BOOK VIII

1

After what we have said, a discussion of friendship would naturally
follow, since it is a virtue or implies virtue, and is besides most
necessary with a view to living. For without friends no one would
choose to live, though he had all other goods; even rich men and those
in possession of office and of dominating power are thought to need
friends most of all; for what is the use of such prosperity without
the opportunity of beneficence, which is exercised chiefly and in
its most laudable form towards friends? Or how can prosperity be guarded
and preserved without friends? The greater it is, the more exposed
is it to risk. And in poverty and in other misfortunes men think friends
are the only refuge. It helps the young, too, to keep from error;
it aids older people by ministering to their needs and supplementing
the activities that are failing from weakness; those in the prime
of life it stimulates to noble actions-‘two going together’-for with
friends men are more able both to think and to act. Again, parent
seems by nature to feel it for offspring and offspring for parent,
not only among men but among birds and among most animals; it is felt
mutually by members of the same race, and especially by men, whence
we praise lovers of their fellowmen. We may even in our travels how
near and dear every man is to every other. Friendship seems too to
hold states together, and lawgivers to care more for it than for justice;
for unanimity seems to be something like friendship, and this they
aim at most of all, and expel faction as their worst enemy; and when
men are friends they have no need of justice, while when they are
just they need friendship as well, and the truest form of justice
is thought to be a friendly quality.

But it is not only necessary but also noble; for we praise those who
love their friends, and it is thought to be a fine thing to have many
friends; and again we think it is the same people that are good men
and are friends.

Not a few things about friendship are matters of debate. Some define
it as a kind of likeness and say like people are friends, whence come
the sayings ‘like to like’, ‘birds of a feather flock together’, and
so on; others on the contrary say ‘two of a trade never agree’. On
this very question they inquire for deeper and more physical causes,
Euripides saying that ‘parched earth loves the rain, and stately heaven
when filled with rain loves to fall to earth’, and Heraclitus that
‘it is what opposes that helps’ and ‘from different tones comes the
fairest tune’ and ‘all things are produced through strife’; while
Empedocles, as well as others, expresses the opposite view that like
aims at like. The physical problems we may leave alone (for they do
not belong to the present inquiry); let us examine those which are
human and involve character and feeling, e.g. whether friendship can
arise between any two people or people cannot be friends if they are
wicked, and whether there is one species of friendship or more than
one. Those who think there is only one because it admits of degrees
have relied on an inadequate indication; for even things different
in species admit of degree. We have discussed this matter previously.

2

The kinds of friendship may perhaps be cleared up if we first come
to know the object of love. For not everything seems to be loved but
only the lovable, and this is good, pleasant, or useful; but it would
seem to be that by which some good or pleasure is produced that is
useful, so that it is the good and the useful that are lovable as
ends. Do men love, then, the good, or what is good for them? These
sometimes clash. So too with regard to the pleasant. Now it is thought
that each loves what is good for himself, and that the good is without
qualification lovable, and what is good for each man is lovable for
him; but each man loves not what is good for him but what seems good.
This however will make no difference; we shall just have to say that
this is ‘that which seems lovable’. Now there are three grounds on
which people love; of the love of lifeless objects we do not use the
word ‘friendship’; for it is not mutual love, nor is there a wishing
of good to the other (for it would surely be ridiculous to wish wine
well; if one wishes anything for it, it is that it may keep, so that
one may have it oneself); but to a friend we say we ought to wish
what is good for his sake. But to those who thus wish good we ascribe
only goodwill, if the wish is not reciprocated; goodwill when it is
reciprocal being friendship. Or must we add ‘when it is recognized’?
For many people have goodwill to those whom they have not seen but
judge to be good or useful; and one of these might return this feeling.
These people seem to bear goodwill to each other; but how could one
call them friends when they do not know their mutual feelings? To
be friends, then, the must be mutually recognized as bearing goodwill
and wishing well to each other for one of the aforesaid reasons.

3

Now these reasons differ from each other in kind; so, therefore, do
the corresponding forms of love and friendship. There are therefore
three kinds of friendship, equal in number to the things that are
lovable; for with respect to each there is a mutual and recognized
love, and those who love each other wish well to each other in that
respect in which they love one another. Now those who love each other
for their utility do not love each other for themselves but in virtue
of some good which they get from each other. So too with those who
love for the sake of pleasure; it is not for their character that
men love ready-witted people, but because they find them pleasant.
Therefore those who love for the sake of utility love for the sake
of what is good for themselves, and those who love for the sake of
pleasure do so for the sake of what is pleasant to themselves, and
not in so far as the other is the person loved but in so far as he
is useful or pleasant. And thus these friendships are only incidental;
for it is not as being the man he is that the loved person is loved,
but as providing some good or pleasure. Such friendships, then, are
easily dissolved, if the parties do not remain like themselves; for
if the one party is no longer pleasant or useful the other ceases
to love him.

