HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY

Time: TTh 5:00-6:15
Instructor: Stephen D. Dumont
Contact: Malloy 301 /1-3757/ dumont.2@nd.edu
Office Hours: By appointment.REQUIRED TEXTS (Note edition)

Hyman-Walsh Arthur Hyman and James J. Walsh, Philosophy in the Middle Ages 2nd ed. (Hackett , 1983)
Spade Paul V. Spade, Five Texts on Mediaeval Problem of Universals (Hackett, 1994)
Wolter Allan B. Wolter, Duns Scotus Philosophical Writings (Hackett, 1987)

RECOMMENDED TEXT

McGrade Steven A. McGrade, Cambridge Companion to Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge, 2003)

COURSE REQUIREMENTS
Undergraduate Graduate
25% = Midterm (Take-home)
25% = Term Paper (10 pages)
50% = Take Home Final 50% = Research Term paper (20 pages)
50% = Final (Take-home)
SYLLABUS: [Note: The following syllabus is ambitious and may be modified as we progress through the course. Many readings will be supplied or on deposit for you to copy.]
EARLY MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY

Boethius
Universals: Second Commentary on the Isagoge of Porphyry (In Isagogen Porphyrii commenta) [Handout from Richard McKeon, Selections from Medieval Philosophers. (New York, 1930), 1:70-99; cf. Spade, 20-25]
Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents: Consolation of Philosophy V [Handout from John F Wippel and Allan B. Wolter. Medieval Philosophy: From St. Augustine to Nicholas of Cusa, Readings in the History of Philosophy. (New York: Free Press), 1969, pp. 84-99]

Anselm
Existence of God: Proslogion 1-4; On Behalf of the Fool by Gaunilo; Reply to the Fool. [Hyman-Walsh, 149-62]

Abelard,
Universals: Glosses on Porphyry in Logic for Beginners (Logica ingredientibus) [Spade, 26-56; cf. Hyman-Walsh, 169-188]

ARABIC AND JEWISH MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY

Avicenna
The Concept of Metaphysics: Metaphysics of the al-Shifa [Class Notes]
Distinction between Essence and Existence Metaphysics of the al-Shifa [Class Notes]
Causality Metaphysics of the al-Shifa [Hyamn-Walsh, 247-255]
Necessary Being and Emanation Metaphysics of the al-Shifa [Hyman-Walsh, 241-47]

Al-Ghazali
Causality: Incoherence of the Philosophers (Tahafut al-Falasifat) [Hyman-Walsh, 283-92]

Averroes
Relation of Philosophy and Theology: Decisive Treatise on the Harmony of Philosophy and Religion [Hyman-Walsh, 297-316]
Unity of the Intellect: Long Commentary on Aristotle’s De anima [Hyman-Walsh, 324-334]

Maimonides
Divine Attributes and Negative Theology: Guide of the Perplexed [Hyman-Walsh, 373-90]
Eternity of the World: Guide of the Perplexed [Hyman-Walsh, 390-401]

LATE MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY

Universities, Translations and Reaction to Aristotle [Class Notes]

Bonaventure
Illumination: Disputed Questions on the Knowledge of Christ q. 4 [Handout from Eugene Fairweather, A Scholastic Miscellany: Anselm to Ockham., The Library of Christian Classics, V. 10. (Westminster, 1956), 379-401)]
Eternity of the World: Commentary on the Sentences; Collations on the Hexaemeron [Handout from Cyril O. Vollert et al., St. Thomas Aquinas, Siger of Brabant, St. Bonaventure On the Eternity of the World, (Marquette University Press, 1964), 105-117.]

Aquinas
Existence of God: ST I.2 [Hyman-Walsh, 523-27]
Language about God: ST I.13[Hyman-Walsh, 527-31]
Eternity of the World: ST I.46 [Hyman-Walsh, 537-41]
Mind-Body: ST I.75-76 [Hyman-Walsh, 541-46]
Will: ST I.82 [Hyman-Walsh, 546-50]
Knowledge: ST I.84-86 [Hyman-Walsh, 550-58]
Happiness: ST I-II.2, 3, 5 [Hyman-Walsh, 558-64]
Virtue: ST I-II.61-62 [Hyman-Walsh, 564-68]
Law: ST II-II.92, 94, 95 [Hyman-Walsh, 569-79]

Condemnations of 1277
Condemnations at Universities of Oxford and Paris 1270 and 1277 [Hyman-Walsh, 584-91]

Henry of Ghent
Illumination: Summa of Ordinary Questions [Handout from Robert Pasnau, Cambridge Translations of Medieval Philosophical Texts, Volume 3: Mind and Knowledge (Cambridge, 2002)]
Eternity of the World: Quodlibetal Questions [Handout from Richard Bosley and Martin M. Tweedale. Basic Issues in Medieval Philosophy: Selected Readings Presenting the Interactive Discourses among the Major Figures. (Broadview Press, 1997), 207-214]
The Will: Quodlibetal Questions [Handout from Roland J. Teske. Quodlibetal Questions on Free Will, (Marquette University Press, 1993), 26-29]

Duns Scotus
Knowledge of God: Ordinatio [Wolter, 14-33]
Illumination: Ordinatio [Wolter, 97-132]
Individuals and Universals: Ordinatio [Spade, 57-113]
Will: Ordinatio [Handout from Bosley-Tweedale, op. cit., 284-300]
Natural Law: Ordinatio [Handout from Alan B. Wolter, Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1997), 198-207]

William of Ockham
Language and Truth [Hyman-Walsh, 653-62]
Individuals and Universals: Ordinatio [Spade, 153-90]

BIBLIOGRAPHY

STANDARD HISTORIES AND GUIDES

Blackwell Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages. Ed. Jorge Gracia. London, 2002.
The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Philosophy. Ed. A. S. McGrade. Cambridge, 2003.
The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy. Ed. A. H. Armstrong. Cambridge, 1967.
The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy. Edd. N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny, J. Pinborg, and E. Stump. Cambridge, 1982.
Gilson, Étienne. History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages. New York, 1955.
Marenbon, John. Early Medieval Philosophy (480-1150): An Introduction. London- Boston, 1983.
—–. Later Medieval Philosophy (1150-1350): An Introduction. London- New York, 1987.
Maurer, Armand A. Medieval Philosophy. Rev. ed. Toronto, 1982.
Routledge History of Philosophy, Vol. 2: Aristotle to Augustine. Ed. David Furley. London, 1997; Vol. 3 Medieval Philosophy. Ed. John Marenbon. London, 1998.
ANTHOLOGIES

Basic Issues in Medieval Philosophy. Ed. R. Bosley and M. Tweedale. Peterborough, Ont., 1997.
The Cambridge Translations of Medieval Philosophical Texts. Cambridge, 1988-
Volume One: Logic and the Philosophy of Language. Edd. Norman Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump. Cambridge, 1988
Volume Two: Ethics and Political Philosophy. Ed A. S. McGrade, et al. Cambridge, 2001
Volume Three: Mind and Knowledge. Ed. Robert Pasnau. Cambridge, 2002.

Medieval Philosophy. Edd. and trans. John F. Wippel and Allan Wolter. New York, 1969.
Medieval Political Philosophy: A Sourcebook. Edd. Ralph Lerner adn Muhsin Mahdi. Ithaca, 1963.
Philosophy in the Middle Ages. Ed. and trans. James J. Walsh and Arthur Hyman. Indianapolis, 1973.
Readings in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy. Ed. James Collins. Westminster, MD, 1960.
A Scholastic Miscellany: Anselm to Ockham. Ed. Eugene Fairweather. Philadelphia, 1956.
Selections from Medieval Philosophers. Ed. Richard McKeon. New York, 1930.

BIBLIOGRAPHIES-INDICES

Bibliographie annuelle du Moyen-Âge tardif : auteurs et textes latins, vers 1250-1500. (B.A.M.A.T.) Rassemblée à la section latine de l’Institut de recherche et d’histoire des textes (C.N.R.S.). Turnhout: Brepols, c1991-
Bulletin de philosophie médiévale. Louvain, 1962-.
Bulletin de théologie ancienne et médiévale. Louvain, 1930-.
Bulletin thomiste. 11 vols. Paris, 1924-62.
Collectanea franciscana. Bibliographia franciscana. Rome, 1938-. [Prior to 1938 Bibliographia not printed separately from Collectanea franciscana. Cumulative index for 1931-1970].
Medioevo latino: bollettino bibliografico della cultura europea dal secolo VI al XIII. Spoleto : Centro italiano di studi sull’alto medioevo, 1980-
Rassegna di Letteratura Tomistica. Rome-Naples, 1966-. [Continuation of the Bulletin thomiste.]
Repértoire bibliographique de la philosophie. Louvain, 1949-.

COLLECTIONS OF SOURCES

• Aristoteles latinus. Ed. L. Minio-Paluello. Paris-Leiden, 1961-.
• Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters. 43 vols. Münster: Westfallen, 1891-1980. Neue folge. 1970-.
• Bibliotheca franciscana scholastica medii aevi. Quaracchi, 1904-.
• Corpus christianorum, series latina. Brepols, 1954-.
• Corpus latinorum commentariorum in Aristotelem graecorum. Leiden, 1973-.
• Corpus scriptorum ecclesiasticorum latinorum. 81 vols. Vienna, 1866-1966.
• Patrologiae cursus completus, series graeca. Ed. J. P. Migne. 162 vols. Paris, 1857-66.
• Patrologiae cursus completus, series latina. Ed. J. P. Migne. 221 vols. Paris, 1844-64.

REFERENCE WORKS

Emden, A. B. A Biographical Register of the University of Oxford to A. D. 1500. 3 vols. Oxford, 1957.
Glorieux, Palémon. Répertoire des maîtres en théologie de Paris au XIII siècle. 2 vols. Paris, 1933-34.
[Corrections and additions: Doucet, Victorin. ‘Maîtres franciscains de Paris: supplèment au Répertoire des maîtres en théologie de Paris au XIII siècle’, Archivum franciscanum historicum 26 (1933) 206-14; 27 (1934) 531-89.]
—–. La litterature quodlibétique. 2 vols. Paris, 1925, 1935.
Lohr, Charles F. ‘Medieval Latin Aristotle Commentaries: Authors A-F’, Traditio 23 (1967) 313-414; ‘Authors G-I’, 24 (1968) 149-246; ‘Authors Jacobus-Johannes’, 26 (1970) 135-216; ‘Authors Johannes de Kanthi-Myngodus’, 27 (1971) 251-352; ‘Authors Narcissus-Richardus’, 28 (1972) 281-396; Authors Robertus-Wilgelmus’, 29 (1973) 93-198; ‘Supplementary Authors’ 30 (1974) 119-44.
Schönberger, Rolf and Kible, Brigitte (Edd.). Repertorium edierter Texte des Mittelalters aus dem Bereich der Philosophie und angrenzender Gebiete. Berlin, Akademie-Verlag, 1994.
Stegmüller, F. Repertorium Commentariorum in Sententias Petri Lombardi. 2 vols. Würzberg, 1947.
[Corrections and additions: Doucet, Victorin. ‘Commentaires sur les Sentences: supplément au Répertoire de M. Frédéric Stegmueller Archivum franciscanum historicum 47 (1954) 88-170, 400-27; Van Dyk, John. ‘Thirty Years Since Stegmüller’, Franciscan Studies 39 (1979) 255-315.]
Sharpe, Richard, A Handlist of the Latin Writers of Great Britain and Ireland before 1540. 2nd ed. with additions and corrections 2001. Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols, 2001.
Weijers, Olga. Le travail intellectuel à la Faculté des arts de Paris: textes et maîtres (ca. 1200-1500). Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols, 1994- .

ELECTRONIC RESOURCES

Title: Patrologia Latina
The Patrologia Latina Database is an electronic version of the first edition of Jacques-Paul Migne’s Patrologia Latina, published between 1844 and 1855, and the four volumes of indexes published between 1862 and 1865. The Patrologia Latina comprises the works of the Church Fathers from Tertullian in 200 AD to the death of Pope Innocent III in 1216. The Patrologia Latina Database contains the complete Patrologia Latina, including all prefatory material, original texts, critical apparatus and indexes. Migne’s column numbers, essential references for scholars, are also included.

Title: Cetedoc Library of Christian Latin Texts
The CLCLT contains searchable texts from the CCL as well as numerous other modern editions. It will eventually include all medieval, Latin authors.

Title: International Medieval Bibiography
Indexes articles, notes, and similar literature on medieval subjects in journals, Festschriften, conference proceedings, and collected essays. Covers all aspects of medieval studies within the date range of 400 to 1500 for the entire continent of Europe, the Middle East and North Africa for the period before the Muslim conquest and parts of those areas subsequently controlled by Christian powers. Includes more than 300,000 articles published 1967- , all of which are fully classified by date, subject and location. Needs to be consulted because Philosophers Index does not cover medieval material very well.


AUGUSTINE

A very useful bibliography organized by topic follows the excellent article on Augustine by Gerard O’Daly in Routledge History of Philosophy, Vol. 2: Aristotle to Augustine. Ed. David Furley. London, 1997, pp. 388-428. The Revue des études Augustiennes. Paris, 1951- contains annual bibliography of studies on Augustine. See also below the searchable bibliography in CAG.

I. Works

Augustine corpus contains more than a hundred items and some 5 million words. Central titles are:

A. Major Works:
Confessiones [397(-401?)]. FC. Augustine’s intellectual and spiritual autobiography. Last three books deal with the nature of memory and time.
De civitate Dei (City of God) [413-426/427]. FC.
De trinitate (The Trinity) [399/400-416/421]. FC.
Retractationes (Reconsiderations) [426-427]. FC. A catalogue made by Augustine of his works, with his own corrigenda noted.

B. Works of Philosophical Interest (Mostly Early)
Contra academicos (Against the Academics) [386]. ACW; FC. Dialogue in three books refuting the “academic” skepticism of Cicero’s late Roman followers.
De beata vita (The Happy Life) [386]. FC. Philosophical dialogue from Cassiciacum.
De immortalitate animae (The Immortality of the Soul) [387]. FC. Sketch for a third book of Soliloquia.
De libero arbitrio voluntatis (The Free Choice of the Will) [388-395]. FC. Dialogue in three books setting forth Augustine’s early, philosophical analysis of evil and rejection of the Manichee solution.
De magistro (The Teacher) [389]. FC. Dialogue, on knowledge and its transmission, between Augustine and his natural son Adeodatus shortly before the son’s death.
De musica (Music) [387-391?], in six books. FC. Deals with abstract questions of time and number and with music treated mainly as a question of rhythm.
De ordine (Order) [386]. FC. Dialogue from Cassiciacum on divine providence.
De quantitate animae (The Magnitude of the Soul) [387/8]. ACW; FC. Dialogue inquiring into the nature of the soul and its attributes.
De vera religione (True Religion) [391]. FC. General defense of the excellence of Christianity. This is the last of his works from before his ordination and shows his mind on the point of turning to a more ecclesiastical style.
Soliloquia (Soliloquies–a word Augustine coined for this work) [386/87]. A dialogue between “Augustine” and “Reason;” a challenging first statement of themes that recur throughout his career.
De doctrina christiana (Christian Doctrine) [books 1-3, 396/397; book 4, 426]. FC.
De genesi ad litteram (Literal Commentary on Genesis) [401-414/415], in twelve books.* The theology of creation, from the first three chapters of Genesis.

