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David Hume sets up a conversation (dialogue/debate) between Demea, Philo and Cleanthes on the nature of the cosmological (first cause) argument and design (teleological argument) for God’s existence. Hume takes this opportunity to espouse a theory of causation which makes the inference of God from design as impossible, and a rejection of a priori (cosmological) arguments for God as self-contradictory.

PART II

 (In this chapter, Philo argues contra Cleanthes that there is only a weak analogy between natural and man-made objects)

I.  Demea

A. is surprised that Cleanthes frames the argument in terms of the existence of God – for Demea, this is unquestioned (13, q.v.)

B. the only question he sees is that of the nature of God

1. God’s nature is “incomprehensible and unknown” to us

2.  even “the manner of his existence, the nature of his duration” is a mystery (n.b.)

3.  his perfections cannot be seen heard, or even conceived (q.v.)

C. quotes Malebranche (13-14, q.v.)

1. one says that God is spirit not to affirm anything positive of him, but only to say that he is not matter

2. just as it is a mistake to think that he has a body like ours, as the Anthropomorphites do, it is a mistake to think that he has a mind like ours, with ideas like ours (14)

II. Philo

A. claims that he, too, accepts the existence of a first cause — whatever it is — that we call God (q.v.)

B. agrees that we ought not to pretend that we know his attributes

C. nor should we assume that God’s “perfections” resemble ours (14)

1. we use words like wisdom, thought, design, knowledge when speaking of God only because these are the only words we have (q.v.)

2. but we ought not to think that our ideas resemble his

3. N.B. if Cleanthes grants this, he’s lost his argument

D. the syllogism: (15, q.v.)

1. our ideas reach no further than our experience

2.  we have no experience of the divine

3.  God is incomprehensible

III.  Cleanthes, addressing Demea:

A.  he sees things quite differently

B.  states design argument (15, q.v.)

1. adaptation of means to ends in nature “resembles exactly” products of human design

2. since effects resemble, causes resemble

3. hence God exists and is like the human mind (15)

(draw diagram on board)

4. cf. Part III, p. 25, where he provides examples of eye and of correspondence of male and female

IV. Demea

A. cannot accept Cleanthes’s conclusion that God is like us

B. nor can he accept Cleanthes’s mode of argument

1. prefers a priori arguments

2. by basing it on experience, renders conclusion only probable, thereby giving advantages to atheists (15)

V.  Philo (16)

A. is bothered not so much by the fact that Cleanthes’s arguments are based on experience as that they are very weak arguments

B. examples of good arguments are of things we’ve observed “a thousand and a thousand times”

C.  for Philo, arguments from experience must be based on repetition of similar cases (q.v.)

1. the stronger the analogy, the stronger the argument; the weaker the analogy, the weaker the argument

2. example of circulation of blood:

a. from the fact that it takes place in one man can conclude that it takes place in another

b. but it is less certain if we argue from animals to man, or animals to plants! (16)

3. but, using a house as an example of a human product, Philo argues that the analogy between a house and the universe is very weak (q.v.)

VI. Cleanthes

A. says these criticisms would be deserved if his argument amounted to no more than conjecture

B. but denies this, reaffirming close analogy between human and divine design

1. adjustment of means to end, final causes

2. compares staircases to legs (bottom of p. 16)

VII. Demea

turns against both Philo and Cleanthes for even considering empirical arguments that “fall short of perfect evidence” (17)

VIII. Philo

A.  replies to Demea

1.  that he is only trying to show Cleanthes the dangers of his way of arguing

2.  but that Cleanthes has nevertheless given a fair account of the a posteriori argument, which he then sets out to explain to Demea

B. first, Philo rejects a priori ways of reasoning about facts

1. cannot determine from one’s ideas alone how the universe is (17)

2. there is no conceivable state of the universe that does not imply a contradiction (i.e., he rejects the ontological argument)

3. nor can reason alone show one the cause of anything, much less the universe — only experience can show us causes (rejects the cosmological argument)