Now the useful is not permanent but is always changing. Thus when
the motive of the friendship is done away, the friendship is dissolved,
inasmuch as it existed only for the ends in question. This kind of
friendship seems to exist chiefly between old people (for at that
age people pursue not the pleasant but the useful) and, of those who
are in their prime or young, between those who pursue utility. And
such people do not live much with each other either; for sometimes
they do not even find each other pleasant; therefore they do not need
such companionship unless they are useful to each other; for they
are pleasant to each other only in so far as they rouse in each other
hopes of something good to come. Among such friendships people also
class the friendship of a host and guest. On the other hand the friendship
of young people seems to aim at pleasure; for they live under the
guidance of emotion, and pursue above all what is pleasant to themselves
and what is immediately before them; but with increasing age their
pleasures become different. This is why they quickly become friends
and quickly cease to be so; their friendship changes with the object
that is found pleasant, and such pleasure alters quickly. Young people
are amorous too; for the greater part of the friendship of love depends
on emotion and aims at pleasure; this is why they fall in love and
quickly fall out of love, changing often within a single day. But
these people do wish to spend their days and lives together; for it
is thus that they attain the purpose of their friendship.

Perfect friendship is the friendship of men who are good, and alike
in virtue; for these wish well alike to each other qua good, and they
are good themselves. Now those who wish well to their friends for
their sake are most truly friends; for they do this by reason of own
nature and not incidentally; therefore their friendship lasts as long
as they are good-and goodness is an enduring thing. And each is good
without qualification and to his friend, for the good are both good
without qualification and useful to each other. So too they are pleasant;
for the good are pleasant both without qualification and to each other,
since to each his own activities and others like them are pleasurable,
and the actions of the good are the same or like. And such a friendship
is as might be expected permanent, since there meet in it all the
qualities that friends should have. For all friendship is for the
sake of good or of pleasure-good or pleasure either in the abstract
or such as will be enjoyed by him who has the friendly feeling-and
is based on a certain resemblance; and to a friendship of good men
all the qualities we have named belong in virtue of the nature of
the friends themselves; for in the case of this kind of friendship
the other qualities also are alike in both friends, and that which
is good without qualification is also without qualification pleasant,
and these are the most lovable qualities. Love and friendship therefore
are found most and in their best form between such men.

But it is natural that such friendships should be infrequent; for
such men are rare. Further, such friendship requires time and familiarity;
as the proverb says, men cannot know each other till they have ‘eaten
salt together’; nor can they admit each other to friendship or be
friends till each has been found lovable and been trusted by each.
Those who quickly show the marks of friendship to each other wish
to be friends, but are not friends unless they both are lovable and
know the fact; for a wish for friendship may arise quickly, but friendship
does not.

4

This kind of friendship, then, is perfect both in respect of duration
and in all other respects, and in it each gets from each in all respects
the same as, or something like what, he gives; which is what ought
to happen between friends. Friendship for the sake of pleasure bears
a resemblance to this kind; for good people too are pleasant to each
other. So too does friendship for the sake of utility; for the good
are also useful to each other. Among men of these inferior sorts too,
friendships are most permanent when the friends get the same thing
from each other (e.g. pleasure), and not only that but also from the
same source, as happens between readywitted people, not as happens
between lover and beloved. For these do not take pleasure in the same
things, but the one in seeing the beloved and the other in receiving
attentions from his lover; and when the bloom of youth is passing
the friendship sometimes passes too (for the one finds no pleasure
in the sight of the other, and the other gets no attentions from the
first); but many lovers on the other hand are constant, if familiarity
has led them to love each other’s characters, these being alike. But
those who exchange not pleasure but utility in their amour are both
less truly friends and less constant. Those who are friends for the
sake of utility part when the advantage is at an end; for they were
lovers not of each other but of profit.

For the sake of pleasure or utility, then, even bad men may be friends
of each other, or good men of bad, or one who is neither good nor
bad may be a friend to any sort of person, but for their own sake
clearly only good men can be friends; for bad men do not delight in
each other unless some advantage come of the relation.