II. Editions and Translations

Augustine’s works occupy PL 32-46 and 24 volumes in the CSEL. These are currently being replaced by critical editions in the CCL. The most convenient translations are found in:

The Basic Writings of St. Augustine. Ed. Whitney J. Oates. 2 vols. New York, 1948. [Selections of major works]

Older and continuing series in which many of Augustine’s works are translated:

The Fathers of the Church. New York-Washington, DC, 1947-.
Ancient Christian Writers. Westminster, MA, 1946-
A Select Library of the Nicene and post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church. New York, The Christian Literature Co., 1886-1902. These are in the public domain and online at http://ccat.sas.upenn.edu/jod/augustine.html

Augustine’s entire corpus has never been translated. The first attempt to do so is underway in:

The Works of Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century. Gen. ed. John E. Rotelle.
Brooklyn, NY: New City Press, 1990-

III. Fundamental Studies:

Armstrong, A. H. St. Augustine and Christian Platonism. Villanova, PA, 1967.
Brown, Peter. Augustine of Hippo: A Biography. London, 1967.
Chadwick, Henry. Past Masters: Augustine. Oxford, 1986.
Gilson, Etienne. Introduction à l’étude de Saint Augustin. 2nd ed. Paris, 1943. Translation: The Christian Philosophy of St. Augustine. Trans. L. E. M. Lynch. New York, 1960.
Kirwin, Christopher, Augustine. The Arguments of the Philosophers. London: Routledge, 1989.
Marrou, Herni. Saint Augustin et la fin de la culture antique. Paris, 1938.
Matthews, Gareth B., Augustine. Blackwell, 2005 (Blackwell Great Minds )
O’ Daly, Gerard. Augustine’s Philosophy of Mind. Los Angeles: University of California, 1987.
O’Donnell, James J. Augustine: Confessions. 3 vols. Oxford: Clarendon, 1992.
Rist, John M. Augustine: Ancient Thought Baptized. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

IV. Guides and Collections

Augustine. A Collection of Critical Essays. Ed. R. A. Markus. New York, 1972. [Very good collection of important articles.]
Augustine through the Ages: An Encyclopedia. Ed. A. Fitzgerald. Grand Rapids, 1999.
Cambridge Companion to Augustine. Edd. Eleonore Stump and Norman Kreztmann. Cambridge, 2001.
The Augustinian Tradition. Ed. Gareth B. Matthews. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999.

V. Online/Electronic

CAG: Corpus Augustinianum Gissense a Cornelio Mayer editum. Edition 1. Aufl. Basel: Schwabe, 1995. [Contains the complete Latin works of St. Augustine (over 5 million words, from the best critical editions), keyword searchable; accompanied by a 20,000-title bibliography of secondary literature on Augustine.]

James J. O’Donnell’s Augustine page and links: http://ccat.sas.upenn.edu/jod/augustine.html

Augustine page at Villanova University. Very valuable for bibliographies and collection of online texts. http://www.augustinian.villanova.edu/writings/index.html

Matthews, Gareth B. (1998). Augustine. In E. Craig (Ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. London: Routledge. http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/B009

Mendelson, Michael, “Saint Augustine”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2000 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/augustine/

AUGUSTINIAN THEMES

Augustine’s influence for the history of medieval philosophy (and especially theology) is both large and complex. A number of concepts and distinctions, however, are clearly identifiable as “Augustinian” and were regarded as such in later medieval thought, often in conscious contrast to Aristotle. Among these are (1) the divine ideas, (2) divine illumination, (3) emphasis on the will, (4) the Trinitarian pyschology of memory, intellect and will, (5) active theory of perception, (6) seminal reasons, and (7) the distinction between use and enjoyment (utor and fruor).

(1) DIVINE IDEAS

A chief Platonic feature of Augustine is the positing of eternal, transcendent forms as ideas in the mind of God. These ‘eternal reasons’ (rationes aeternae) are the archetypes according to which God created all things, later called exemplar causes, and the source of our knowledge, which became known as illumination (see below). Augustine identified the procession of the second person of the Trinity – the Word or logos of the opening of John – with the cognitive act of God productive of these ideas. This entered as a commonplace into medieval philosophy and theology. Indeed, the epistemological and metaphysical role of the divine ideas was disputed into the early modern period.

Scholastic authors debated at length the ontological status of the divine ideas and their causal roles. Generally, the more reality and causal responsibility a thinker assigned to the ideas, the more Platonic or Augustinian his outlook. Thus, far example, Bonaventure famously located the root of Aristotle’s errors in his denial of ideas in God.

On Eighty-Three Diverse Questions, q. 46

Plato is known as the first to have named the Ideas. Not that if this name were nonexistent before he established it, the things that he called Ideas would not have existed, or would not have been understood by anyone—but they were probably called by different names by different people. It is permitted to give to any known thing that lacks an accepted name, whatever name one wishes…. But enough has previously been said about the name; let us examine the thing which is principally to be considered and understood, leaving each person free, as far as the terms are concerned, to give whatever name he wishes to the object of his knowledge.
So, in Latin we may call Ideas forms or species, to make it clear that we are translating word for word. But, if we call them “reasons,” we are departing somewhat from a strict translation; reasons are called logos in Greek and not Ideas. However, if a person chose to use this term, he would not be far from the real meaning. In fact, Ideas are the primary forms, or the permanent and immutable reasons of real things, and they are not themselves formed; so they are, as a consequence, eternal and ever the same in themselves, and they are contained in the divine intelligence. And since they never come into being or go out of it, everything that can come into being and go out of it, and everything that does come into being and goes out of it, may be said to be formed in accord with them.
It is denied that the soul can look upon them, unless it be rational, in that part whereby it excels, that is, in its mind and reason, as it were in its face or interior and intellectual eye. And for this vision not everyone is suitable but only that rational soul which is holy and pure, that one which keeps the eye in which such objects are seen, healthy, clear, serene and like unto those objects to which its view is directed. What religious man, infused with the true religion, even though not yet able to contemplate these objects, would nevertheless dare to deny and even refuse to confess that all things that are—that is, whatsoever things are constituted with a nature of their own in their proper kinds—were created by God as their source, so that they might exist? And that all living things are alive by virtue of the same source? And that the whole of things is preserved, and the very order in which they change, as they manifest their temporal courses according to a definite pattern, is maintained and governed, by the laws of the highest God? When this is established and admitted, who will dare to say that God established all things in an irrational manner? Now if this cannot be said or accepted in any proper sense, the conclusion remains that all things were founded by means of reason. Not that a man is based on the same reason as a horse; this would be an absurd notion. So, each one of these is created in accord with its own reason. Now, where would we think that these reasons are, if not in the mind of the Creator? For He did not look to anything placed outside Himself as a model for the construction of what he created; to think that He did would be irreligious.

Now, if these reasons for all things to be created, or already created, are contained in the divine mind, and if there can be nothing in the divine mind unless it be eternal and immutable, and if Plato called these primary reasons of things Ideas—then not only do Ideas exist but they are true because they are eternal and they endure immutably in this way; and it is by participation in these that whatever exists is produced, however its way of existing may be.

(2) DIVINE ILLUMINATION

Perhaps the most characteristic philosophical doctrine of Augustine is that of divine illumination, which is of a piece with the above theory of the ideas. Although Augustine rejected the Platonic account of recollection because of its attached doctrine of the pre-existence of souls, he nonetheless agreed with Plato that the senses could not be sources of knowledge. Sense, for example, cannot reveal mathematical truths or philosophical truths regarding the conduct of life. Unity and beauty cannot be “seen” by the senses. Rather, the what we sense is judged to be one or beautiful by appeal to true unity or beauty we see only with the mind by turning inward and away from the senses. These ideal, eternal and unchanging paradigms that we see within our minds (cf. Phaedo) are the impression on us of the divine ideas. Just as all creation is impressed with the order and number of the divine ideas, so too are our minds, where we see them as unchanging by participating in an ‘intelligible world.’ This is divine illumination.

The at root Platonic origins of illumination, of course, ran counter to Aristotle’s account of knowledge, which the medievals construed as an abstraction of the forms from material things as given in sense. A major task of the thirteenth century was to give both Aristotle and Augustine some role in epistemology. Bonaventure, for example, gave a very prominent role to illumination, while Aquinas greatly attenuated its function by simply identifying it with the natural ‘illumination’ of Aristotle’s agent intellect. Ultimately, illumination did not prevail. Duns Scotus forcefully rejected it. It would resurface, however, in a different form in Descartes’ innate idea of God.

On Free Choice of the Will I.16

Wisdom shows itself to the seeker in the guise of numbers embodied in all things of this world.

A. When we are eager to be wise, we simply, and as quickly as we can, find some means of concentrating our whole soul on the object; when it is attained by the mind, we fix it there firmly, not so that the soul may rejoice in its own private pleasure-which involves only fleeting pleasures-but so that the soul, free of all inclination toward the things of time and space, may grasp that which is one, the same, and eternal. As the soul is the whole life of the body, so God is the happy life of the soul. This is the undertaking in which we are engaged, and toward which we will strive until we have completed it. It has been granted to us to enjoy these true and certain goods which gleam before us, however obscured they may have been until this stage of our journey. Is this not what was written of wisdom’s treatment of its lovers, when they approach and seek it? It is said, “In the ways it will show itself to them joyfully and in all providence it will meet them.” ‘Wherever you turn, wisdom speaks to you through the imprint it has stamped upon its works. When you begin to slip toward outward things, wisdom calls you back, by means of their very forms, so that when some-thing delights you in body and entices you through the bodily senses, you may see that it has number and may ask whence it comes. Thus you return to yourself: you know that you can-not approve or disapprove of what you touch with the bodily senses, unless you have within you certain laws of beauty to which you refer the beautiful objects that you perceive out-side of you.
Look at the sky, the earth, and the sea, and at whatever in them shines from above or crawls, flies, or swims below. These have form because they have number. Take away these forms and there will be nothing. Whence are these except from number? Indeed, they exist only insofar as they have number.

In art, the makers of all bodily forms have numbers by which they organize their works. They move their hands and instruments in producing their works until what has been formed externally achieves completion by corresponding as closely as possible to the inward light; and when it has been communicated by the intermediaries of the senses, it delights the inner judge who gazes upward upon numbers.

(3) WILL

Arguably Augustine’s most significant philosophical contribution was the establishment of the will as the center of moral responsibility. It is generally agreed that there is no corresponding concept of will in Greek philosophy (cf. A. Dihle, The Concept of Will in Classical Antiquity). Aristotle, for example, accounted for choice (prohairesis) by the interaction of desire and deliberation; there was no separate ‘will’ mediating and controlling the interaction of the two. Augustine makes ‘free choice of the will’ (liberum arbitrium voluntatis) the cause of moral wrong doing, rather than some form of ignorance, as did Aristotle and Plato, and makes the moral virtues dependent on a ‘good will’.

In later medieval philosophy the challenge was to integrate Augustine and Aristotle on human action, as is very evident in the I-II of Aquinas’s Summa.

On Free Choice of the Will II

A. Since, because of justice, whatever is equal or superior to the mind that possesses virtue and is in control does not make the mind a slave to lust; and since, because of its weakness, whatever is inferior to the mind cannot do this (as the things we have established prove)—therefore it follows that nothing can make the mind a companion of desire except its own will and free choice [voluntas et liberum arbitrium].

A. Should we not, therefore, rejoice that we have some-thing in our spirit which I call good will, compared to which the things we have just mentioned are worthless, though we see many men shrink from no trouble or peril to acquire them?
E. Yes, we ought to rejoice very much.
A. Do you think that men who do not feel this joy suffer only a slight loss when they lose so great a good?
E. They suffer, rather, the greatest loss.
A. Now I think you see that it lies in the power of our own will to enjoy or else to lack such a great and true good. For what lies more truly in the power of the will than the will itself? Whoever has a good will certainly has a thing to be preferred by far to all earthly realms and all pleasures of the body. Whoever does not have a good will surely lacks that very thing which is more excellent than all the goods not in our power, that thing which the will alone, in itself, may give. So while a man thinks that he is very unhappy if he has lost his fine reputation, great wealth, or various goods of the body, would you not consider him extremely unhappy even if he had an abundance of such things? For he is clinging to things that he can very easily lose and that he does not have while he wants then; he lacks, moreover, the good will which is not to be compared to these and which, though it is so great a good, he needs only to will in order to possess.
E. Quite right.
A. Rightly and deservedly are foolish men afflicted by unhappiness of this sort, even if they never were wise (for this point is uncertain and obscure).
E. I agree.
(4) TRINITARIAN PHILOSOPHY OF MIND

For Augustine the rational creature was the image of God, and this meant that it imitated the Trinity. Thus, the rational structure of the human being consisted in having an intellect, memory, and will, corresponding respectively to the three Persons of the Trinity, and Augustine drew out analogies of the human cognitive and affective processes with the processions of the Trinity of the Son and Spirit from the Father. This was totally incommensurate with any Platonic or Aristotelian tripartite division of the soul. Most notable, in connection with the prior point, was the insertion alongside the intellect of a distinct, rational component of the will.

Again, scholastics could not simpy jettison Augustine’s elaborate Trinitarian account the rational part of the human being and tried to integrate this with Aristotle’s account of knowledge and choice, particularly in the De anima and Ethics, where Aristotle’s conspicuous lack of any ‘will’ was noted repeatedly in the thirteenth century.

