excess, that
is more opposed to temperance. This happens from two reasons, one
being drawn from the thing itself; for because one extreme is nearer
and liker to the intermediate, we oppose not this but rather its contrary
to the intermediate. E.g. since rashness is thought liker and nearer
to courage, and cowardice more unlike, we oppose rather the latter
to courage; for things that are further from the intermediate are
thought more contrary to it. This, then, is one cause, drawn from
the thing itself; another is drawn from ourselves; for the things
to which we ourselves more naturally tend seem more contrary to the
intermediate. For instance, we ourselves tend more naturally to pleasures,
and hence are more easily carried away towards self-indulgence than
towards propriety. We describe as contrary to the mean, then, rather
the directions in which we more often go to great lengths; and therefore
self-indulgence, which is an excess, is the more contrary to temperance.

9

That moral virtue is a mean, then, and in what sense it is so, and
that it is a mean between two vices, the one involving excess, the
other deficiency, and that it is such because its character is to
aim at what is intermediate in passions and in actions, has been sufficiently
stated. Hence also it is no easy task to be good. For in everything
it is no easy task to find the middle, e.g. to find the middle of
a circle is not for every one but for him who knows; so, too, any
one can get angry- that is easy- or give or spend money; but to do
this to the right person, to the right extent, at the right time,
with the right motive, and in the right way, that is not for every
one, nor is it easy; wherefore goodness is both rare and laudable
and noble.

Hence he who aims at the intermediate must first depart from what
is the more contrary to it, as Calypso advises-

Hold the ship out beyond that surf and spray.

For of the extremes one is more erroneous, one less so; therefore,
since to hit the mean is hard in the extreme, we must as a second
best, as people say, take the least of the evils; and this will be
done best in the way we describe. But we must consider the things
towards which we ourselves also are easily carried away; for some
of us tend to one thing, some to another; and this will be recognizable
from the pleasure and the pain we feel. We must drag ourselves away
to the contrary extreme; for we shall get into the intermediate state
by drawing well away from error, as people do in straightening sticks
that are bent.

Now in everything the pleasant or pleasure is most to be guarded against;
for we do not judge it impartially. We ought, then, to feel towards
pleasure as the elders of the people felt towards Helen, and in all
circumstances repeat their saying; for if we dismiss pleasure thus
we are less likely to go astray. It is by doing this, then, (to sum
the matter up) that we shall best be able to hit the mean.

But this is no doubt difficult, and especially in individual cases;
for or is not easy to determine both how and with whom and on what
provocation and how long one should be angry; for we too sometimes
praise those who fall short and call them good-tempered, but sometimes
we praise those who get angry and call them manly. The man, however,
who deviates little from goodness is not blamed, whether he do so
in the direction of the more or of the less, but only the man who
deviates more widely; for he does not fail to be noticed. But up to
what point and to what extent a man must deviate before he becomes
blameworthy it is not easy to determine by reasoning, any more than
anything else that is perceived by the senses; such things depend
on particular facts, and the decision rests with perception. So much,
then, is plain, that the intermediate state is in all things to be
praised, but that we must incline sometimes towards the excess, sometimes
towards the deficiency; for so shall we most easily hit the mean and
what is right.

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