The friendship of the good too and this alone is proof against slander;
for it is not easy to trust any one talk about a man who has long
been tested by oneself; and it is among good men that trust and the
feeling that ‘he would never wrong me’ and all the other things that
are demanded in true friendship are found. In the other kinds of friendship,
however, there is nothing to prevent these evils arising. For men
apply the name of friends even to those whose motive is utility, in
which sense states are said to be friendly (for the alliances of states
seem to aim at advantage), and to those who love each other for the
sake of pleasure, in which sense children are called friends. Therefore
we too ought perhaps to call such people friends, and say that there
are several kinds of friendship-firstly and in the proper sense that
of good men qua good, and by analogy the other kinds; for it is in
virtue of something good and something akin to what is found in true
friendship that they are friends, since even the pleasant is good
for the lovers of pleasure. But these two kinds of friendship are
not often united, nor do the same people become friends for the sake
of utility and of pleasure; for things that are only incidentally
connected are not often coupled together.

Friendship being divided into these kinds, bad men will be friends
for the sake of pleasure or of utility, being in this respect like
each other, but good men will be friends for their own sake, i.e.
in virtue of their goodness. These, then, are friends without qualification;
the others are friends incidentally and through a resemblance to these.

5

As in regard to the virtues some men are called good in respect of
a state of character, others in respect of an activity, so too in
the case of friendship; for those who live together delight in each
other and confer benefits on each other, but those who are asleep
or locally separated are not performing, but are disposed to perform,
the activities of friendship; distance does not break off the friendship
absolutely, but only the activity of it. But if the absence is lasting,
it seems actually to make men forget their friendship; hence the saying
‘out of sight, out of mind’. Neither old people nor sour people seem
to make friends easily; for there is little that is pleasant in them,
and no one can spend his days with one whose company is painful, or
not pleasant, since nature seems above all to avoid the painful and
to aim at the pleasant. Those, however, who approve of each other
but do not live together seem to be well-disposed rather than actual
friends. For there is nothing so characteristic of friends as living
together (since while it people who are in need that desire benefits,
even those who are supremely happy desire to spend their days together;
for solitude suits such people least of all); but people cannot live
together if they are not pleasant and do not enjoy the same things,
as friends who are companions seem to do.

The truest friendship, then, is that of the good, as we have frequently
said; for that which is without qualification good or pleasant seems
to be lovable and desirable, and for each person that which is good
or pleasant to him; and the good man is lovable and desirable to the
good man for both these reasons. Now it looks as if love were a feeling,
friendship a state of character; for love may be felt just as much
towards lifeless things, but mutual love involves choice and choice
springs from a state of character; and men wish well to those whom
they love, for their sake, not as a result of feeling but as a result
of a state of character. And in loving a friend men love what is good
for themselves; for the good man in becoming a friend becomes a good
to his friend. Each, then, both loves what is good for himself, and
makes an equal return in goodwill and in pleasantness; for friendship
is said to be equality, and both of these are found most in the friendship
of the good.

6

Between sour and elderly people friendship arises less readily, inasmuch
as they are less good-tempered and enjoy companionship less; for these
are thou to be the greatest marks of friendship productive of it.
This is why, while men become friends quickly, old men do not; it
is because men do not become friends with those in whom they do not
delight; and similarly sour people do not quickly make friends either.
But such men may bear goodwill to each other; for they wish one another
well and aid one another in need; but they are hardly friends because
they do not spend their days together nor delight in each other, and
these are thought the greatest marks of friendship.

One cannot be a friend to many people in the sense of having friendship
of the perfect type with them, just as one cannot be in love with
many people at once (for love is a sort of excess of feeling, and
it is the nature of such only to be felt towards one person); and
it is not easy for many people at the same time to please the same
person very greatly, or perhaps even to be good in his eyes. One must,
too, acquire some experience of the other person and become familiar
with him, and that is very hard. But with a view to utility or pleasure
it is possible that many people should please one; for many people
are useful or pleasant, and these services take little time.

Of these two kinds that which is for the sake of pleasure is the more
like friendship, when both parties get the same things from each other
and delight in each other or in the things, as in the friendships
of the young; for generosity is more found in such friendships. Friendship
based on utility is for the commercially minded. People who are supremely
happy, too, have no need of useful friends, but do need pleasant friends;
for they wish to live with some one and, though they can endure for
a short time what is painful, no one could put up with it continuously,
nor even with the Good itself if it were painful to him; this is why
they look out for friends who are pleasant. Perhaps they should look
out for friends who, being pleasant, are also good, and good for them
too; for so they will have all the characteristics that friends should
have.