On the Trinity X

Chapter 4: Of the many mental acts of which mind is certain, the author selects memory, understanding, and will from which to construct his final draft of the image of the divine trinity in the mind

18. These three then, memory, understanding, and will, are not three lives but one life, nor three minds but one mind. So it follows of course that they are not three substances but one substance. When memory is called life, and mind, and substance, it is called so with reference to itself; but when it is called memory it is called so with reference to another. I can say the same about understanding and will; both understanding and will are so called with reference to another. But each of them is life and mind and being with reference to itself. For this reason these three are one in that they are one life, one mind, one being; and whatever else they are called together with reference to self, they are called it in the singular, not in the plural. But they are three in that they have reference to each other. And if they were not equal, not only each to the other but also each to them all together, they would not of course contain each other. In fact though they are not only each contained by each, they are all contained by each as well. After all, I remember that I have memory and understanding and will, and I understand that I understand and will and remember, and I will that I will and remember and understand, and I remember my whole memory and understanding and will all together. If there is any of my memory that I do not remember, then it is not in my memory. But nothing is more in the memory than memory itself. Therefore I remember the whole of it. Again, whatever I understand I know that I understand, and I know that I will whatever I will; and whatever I know I remember. So I remember my whole understanding and my whole will.
Likewise when I understand these three I understand the whole of them together. For the only understandable things I do not understand are the ones I am ignorant of. But what I am ignorant of I neither remember nor will. So it follows that any understandable thing which I do not understand, I do not remember or will either. Therefore whatever understandable thing I remember and will I also understand in consequence. My will also contains my whole understanding and my whole memory while I use the whole of what I understand and remember. Therefore since they are each and all and wholly contained by each, they are each and all equal to each and all, and each and all equal to all of them together, and these three are one, one life, one mind, one being.
19. Are we already then in a position to rise with all our powers of concentration to that supreme and most high being of which the human mind is the unequal image, but the image nonetheless?

(5) ACTIVE SENSATION OR ‘VITAL ATTENTION’

For Aristotle, sensation as well as intellection, consisted of a process of actualization by the object of the sense power or intellect that was in potency. By considering the sense and intellectual as essentialy passive capacities, Aristotle assured their openess to sensing or understanding all things. Augustine, however, denies that the body can act on the soul, for it is inferior, and what is inferior does not ‘judge’ or control the superior. Thus, for Augustine, sensation consists in a bodily disturbance which the soul notices. This is Augustine’s doctrine of vital attention.

For the scholastics it was a point of dispute, connected to this view, to what degree the cognitive and affective powers were of themselves active or passive, with the Augustinians holding more to the former, and thus reducing the role of the object, and the Aristotelians holding the latter. This was most contentious in the discussions of the will where the more Augustinian view was that it was a self-moving power that was the total cause of volition. The object acted only as a necessary precondition for the activity of the will. The general idea of a ‘self-moving mover’ was Platonic and rejected by Aristotle as incoherent.

De musica VI.5.9-10

Master: Immediately I shall say what I think. But you – you either follow or even precede, if you are able, when you notice me delay and hesitate. Now, I do not think that this body is animated by the soul unless by the intention of its Maker. Nor do I think that the soul suffers anything from the body, but acts with the body and in it, subjected divinely to its domination. Nevertheless, I think that the soul operates sometimes with ease, sometimes with difficulty, in so far as corporeal nature gives way, more or less, to it in accordance with its merits. Therefore, whatever corporeal things are put into or taken out of this body from without, produce something, not in the soul but in the body, which either is opposed to its work or agrees with it. And so, when the soul strives against the reluctant body and with difficulty molds the matter subjected to it for the ways of its working, it becomes more attentive to the activity on account of the difficulty—and this difficulty is called sensation on account of the attention (since it does not escape the notice of the soul). This perception is called pain or labor. But when that which is brought in or lies close, agrees, the soul easily brings the whole of it, or of it as much as it needs, into the journeyings of its working. And this action by which it joins its body extrinsically to a suitable object is not hidden, since the action is carried on more attentively on account of some adventitious circumstance and, moreover, on account of the suitability it is sensed with pleasure. But when those things by which it re-stores the losses of the body are absent, extreme want follows. When by that difficulty of action it becomes more attentive, and when such an operation of it does not lie hidden from the soul, it is called hunger or thirst or something similar. When, however, what has been eaten is above measure, and difficulty of working is born from the weight of the food, neither does this happen without attention. Further, when such an action is not hidden, sluggishness is felt. It even functions attentively when it ejects the superfluity if gently, with delight; if roughly, with pain. The soul attentively acts in the morbid disturbance of the body, seeking to aid the body as it slips and disintegrates. Again, when this action is not hidden, the soul is said to feel illness and disease.

And lest I make it too long, it seems to me that the soul, when it feels in the body, is not affected in anything from it but acts more attentively in its affections, and then these actions are either easy, on account of the agreeableness, or difficult on account of the disagreeableness, and they do not escape the soul. This is all that is called sensation. But that sense which, even when we do not sense still is present, is an instrument of the body, which is such a disposition that the soul be in it more prepared to direct the passions of the body with attention, so that it joins like things to like and repels what is harmful. Furthermore, as I think, it directs in the eyes, something akin to light; in the ears, breezes, the most gentle and mobile; in the nose, something misty; in the mouth, moist; and in the touch, earthy and muddy. But whether by this or by some other distribution, these things are united the soul acts quietly, when those inner components of its integrated health occur in some sort of intimate state of agreement. But when those are used which affect the body with some change, if I may speak thus, the soul then brings out more attentive actions as suited to the proper place and instrument. In that instance it is said to hear, or to smell, or to taste, or to sense by touching, and by these actions it gladly associates the compatible things, with difficulty resists the incompatible. These operations the soul puts over against the passions of the body when it senses and itself does not receive the same feelings.

(6) SEMINAL REASONS (rationes seminales)

In part to accomodate the dual creation stories in Genesis, Augustine took over the Stoic doctrine of logoi spermatikoi and held that matter contained already the ‘seeds’ of all diverse creatures. In this, Augustine essentially assigned some positive state and form to matter, which directly conflicted with the Aristotelian idea that prime matter is a purely potential principle.

De Trinitate III.8.13; Literal Commentary on Geneis IX.17.32

INVISIBLE SEEDS IN THE ELEMENTS
Yet it is not on this account to be thought that the matter of visible things is subservient to the bidding of those wicked angels; but rather to that of God, by whom this power is given, just so far as He, who is unchangeable, determines in His lofty and spiritual abode to give it. For water and fire and earth are subservient even to wicked men, who are condemned to the mines, in order that they may do therewith what they will, but only so far as is permitted. Nor in truth are those evil angels to be called creators, because by their means the magicians, withstanding the servant of God, made frogs and serpents; for it was not they who created them. But in truth some hidden seeds of all things that are born corporeally and visibly are concealed in the corporeal elements of this world. For those seeds that are visible at once to our eyes from fruits and living things, are quite distinct from the hidden seeds of those former seeds; whence, at the bidding of the Creator, the water produced the first swimming creatures and fowl, and the earth the first buds after their kind, and the first living creatures after their kind. For neither at that time were those seeds so drawn forth into products of these several kinds, as that the power of production was exhausted in those products; but for the most part, suitable combinations of circumstances are wanting, whereby they may be enabled to burst forth and complete their species. For consider, the very least shoot is a seed; for, if fitly consigned to the earth, it produces a tree. But of this shoot there is a yet more subtle seed in some grain of the same species, and this so far visible to us. But of this grain also there is further still a seed, which, although we are unable to see with our eyes, yet we can conjecture its existence from our reason; because, except there were some such power in those elements, there would not so generally be produced from the earth things which had not been sown there; nor yet so many animals, without any previous commixture of male and female, whether on the land, or in the water, which yet grow, and by commingling bring forth others, while themselves sprang up without any union of parents. And certainly bees do not conceive the seeds of their young by commixture, but gather them as they lie scattered over the earth with their mouth. For the Creator of these invisible seeds is the Creator of all things Himself: since whatever comes forth to our sight by being born, receives the first beginnings of its course from hidden seeds, and takes the successive increments of its proper size and its distinctive forms from these as it were original rules.

THE ELEMENTS CONTAIN SEMINAL REASONS*
The elements of this bodily world have their own precise force and quality, what each of them can or cannot do, what can be made from what, or cannot. From these elements, as the original principles of things, all things that are generated take their origin and development, each in its proper time; and they receive their terminations and decreases, each according to its kind. Hence it comes about that a bean does not grow from a grain of wheat, or wheat from a bean, or a man from a beast, or a beast from a man. Above this natural change and course of things, the power of the Creator keeps to Himself the ability to make out of all these things something other than what their seminal reasons, as it were, contain—but not something that He did not place in them, so that He might produce it out of them or accomplish it by His own power. For He is omnipotent, not by virtue of thoughtless power but by virtue of His wisdom.

(7) UTOR AND FRUOR

One of the most discussed of Augustine’s distinctions is that between enjoyment (fruitio) and use (usus), usally referred to by the first person verbs utor and fruor. Augustine maintains that only eternal things, namely, God, are to be enjoyed, that is, pursued as an end in itelf and for its own sake. All other things, including our selves and other human beings, are only to be used to that end and are not strictly objects of enjoyment. While Augustine does not mean by this that we can rankly exploit other creatures, nonetheless it is a provocative position that is quite the opposite of the Kantian kingdom of ends, where every rational creature is to be considered an end in itself

On Christian Doctrine I

The division of things; what is meant by enjoying and using
3, 3. So then, there are some things which are meant to be enjoyed, others which are meant to be used, yet others which do both the enjoying and the using. Things that are to be enjoyed make us happy; things which are to be used help us on our way to happiness, providing us, so to say, with crutches and props for reaching the things that will make us happy, and enabling us to keep them.
We ourselves, however, both enjoy and use things, and find ourselves in the middle, in a position to choose which to do. So if we wish to enjoy things that are meant to be used, we are impeding our own progress, and sometimes are also deflected from our course, because we are thereby delayed in obtaining what we should be enjoying, or turned back from it altogether, blocked by our love for inferior things.
4, 4. Enjoyment, after all, consists in clinging to something lovingly for its own sake, while use consists in referring what has come your way to what your love aims at obtaining, provided, that is, it deserves to be loved. Because unlawful use, surely, should rather be termed abuse or misuse. Supposing then we were exiles in a foreign land, and could only live happily in our own country, and that being unhappy in exile we longed to put an end to our unhappiness and to return to our own country, we would of course need land vehicles or sea-going vessels, which we would have to make use of in order to be able to reach our own country, where we could find true enjoyment. And then suppose we were delighted with the pleasures of the journey, and with the very experience of being conveyed in carriages or ships, and that we were converted to enjoying what we ought to have been using, and were unwilling to finish the journey quickly, and that by being perversely captivated by such agreeable experiences we lost interest in our own country, where alone we could find real happiness in its agreeable familiarity. Well that’s how it is in this mortal life in which we are exiles away from the Lord (2 Cor 5:6); if we wish to return to our home country, where alone we can be truly happy, we have to use this world, not enjoy it,†4 so that we may behold the invisible things of God, brought to our knowledge through the things that have been made (Rom 1:20); that is, so that we may proceed from temporal and bodily things to grasp those that are eternal and spiritual.

God, Father, Son and Holy Spirit, is the ultimate thing to be enjoyed; but he is inexpressible
5, 5. The things therefore that are to be enjoyed are the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, in fact the Trinity, one supreme thing, and one which is shared in common by all who enjoy it; if, that is to say, it is a thing, and not the cause of all things; if indeed it is a cause. It is not easy, after all, to find any name that will really fit such transcendent majesty. In fact it is better just to say that this Trinity is the one God from whom are all things, through whom all things, in whom all things (Rom 11:36). Thus Father and Son and Holy Spirit are both each one of them singly God and all together one God; and each one of them singly is the complete divine substance, and all together are one substance.

God alone is to be enjoyed
22, 20. Among all the things there are, therefore, those alone are to be enjoyed which we have noted as being eternal and unchanging, while the rest are to be used, in order that we may come at last to the enjoyment of the former sort. And so we, who both enjoy and use other things, are ourselves also things. Yes, a great thing indeed is man, made to the image and likeness of God (Gn 1:26-27), not insofar as he is enclosed in a mortal body, but insofar as he takes precedence over the animals in the dignity of a rational soul. And so the great question is whether human beings ought to regard themselves as things to be enjoyed, or to be used, or both.
We have been commanded, after all, to love one another; but the question is whether people are to be loved by others for their own sake, or for the sake of something else. If it is for their own sake, then they are things for us to enjoy; if for the sake of something else, they are for us to use. Now it seems to me that they are to be loved for the sake of something else, because if a thing is to be loved for its own sake, it means that it constitutes the life of bliss, which consoles us in this present time with the hope of it, even though not yet with its reality. Cursed, however, is the one who places his hopes in man (Jer 17:5).
21. But none of us ought either to find enjoyment in ourselves, if you consider the matter straightforwardly, because we ought not either to love ourselves for our own sakes, but for the sake of the one whom we are to enjoy. Then indeed are people as good as can be, when they aim all their lives long at that unchanging life, and cling to it with all their hearts. But if they love themselves for their own sakes, they are not relating themselves to God; rather, in turning to themselves, they are not turning to anything unchangeable. And that is why their enjoyment of themselves is to some extent defective, because they are better when they cleave to the unchangeable good and are tightly bound to it, than when they release themselves from it to cling even to themselves.
So if you ought not to love yourself for your own sake, but for the sake of the one to whom your love is most rightly directed as its end, other people must not take offense if you also love them for God’s sake and not their own. This, after all, is the rule of love that God has set for us: You shall love, he says, your neighbor as yourself; God, however, with your whole heart and your whole soul and your whole mind (Mk 12:31.30; Lv 19:18; Dt 6:5). Thus all your thoughts and your whole life and all your intelligence should be focused on him from whom you have received the very things you devote to him. Now when he said with your whole heart, your whole soul, your whole mind, he did not leave out any part of our life, which could be left vacant, so to speak, and leave room for wanting to enjoy something else. Instead, whatever else occurs to you as fit to be loved must be whisked along toward that point to which the whole impetus of your love is hastening.



BOETHIUS

The works of Boethius are contained in PL 63-64, CSEL 48, 67 and CCL 94. In addition, the Latin texts and translations of his opuscula sacra, together with the De consolatione philosophiae, are found in:

The Theological Tractates; The Consolation of Philosophy. Trans. H. F. Stewart, E. K. Rand, and S. J. Tester. Loeb Classical Library 74. 2nd rev. ed. Cambridge, MA, 1973.

Boethius’ translations of Aristotle from the Greek are contained in the following volumes of Aristoteles latinus:

1: Categories; also Boethius’ translation of Porphyry’s Isagoge or Introduction to the Categories of Aristotle
2: De interpretatione (Peri hermeneias)
3: Prior Analytics
5: Topics
6: Sophistical Refutations (Elenchi sophistici)

Editions

Commentarii in librum Aristotelis Perihermeneias. Ed. Charles Meiser. 2 vols. Leipzig, 1877-90.
De consolatione philosophiae. CCL 94.
De hypotheticis sylllogismis. Ed. and trans. L Orbertello. Brescia, 1969.
De Trinitate. PL 64.1247-56; Stewart-Rand-Tester, 2-31.
In Categorias Aristotelis. PL 64.159-292.
In Isagogen Porphyrii commentorum editio prima [i.e., commentary based upon Victorinus’ translation of the Isagoge]. PL 64.9-70; CSEL 48.1-132.
In Isagogen Porphyrii commentorum editio secunda [i.e., commentary based upon Boethius’ own translation of the Isagoge]. PL 64.71-158; CSEL 48.132-348.
Liber de persona et duabus naturis contra Eutychen et Nestorium. PL 64.1337-54; Stewart-Rand-Tester, 76-126.
Quomodo substantiae in eo quod sint, bonae sint…seu De hebdomatibus. PL 63.1331-14; Stewart-Rand-Tester, 38-51.

