http://ocw.capilanou.ca/philosophy/phil-208-environmental-ethics/non-anthropocentric.htm

Sterba attempts a kind of reconciliation between anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric environmental ethics. His main point is that the most plausible interpretations of each view will generate roughly the same set of prescriptions concerning our behaviour towards the environment, even though some fundamental theoretical disagreements remain.

Non-anthropocentric environmental ethics

As we have noted, non-anthropocentric theories can be either individualistic or holistic. The key aspect of these theories is the view that there is no sound reason for thinking that any species is special or superior, including humans, with the apparent direct implication that there are no good grounds for treating either individuals of different species, or living things collectively, differently. In particular, humans occupy no privileged place in nature. This has the radical consequence, so it seems, that human interests count for not more than the interests of any other living thing or system. Many find this highly implausible. Sterba thinks that this final implication need not follow.

Sterba’s argument is outlined on pp. 179-80. Some key points are:

1. It can be morally permissible to act showing preference for human interests on self-defence grounds. The arguments here are parallel to those justifying self-defence against other humans. We must note, though, that actions taken in self defence must be proportional, if possible, to the attack (e.g., with respect to the degree of force).

2. t can be morally permissible to act showing preference for human interests for the sake of preservation of human basic needs. The caveat here is that it is impermissible to attain those needs at the expense of other human basic needs. Even though this shows a preference for humans, Sterba thinks that this is not a problem because it is the way all species behave, i.e., showing preference to their own species. In other words, there is no reciprocity between species. [There looks to be a problem here, though; if reciprocity is necessary for moral constraint, then why should we have any kind of moral concern for other species?]

3. It is impermissible to show preference to human interests when the goal is disproportionate to the harm caused. That is, if what humans seek is some non-basic need, then the action taken against members of other species is not justified. [Note the radical practical implications of this principle.]

Two things follow:

1. Given the acceptance of an individualistic non-anthropocentric ethic, if basic needs are at stake, there are good grounds for humans harming other individuals living things.

2. Given the acceptance of a holistic non-anthropocentric ethic, if only non-basic needs are at stake, there are no good grounds for humans harming other individuals living things.

Sterba thinks that the truth of these two claims should lead to a resolution of the disagreement between individualists and holists.

Anthropocentric environmental ethics

Sterba asks what follows if we adopt an anthropocentric position, general. First, traditional ethical systems allows both for self-defence and preservation of life by seeking basic needs. But will there be any moral requirement of proportionality concerning non-humans?

Sterba argues that there will because even though it is the case that human superiority leads to humans having the greatest value, it does not follow that other species are of no value. Each has at least some kind of intrinsic value. Moreover, proper recognition of this value requires that we take their interests or needs into account, again, with the corresponding practical implications.