Power without self-contradiction

Source: enjoyinggodministries.com

Can God do anything and everything? Certain medieval theologians and later philosophers such as Rene Descartes argued that God has an absolute power that is free from, indeed often contradictory to, all reason and morality (God is ex lex, outside of or beyond law) . Thus, they concluded that God can sin, lie, and die, among other things. He is not only able to do all he wills, but he is able also to will everything, even the logically contradictory. Most theologians, however, have pointed to several texts of Scripture that indicate otherwise:

“Because God wanted to make the unchanging nature of his purpose very clear to the heirs of what was promised, he confirmed it with an oath. God did this so that, by two unchangeable things in which it is impossible for God to lie, we who have fled to take hold of the hope offered to us may be greatly encouraged” (Heb. 6:17-18).

“If we are faithless, he will remain faithful, for he cannot deny himself” (2 Tim. 2:13).

“When tempted, no one should say, ‘God is tempting me.’ For God cannot be tempted by evil, nor does he tempt anyone” (Js. 1:13).

Charles Hodge, 19th century Princeton theologian, makes this observation:

“It is . . . involved in the very idea of power, that it has reference to the production of possible effects. It is no more a limitation of power that it cannot effect the impossible, than it is of reason that it cannot comprehend the absurd, or of infinite goodness that it cannot do wrong. It is contrary to its nature. Instead of exalting, it degrades God, to suppose that He can be other than He is, or that He can act contrary to infinite wisdom and love. When, therefore, it is said that God is omnipotent because He can do whatever He wills, it is to be remembered that His will is determined by His nature. It is certainly no limitation to perfection to say that it cannot be imperfect” (Systematic Theology I:409).

These would appear to be those things God cannot do: (1) the logically contradictory (God’s inability to be illogical is prevented by his truth, righteousness, faithfulness, etc.); (2) immoral actions (again, because of his moral excellency and consistency); (3) actions appropriate to finite creatures; (4) actions denying his own nature as God; and (5) the alteration of his eternal plan.
Augustine concurs: “God is omnipotent, and yet he cannot die, he cannot lie, he cannot deny himself. How is he omnipotent then? He is omnipotent for the very reason that he cannot do these things. For if he could die, he would not be omnipotent.”

But how is it that to say God cannot do something is power, and to say God can do something else is weakness? Augustine answers:

“The power of God is not diminished when it is said that he cannot die, and cannot sin; for if he could do these things, his power would be less. A being is rightly called omnipotent, from doing what he wills, and not from suffering what he does not will.”

What Augustine is saying is this: to be able to do all that one wills to do is to be omnipotent. But to be unable to do what one does not will to do is not weakness, for power is the ability to do one’s will, not the ability to do what is not one’s will. Ronald Nash puts it yet another way:

“The power to sin is the power to fall short of perfection. Since this is the opposite of omnipotence, God’s inability to sin is not inconsistent with His omnipotence; rather, it is entailed by His omnipotence” (40).

Whereas both Hodge and Augustine are correct, in yet another sense it must be said that God can, in fact, do everything. When I say God can do everything, someone will respond by pointing out that God cannot do the logically absurd or self-contradictory. For example, this objector would say: “God cannot create a round triangle!” But a “round triangle” is a non-entity, a nothing. To say that “something” is round at the same time and in the same sense in which it is triangular is to utter a contradiction. Such contradictions do not exist, indeed cannot exist, in fact cannot even be conceived as existing. It is, of course, possible to conceive of the proposition, “Here is a round triangle.” But it is not possible to conceive of a “round triangle” as actually existing. If you think you can conceive of one, describe it to me. What does a round triangle look like? What are its properties? Therefore, God’s supposed “inability” to create a round triangle is not a result of his being limited by uncreated conditions in the universe. Rather, it is an inability to do nothing, since that is precisely what a round triangle is: nothing! And to say that God is unable to do a “nothing” is a meaningless assertion. Consequently, God can do everything, for “round triangles” are not “things” subject to being done. Thus, Carl F. H. Henry concludes:

“That God will not alter his own nature, that he cannot deny himself, that he cannot lie and cannot sin, that he cannot be deceived, and that, moreover, he cannot die, are affirmations which historic Christian theology has always properly associated with divine omnipotence and not with divine limitation or divine impotency, because the ‘possibility’ as stated is a logical impossibility. Any conception of omnipotence that requires God to contradict himself reflects a conjectural and ridiculous notion of absolute power” (God, Revelation, Authority, V:319).

The objection that this puts God in subservience to the laws of logic, as if to say he is restricted by something external to himself, fails to realize that the laws of logic are simply the way God thinks. The so-called “laws of logic” are the organization of the divine mind.

Let us apply the preceding to the age-old conundrum: can God create a stone too heavy for God to lift?

“If God can create the stone too heavy for God to lift, there is something God cannot do (namely, lift the stone). And if God cannot create the stone too heavy for him to lift, there is still something he cannot do (in this case, create the stone). Either God can or cannot create such a stone. Therefore, in either case, there is something God cannot do; and in either case, we seem forced to conclude that God is not omnipotent” (Ronald Nash, 47).

But again, for this objection to hold, it must propose a “thing,” a genuine “task” for God to do. But it does not. The request that “the Being who can do anything, which includes creating and lifting all stones, create a stone too heavy to be lifted by the Being who can lift any created thing” is incoherent. It proposes nothing. It is a pseudo-task. That is to say, a stone too heavy to be lifted by him who can lift all stones is contradictory. Likewise, for God to create something which is a nothing (namely, a stone too heavy to be lifted by him who can lift all stones), is contradictory. That God cannot create a stone which logically cannot be created is no more a threat to omnipotence than his alleged “inability” to create a round triangle.

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