Translations

Boethian Number Theory: A Translation of the De institutione arithmetica. Trans. Michael Masi. Amsterdam, 1983.
De topicis differentiis. Trans. Eleonore Stump. Ithaca, N. Y., 1978.
In Ciceronis topica. Trans. Eleonore Stump. Ithaca, N. Y., 1988.

Fundamental Studies

Boethius and the Liberal Arts: A Collection of Essays. Ed. Michael Masi. Bern, 1981.
Boethius: His Life, Thought, and Influence. Ed. Margaret Gibson. Oxford, 1981.
Chadwick, Henry. Boethius: The Consolations of Music, Logic, Theology, and Philosophy. Oxford, 1981.
Courcelle, Pierre. La consolation de philosophie dans la tradition littéraire; antécédents et postérité de Boéce. Paris, 1967.
Marenbon, John. Boethius. Oxford, 2003.

Online

J. J. O’Donnell’s Boethius page: http://ccat.sas.upenn.edu/jod/boethius.html

UNIVERSALS

In his commentaries on the Isagoge of Porphyry, Boethius introduced the problem of the universal to the Middle Ages. In his translations of Aristotle, he fixed the Latin vocabulary for Aristotle. Below are some technical terms associated with Boethius’ discussion. In the references, AL = Aristoteles latinus and CAG = Commentaria in Aristotelem graeca. The numbers following the citation to Aristotle are the Bekker numbers, i.e, page-column-line of the Prussian Academy edition of Aristotle’s works.

CATEGORIES (praedicamenta, genera generalissima, decem genera):

The most general classifications of reality. Most medieval philosophers and theologians took as definitive the list of the ten general classes given by Aristotle his Categories. In the Latin translation of Boethius, the ten categories are:
Categories 4 (1b25-27) Boethius translation Oxford translation

 ousia substantia substance
 poson quantitas quantity
 poion qualitas quality
 pros ti ad aliquid relation
 pou ubi place
 pote quando time
 keisthai situs position
 exein habitus state
 poiein facere action
 paschein pati affection

The main division is between substance and the nine accidental categories. Of the latter, quality, quantity, and relation were the most discussed because of their usefulness in theological explanations of the Trinity, Christ, and the Sacraments.

PRAEDICABLES (praedicabilia, praedicata):

The most general classifications of the way in which a predicate can be related to a subject. As such, the predicables are logical notions. Aristotle listed four predicables in the Topics: genus, definition, property, and accident. This was later expanded by Porphyry to five, which the medievals universally adopted: genus, difference, species, property, and accident. Again, in the Latin translation of Boethius, the predicables are:
Topics 1.4-5
(101b25, 37-38) Boethius translation
(AL 5.8:18-19) Isagoge
(CAG 4.1:4-5) Boethius translation
(AL 1 pt.6-7 5:3-4)

 genos genus  genus
 horos terminus  differentia
 idion proprium  species
 sumbebekos accidens  proprium
 accidens

DIVISION – TREE OF PORPHYRY (arbor Porphyrii, linea praedicamentalis)

A genus is said to be ‘divided’ or differentiated into its species. The final step of division results in an ‘atomic’ or ‘most specific’ species (species atoma; species specialissima). Similarly, that into which ultimate species are divided are individuals (individua, i.e., undivided) since they admit of no further differentiation. In the category of substance division was represented in the so called ‘tree of Porphyry’ illustrated below from Boethius’ first commentary on Porphyry (PL 64.42).

-

BOETHIUS THE TRANSLATOR

Boethius intended to translate and comment on all the works of Aristotle and the dialogues of Plato. Since such a project would take a lifetime, Boethius clearly saw himself as an preserver and transmitter of Greek learning to the West rather than as an innovator.

‘…ego omne Aristotelis opus, quodcumque in manus venerit, in romanum stilum vertens eorum omnium commenta latina oratione perscribam, ut si quid ex logicae artis subtilitate, ex moralis gravitate peritiae, ex naturalis acumine veritatis ab Aristotele conscriptum sit, id omne ordinatum transferam atque etiam quodam lumine commentationis inlustrem omnesque Platonis dialogos vertendo vel etiam commentando in latinam redigam formam.’ (Commentarii in librum Aristotelis Perihermeneias. Editio secunda. [ed. Meiser, 2.79-80]).

Although Boethius never completed his ambitious program of translation, he did translate most of Aristotle’s logical corpus (Organon). Boethius’ translations of Aristotle, together with his commentaries, constituted the logica vetus or ‘old logic’, so-called in reference to the logica nova or new logic comprising Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics and other treatises in the twelfth century. One of the most important of Boethius’ commentaries was his second on the Isagoge of Porphyry in which he set out for the Middle Ages the problem of the universal.

THE ISAGOGE OF PORPHYRY

Porphyry was a Neoplatonic philosopher of the second half of the third century A.D. He was also the biographer, editor and disciple of Plotinus. The Isagoge, as the name indicates (transliteration of the Greek word for ‘introduction’), was written by Porphyry as an introduction to the Categories of Aristotle.1 Instead of directly commenting on the Categories, however, Porphyry instead explains the ‘predicables’ — genus, difference, species, property, accident — given by Aristotle in his Topics. See terms above for how Porphyry modified Aristotle’s list. According to Porphyry, a knowledge of the predicables is necessary to understand the categories.2 The five predicables are defined by Porphyry in the Isagoge as follows:

Genus: ‘Philosophers explain genus as that predicated essentially of many things which differ in species, as animal, for example’ (Warren, p. 30)

‘…apud philosophos sermo est, quod etiam describentes adsignaverunt genus esse dicentes quod de pluribus et differentibus specie in eo quod quid sit praedicatur, ut animal’ (Aristoteles latinus 1.6-7, pp. 6-7)

Species: ‘Our philosophic predecessors, therefore, especially the Peripatetics, define the species as what is ordered under the genus and what the genus is predicated of essentially. They say also that species is that predicated essentially of many things which differ in number’ (Warren, p. 35).

‘Adsignant ergo et sic speciem: “species est quod ponitur sub genere et de qua genus in eo quod quid sit praedicatur”. Amplius autem sic quoque: “species est quod de pluribus et differentibus numero in eo quod quid sit praedicatur”. (Aristoteles latinus 1.6-7, p. 9).

Difference: ‘Strictly two things are said to differ whenver they differ because of a specific difference, as a man differs from a horse because of a specific difference, the quality rational’ (Warren, p. 42).

‘Magis proprie differre alterum altero dicitur quando specifica differentia distiterit, quemadmodum homo ab equo specifica differentia differt rationali qualitate’. (Aristoteles latinus 1.6-7, p. 14).

Property: ‘Our predecessors distinguish four meanings of property… (4) what occurs in the entire species, in it only, and always, as the capacity to laugh in man’ (Warren, p. 48).

‘Proprium vero quadrifariam dividunt. …quartum vero in quod concurrit et soli et omni et semper, quemadmodum homini esse risibile’ (Aristoteles latinus 1.6-7, pp. 19-20).

Accident: ‘What comes into being and passes away apart from the destruction of the substratum is an accident. Two types are distinguished, the separable and the inseparable. Sleeping is a separable accident, while being black occurs inseparably in the crow… (Warren, p. 48-49).

‘Accidens vero est quod adest et abest praeter subiecti corruptionem. Dividitur autem in duo, et separabile et in inseparabile; namque dormire est separabile accidens, nigrum vero esse inseparabiliter corvo…accidit’ (Aristoteles latinus 1.6-7, p. 20).

In sum, a genus is that which is predicated of things differing in species (e.g., animal of horse and man). A species, in turn, is that which is predicated of things differing in number (e.g., horse of Secretariat and Man-o-War). A difference is that which separates one species from another (e.g., rationality). A property is a feature which accrues to a species necessarily but is neither its genus nor difference (e.g., ability to laugh in man). Finally, an accident is a feature which does not necessarily belong to a subject (e.g., English speaking).

BOETHIUS’ SECOND COMMENTARY ON THE ISAGOGE OF PORPHYRY

Boethius commented twice on the Isagoge. The second commentary is based upon his own translation and is more advanced than the first, which is based upon the translation of Marius Victorinus and written in dialogue form. The more advanced problems considered by Boethius in his second commentary are the following:

Is logic a part or tool of philosophy? (In Isagogen I.3):

Boethius addresses the question of the status of logic itself. Is it a philosophical discipline unto itself, or is it merely a instrument of the other branches of philosophy? It is important for Boethius to settle this question because he plans to raise philosophical issues, such as that of the universal, which could not be properly investigated here if logic were not a part of philosophy.

Boethius reports the arguments on both sides:

Logic is a part of philosophy: Logic deals with propositions and syllogisms. But this subject matter is (1) considered only by philosophy but (2) is not considered by either of the other parts of philosophy, namely, speculative and practical. Therefore, from (1) logic must be a part of philosophy and from (2) it must be a part distinct from the practical and speculative parts. Therefore, logic is a philosophical discipline in its own right, forming the third or rational part of philosophy.

Logic is an instrument of philosophy: On the other hand, it is argued that logic, unlike the other two parts of philosophy, has no end of its own. Speculative philosophy has as its end true knowledge of things. The end of practical philosophy is virtuous moral practice and institutions. These are distinct parts of philosophy because neither end is referred to the other. The only end of logic, however, is to aid the other two branches in the achievement of their ends by providing correct arguments. Since logic does not have its own end, but is merely a means used by the other philosophies for their ends, it cannot be a separate part of philosophy.

Boethius’ solution: Boethius solves the question by arguing that logic is both a part and instrument of philosophy. There is no contradiction here since something can have its own end and, at the same time, be useful for another end. Boethius illustrates this with the parts of the body, which are both parts and instruments of the body.

Division of philosophy: Boethius divided philosophy into the two basic parts of practical and speculative (Cf., Aristotle, NE 6.1-2). In the famous text with which Boethius opens his Consolatione of Philosophy, lady philosophy is described as wearing a dress embroidered with a Greek pi at the bottom and a theta at the top linked by a woven ladder. This symbolizes the division of into the practical and speculative and the need to ascend from the one to the other.

Harum in extremo margine .Π. Graecum, in supremo vero .Θ. legebatur intextum atque in utrasque litteras in scalarum modum gradus quidam insigniti videbantur, quibus ab inferiore ad superius elementum esset ascensus. (Cons. 1.1 [CCL 94.2]).

Using this image, Boethius’ division of the speculative and practical parts of philosophy as found in his In Isagogen. editio secunda (CSEL 48.8-9) and De Trinitate c.2 is given below. On the division science in the Middle Ages, see James A. Weisheipl, ‘The Classification of the Sciences in Medieval Thought,’ Mediaeval Studies 27 (1965) 5-90. The division of the sciences was of great importance to the medieval period and the commentary tradition from antiquity in general.

Boethius’s division of the sciences

Science Method Object
Theology intellectualiter Immaterial forms
 Theoretical Mathematics disciplinaliter Forms in but separable from matter
Physics rationaliter Forms in but inseparable from matter

Object: Specification: Name
Individual Ethics
 Practical Human Acts Family Economics
State Politics
Are genera and species in reality or in the mind alone? (In Isagogen I.10):

In chapter 10 of his commentary, Boethius takes up three related questions which Porphyry himself says he is leaving aside because they have no place in an introductory treatise. At issue in these more difficult questions is the status of the universals, namely, species and genera. Put very simply, the problem concerns the relationship of reality to our knowledge of it. The Greek tradition had recognized that only what is universal and unchanging is truly intelligible. The real world, however, as immediately given to the senses, is made up of individuals that constantly change. Boethius supplied the Middle Ages with the two main solutions to this apparent discrepancy from Plato and Aristotle.

Plato: Plato denied the full reality of the sensible world. That is, he posited the universals, also called the ideas or forms, as existing in their own right, completely separate from the world of individual sensible things. This realm of separately existing universal forms was, according to Plato, the real world. Sensible things were only partially real to the extent that they were images of the ideal, separated forms. For example, according to Plato, real beauty was not to be found in sensible things but existing separately as an ideal form. Thus, for Plato, there is no problem explaining the relationship of our knolwedge of universals to reality, since for him universals exist as fully real outside the mind. Rather, Plato’s problem is to explain the relationship between the ‘two worlds’ of universal forms and individual sensible things. It is this problem of how individuals can share or participate in actually existing universal forms that Boethius explores in the ‘dilemma’ below.

Aristotle: Rejecting Plato’s separation of universal forms from individuals, Aristotle located forms in sensible things. For Aristotle, forms are found in reality outside the mind only as individual, not as universal. Aristotle guaranteed the full reality of sensible individuals and avoided the difficulty Plato encountered trying to relate the ‘two worlds’ of universal forms and sensible things. But if Aristotle maintains, against Plato, that only individual sensible things and not universal forms have real existence outside the mind, how is our knowledge, which is of universals, about anything real? According to Aristotle, an activity of the intellect renders the form found as individual outside the mind universal and intelligible in the mind. This activity was latter called abstraction. Aristotle provides no detailed account of how the intellect can render the sensible thing intelligible, but calls the part of the intellect that does so the ‘agent intellect’ (intellectus agens = Greek nous poietikos).

These three deeper questions concerning universals posed by Porphyry are:

 

Questions

1. Do genera and species subsist3 or are they purely in the mind?

That is, do genera and species have a real existence apart from the mind or are they purely the product of the mind?

2. If they subsist, are they corporeal or incorporeal?

Given that genera and species are found in reality and not just in the mind, it can still be asked whether they are corporeal or not.

3. If they are incorporeal, then do they subsist in sensible things or apart from them?

Boethius explains that there are two types of incorporeals: (1) those which do or can exist in reality apart from bodies, such as God and the intellectual soul; (2) those which cannot in reality exist separated from bodies, such as mathematical entities like line and number. The latter are incorporeal in the sense that their definition would include no reference to sensible bodies.

Boethius draws out the dilemma of the universal posed in attempting to answer these questions.

Dilemma

Universals (i.e., genera and species) either (1) are and subsist in reality or (2) are formed by the mind alone. But (1) cannot be the case, therefore (2). But if universals are not in reality, then their formation by the intellect is false. Therefore, universals neither can be in reality nor can be thought.