People in positions of authority seem to have friends who fall into
distinct classes; some people are useful to them and others are pleasant,
but the same people are rarely both; for they seek neither those whose
pleasantness is accompanied by virtue nor those whose utility is with
a view to noble objects, but in their desire for pleasure they seek
for ready-witted people, and their other friends they choose as being
clever at doing what they are told, and these characteristics are
rarely combined. Now we have said that the good man is at the same
time pleasant and useful; but such a man does not become the friend
of one who surpasses him in station, unless he is surpassed also in
virtue; if this is not so, he does not establish equality by being
proportionally exceeded in both respects. But people who surpass him
in both respects are not so easy to find.

However that may be, the aforesaid friendships involve equality; for
the friends get the same things from one another and wish the same
things for one another, or exchange one thing for another, e.g. pleasure
for utility; we have said, however, that they are both less truly
friendships and less permanent.

But it is from their likeness and their unlikeness to the same thing
that they are thought both to be and not to be friendships. It is
by their likeness to the friendship of virtue that they seem to be
friendships (for one of them involves pleasure and the other utility,
and these characteristics belong to the friendship of virtue as well);
while it is because the friendship of virtue is proof against slander
and permanent, while these quickly change (besides differing from
the former in many other respects), that they appear not to be friendships;
i.e. it is because of their unlikeness to the friendship of virtue.

7

But there is another kind of friendship, viz. that which involves
an inequality between the parties, e.g. that of father to son and
in general of elder to younger, that of man to wife and in general
that of ruler to subject. And these friendships differ also from each
other; for it is not the same that exists between parents and children
and between rulers and subjects, nor is even that of father to son
the same as that of son to father, nor that of husband to wife the
same as that of wife to husband. For the virtue and the function of
each of these is different, and so are the reasons for which they
love; the love and the friendship are therefore different also. Each
party, then, neither gets the same from the other, nor ought to seek
it; but when children render to parents what they ought to render
to those who brought them into the world, and parents render what
they should to their children, the friendship of such persons will
be abiding and excellent. In all friendships implying inequality the
love also should be proportional, i.e. the better should be more loved
than he loves, and so should the more useful, and similarly in each
of the other cases; for when the love is in proportion to the merit
of the parties, then in a sense arises equality, which is certainly
held to be characteristic of friendship.

But equality does not seem to take the same form in acts of justice
and in friendship; for in acts of justice what is equal in the primary
sense is that which is in proportion to merit, while quantitative
equality is secondary, but in friendship quantitative equality is
primary and proportion to merit secondary. This becomes clear if there
is a great interval in respect of virtue or vice or wealth or anything
else between the parties; for then they are no longer friends, and
do not even expect to be so. And this is most manifest in the case
of the gods; for they surpass us most decisively in all good things.
But it is clear also in the case of kings; for with them, too, men
who are much their inferiors do not expect to be friends; nor do men
of no account expect to be friends with the best or wisest men. In
such cases it is not possible to define exactly up to what point friends
can remain friends; for much can be taken away and friendship remain,
but when one party is removed to a great distance, as God is, the
possibility of friendship ceases. This is in fact the origin of the
question whether friends really wish for their friends the greatest
goods, e.g. that of being gods; since in that case their friends will
no longer be friends to them, and therefore will not be good things
for them (for friends are good things). The answer is that if we were
right in saying that friend wishes good to friend for his sake, his
friend must remain the sort of being he is, whatever that may be;
therefore it is for him oily so long as he remains a man that he will
wish the greatest goods. But perhaps not all the greatest goods; for
it is for himself most of all that each man wishes what is good.

8

Most people seem, owing to ambition, to wish to be loved rather than
to love; which is why most men love flattery; for the flatterer is
a friend in an inferior position, or pretends to be such and to love
more than he is loved; and being loved seems to be akin to being honoured,
and this is what most people aim at. But it seems to be not for its
own sake that people choose honour, but incidentally. For most people
enjoy being honoured by those in positions of authority because of
their hopes (for they think that if they want anything they will get
it from them; and therefore they delight in honour as a token of favour
to come); while those who desire honour from good men, and men who
know, are aiming at confirming their own opinion of themselves; they
delight in honour, therefore, because they believe in their own goodness
on the strength of the judgement of those who speak about them. In
being loved, on the other hand, people delight for its own sake; whence
it would seem to be better than being honoured, and friendship to
be desirable in itself. But it seems to lie in loving rather than
in being loved, as is indicated by the delight mothers take in loving;
for some mothers hand over their children to be brought up, and so
long as they know their fate they love them and do not seek to be
loved in return (if they cannot have both), but seem to be satisfied
if they see them prospering; and they themselves love their children
even if these owing to their ignorance give them nothing of a mother’s
due. Now since friendship depends more on loving, and it is those
who love their friends that are praised, loving seems to be the characteristic
virtue of friends, so that it is only those in whom this is found
in due measure that are lasting friends, and only their friendship
that endures.