C. then Philo turns to explain the empirical or a posteriori argument for the existence of God

1. the experience of order, arrangement, adjustment of means to ends alone does not prove design, except insofar as it has been experienced to result from design (17, q.v.)

a. for all we can know a priori, order could be produced by matter alone (17-18)

b. there is no more difficulty in order resulting from matter than in its resulting from mind (18)

2. however, we have had experience of order being produced only by mind, not by matter

a. metal does not spontaneously produce a watch, etc. (18)

b. but ideas in the mind may form the plan of a watch

3. experience, then, shows us that order results from mind, not from matter (18)

4. From similar effects we infer similar causes.

5. So the order in the universe must result from a similar cause

D. having explained Cleanthes’s argument to Demea, Philo says that he is scandalized by the assertion of resemblance between man and God

E. so now Philo turns to refute the design argument, in order, he says to Demea, to defend the mysteriousness of God

1. that all inferences concerning matters of fact are grounded in experience and that experimental reasonsings are based on the following assumptions he will not at present dispute: (18, q.v.)

a. from similar causes, infer similar effects

b. from similar effects, infer similar causes

2. however, if cases are not exactly similar, cannot have confidence in conclusions.

a. Every difference in circumstances requires “new experiments”

b. if there were any changes or differences in the cases, it would be very bold to expect the same results (18-19, q.v.)

3. then, turning to Cleanthes, asks him whether from his comparison of the universe to houses, ships, furniture, and machines, he can conclude a similarity of causes (19)

4. Philo then argues that thought, design, intelligence that produces houses, etc. is only a part of the universe, only one of the different kinds of causes we see acting (q.v.)

a. Cleanthes would transfer a conclusion from the operations of a part to the origin of the whole

b. even if we could reason from part to whole, why this part, that is, “the reason and design of animals,” other than the fact that we have some bias in our own favor?  Why privilege thought?  (q.v.)

c. what about the rest of the universe?

1.) do we have any reason to think there are thinking creatures elsewhere?

2.) compares this way of thinking to the peasant who tries to reason from the economy of his household to that of a kingdom (19-20)

5. But even if there were thinking beings everywhere (20)

a. we would be arguing from what may be true of a world already constituted, arranged, etc. to what would be true of the world in the beginning, in its “embryo-state” (20)

b. which would be as illegitimate as reasoning from a what a mature animal is like to a fetus or to an “animalcule in the loins of its male parent”

6. in sum, Cleanthes is basing his conclusion on a very small part of the universe during a very short time

F.  Philo’s empiricism

1.  Says he is like Simonides, who could not give a definition of God – an important point he’ll return to in XII

2.  does not know what God is (q.v.)

a.  subject is beyond his faculties

b.  remote from sphere of observation

3. arguments from experience work like this: (20-21, q.v.)

a. from our experience of two kinds of objects always occurring together

b. whenever we see an object of one kind we infer the presence of the other

4. but in theology we are arguing about a single case that resembles no other (21)

a. we have never seen universes being created

b. so how can we say order must arise from thought?

c. N.B.   Pamphilus doesn’t think Philo is being entirely serious (21)

IX. Cleanthes

A.  accuses Philo of “abusing terms,” of equivocating over the meaning of “experience”

B.  with regards to matters of fact and existence, reason is just experience

C. to prove by experience the origin of the universe is no more against what we mean by “experience” than proving the motion of the earth by experience

1. that is, we do not directly experience the motion of the earth any more than the origin of universes

2. and the same objections could be raised against arguments for the motion of the earth

X.  Philo

contra Cleanthes, argues that in the case of the motion of the Earth, there are analogies we can draw with other planets, satellites, etc. that revolve around their axes and around the sun or another planet

A.  points to the way in which Galileo had to argue (22)

1.  that there is no distinction between celestial and terrestrial matter

2.  that the moon and the other planets are analogous to the earth

3.  (remember his buddy Adam Smith wrote a history of astronomy)

B.  suggests that Cleanthes is less cautious than Galileo, in that Cleanthes does not trouble himself to argue for the analogy of houses with universes (22)

C.  and of course Cleanthes has never seen a universe created