(1) Genera cannot be in reality, for if they are, then they (a) must be common since universal and (b) one.

(a) If genera are common, then they are not one. The reason is that a genus must be shared as a whole, and not merely as a part, by the several species to which it is common. But then the genus will not be one since there will be as many genera as species. But if genera are not one, then they are not in reality at all, since something has being only to the extent that it is one.

(b) If genera are one, then they cannot be common, for something can be one and common in only three ways:

(i) By parts, e.g., we all share the same pie by pieces.
(ii) As a whole but at different times, e.g., a horse is shared by several riders.
(iii) As a whole at the same time, e.g., all the theater goers watch the same performance on stage.

But none of these satisfy the requirement that the genus is common in such a way to be the very substance of that which shares it.

Thus, if genera cannot be one because they are common and cannot be common because they are one, then genera cannot be in reality at all.

(2) Thus, genera must be found in the understanding alone. But whatever is in understanding must derive from a subject which is either (a) as it is in reality or (b) as it is not.

If (a), then genera are real, which was denied in (1) above.
If (b), then genera are not real, and consequently the ideas of them in the intellect are false.
Therefore, from (1) and (2) genera neither are in reality nor when understood true.

In sum, the dilemma or ‘knot’ of the universal amounts to this. Universals cannot be in reality because the community required by a universal is inimical to unity, and unity is the cause of being. But if universals are not in reality, then our knowledge of them is false.
Solution

Boethius adopts the solution of the Greek commentator, Alexander of Aphrodisias, which is Aristotle’s solution. Boethius says that he does this not because he favors Aristotle’s resolution over Plato’s, but only because he is commenting on an introduction to Aristotle’s Categories.

The Aristotelian solution is that universals subsist in one manner and are understood in another. They subsist as individual in sensible things, but are understood as universal and having being in themselves apart from sensible things. But then are the ideas of universals false since they are not derived from a subject as it is in reality?

Boethius unties the knot of this dilemma by recognizing that falsity arises in the intellect only as a result of its conjoining things and never as a result of separation. Thus we can separate the universal from the bodily conditions which render it individual in reality without error. In this way, the intellect can know the universal in its purity as separate from sensible things, even though it is never found in such a condition in reality, without falsity.

Boethius is less clear on how this separation of the universal by the intellect comes about. He simply says it occurs as the result of ‘collecting’ similarities among individuals of the same species or species of the same genus.
THE CONSOLATION OF PHILOSOPHY V: DIVINE FOREKNOWLEDGE

The CP is B.’s most famous and original work. Written while in prison awaiting execution on charges of treason against the Ostrogothic emperor Theoderic, it is a dialogue in five books with the personification of Philosophy on the nature of fate and providence, recalling Socrates’s long examination of immortality in the Phaedo on the day of his execution. The work is prosimetric – i.e., written in alternating passages of prose and poetry – and has therefore been the subject of divided treatments as a literary and philosophical work. (Our translated selection has omitted the verse sections.) The first four books are in general less philosophical in style, which changes in the final book to a more technical discussion. Although B. was undoubtedly a Christian, the CP is notoriously lacking in explicit references to scripture or Christian authors. B. himself traces the difficulty of foreknowledge back to Cicero. CP V contains B.’s most original philosophical contribution, and it is one that carries influence even today (Cf. Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann, “Eternity,” J. of Phil. 78 [1981] 429-58).

For background, translation, Latin text, and a philosophical and philological commentary, see:
R. W. Sharples, Cicero: On Fate and Boethius: The Consolation of Philosophy, IV.5-V.6. (Warminster, 1991). [Should be corrected in certain details by Marenbon, Boethius, chapter 7.]

Outline
Statement of the problem
If God infallibly foreknows our choices, then they necessarily occur as God knows them.
If our choices are free and contingent, then God cannot have foreknowledge of them.
Putative solution and its rejection
Solution of Origen: God’s foreknowledge does not cause our choices
Boethius’s Reply
Causality irrelevant
Temporal things cannot cause divine knowledge
God cannot know contingent events as certain:
”What is conceived as certain knowledge cannot be otherwise than as conceived” (id quod ab scientia concipitur esse aliter atque concipitur nequit)
Solution
Limitation of human reason
Solution to 1A
Solution to 1B
Epistemological principle:
”Things are not known according to its own power or nature, but according to the capacity of the knower.” (Omne enim quod cognoscitur non secundum sui vim sed secundum cognoscentium potius comprehenditur facultatem)
Hierarchy of powers
sensus, imaginatio, ratio, intelligentia
Definition of eternity
”Eternity is endless life possessed all at once in its totality and perfection” (Aeternitas igitur est interminabilis vitae tota simul et perfecta possessio)
Distinction in necessity
”There are two necessities, one absolute … the other conditional … .” (Duae sunt etenim necessitates, simplex una … altera condicionis)

ANSELM OF CANTERBURY

Editions

S. Anselmi Cantuariensis Archiepiscopi opera omnia. Ed. F. S. Schmitt. 6 vols. Seckau-Rome-Edinburgh, 19381961. [The standard edition of Anselm’s works, replacing the edition in PL 158159. See the Addenda & corrigenda in vol. 4 of the HopkinsRichardson translation below.]
Eadmer. The Life of St. Anselm, Archbishop of Canterbury. Ed. and trans. Richard W. Southern. Rev. ed. Oxford, 1972.
Translations

Anselm of Canterbury. The Major Works. Ed. Brian Davies and G. R. Evans. Oxford, 1998.
Anselm of Canterbury. Trans. Jasper Hopkins and Herbert Richardson. 2nd American edition, Toronto 19741976. [Replaces the translation of Sidney Norton Dean; includes all recognized works, in translation only; vol. 4 is companion of studies, appendices, and bibliography.]
St. Anselm’s Proslogium, with a reply on behalf of the Fool by Gaunilo and the author’s reply to Gaunilo. Trans. M.J. Charlesworth. Oxford, 1965. [Contains commentary with facing Latin of the Schmitt edition.]

Studies

Analecta Anselmiana. Ed. F. S. Schmitt et al. 5 vols. Frankfurt/Main, 1969-76.
The Cambridge Companion to Anselm, ed. Brian Davies and Brian Leftow. Cambridge University Press. Forthcoming.
Henry, Desmond Paul. The De grammatico of St. Anselm: The Theory of Paronymy. Notre Dame, 1964.
Hopkins, Jasper. A Companion to the Study of St. Anselm. Minneapolis, 1972.
McIntyre, John. St. Anselm and His Critics; A Re-interpretation of the Cur Deus homo. Edinburgh 1954.
Pegis, Anton C. “St. Anselm and the Argument of the Proslogion.” Mediaeval Studies 28 (1966) 22867.
Southern, Richard W. Saint Anselm and His Biographer, A Study of Monastic Life and Thought 1059c.1130. Cambridge, 1963.
—–. Saint Anselm. A Portrait in a Landscape. Cambridge, 1990.
Memorials of St. Anselm. Edd. Richard W. Southern and F. S. Schmitt. London, 1969.

 

THE ARGUMENT OF THE PROSLOGION

CHAPTER II: God Truly Exists

Faith grants us the notion of God, whom we believe to exist: that than which nothing greater can be thought (‘aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari possit [Schmitt, 1.]).

Does such a nature exist? That this question can be asked is shown by the biblical Fool who says in his heart there is no God. At this point we can be sure that we have engaged the rational structure of the proof. The dialogue is now with the Fool or disbeliever in mind.

The Fool hears the words ‘that than which nothing greater can be thought’ and understands what he hears. Argument: Otherwise the Fool could not deny the existence of what he does not understand.

Since the Fool understands what he hears, ‘that than which nothing greater can be thought’ must be in the understanding of the Fool even if he does not understand ‘that than which nothing greater can be thought’ to exist. Argument: It is one thing for a thing to be in the intellect, another to understand it to be. (‘Aliud enim est rem esse in intellectu, aliud intelligere rem esse’ [Schmitt 1.101:910]). Artist example.

Thus, the Fool is at least convinced that ‘that than which nothing greater can be thought’ is in the understanding. For he understands ‘that than which nothing greater can be thought’ when he hears it, and what he understands is in the understanding.

But ‘that than which nothing greater can be thought’ cannot be in the understanding alone. Argument:

i. Assume ‘that than which nothing greater can be thought’ is only in the understanding.

ii. But then ‘that than which nothing greater can be thought’ can be thought to be in reality as well, since this implies no contradiction.

iii. But to be in reality is greater than to be in understanding alone.

iv. Thus, if ‘that than which nothing greater can be thought’ is only in the understanding, then ‘that than which nothing greater can be thought’ does not equal ‘that than which nothing greater can be thought’, which is a contradiction.

v. Thus, if ‘that than which nothing greater can be thought’ is truly ‘that than which nothing greater can be thought’, it must exist in reality as well as in understanding.

Therefore, God exists.
CHAPTER III: God Cannot Be Thought Not To Exist.
It is possible to think of something whose nonexistence cannot be thought.

Such a being is greater than any being whose nonexistence can be thought.

Now if ‘that than which nothing greater can be thought’ is a being whose non-existence can be thought, then it is not ‘that than which nothing greater can be thought’. Argument: It would be possible to think of something greater still, namely, a being whose non-existence cannot be thought.

Conclusion: God is truly. What does it mean to be truly? To be such that nonexistence is inconceivable, i.e., to exist so much that one must exist?

If God’s nonexistence is inconceivable, how could the Fool deny that God exists?
CHAPTER IV: How Can The Fool Think What Cannot Be Thought?

To say in one’s heart’ = ‘to think.’ But something can be thought in more two different senses:

aliter cum vox eam significans cogitatur = KNOWLEDGE OF THE TERMS.
In this weak sense of thinking, God can be thought not to exist, since merely the words are thought with no understanding of the reality signified by the words.
res cogitatur
aliter cum id ipsum quod res est intelligitur = KNOWLEDGE OF THE REALITY SIGNIFIED.
In this strong sense of thinking, God cannot be thought not to exist since here the reality signified by the words and not just the words themselves are thought.

Thus the Fool can say in his heart the mere words ‘God does not exist,’ but as soon as he in any way understands the reality behind the words, he cannot have ‘God’ and ‘does not exist’ in his mind at once.

What has the rational component of the proof given to faith? Anselm tell us that understanding adds necessity to belief:

‘Gratias tibi, bone domine, gratias tibi, quia quod prius credidi te donante, iam sic intelligo te illuminante, ut si te esse nolim credere, non possim non intelligere.’ (Schmitt 1.103.45)

That is, faith is a gift of God through which we seek understanding. But understanding is also a gift of God, which is needed because God dwells in inaccessible light (‘Ergo, domine, qui das fidei intellectum, da mihi, ut…intelligam….’ [Schmitt 1.101.3]). Thus, without God illuminating (te illuminante) we could not find what we seek. But even though God does Himself illumine us through this whole reasoning process, there is a distinctly recognizable rational component to the Proslogion, as is evidenced by the discourse with the Fool who is an unbeliever. This discourse adds necessity to faith. That is, even if I did not want to believe, I am forced to understand. Faith, before understanding, cannot see the necessity of the truth it holds. These socalled necessary reasons or foundations (rationes necessariae) for faith found through understanding.

THE REPLY OF GAUNILO

Much as Descartes’ ontological argument elicted an immediate reaction from Gassendi and then a later one from Kant, so Anselm’s argument brought an immediate criticism from Gaunilo and then a later one from Aquinas.

Opinion was divided on Anselm’s argument in the thirteenth and fourteenth century. The dispute centered mostly on whether Anselm was claiming that God’s existence is self-evident. Bonaventure endorsed the argument, Aquinas rejected it, and Duns Scotus diagnosed it as requiring a further premise, namely, that God was possible, thus anticipating Leibniz.

In the present century Norman Malcolm (The Philosophical Review 69:1 (1960), pp. 41-62) gave a famous analysis of Proslogion II-III in which he claimed that Anselm, even if he himself did not appreciate it, there gave two separate and different arguments. According to Malcolm, Anselm’s reasoning in Proslogion II failed because it violated Kant’s claim that existence is not a predicate, but the argument of Proslogion III succeeds since it presumes that necessary existence is a perfection, which escapes the Kantian critique. Malcolm’s reconstruction evoked a number of responses (=Philosophical Review 70:1 (1961), pp. 55-111), among them Alvin Plantinga’s who rejected the analysis on philosophical grounds. Both articles have been reprinted in The Ontological Argument, ed. Alvin Plantinga (Double Day, 1965). The originals, which first appeared in the Philosophical Review are also available online:

Anselm’s Ontological Arguments
Norman Malcolm
The Philosophical Review, Vol. 69, No. 1. (Jan., 1960), pp. 41-62.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8108%28196001%2969%3A1%3C41%3AAOA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-H

A Valid Ontological Argument?
Alvin Plantinga
The Philosophical Review, Vol. 70, No. 1. (Jan., 1961), pp. 93-101.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8108%28196101%2970%3A1%3C93%3AAVOA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C

Gaunilo was a monk of the abbey at Marmoutier, near Tours, an ancient abbey and at the time of Anselm had a reputation for scholarship. Nothing else by Gaunilo is known to exist. His criticism, apparently communicated to Anselm in a letter much as Gassendi communicated his to Descartes, anticipates many points made in later critiques.

[1] Gaunilo first summarizes Anselm’s proof. He says that it relies on:

One who doubts or denies that N exists already has N in his mind, since when he hears the expression N he understands what he hears
N cannot exist only in the understanding but must also exist in reality.

Gaunilo then presents the argument for B as follows:

It is greater to exist both in reality and the mind than in the mind alone.
But if N existed only in the mind, then anything that existed in reality would be greater than N.
But if (2) then N would not be greater than everything, which is a contradiction.
Therefore, that which is greater than everything does not exist in the mind alone but also in reality.

Gaunilo will proceed to attack both A and B: A by arguing that N is not in our understanding in any but the weakest fashion, similar to the way in which we conceive ficitonal beings, and B by concluding that the existence of anything known in such a weak way can always be doubted.

But note that Gaunilo has misstated A.’s argument on two points: (1) the concept of God at issue is not “that which is greater than all things” (2) nor A. does reason that if N exists only in the mind then all things that do exist extramentally would be greater than N. A. will point out these inaccuracies in his reply.

[2] G. here essentially turns the distinction in Proslogion IV against A., arguing that it entails either that the argument fails or is unnecessary. When the Fool hears N, so that N is in the mind since the Fool understands what he hears, G. replies that in this sense even figments that do not and cannot exist are in the mind, since we can understand what it meant when we deny they exist. Thus, the existence of N could always be doubted. If, however, when the Fool hears N it is in the mind in a different sense, namely, by understanding it in such a way that its existence cannot be doubted, then G. replies that (1) the artist example does not apply and (2) then ensuing argument is unnecessary.