It is in this way more than any other that even unequals can be friends;
they can be equalized. Now equality and likeness are friendship, and
especially the likeness of those who are like in virtue; for being
steadfast in themselves they hold fast to each other, and neither
ask nor give base services, but (one may say) even prevent them; for
it is characteristic of good men neither to go wrong themselves nor
to let their friends do so. But wicked men have no steadfastness (for
they do not remain even like to themselves), but become friends for
a short time because they delight in each other’s wickedness. Friends
who are useful or pleasant last longer; i.e. as long as they provide
each other with enjoyments or advantages. Friendship for utility’s
sake seems to be that which most easily exists between contraries,
e.g. between poor and rich, between ignorant and learned; for what
a man actually lacks he aims at, and one gives something else in return.
But under this head, too, might bring lover and beloved, beautiful
and ugly. This is why lovers sometimes seem ridiculous, when they
demand to be loved as they love; if they are equally lovable their
claim can perhaps be justified, but when they have nothing lovable
about them it is ridiculous. Perhaps, however, contrary does not even
aim at contrary by its own nature, but only incidentally, the desire
being for what is intermediate; for that is what is good, e.g. it
is good for the dry not to become wet but to come to the intermediate
state, and similarly with the hot and in all other cases. These subjects
we may dismiss; for they are indeed somewhat foreign to our inquiry.

9

Friendship and justice seem, as we have said at the outset of our
discussion, to be concerned with the same objects and exhibited between
the same persons. For in every community there is thought to be some
form of justice, and friendship too; at least men address as friends
their fellow-voyagers and fellowsoldiers, and so too those associated
with them in any other kind of community. And the extent of their
association is the extent of their friendship, as it is the extent
to which justice exists between them. And the proverb ‘what friends
have is common property’ expresses the truth; for friendship depends
on community. Now brothers and comrades have all things in common,
but the others to whom we have referred have definite things in common-some
more things, others fewer; for of friendships, too, some are more
and others less truly friendships. And the claims of justice differ
too; the duties of parents to children, and those of brothers to each
other are not the same, nor those of comrades and those of fellow-citizens,
and so, too, with the other kinds of friendship. There is a difference,
therefore, also between the acts that are unjust towards each of these
classes of associates, and the injustice increases by being exhibited
towards those who are friends in a fuller sense; e.g. it is a more
terrible thing to defraud a comrade than a fellow-citizen, more terrible
not to help a brother than a stranger, and more terrible to wound
a father than any one else. And the demands of justice also seem to
increase with the intensity of the friendship, which implies that
friendship and justice exist between the same persons and have an
equal extension.

Now all forms of community are like parts of the political community;
for men journey together with a view to some particular advantage,
and to provide something that they need for the purposes of life;
and it is for the sake of advantage that the political community too
seems both to have come together originally and to endure, for this
is what legislators aim at, and they call just that which is to the
common advantage. Now the other communities aim at advantage bit by
bit, e.g. sailors at what is advantageous on a voyage with a view
to making money or something of the kind, fellow-soldiers at what
is advantageous in war, whether it is wealth or victory or the taking
of a city that they seek, and members of tribes and demes act similarly
(Some communities seem to arise for the sake or pleasure, viz. religious
guilds and social clubs; for these exist respectively for the sake
of offering sacrifice and of companionship. But all these seem to
fall under the political community; for it aims not at present advantage
but at what is advantageous for life as a whole), offering sacrifices
and arranging gatherings for the purpose, and assigning honours to
the gods, and providing pleasant relaxations for themselves. For the
ancient sacrifices and gatherings seem to take place after the harvest
as a sort of firstfruits, because it was at these seasons that people
had most leisure. All the communities, then, seem to be parts of the
political community; and the particular kinds friendship will correspond
to the particular kinds of community.

10

There are three kinds of constitution, and an equal number of deviation-forms–perversions,
as it were, of them. The constitutions are monarchy, aristocracy,
and thirdly that which is based on a property qualification, which
it seems appropriate to call timocratic, though most people are wont
to call it polity. The best of these is monarchy, the worst timocracy.
The deviation from monarchy is tyrany; for both are forms of one-man
rule, but there is the greatest difference between them; the tyrant
looks to his own advantage, the king to that of his subjects. For
a man is not a king unless he is sufficient to himself and excels
his subjects in all good things; and such a man needs nothing further;
therefore he will not look to his own interests but to those of his
subjects; for a king who is not like that would be a mere titular
king. Now tyranny is the very contrary of this; the tyrant pursues
his own good. And it is clearer in the case of tyranny that it is
the worst deviation-form; but it is the contrary of the best that
is worst. Monarchy passes over into tyranny; for tyranny is the evil
form of one-man rule and the bad king becomes a tyrant. Aristocracy
passes over into oligarchy by the badness of the rulers, who distribute
contrary to equity what belongs to the city-all or most of the good
things to themselves, and office always to the same people, paying
most regard to wealth; thus the rulers are few and are bad men instead
of the most worthy. Timocracy passes over into democracy; for these
are coterminous, since it is the ideal even of timocracy to be the
rule of the majority, and all who have the property qualification
count as equal. Democracy is the least bad of the deviations; for
in its case the form of constitution is but a slight deviation. These
then are the changes to which constitutions are most subject; for
these are the smallest and easiest transitions.

