Is Kantian ethics compatible with utilitarianism?  Sorting Out Ethics R.M.Hare pages 153-5

RM Hare argues in this extract that much of Kantian ethics is compatible with utilitarian ethics. He considers what the second formulation of ends really means, and when considering the examples Kant produces, sees only the argument against suicide as incompatible with utilitarian ethics.  From Sorting Out Ethics section 8.2 to 8.5.

I want first to draw attention to some passages in the Groundwork which bear on my question. I will start with the famous passage, beloved of anti-utilitarians, about treating humanity as an end. In full it runs: Act in such away that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end' (GrBA66 f. = 429). To understand this we have to know what Kant means by 'treat as an end'. He gives us some important clues to this in the succeeding passage, but unfortunately he seems to be using the expression in at least two different senses. Broadly speaking, the first and third of his examples, those concerned with duties to oneself, are inconsistent with a utilitarian interpretation, but the second and fourth, those concerned with duties to others, are consistent with it. As we shall see,this difference is no accident.

I will take the second and fourth examples first. The second concerns false promises. He combines this with similar examples about 'attempts on the freedom and property of others'. The fault in all such acts lies, he says, in 'intending to make use of another man merely as means to an end he does not share. For the man whom I seek to use for my own purposes by such a promise cannot possibly agree with my way of behaving to him, and so cannot himself share the end of the action'. Other people 'ought always at the same time to be treated as ends–that is, only as beings who must themselves be able to share in the end of the very same action'.

The fourth example I will quote in full:

Fourth, as regards meritorious duties to others, the natural end which all men seek is their own happiness. Now humanity could no doubt subsist if everybody contributed nothing to the happiness of others but at the same time refrained from deliberately impairing their happiness.This is, however, merely to agree negatively and not positively with humanity as an end in itself unless every one endeavours also, so far as in him lies, to further the ends of others. For the ends of a subject who is an end in himself must, if this conception is to have its full effect in me, be also, as far as possible, my ends.

I interpret this as meaning that, in order to fulfil this version of the Categorical Imperative, I have to treat other people's ends (i.e. what they will for its own sake)as my ends. They must be able to do the same, i.e. share the end. In the Tugendlehre Kant explains the relation between an end and the will as follows: 'An end is an object of the power of choice (of a rational being), through the thought of which choice is determined to an action to produce this object' (Tgl A4 =381). We shall be examining later the distinction between 'Will' and 'choice', and the alleged distinction between will and desire. On this, see esp. Tgl A 49 = 407,where Will is both distinguished from choice, and identified with a kind of desire: 'not a quality of the power of choice, but of the will, which is one with the rule it adopts and which is also the appetitive power as it gives universal law. Only such an aptitude can be called virtue'.

Elsewhere Kant qualifies this explanation of what it is to treat others as ends, by saying that the ends of others which we are to treat as our own ends have to be not immoral (Tgl A119 = 450. Some utilitarians,for example Harsanyi, take a similar line and rule out immoral or anti-social ends from consideration ( 1988c: 96). I am tempted to say, in the light of the similarity between the views of these utilitarians and Kant, and of the passages we have been discussing, that he was a sort of utilitarian, namely a rational- will utilitarian. For a utilitarian too can prescribe that we should do what will conduce to satisfying people's rational preferences or wills-for-ends–ends of which happiness is the sum.

We may notice in passing that this same passage in Kant (Gr BA69 = 430) provides an answer to self-styled Kantians who use what has been one of their favourite objections to utilitarianism, that utilitarians do not 'take seriously the distinction between persons' ( Rawls 1971: 27: see Mackie and Hare in H 1984g: 106, Richardsand Hare in H 1988c: 256). It is hard to understand precisely what the objection is.Clearly utilitarians are as aware as anybody else that different and distinct persons are involved in most situations about which we have to make moral judgements.Probably what the objectors are attacking is the idea that we have, when making amoral decision about a situation, to treat the interests, ends, or preferences of different people affected by our actions as of equal importance, strength for strength. This is the same as to show equal concern and respect for all (another slogan of the objectors, which seems inconsistent with the one we are considering).In other words, I am to treat the interests of the others on a par with my own. This,according to utilitarians, is what is involved in being fair to all those affected. It is to obey Bentham's injunction 'Everybody to count for one, nobody for more than one'(ap. Mill 1861: last chapter). And if we treat equal preferences as of equal weight,utilitarianism is the result.

But that is precisely what Kant is telling us to do in this passage, as Mill observes(ibid.). For if I make the ends of others my ends, I shall, in adjudicating between them when they conflict, treat them in the same way as I would my own ends. In so doing I am not failing to distinguish between different people, but, as justice demands, giving equal weight to their and my equal interests (the ends which they and I seek with equal strength of will), just as I give equal weight to my own equal interests. So, if the objection did undermine utilitarianism, it would undermine Kant too.

8.3. But now we have to turn to Kant's first and third examples. In the first, he is against suicide because it involves 'making use of a person merely as a means tomaintain a tolerable state of affairs till the end of his life'. But this is not the same sense of 'use as a means' as that which contrasts with 'treat as an end' in the second and fourth examples. I might have as an end the saving myself from intolerable pain. Obviously there is no difficulty in my sharing this end with myself, or agreeing with my way of behaving to myself. Kant must therefore be here using 'use as means' and 'treat as an end' in some different sense. I shall not here investigate what it is; but it seems to be something like 'regard (or not regard) a human being(myself) as at my own disposal to do what I like with for my own purposes’.