[3] The artist example fails because an artist has in his mind what he is about to make in an entirely different way that just understanding what the words mean.

[4-5] This is the heart of G.’s criticism. G. argues that we hear N we cannot think of what it means to any greater degree than, as mentioned, we can think of some fictitious entity whose existence we can always doubt. From such a tenuous knowledge we can never infer existence. In other words, according to G., we can never reach an understanding of what N means as defined by A. in Proslogion IV, namely, a thinking of the reality itself signified by the terms. For we cannot know (a) the reality itself signified by N nor can we know this reality from (b) things similar to it. We cannot know (a) since we have no access to the reality itself that is God, nor can we know (b) since this would only be possible through species or genus. Thus, for example, if I am told of another individual whom I have never met, I still know something of his reality on the basis of knowing other individuals in the same species and, mutatis mutandis for species under a genus. But the divine reality cannot fall under a genus or species with creatures. When the Fool hears N, then, he does not know the reality to which the words refer, but only the words (illud secundum rem veram mihique notam cogitare possem, istud omnino nequeam nisi tantum secundum vocem), not in the sense of the sounds themselves, for these are themselves a true reality and do exist, but in the sense of what the words might possibly mean. But from this very weak way of thinking and being in the mind, one cannot infer that anything actually exists.

Thus, whenever anyone tries to show the Fool that, give that N exists in his mind, therefore it must also exist in reality, the Fool can always doubt that this is the case in the way that one might always doubt or even deny that some fictitious or mysterious entity might exist.

[6] G. illustrates the fallacy of attempting to reason to the existence of something based on such a weak knowledge with the ‘Lost Isle’ argument.

People believe that there is a ‘Lost Isle’ in the Ocean which is greater than any other place.
I doubt that such a island exists.
But when you hear “that island no greater than which any land can be conceived”, you understand what you hear, and thus it is in your understanding.
But this island cannot be in your understanding alone, since then it would not be that island no greater than which can be conceived, since any island that exists would be greater than it.
Therefore, it exists in reality.

Note once again G. does not exactly reproduce A.’s reasoning, but it could easily be adjusted to do so.

[7] In response to P III, G. says (1) that since P II has failed to show that N exists in the first place, one cannot further deduce that it exists in such a way that it cannot be thought not to exist and (2) to be accurate one should properly say, in light of the distinction drawn in P IV, that N cannot be understood (= intelligi) rather than thought (= cogitari) not to exist, since we only know N by thinking the words rather than understanding the reality.

RESPONSE OF ANSELM

[I] A. says that G. has made two criticisms of his argument:

That N cannot be in the understanding
That if N is in the understanding, it does not follow that is exists in reality.

In response to A. Anselm says that it would entail either (i) that N is a false notion of God or (ii) that we cannot form any true notion of God. Both of these are false on faith, with which the proof begins and which Gaunilo, as a believer, must concede. Since these are therefore contrary to faith, A. concludes that G.’s arguments supporting them cannot be valid.

Anselm then proceeds to address B. by developing three further arguments to show principally that if N can be thought, then N necessarily exists in reality. The three further conclusions are:

If N can be thought to exist, then of necessity it exists. (Si ergo cogitari potest esse, ex necessitate est.)
If N can even be thought, then it is necessary that it exist. (Si cogitari potest, necesse est illud esse.)
N exists as a whole at every place and every time.

A.’s arguments through this section are somewhat elliptical and confusingly structured, but the thrust of 1. and 2. seem to be that unless N exists, it will be impossible for it to exist. This, at any rate, is the direction in which Malcolm has taken the argument and was has Scotus, among others, reasoned. The reasoning of 1. and 2. when combined and expanded is:

N can be thought to exist.
Arg: The existence of N is not contradictory.
But if N can be thought to exist and does not exist, then N must be thought as having a beginning to its existence.
Arg: If N does not exist and cannot be thought as ever beginning to exist, then it cannot be thought to exist, which contradicts 1.
But N cannot have a beginning to its existence, since it is easy to conceive of a being that has no beginning, which is greater still.
Therefore, if N can be thought to exist, it must exist.

In other words, if N’s existence is conceivable, then it must exist, for if it does not exist, it cannot be brought into existence. Its existence would therefore be impossible, and thus not conceivable, violating the original assumption. A.’s strategy here seems to be to avoid the controversial assumption that it is greater to exist in the understanding and reality than in the understanding alone and argue instead that it is greater to exist without a beginning or necessarily than with a beginning or contingently. Therefore, if N can be thought of as existing at all, it must be thought of as existing necessarily, for otherwise it would be impossible for it to exist, which on assumption is denied.

A. concludes that this reasoning shows that G. has some notion of N in his understanding, since otherwise he would not be able to follow A.’s argumentation here. A. sees G. as fallaciously arguing that because we do not have a complete or perfection notion of God, we therefore have no notion at all. According to A., a partial or imperfect understanding of God is sufficient to drive his argument.

[III] In response to the ‘Lost Isle’ objection, A. responds that his reasoning applies only to N, not to anything else similarly formulation like N. We can add that A. might have observed that N is the greatest thinkable object without qualification, not the greatest thinkable object of a given kind, such as a place. The reasoning therefore only applies to an unqualified highest thinkable object.

[IV] To G.’s objection that, given the distinction drawn in P IV, we can only say that God cannot be understood not to exist, not that God cannot be thought not to exist. A. replies that nothing can be understood not to exist, when it actually exists, so that this is not proper to God. Rather, only God cannot be thought not to exist, since anything, even ourselves, can be thought not to exist, since, for example, they can be imagined as ceasing to exist, even when they do exist.

[V] A. seizes on G.’s misformulation of his argument and in particular that he called N “that which is greater than all others”. A. agrees that if N is so construed that he conclusion does not follow, or at least does not follow so immediately. The reason, A. points out, is that on G.’s reformulation the required inconsistency does not immediately appear on assumption that N exists only in the understanding.

GAUNILO ANSELM
That which is greater than all other existing things. = G

Assume that G can be thought not to exist or can possibly not exist.

From this contradiction does not follow – at least not directly – since the greatest of existing things is not immediately inconsistent with being thought not to exist (i.e., the greatest of existing things could be contingent). That than which nothing greater can be thought. = N
Assume that N can be thought not to exist or can possibly not exist.

From this contradiction immediately follows since what can not exist is not the highest thinkable thing.

[VIII] This is the main reply to G.’s charge that N cannot be understood or thought of in reference to anything real, since it is not similar to anything else, either by way of genus or species. A. denies this, by means of his doctrine of ‘pure perfections’, according to which to the extent anything is good at all, it is similar to a greater good. By means of this, A. shows dialectically how one might reach, with reference to creatures, the concept of ‘that than which nothing greater can be thought.’ Scotus will later refer to this passage to show that being and other such perfections must have an underlying univocal sense to be applicable to God, although A. himself nowhere claims this.

[X] A. here is clear that his proof relies on the doctrine of pure perfections, which is anything that is ‘better to be than not to be.’

PETER ABELARD

Works

Abelard’s works are in some cases fragmentary and in several versions. The main items of philosophical interest are:

Logic:

Abelard wrote much in logic, some of which has survived only in fragmentary form. The main writings of Abelard in logic that have received the most attention are two: (1) a set of commentaries on the old logic — Porphyry, Categories, and Perihermeneias — known collectively from their incipit as the Logica ingredientibus and (2) a second, later commenary on Porphyry known by its incipit either as Logica nostrorum petitioni sociorum or its proper title the Glossulae. All were edited by Geyer over the course of a decade and occupy volume 21 of the Beiträge under the title of Peter Abelards Philosophische Schriften:

Logica ingredientibus
Heft 1 (1919) Glosses on Porphyry, pp. 1-109
Introduction, pp. 1-32 = our text
On Genus, pp. 32-40
On Species, pp. 41-65
On Difference, pp. 65-87
On Property, pp. 88-91
On Accident, pp. 91-96
On Common Properties of Predicable, pp. 96-109
Heft 2 (1921) Glosses on the Categories, pp. 111-305
Heft 3 (1927) Glosses on the Peri hermeneias, pp. 307-503
Logica nostrorum petitioni sociorum
Heft 4 (1933) Glossulae, pp. 505-580

As noted, our text comes from the Introduction of the Glosses on Porphyry in the Logica ingredientibus edited in Geyer above, pp. 1-32. Abelard’s commentary is, of course, divided itno chapters corresponding to Porphyry’s own separate chapters on each of the predicables. Following Boethius’s commentary, it is in the Introduction that Abelard raises the more difficult questions left unanswered by Porphyry on the ontological status of the universal. Our translations correspond to the Latin text as follows:

McKeon, Selections from Medieval Philosophers I, pp. 208-58 = Geyer, p. 1-30 line 26.
Hyman-Walsh, pp. 169-88, which is reprint of above, except has omitted Geyer, p. 2 line 8-7 line 24.
Spade, Five Texts, pp. 26-56, which is a re-translation of the above, but omits Geyer, pp. 1- 7 line 24 (i.e., the beginning literal commentary), which McKeon includes, and then adds p. 30 line 25 to 32 line 12 (i.e., the end of the Introduction), which McKeon omits.
Martin Tweedale, Basic Issues in Medieval Philosophy, pp. 378-92 = Geyer, 8 line 32-32 line 12. Another translation of the above.

In other words, for reasons unknown, McKeon has left off part of the end of the text and Spade part of the beginning, but between the two the whole text of the Introduction is translated.

In addition to the Logica and Glossulae, which are commentaries, Abelard wrote a systematic work on logic called the Dialectica, whose date was widely thought to be late, but now considered earlier. Edited by DeRijk but untranslated.

Theology:

Abelard wrote three theological treatises that focused especially on the Trinity, the views on which resulted in his condemnation:

Theologia Summi boni: This was condemned at the Council of Soissons in 1121, and Abelard was forced to burn it himself.
Theologia Christiana: A greatly expanded revision of the above, written five years later, but never completed.
Theologia Scholarium: Final attempt of re-writing the above.

Abelard also wrote a very important treatise on theological method:

Sic et non: Latin for “pro and con”, this laid out the principles for resolving conflicting views of Patristic authorities and scripture. This was a precursor to what would become the single most important theological handbook of the medieval period, the Sentences of Peter Lombard, which was adapted as the systematic text in the theology faculties.

Ethics:

Ethica or Scito teipsum In Latin Ethics or Know Thyself, an ethical treatise originally projected to contain two books, the first on sin and the second on virtue. Only the first book survives. Contains Abelard’s famous doctrine that sin is found in intention.

Autobiography:

Historia calamitatum Like Augustine, Abelard wrote an autobiography, entitled aptly Story of my Adversitites, which details his spectacularly troubled career, including his affair with Heloise, subsequent mutilation, and theological condemnation. Of interest to us for his details of his teachers, espeically William of Champeaux.
Editions

Abaelardiana inedita: 1. Super periermenias XII-XIV; 2. Sententie secundum M. Petrum. Ed. L. Minio-Paluello. Rome, 1958. [Latin text, English introduction.]

Collationes. Ed. and trans. John Marenbon and Giovanni Orlandi. Oxford: Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. [Same work as below.]

Dialogus inter philosophum, iudaeum et christianum. Ed. Rudolf Thomas. Stuttgart, 1970. [This work also known as Collationes, under which title it has been translated by Marenbon. See above.]

Dialectica. Ed. L. M. de Rijk. Assen, 1956; repr. 1970.

Historia calamitatum. Ed. J. Monfrin. Paris, 1959. [Also by J. T. Muckle, Mediaeval Studies 12 (1950) 163- 213.]

Opera: hactenus seorsim edita nunc primum in unum collegit. Ed. Victor Cousin. Paris, 1849-59; rpt. Hildesheim and New York, 1970.

Ouvrages inedits d’Abelard. Ed. Victor Cousin. Paris, 1836.

Peter Abelard’s Ethics. Ed. D. E. Luscombe. Oxford, 1971. [Includes facing English translation.]

Peter Abelards Philosophische Schriften. Ed. Bernhard Geyer. Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters 21. Heft 1-4. Münster, 1919-1933. [This contains (1) Abelard’s commentaries on the old logic — Porphyry, Catgories, and Perihermenias — edited by Geyer over the period of a decade collectively known from its incipit as the Logica ingredientibus and (2) a second, later commenary on Porphyry known by its incipit either as Logica nostrorum petitioni sociorum or its proper title the Glossulae]:

Petri Abaelardi abbatis Rugensis opera omnia. PL 178. Paris, 1885.

Petri Abaelardi opera theologica. Ed. E. M. Buytaert and C. Mews. CCL Continuatio Mediaevalis 11-13. Turnholt, 1969-1987.

Pietro Abelardo. Scritti di logica. Ed. M. Dal Pra. 2nd ed. Florence, 1969. [Early literal glosses on logical texts.]

Sic et non: A Critical Edition. Edd. Blanche B. Boyer and Richard McKeon. Chicago, 1976-1977.

Ulivi, Lucia. La psicologi di Abelardo e il Tractatus de intellectibus. [Edition of the Tractatus de intellectibus on pp. 103-27].

Translations

Abailard’s Ethics. Trans. James Ramsay McCallum. Oxford, 1935. [Better Luscombe above.]

Abelard’s Christian Theology. Trans. James Ramsay McCallum. Oxford, 1948. [Extracts from Theologia christiana.]

Basic Issues in Medieval Philosophy, ed. and trans. Martin Tweedale and Richard Bosley. Peterborough, Ont. 1997. Selections from several of Abelard’s otherwise untranslated works. See p. 671 for list.

A Dialogue of a Philosopher with a Jew, and a Christian. Trans. Pierre J. Payer. Toronto, 1979.

Glosses on Porphyry. In Selections from medieval philosophers. Ed. Richard McKeon. 2 vols. New York, 1929-30, 1.208-58. Revised in Spade and Tweedale, as noted above.

The Story of Abelard’s Adversities. Trans. J. T. Muckle. Toronto, 1954. [Translation of the Historia calamitatum.]

Studies

Abelard: le “dialogue”, la philosophie de la logique. Acts of the Colloque de Neuchatel, 16-17 Novem ber 1979. Ed. Maurice de Gandillac et al. Geneva, 1981.

Beonio-Brocchieri Fumagalli, Maria Teresa. The Logic of Abelard. Trans. Simon Pleasance. 2nd ed. Dordrecht, 1970.

Carre, Meyrick Heath. Realists and Nominalists. London, New York, etc., 1946.

Compayre, Gabriel. Abelard and the Origin and Early History of Universities. New York, rpt. 1969.

Gilson, Etienne. Heloise and Abelard. Ann Arbor, MI, 1960.