One may find resemblances to the constitutions and, as it were, patterns
of them even in households. For the association of a father with his
sons bears the form of monarchy, since the father cares for his children;
and this is why Homer calls Zeus ‘father’; it is the ideal of monarchy
to be paternal rule. But among the Persians the rule of the father
is tyrannical; they use their sons as slaves. Tyrannical too is the
rule of a master over slaves; for it is the advantage of the master
that is brought about in it. Now this seems to be a correct form of
government, but the Persian type is perverted; for the modes of rule
appropriate to different relations are diverse. The association of
man and wife seems to be aristocratic; for the man rules in accordance
with his worth, and in those matters in which a man should rule, but
the matters that befit a woman he hands over to her. If the man rules
in everything the relation passes over into oligarchy; for in doing
so he is not acting in accordance with their respective worth, and
not ruling in virtue of his superiority. Sometimes, however, women
rule, because they are heiresses; so their rule is not in virtue of
excellence but due to wealth and power, as in oligarchies. The association
of brothers is like timocracy; for they are equal, except in so far
as they differ in age; hence if they differ much in age, the friendship
is no longer of the fraternal type. Democracy is found chiefly in
masterless dwellings (for here every one is on an equality), and in
those in which the ruler is weak and every one has licence to do as
he pleases.

11

Each of the constitutions may be seen to involve friendship just in
so far as it involves justice. The friendship between a king and his
subjects depends on an excess of benefits conferred; for he confers
benefits on his subjects if being a good man he cares for them with
a view to their well-being, as a shepherd does for his sheep (whence
Homer called Agamemnon ‘shepherd of the peoples’). Such too is the
friendship of a father, though this exceeds the other in the greatness
of the benefits conferred; for he is responsible for the existence
of his children, which is thought the greatest good, and for their
nurture and upbringing.

These things are ascribed to ancestors as well. Further, by nature
a father tends to rule over his sons, ancestors over descendants,
a king over his subjects. These friendships imply superiority of one
party over the other, which is why ancestors are honoured. The justice
therefore that exists between persons so related is not the same on
both sides but is in every case proportioned to merit; for that is
true of the friendship as well. The friendship of man and wife, again,
is the same that is found in an aristocracy; for it is in accordance
with virtue the better gets more of what is good, and each gets what
befits him; and so, too, with the justice in these relations. The
friendship of brothers is like that of comrades; for they are equal
and of like age, and such persons are for the most part like in their
feelings and their character. Like this, too, is the friendship appropriate
to timocratic government; for in such a constitution the ideal is
for the citizens to be equal and fair; therefore rule is taken in
turn, and on equal terms; and the friendship appropriate here will
correspond.

But in the deviation-forms, as justice hardly exists, so too does
friendship. It exists least in the worst form; in tyranny there is
little or no friendship. For where there is nothing common to ruler
and ruled, there is not friendship either, since there is not justice;
e.g. between craftsman and tool, soul and body, master and slave;
the latter in each case is benefited by that which uses it, but there
is no friendship nor justice towards lifeless things. But neither
is there friendship towards a horse or an ox, nor to a slave qua slave.
For there is nothing common to the two parties; the slave is a living
tool and the tool a lifeless slave. Qua slave then, one cannot be
friends with him. But qua man one can; for there seems to be some
justice between any man and any other who can share in a system of
law or be a party to an agreement; therefore there can also be friendship
with him in so far as he is a man. Therefore while in tyrannies friendship
and justice hardly exist, in democracies they exist more fully; for
where the citizens are equal they have much in common.

