ORIGINAL TEXT Nicomachean Ethics
October 31, 2008
Of the irrational element one division seems to be widely distributed,
and vegetative in its nature, I mean that which causes nutrition and
growth; for it is this kind of power of the soul that one must assign
to all nurslings and to embryos, and this same power to fullgrown
creatures; this is more reasonable than to assign some different power
to them. Now the excellence of this seems to be common to all species
and not specifically human; for this part or faculty seems to function
most in sleep, while goodness and badness are least manifest in sleep
(whence comes the saying that the happy are not better off than the
wretched for half their lives; and this happens naturally enough,
since sleep is an inactivity of the soul in that respect in which
it is called good or bad), unless perhaps to a small extent some of
the movements actually penetrate to the soul, and in this respect
the dreams of good men are better than those of ordinary people. Enough
of this subject, however; let us leave the nutritive faculty alone,
since it has by its nature no share in human excellence.
There seems to be also another irrational element in the soul-one
which in a sense, however, shares in a rational principle. For we
praise the rational principle of the continent man and of the incontinent,
and the part of their soul that has such a principle, since it urges
them aright and towards the best objects; but there is found in them
also another element naturally opposed to the rational principle,
which fights against and resists that principle. For exactly as paralysed
limbs when we intend to move them to the right turn on the contrary
to the left, so is it with the soul; the impulses of incontinent people
move in contrary directions. But while in the body we see that which
moves astray, in the soul we do not. No doubt, however, we must none
the less suppose that in the soul too there is something contrary
to the rational principle, resisting and opposing it. In what sense
it is distinct from the other elements does not concern us. Now even
this seems to have a share in a rational principle, as we said; at
any rate in the continent man it obeys the rational principle and
presumably in the temperate and brave man it is still more obedient;
for in him it speaks, on all matters, with the same voice as the rational
principle.
Therefore the irrational element also appears to be two-fold. For
the vegetative element in no way shares in a rational principle, but
the appetitive and in general the desiring element in a sense shares
in it, in so far as it listens to and obeys it; this is the sense
in which we speak of ‘taking account’ of one’s father or one’s friends,
not that in which we speak of ‘accounting for a mathematical property.
That the irrational element is in some sense persuaded by a rational
principle is indicated also by the giving of advice and by all reproof
and exhortation. And if this element also must be said to have a rational
principle, that which has a rational principle (as well as that which
has not) will be twofold, one subdivision having it in the strict
sense and in itself, and the other having a tendency to obey as one
does one’s father.
Virtue too is distinguished into kinds in accordance with this difference;
for we say that some of the virtues are intellectual and others moral,
philosophic wisdom and understanding and practical wisdom being intellectual,
liberality and temperance moral. For in speaking about a man’s character
we do not say that he is wise or has understanding but that he is
good-tempered or temperate; yet we praise the wise man also with respect
to his state of mind; and of states of mind we call those which merit
praise virtues.
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