Gracia, Jorge J. E. Introduction to the Problem of Individuation in the Early Middle Ages. Vienna, 1984: Chapter IV: “The Tradition Based on Boethius’ Logical Works: Peter Abailard and John of Salisbury,” pp. 195-254.

Luscombe, David. The School of Peter Abelard: The Influence of Abelard’s Thought in the Early Scholastic Period. Cambridge, 1969.

Marenbon, John. The Philosophy of Peter Abelard. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

Tweedale, Martin. Abelard on Universals. Amsterdam, 1976. [Contains many and extensive passages translated from Abelard’s logic.]
12TH CENTURY BACKGROUND STUDIES

Dronke, Peter. A History of Twelfth-century Western Philosophy. Cambridge-New York, 1988. [Bibliographies, pp. 443-486.]

Häring, N. ‘Chartres and Paris revisited.’ Essays in Honour of Charles Anton Pegis. Ed. J. R. O’Don nell. Toronto, 1974. [Attack on Southern’s argument in ‘Humanism and the School of Chartres’ that there was no school of Chartres.]

Haskins, C. H. The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century. Cambridge, Mass. 1927.

Southern, Richard W. ‘Humanism and the School of Chartres.’ Medieval Humanism and Other Studies Oxford, 1970.

—–. Platonism, Scholastic Method and the School of Chartres. Reading 1979. [Rebuttal of Häring’s criticism.]

Vivarium 30 (1992) is a special issue devoted to 12th century nominalism and contains twelve articles and a complete bibliography.

 

THE PROBLEM OF THE UNIVERSALS IN THE 12TH CENTURY

In general the debate was over whether the reality of a universal is merely a that of a term (nomen) or a thing (res). Hence, the two major positions are called nominalism (from nomen) or realism (from res).
NOMINALISM: Roscelin (1050 -post 1120): The reality of the universal is identified with the physical reality of the word or nomen expressing the universal, e.g., the term ‘man’. It is thus said to have merely the reality of a ‘breath’ (flatus vocis):

‘…illi utique dialectici, qui non nisi flatum vocis putant universales esse substantias …’ (Anselm, Epistolae De Incarnatione Verbi Prior Recensio [Schmitt I.285:4-5])

‘Alius ergo consistit in vocibus (licet haec opinio cum Rocelino suo fere omnino iam evanuerit)…’ (John of Salisbury, Metalogicon II.17 [PL 199.874 C]).
REALISM: Held by William of Champeaux (1070 – 1121), the teacher of Abelard: The universal is common as one thing (res) outside the mind. Realism here takes two forms, and apparently William held both. Abelard claims he forced William to abandon the first and take up the second.

A. STRONG REALISM (essentialiter):

The universal is one and the self-same thing (res) common to all, so that the nature ‘humanity’ in Plato and Socrates is one thing (res) outside the mind. According to this view, then, Plato and Socrates have one and the same essence of humanity and differ only by accidental qualities. The first opinion of William of Champeaux, according to Abelard:

Tum ego, ad eum reversus ut ab ipso rhetoricam audirem, inter cetera disputationum nostrarum conamina antiquam eius de universalibus sententiam patentissimis argumentorum reationbus ipsum commutare, immo destruere compuli. Erat autem in ea sententia de communitate universalium ut eamdem essentialiter rem totam simul singulis suis inesse astrueret individuis, quorum quidem nulla esset in essentia diversitas, sed sola multitudine accidentium varietas. (Historia calamitatum [ed. Muckle, p.178]).

At that time I returned to him to hear him lecturing on rhetoric. Among other essays at discussion I forced him by clear proofs from reasoning to change, yes, to abandon his old stand on universals. For he held the position on the common existence of universals that the same thing exists wholly and essentially in all individuals of a class and that there is no distinction of essence in them but only variety through multiplication of accidents. (Trans. Muckle, p.16)

B. MODIFIED REALISM (indifferenter):

Here an essence or nature is not common as one thing, but each individual has its own nature which is ‘not different’ (indifferenter) from the nature of another. This was the second position of William of Champeaux according to Abelard:

Sic autem istam tunc suam correxit sententiam ut deinceps rem eamdem non essentialiter sed indifferenter diceret. (Historia calamitatum, ibid.)

He subsequently so modified his position as to assert that the same things exists in individuals, not essentially, but without differentiation. (Trans. Muckle, p. 17)

The term indifferenter appears to derive from its technical application in the Trinity where there is said to be a ‘non-difference’ (indifferentia) between the divine Persons. See for example, Thierry of Chartres, In Boethii De Trinitate I.34 (ed. Häring, 143.45-50). This is weaker than the essentialiter position, since the community of the universal is not an identity of one and the same nature, but a similarity of different natures. This at least seems to be the meaning for William:

Et ut omne ambiguitatis genus excludamus, vides has duas voces unum scilicet et idem duobus accipi modis, secundum indifferentiam et secundum idemtitatem eiusdem prorsus essentiae. Secundum indifferentiam, ut Petrum et Paulum idem dicimus esse in hoc quod sunt homines; quantum enim ad humanitatem pertinet, sicut iste est rationalis et ille; et sicut iste est mortalis et ille. Sed si veritatem confiteri volumus, non est eadem utriusque (sc. Petri et Pauli) humanitas, sed similis cum sint duo homines.’ (G. Lefèvre, Les variations de Guillaume de Champeaux et la question des universaux, [Lille, 1989], p. 25).

And to avoid all ambiguity, know that these two terms, namely, ‘one’ and ‘same’ can be taken in two ways: according to indifference and identity of one and the same essence. For example, according to indifference we say that Peter and Paul are the same insofar as they are human, for insofar as their humanity is concerned, just as Peter is rational, so is Paul, and just as Peter is mortal, so is Paul. But if we want to admit the truth, there is not one and the same humanity for both, but a similar [humanity], since there are two human beings.

Abelard himself takes indifferenter to mean similarity as opposed to identity:

…idem pro indifferenti, id est consimili, intelligunt.’ (Geyer, p.14; Hyman-Walsh, p. 175).
PETER ABELARD, GLOSSES ON PORPHYRY FROM THE
LOGICA INGREDIENTIBUS (ed. Geyer, 1-32)
Abelard, like Boethius before him in his commentary on the Isagoge, undertakes to answer the three more difficult questions posed by Porphyry on the categories. The three questions of Porphyry, Abelard adds a fourth of his own:

‘Whether genera and species, so long as they are genera and species, must have some thing subject to them by nomination, or whether, if the things were destroyed, the universal could still consist of the meaning only of the conception, as this noun ‘rose’ when there is not a single rose to which it is common.’ (Hyman-Walsh, 171)

According to Abelard, the problem of ‘univerals’ is that various authorities take universals to be both things and words. Abelard’s strategy is to argue that universals can in no way be things, whether a single thing or a collection of things. It will thus follow that only terms are universal.

‘And since it is known that genera and species are universals and in them Porphyry touches on the nature of all universals generally, let us inquire here into the common nature of universals by studying these two [i.e., genera and species] and let us inquire also whether they apply only to words or to things as well. … Let us inquire here therefore how either one thing or a collection of things is called universal, and let us state all the opinions of all thinkers.’ (Hyman-Walsh, 171-72).

Abelard gives two different strains of the realist position.

 

THE REALIST POSITIONS AND THEIR CRITICISM BY ABELARD

First Realist Position: (essentialiter)

The universal is one and the same substance essentially and is diversified through inferior forms. The species ‘human’ is diversified into individuals by accidents; the genus ‘animal’ diversified through the specifying differences ‘rational’ and ‘irrational’. In each case ‘man’ and ‘animal’ is one and essentially the same in all.

‘Certain philosophers, indeed, take the universal thing thus: in things different from each other in form they set up a substances essentially the same; this is the material essence of the individuals in which it is, and it is one in itself and diverse only through the forms of its inferiors.’ (Hyman-Walsh, 172)

Against the essentialiter position, Abelard argues as follows (Hyman-Walsh, 173-74):

Then rationality and irrationality would not be contraries, since they would inhere in one and the same thing (e.g., ‘animal’) essentially at the same time. Counter-Reply: They would only not be contrary, not if found together in same genus and species, but only in same individual. Abelard’s answer: Both rationality and irrationality found in Socrates since both animal and man.

The universal form which is essentially one cannot be diversified through advening qualities or forms. For, according to this realist position, these advening forms or qualities will themselves be essentially the same. Thus the humanity which is essentially the same in Peter and Paul cannot be diversified through the forms of quality or quantity since these are also essentially the same in Peter and Paul.

Individuation cannot occur through accidental forms since they presuppose the individual substance.
The Second Realist Position: indifferenter

Here the universal is not said to be one thing essential but indifferently. That is, individuals and speices do not share in one single essence, but all have their own essences which are nonetheless said ‘not to differ’.

‘Therefore, others are of another opinion concering universality, and approaching the truth more closely they say that individual things are not only different from each other in forms, but are discrete personally in their essences . . . and yet they cling to the universality of things. They reconcile these positions by saying that things which are discrete are one and the same not essentially but indifferently, as they say individual men, who are discrete in themselves, are the same in man, that is, they do not differ in the nature of humanity, and the same things which they call individual according to discreteness, they call universal according to indifference and the agreement of similitude.’ (Hyman-Walsh, 174-75).

Abelard says that there are two strains of this position, which we call the ‘collection’ theory and the ‘agreement’ theory of the universal, after the terms – collectio and convenientia – that Abelard uses to describe them:

Collection Theory

“But here too there is disagreement, for some hold that the universal thing is only in a collection of the many. They in no manner call Socrates and Plato species in themselves, but they say that all men collected together are that species which is man, and all animals taken together that genus of animal. …” [Hyman-Walsh, 175]

Agreement Theory

“But there are others who not only call all men collected together the species, but also the single men insofar as they are men. When they say the thing that is Socrates is several, they are taking this in a metaphorical sense, as if they were saying several men are the same as, that is agree with, him, or he with several men. With respect to the number of things, they maintain as many species as individuals, and as many genera. But with respect to similiarity of natures, they assign a lesser number of universals than of singulars.” [Spade, p. 34]

It now remains for us to attack those who call universal the single individuals insofar as they agree with others, and who grant that the same things are predicated of several, not in such a way that the several are essentially those things but because the several agree with them.” [Spade, p. 36]

As we mentioned, William of Champeaux was led by Abelard to abandon the essentialiter position and take up the indifferenter view, presumably the first variant, in which the universal is identified with all instances collectively. The second variant, whose meaning is not entirely clear, was apparently held by one Walter Mortagne, who, according to John of Salisbury, even abandonned it himself:

Accordingly, following Walter of Mortagne, they distinguish [various] states and say that Plato is an individual insofar as he is Plato; a species insofar as he is a man; a genus of a subordinate kind insofar as he is an animal; and a most general genus insofar as he is a substance. Although this opinion formerly had some proponents, it has been a long time since anyonw has asserted it. Walter now upholds ideas, emulating Plato and imitating Bernard of Chartes … . [John of Salisbury, Metalogicon II.17= Hyman-Walsh, p. 168]

Against the collection theory Abelard argues:

that this is just a case of predicating the whole (i.e., collection) of its parts (the individuals in the collection). But the community of a whole to its parts is not sufficient for the community of a universal, as Boethius had already shown.

Socrates would be a universal, since he as a whole could be predicated of his parts (e.g., of his ears, his hands, etc.)

Any group of humans would be a universal predicable of each contained within that group. But then there would be multiple species below the final species.

Similar to the above reasoning, there would be several most general genera.

Whole-part relation cannot be a universal-particular relation:

since universals are naturally prior to their instantiations, but a whole is natural posterior to its parts;

parts cannot be identical with their integral wholes, while universals are identical to their particulars.

Against the agreement theory Abelard argues:

Predication of the individual would be impossible since nothing agrees with just one thing (i.e., if predication is based on ‘agreement’, and universal predication occurs when something agrees with many, then particular predication is made there is agreement only with one, which is impossible)

Universal would not differ from the particular in that it is “predicated of many”, as the traditional definition holds, since on this theory both Socrates and man are predicated of many.

This position, which holds that the Socrates is both universal and particular, would require a thing to be distinct from itself.

If this position is interpreted purely negatively, so that Plato and Socrates agree in being human only in the negative sense that they do not differ in their humanity, then they likewise can be said to agree in being rocks, since neither do they differ in being rocks.
ABELARD’S SOLUTION

Therefore, since a universal cannot be a thing either collectively or singly, it follows that univeraslity belongs to words (voces) alone.

‘Now, however, that reasons have been given why things cannot be called universals, taken either singly or collectively, because they are not predicated of many, it remains to ascribe universality of this sort to words alone.’ (Hyman-Walsh, 177)

Thus, a univeral is a term that is predicated of many singly, e.g., ‘human being’ or ‘animal’, and is contrasted with a particular term which is predicated of just one, e.g., ‘Socrates’.

It is important to note that for Abelard the universality of a universal word applies not only to the unity of the term, but of the meaning. So that an equivocal term is not universal because it is predicated of many (Hyman-Walsh, 177). For example, ‘The Black Knight’ is not a universal term because it is predicated of a chess piece and John of Gaunt, son of Edward III. Thus, Abelard’s position is a nominalism in that he denies that universality is a property of things and holds it is a property of terms. But it is not the radical nominalism of Roscelin, and should perhaps better be called a conceptualism, i.e., the reality of the universal is the concept or meaning, not the term itself. This is seen also from analysis of predication, for what is required for a universal statement to be true is not mere correctness in construction (grammar) but also correctness in predication (logis).

‘Socrates is a rock’ is correct according to grammar or construction. If the reality of the universal were identified with the reality of the term (Roscelin), then the above statement would be true because it is grammatically correct. A consequence of radical nominalism would be that grammatical form would determine truth. ‘Socrates is a rock’ is incorrect according to predication. This is false with regard to the nature of things and the meaning of the proposition, even though correct with regard to grammatical construction.

But this gives rise to the following further difficulty. If Abelard’s position is that since there is nothing universal in reality and everything is discrete or individual, what real basis do we have for saying that ‘Socrates is a human being’ is true, and that ‘Socrates is a rock’ is false? (Hyman-Walsh, 178) How can we have the meaning of a universal, since it is not the single thing nor a collection?
CAUSE OF THE UNIVERSAL (Hyman-Walsh, 179-80):

As Abelard has shown, individual human beings differ not only in qualitative forms (i.e., accidents), but in their very essence (humanity). Thus, for Abelard all reality is radically individual since the universal is not a thing. If this is the case, what warrant do we have to apply our universal statements to real things and, more seriously, how do we ever come by the meaing of universal terms in the first place? Abelard’s answer is that while humanity is not a thing, all humans agree in being humans. To say that Socrates and Plato agree in being human is not to say that they are united in some one thing or essence called ‘humanity’ since there is no thing huamnity except the individual human being. According to Abelard, ‘to be human’ is a no-thing, any more than ‘not to be in a subject’, which is universally predicated of all substances, is a thing . So ‘to be human’ is what Socrates and Plato agree in, just as ‘not to be a human’ is what horse and ass agree in. Yet, no one claims that the ‘not be be human’ in which horse and ass agree is some ‘thing’ of its own common to both. Abelard calls agreement which forms the basis for our knowledge of universal concepts such as ‘humanity’ and ‘animality’ a thing’s ‘state’ (status). All individuals which agree do so not because they share in some third thing, but simply because they all happen to be that which they are, i.e., they all have the same ‘state.’ But this state is not itself a thing apart from the individual thing. Abelard says that in accounting for our knowledge of universals he appeals to no essence.