12

Every form of friendship, then, involves association, as has been
said. One might, however, mark off from the rest both the friendship
of kindred and that of comrades. Those of fellow-citizens, fellow-tribesmen,
fellow-voyagers, and the like are more like mere friendships of association;
for they seem to rest on a sort of compact. With them we might class
the friendship of host and guest. The friendship of kinsmen itself,
while it seems to be of many kinds, appears to depend in every case
on parental friendship; for parents love their children as being a
part of themselves, and children their parents as being something
originating from them. Now (1) arents know their offspring better
than there children know that they are their children, and (2) the
originator feels his offspring to be his own more than the offspring
do their begetter; for the product belongs to the producer (e.g. a
tooth or hair or anything else to him whose it is), but the producer
does not belong to the product, or belongs in a less degree. And (3)
the length of time produces the same result; parents love their children
as soon as these are born, but children love their parents only after
time has elapsed and they have acquired understanding or the power
of discrimination by the senses. From these considerations it is also
plain why mothers love more than fathers do. Parents, then, love their
children as themselves (for their issue are by virtue of their separate
existence a sort of other selves), while children love their parents
as being born of them, and brothers love each other as being born
of the same parents; for their identity with them makes them identical
with each other (which is the reason why people talk of ‘the same
blood’, ‘the same stock’, and so on). They are, therefore, in a sense
the same thing, though in separate individuals. Two things that contribute
greatly to friendship are a common upbringing and similarity of age;
for ‘two of an age take to each other’, and people brought up together
tend to be comrades; whence the friendship of brothers is akin to
that of comrades. And cousins and other kinsmen are bound up together
by derivation from brothers, viz. by being derived from the same parents.
They come to be closer together or farther apart by virtue of the
nearness or distance of the original ancestor.

The friendship of children to parents, and of men to gods, is a relation
to them as to something good and superior; for they have conferred
the greatest benefits, since they are the causes of their being and
of their nourishment, and of their education from their birth; and
this kind of friendship possesses pleasantness and utility also, more
than that of strangers, inasmuch as their life is lived more in common.
The friendship of brothers has the characteristics found in that of
comrades (and especially when these are good), and in general between
people who are like each other, inasmuch as they belong more to each
other and start with a love for each other from their very birth,
and inasmuch as those born of the same parents and brought up together
and similarly educated are more akin in character; and the test of
time has been applied most fully and convincingly in their case.

Between other kinsmen friendly relations are found in due proportion.
Between man and wife friendship seems to exist by nature; for man
is naturally inclined to form couples-even more than to form cities,
inasmuch as the household is earlier and more necessary than the city,
and reproduction is more common to man with the animals. With the
other animals the union extends only to this point, but human beings
live together not only for the sake of reproduction but also for the
various purposes of life; for from the start the functions are divided,
and those of man and woman are different; so they help each other
by throwing their peculiar gifts into the common stock. It is for
these reasons that both utility and pleasure seem to be found in this
kind of friendship. But this friendship may be based also on virtue,
if the parties are good; for each has its own virtue and they will
delight in the fact. And children seem to be a bond of union (which
is the reason why childless people part more easily); for children
are a good common to both and what is common holds them together.

How man and wife and in general friend and friend ought mutually to
behave seems to be the same question as how it is just for them to
behave; for a man does not seem to have the same duties to a friend,
a stranger, a comrade, and a schoolfellow.

13

There are three kinds of friendship, as we said at the outset of our
inquiry, and in respect of each some are friends on an equality and
others by virtue of a superiority (for not only can equally good men
become friends but a better man can make friends with a worse, and
similarly in friendships of pleasure or utility the friends may be
equal or unequal in the benefits they confer). This being so, equals
must effect the required equalization on a basis of equality in love
and in all other respects, while unequals must render what is in proportion
to their superiority or inferiority. Complaints and reproaches arise
either only or chiefly in the friendship of utility, and this is only
to be expected. For those who are friends on the ground of virtue
are anxious to do well by each other (since that is a mark of virtue
and of friendship), and between men who are emulating each other in
this there cannot be complaints or quarrels; no one is offended by
a man who loves him and does well by him-if he is a person of nice
feeling he takes his revenge by doing well by the other. And the man
who excels the other in the services he renders will not complain
of his friend, since he gets what he aims at; for each man desires
what is good. Nor do complaints arise much even in friendships of
pleasure; for both get at the same time what they desire, if they
enjoy spending their time together; and even a man who complained
of another for not affording him pleasure would seem ridiculous, since
it is in his power not to spend his days with him.

But the friendship of utility is full of complaints; for as they use
each other for their own interests they always want to get the better
of the bargain, and think they have got less than they should, and
blame their partners because they do not get all they ‘want and deserve’;
and those who do well by others cannot help them as much as those
whom they benefit want.