But this objection to suicide, if valid at all, is different from those to promise-breaking and non-beneficence. To treat myself as at my own disposal is not to frustrate the ends that I will. Perhaps Kant is here harking back to something he heard when young, that man is created as a human being to fulfil an end ordained by God, and therefore ought not to act contrary to God's will by not fulfilling God'sends. But to argue thus would be to follow a principle of heteronomy such as he later rejects (Gr BA92 = 443). It cannot be turned into an autonomous principle by simply substituting 'myself ' for 'God'. For if it is not God's will but my will that is in command, then it can, within a consistent set of ends, choose suicide in these special circumstances.

The same could be said about the third example concerning the cultivation of one's talents. For a full statement of the example we have to refer back to Gr BA55 = 423.I shall discuss this earlier use of the example shortly. Here it is to be noted that Kant speaks of 'nature's purpose for humanity in our person' (Gr BA69 = 430), thus again betraying the theological and heteronomous source of his argument here. A person could certainly with consistency will as his end (whatever nature intended) to live like the South Sea Islanders of whom Kant has earlier spoken slightingly; and he could certainly share this end with himself,and agree to it. So the sense of 'treat as an end' used in the second and fourth examples would provide no argument at all against his devoting his life solely to idleness, indulgence, procreation, and in a word, to enjoyment' (Gr BA55 = 423). In the sense used in the second and fourth examples, treating humanity in myself as an end would not preclude my lotus-eating, any more than it would preclude suicide.

I should like to mention here that in my own adaptation of the Kantian form of argument in FR ch. 8 I specifically excluded from its scope personal ideals not affecting other people, and said that about these one could not argue in this way.So my view on these first and third examples of Kant is that he is going astray through trying (in order to buttress his inbred convictions) to use arguments from universalizability outside their proper field, which is duties to other people.

There is a possible objection to the assimilation of wills to preferences that I have just made: that a preference, being something empirical, is not the same as a will, which is, in the pure Kantian doctrine, something noumenal (cf. KpV A74 f. = 43).To this objection I shall return (8.8).

8.4. But now we must turn to another famous passage, the formulation of theCategorical Imperative which runs: 'Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law' (Gr BA52 = 421).

This version too is consistent with utilitarianism. If we are going to will the maxim of our action to be a universal law, it must be, to use the jargon, universalizable. Ihave, that is, to will it not only for the present situation, in which I occupy the role that I do, but also for all situations resembling this in their universal properties,including those in which I occupy all the other possible roles. But I cannot will this unless I am willing to undergo what I should suffer in all those roles, and of course also get the good things that I should enjoy in others of the roles. The upshot is that I shall be able to will only such maxims as do the best, all in all, impartially, for all those affected by my action. And this, again, is utilitarianism. To link it up with the other formulaabout treating people as ends: if I am to universalize my maxim, it must beconsistent with seeking the ends of all the other people on equal terms with my own.

This formulation of the Categorical Imperative is followed by another rather similar one: Act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a universal law of nature' (Gr BA 52 = 421). After this, Kant illustrates these two formulations with the same examples as we have been discussing in connection with the 'humanity as an end' formulation. Here again the promise-keeping and beneficence examples fit well with a utilitarian interpretation, but the suicide and cultivation-of-talents examples do not. In the promising case, he uses a form of argument usually now called by English- speaking writers utilitarian generalization;he asks 'How would things stand if my maxim became a universal law?', and answers that promises would become 'empty shams'. This is not a strong argument,because one might will as a universal law that people should break promises in precisely one's own present situation, when one can get away with it and the institution of promising would survive. (Recent work on the difficulty of drawing aline between act- and rule-utilitarianism is relevant here; cf. FR130 ff., Lyons 1965:ch. 3). The argument against promise-breaking we considered earlier, which says that the victim cannot share the end of the promise-breaker, is much stronger, and is similar to one I would myself, as a utilitarian, rely on (H 1964d: s.f.).

Kant's argument here against non-beneficence comes to much the same as the one I discussed earlier, and one which I should myself, as a utilitarian, employ, and I have no time to analyse it further. The argument against suicide is again very weak.I could certainly without contradiction will universally that those who would otherwise have to endure intolerable pain should kill themselves. This could indeed become a universal law of nature, and I could act as if it were to become so through my will. Kant thinks it is a good argument only because he thinks (perhaps owing to his rigorist upbringing) that maxims have to be very simple. If we have a choice between the simple maxims Always preserve human life' and 'Destroy human life whenever you please', we shall probably opt for the former. But there are many less simple maxims in between these extremes which most of us would will in preference to either of them: for example 'Preserve people's lives when that is in their interests'(and perhaps we would wish to add other qualifications). As we have seen (8.1)moral principles do not have to be as simple and general as Kant seems to have thought, and they can still be universal all the same (H 1972a, 1994b).

As regards cultivation of talents, Kant is also on shaky ground. It is perfectly possible to will that those who are in the fortunate position of being able to live like the South Sea Islanders should do so: and this could become a law of nature if nature were as benign everywhere as it is said to be in Tahiti. The best argument against lotus- eating is a utilitarian one, which Kant does not use though he could have; namely that one person's indolence may, in the actual state of nature, harm others whom he might be helping if more industrious, and who therefore cannot share his ends.

8.5. The score at this point is that Kant's theory, in the formulations of theCategorical Imperative we have considered, is compatible with utilitarianism, and so are some arguments that he uses, or could have used consistently with the theory, in some of his examples. By my reckoning the first example (suicide) is the only one that cannot be handled in a utilitarian way in accordance with the Categorical Imperative in these three formulations, although Kant himself does handle both this and the third example in a non-utilitarian way. So, as I said at the beginning, Kant could have been a utilitarian, in the sense that his theory is compatible with utilitarianism, but in some of his practical moral judgements his inbred rigorism leads him into bad arguments which his theory will not really support. I do not think that this score ought to give much comfort to modern anti-utilitarians who usurp Kant's authority.