Now it seems that, as justice is of two kinds, one unwritten and the
other legal, one kind of friendship of utility is moral and the other
legal. And so complaints arise most of all when men do not dissolve
the relation in the spirit of the same type of friendship in which
they contracted it. The legal type is that which is on fixed terms;
its purely commercial variety is on the basis of immediate payment,
while the more liberal variety allows time but stipulates for a definite
quid pro quo. In this variety the debt is clear and not ambiguous,
but in the postponement it contains an element of friendliness; and
so some states do not allow suits arising out of such agreements,
but think men who have bargained on a basis of credit ought to accept
the consequences. The moral type is not on fixed terms; it makes a
gift, or does whatever it does, as to a friend; but one expects to
receive as much or more, as having not given but lent; and if a man
is worse off when the relation is dissolved than he was when it was
contracted he will complain. This happens because all or most men,
while they wish for what is noble, choose what is advantageous; now
it is noble to do well by another without a view to repayment, but
it is the receiving of benefits that is advantageous. Therefore if
we can we should return the equivalent of what we have received (for
we must not make a man our friend against his will; we must recognize
that we were mistaken at the first and took a benefit from a person
we should not have taken it from-since it was not from a friend, nor
from one who did it just for the sake of acting so-and we must settle
up just as if we had been benefited on fixed terms). Indeed, one would
agree to repay if one could (if one could not, even the giver would
not have expected one to do so); therefore if it is possible we must
repay. But at the outset we must consider the man by whom we are being
benefited and on what terms he is acting, in order that we may accept
the benefit on these terms, or else decline it.

It is disputable whether we ought to measure a service by its utility
to the receiver and make the return with a view to that, or by the
benevolence of the giver. For those who have received say they have
received from their benefactors what meant little to the latter and
what they might have got from others-minimizing the service; while
the givers, on the contrary, say it was the biggest thing they had,
and what could not have been got from others, and that it was given
in times of danger or similar need. Now if the friendship is one that
aims at utility, surely the advantage to the receiver is the measure.
For it is he that asks for the service, and the other man helps him
on the assumption that he will receive the equivalent; so the assistance
has been precisely as great as the advantage to the receiver, and
therefore he must return as much as he has received, or even more
(for that would be nobler). In friendships based on virtue on the
other hand, complaints do not arise, but the purpose of the doer is
a sort of measure; for in purpose lies the essential element of virtue
and character.

14

Differences arise also in friendships based on superiority; for each
expects to get more out of them, but when this happens the friendship
is dissolved. Not only does the better man think he ought to get more,
since more should be assigned to a good man, but the more useful similarly
expects this; they say a useless man should not get as much as they
should, since it becomes an act of public service and not a friendship
if the proceeds of the friendship do not answer to the worth of the
benefits conferred. For they think that, as in a commercial partnership
those who put more in get more out, so it should be in friendship.
But the man who is in a state of need and inferiority makes the opposite
claim; they think it is the part of a good friend to help those who
are in need; what, they say, is the use of being the friend of a good
man or a powerful man, if one is to get nothing out of it?

At all events it seems that each party is justified in his claim,
and that each should get more out of the friendship than the other-not
more of the same thing, however, but the superior more honour and
the inferior more gain; for honour is the prize of virtue and of beneficence,
while gain is the assistance required by inferiority.

It seems to be so in constitutional arrangements also; the man who
contributes nothing good to the common stock is not honoured; for
what belongs to the public is given to the man who benefits the public,
and honour does belong to the public. It is not possible to get wealth
from the common stock and at the same time honour. For no one puts
up with the smaller share in all things; therefore to the man who
loses in wealth they assign honour and to the man who is willing to
be paid, wealth, since the proportion to merit equalizes the parties
and preserves the friendship, as we have said. This then is also the
way in which we should associate with unequals; the man who is benefited
in respect of wealth or virtue must give honour in return, repaying
what he can. For friendship asks a man to do what he can, not what
is proportional to the merits of the case; since that cannot always
be done, e.g. in honours paid to the gods or to parents; for no one
could ever return to them the equivalent of what he gets, but the
man who serves them to the utmost of his power is thought to be a
good man. This is why it would not seem open to a man to disown his
father (though a father may disown his son); being in debt, he should
repay, but there is nothing by doing which a son will have done the
equivalent of what he has received, so that he is always in debt.
But creditors can remit a debt; and a father can therefore do so too.
At the same time it is thought that presumably no one would repudiate
a son who was not far gone in wickedness; for apart from the natural
friendship of father and son it is human nature not to reject a son’s
assistance. But the son, if he is wicked, will naturally avoid aiding
his father, or not be zealous about it; for most people wish to get
benefits, but avoid doing them, as a thing unprofitable.-So much for
these questions.

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