‘Abhorrednum autem videtur, quod convenientiam reurm secundum id accipiamus, quod non est res aliqua, tamquam in nihilo ea quae [non] sunt, uniamus, cum scilicet hunc et illum in statu hominis, id est in eo quod sunt homines, convenire dicimus. Sed nihil aliud sentimus nisi eos homines esse, et secundum hoc nullatenus differre, secundum hoc, inquam, quod homines sunt licet ad nullam vocemus essentiam. Statum autem hominis ipsum esse hominem, quod non est res, vocamus, quod etiam diximus communem causam impositionis nominis ad singulos, secundum quod ipsi ad invicem conveniunt. Saepe autem causae nomine ea quoque quae res aliqua non sunt, appellamus . . . .’ (ed. Geyer, 20)

It seems, however, that we must avoid considering the agreement of things according to that which is not any thing (as if we were to unite in nothing things which are, since we say, in fact, that this and that agree in the status of man, that is, in that they are men. But we understand nothing other than that they are men, and in this they do not differ in the least, in this, I say, that they are men. although we appeal to no essence. We call it the status itself of man to be man, which is not a thing and which we also called the common cause of imposition of the word on individuals, according as they themselves agree with each other. Often, however, we call those things too by the name of the cause which are any thing . . . . (Hyman-Walsh, 179-80).

The cause, then, of our imposing common names on individual things is that they agree in being in a certain state. But to be in a state is itself no thing over and above the individual things in a certain state.



MEDIEVAL ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY

Davidson, H.A. Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averroes on Intellect: Their Cosmologies, Theories of the Active Intellect, and Theories of the Human Intellect, New York: Oxford University Press, 1992.

———-. Proofs for Eternity, Creation and Existence of God in Medieval Islamic and Jewish Philosophy. Oxford, 1987.

Fakhry, Majid. A History of Islamic Philosophy. 2d ed. New York and London, 1983

—–. Islamic Occasionalism, and its Critique by Averoës and Aquinas. London, Allen & Unwin [1958]

Gutas, Dimitri. Greek Thought, Arabic Culture. The Graeco-Arabic Translation Movement in Baghdad and Early Abbasid Society. London: Routledge, 1998.

History of Islamic Philosophy S. H. Nasr and O. Leaman (eds). 2 vols. London: Routledge, 1996.

Islamic Theology and Philosophy: Studies in Honor of George F. Hourani. Ed. M. Marmura. SUNY, 1984.

Leaman, Oliver. An Introduction to Medieval Islamic Philosophy. Cambridge, 1985.

Medieval Islamic Thought. Special issue of American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 73 (1999).

AVICENNA (980–1037)

Works

al-Shifa’ (Healing). (Ibn Sina’s major encyclopedic work on philosophy divided into separate treatises roughly according to Aristotelian corpus. Large sections of this work were translated in the West, namely, part of the Isagoge, much of the Physics and associated works, and both the De anima and Metaphysics entire. A French translation and notes exists of the Metaphysics:

La Métaphysique du Shifa’. Trans. Georges C. Anawati. 2 vols. Paris: Vrin, 1978-1975.

The medieval, Latin translations are almost all critically edited in the series Avicenna Latinus by Simone van Reit (Peeters: Louvain, 1968-) and contain substantial introductions summarizing the contents by Gerard Verbeke:

Liber primus naturalium de causis et prinicpiis naturalium.
Liber tertius naturalium de generatione et corruptione.
Liber quartus naturalium de actionibus et passionibus qualitatum primarum.
Liber de Anima seu Sextus de Naturalibus 2 vols.
Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina. 3 vols.
Danishnama-i ‘ala’i (The Book of Scientific Knowledge). In Persian, not Arabic, and not transmitted to the West. A translation exists:

Ed. and trans. P. Morewedge, The Metaphysics of Avicenna, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973.

General Studies

Goodman, L. Avicenna, London: Routledge, 1992.

Gutas, D. Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition, Introduction to Reading Avicenna’s Philosophical Works, Leiden: Brill, 1988.

Janssens, J.L. An Annotated Bibliography on Ibn Sina (1970–1989), Including Arabic and Persian Publications and Turkish and Russian references, Leuven: University of Leuven Press, 1991.

Mamura, M.E. ‘Some Aspects of Avicenna’s Theory of God’s Knowledge of Particulars’, Journal of the American Oriental Society 82 (1962): 299–312.

Mamura, M.E. ‘Avicenna’s Proof from Contingency for God’s Existence in the Metaphysics of al Shifa’, Medieval Studies 42 (1980): 337–52.

Rahman, F. ‘Essence and Existence in Avicenna’, Medieval and Renaissance Studies 4 (1958): 1–16

I. AVICENNA: THE CONCEPT OF METAPHYSICS

Fakhry, Majid. “The Subject-Matter of Metaphysics: Aristotle and Ibn Sina,” in Islamic Theology and Philosophy, pp. 137-47.

G. E. L. Owen, “Logic and Metaphysics in Some Earlier Works of Aristotle,” in: G. E. L. Owen, Logic, Science, and Dialectic. Collected Papers in Greek Philosophy, Ithaca, N. Y. 1986, 180-199.

Owens, Joseph. The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics. 3rd rev. ed. Toronto, 1978.
ARISTOTLE ON THE SUBJECT OF A SCIENCE
Posterior Analytics

Apo 1.4 (73b26-27): 
(Medieval trans.): Universale autem dico quod, cum de omni sit et per se et secundum quod ipsum est.
(Oxford trans.): I term ‘commensurately universal’ an attribute which belongs to every instance of its subject, and to every instance essentially and as such.

Apo 1.10 76b12-16 (Oxford Trans.):
For indeed every demonstrative science has three elements: (1) that which it posits, the subject genus ( ; genus) whose essential attributes it examines; (2) the so-called axioms, which are primary premisses of its demonstration; (3) the attributes, ( ; passiones) the meaning of which it assumes.

 

ARISTOTLE ON METAPHYSICS
Metaphysics IV.1-2 and VI.1

Metaph. IV.1-2
There is a science which investigates being as being and the attributes which belong to this in virtue of its own nature. Now this is not the same as any of the so-called special sciences; for none of these others treats universally of being as being. They cut off a part of being and investigate the attribute of this part; this is what the mathematical sciences for instance do. Now since we are seeking the first principles and the highest causes, clearly there must be some thing to which these belong in virtue of its own nature. If then those who sought the elements of existing things were seeking these same principles, it is necessary that the elements must be elements of being not by accident but just because it is being. Therefore it is of being as being that we also must grasp the first causes.

c. 2
There are many senses in which a thing may be said to ‘be’, but all that ‘is’ is related to one central point, one definite kind of thing, and is not said to ‘be’ by a mere ambiguity. Everything which is healthy is related to health, one thing in the sense that it preserves health, another in the sense that it produces it, another in the sense that it is a symptom of health, another because it is capable of it. And that which is medical is relative to the medical art, one thing being called medical because it possesses it, another because it is naturally adapted to it, another because it is a function of the medical art. And we shall find other words used similarly to these. So, too, there are many senses in which a thing is said to be, but all refer to one starting-point; some things are said to be because they are substances, others because they are affections of substance, others because they are a process towards substance, or destructions or privations or qualities of substance, or productive or generative of substance, or of things which are relative to substance, or negations of one of these thing of substance itself. It is for this reason that we say even of non-being that it is nonbeing. As, then, there is one science which deals with all healthy things, the same applies in the other cases also. For not only in the case of things which have one common notion does the investigation belong to one science, but also in the case of things which are related to one common nature; for even these in a sense have one common notion. It is clear then that it is the work of one science also to study the things that are, qua being.-But everywhere science deals chiefly with that which is primary, and on which the other things depend, and in virtue of which they get their names. If, then, this is substance, it will be of substances that the philosopher must grasp the principles and the causes.

Metaph. VI.1
We are seeking the principles and the causes of the things that are, and obviously of them qua being. For, while there is a cause of health and of good condition, and the objects of mathematics have first principles and elements and causes, and in general every science which is ratiocinative or at all involves reasoning deals with causes and principles, more or less precise, all these sciences mark off some particular being-some genus, and inquire into this, but not into being simply nor qua being, nor do they offer any discussion of the essence of the things of which they treat; but starting from the essence-some making it plain to the senses, others assuming it as a hypothesis-they then demonstrate, more or less cogently, the essential attributes of the genus with which they deal. It is obvious, therefore, that such an induction yields no demonstration of substance or of the essence, but some other way of exhibiting it. And similarly the sciences omit the question whether the genus with which they deal exists or does not exist, because it belongs to the same kind of thinking to show what it is and that it is.
And since natural science, like other sciences, is in fact about one class of being, i.e. to that sort of substance which has the principle of its movement and rest present in itself, evidently it is neither practical nor productive. For in the case of things made the principle is in the maker-it is either reason or art or some faculty, while in the case of things done it is in the doer-viz. will, for that which is done and that which is willed are the same. Therefore, if all thought is either practical or productive or theoretical, physics must be a theoretical science, but it will theorize about such being as admits of being moved, and about substance-as-defined for the most part only as not separable from matter.
…
That physics, then, is a theoretical science, is plain from these considerations. Mathematics also, however, is theoretical; but whether its objects are immovable and separable from matter, is not at present clear; still, it is clear that some mathematical theorems consider them qua immovable and qua separable from matter. But if there is something which is eternal and immovable and separable, clearly the knowledge of it belongs to a theoretical science,-not, however, to physics (for physics deals with certain movable things) nor to mathematics, but to a science prior to both. For physics deals with things which exist separately but are not immovable, and some parts of mathematics deal with things which are immovable but presumably do not exist separately, but as embodied in matter; while the first science deals with things which both exist separately and are immovable. Now all causes must be eternal, but especially these; for they are the causes that operate on so much of the divine as appears to us. There must, then, be three theoretical philosophies, mathematics, physics, and what we may call theology, since it is obvious that if the divine is present anywhere, it is present in things of this sort. And the highest science must deal with the highest genus. Thus, while the theoretical sciences are more to be desired than the other sciences, this is more to be desired than the other theoretical sciences. For one might raise the question whether first philosophy is universal, or deals with one genus, i.e. some one kind of being; for not even the mathematical sciences are all alike in this respect,-geometry and astronomy deal with a certain particular kind of thing, while universal mathematics applies alike to all. We answer that if there is no substance other than those which are formed by nature, natural science will be the first science; but if there is an immovable substance, the science of this must be prior and must be first philosophy, and universal in this way, because it is first. And it will belong to this to consider being qua being-both what it is and the attributes which belong to it qua being.
AVICENNA

Metaphysics Proves the Existence of God
Prima philosophia I.l (Avicenna Latinus 1.4:535:85).

It is known that every science has its own proper subject. Let us investigate what the subject of this science [i.e., Metaphysics] is and let us consider whether it is God Himself, may He be exalted. But it is not God because God is one of the things investigated in this science. I say therefore that is impossible for God to be the subject of this science since in every science the subject is something whose being is conceded; the science itself only investigates the properties of that subject, as we have shown elsewhere. But that God exists cannot be conceded in this science as its subject. Rather, it is demonstrated here. For if this is not the case, then either (A) God is conceded in this science and demonstrated in another science or (B) God is conceded in this science and not demonstrated in another science.
But either alternative is false. (A) For it is impossible that God be demonstrated in some other science, because the other sciences are either ethical, political, physical, mathematical, or logical. There are no other philosophical sciences aside from these. In none of these sciences, however, can the existence of God be demonstrated, because God cannot be an object of investigation in any of them. After a little reflection, you will understand this from what has been repeatedly taught.
Nor (B) is it possible that God is not demonstrated in some science other than these, for then God would not be demonstrated in any science whatsoever. Therefore, either (l) God is selfevident or (2) it is impossible to know God by any reasoning at all. But (l) God is not selfevident, nor (2) is it impossible to demonstrate God since we have signs of God’s existence. Furthermore, how can one concede the existence of what cannot be demonstrated? It remains, therefore, that only this science can demonstrate God. Since, however, this science investigates whether God is, God cannot here be the subject. For no science establishes the being of its own subject.
Being is the Subject of Metaphysics
Prima philosophia I.2 (Avicenna Latinus, 1.12-13)

Thus, it has been shown to you from these considerations that being insofar as it is being (ens inquantum ens) is common to all these things and that it must be posited as the subject of this discipline. Therefore, the first subject of this science is being insofar as it is being, and those things which this science investigates are the attrirbutes of being insofar as it is being without qualification.

Avicenna’s Properly Metaphysical Proof
Prima philosophia 1.3 (Avicenna Latinus, 1.23-24)

Debes etiam scire quod in ipsis rebus est via qua ostenditur quod intentio huius scientiae non est ponere aliquid esse principium nisi postquam probatum fuerit in alia scientia. Postea vero manifestabitur tibi innuendo quod nos habemus viam ad stabiliendum primum principium, non ex via testificationis sensibilium, sed ex via propositionum universalium intelligibilium per se notarum, quae facit necessarium quod ens habet principium quod est necesse esse, et prohibet illud esse variabile et multiplex ullo modo. et facit debere illud esse principium totius, et quod totum debet esse per illud secundum ordinem totius. Sed nos propter infirmitatem nostrarum animarum non possumus incedere per ipsam viam demonstrativam, quae est progressus ex principiis ad sequentia et ex causa ad causatum, nisi in aliquibus ordinibus universitatis eorum quae sunt, sine discretione. Igitur ex merito huius scientiae in se est, ut ipsa sit altior omnibus scientiis; quantum vero ad nos posterioratur post omnes scientias. Iam igitur locuti sumus de ordine huius scientiae inter omnes scientias.
♦ ♦ ♦
You should know that, on this point, there is a way by which it is shown that the end of this science is not to posit a principle only after it has been established in another science. It will become clear to you anon through an intimation that we have a way for proving the First Principle, not by way of inference from sensible things, but through universal rational premises that make it necessary that there must be for existence a principle that is necessary in its existence, that make it impossible for [this principle] to be in any respect multiple, and that make it neccssary that it must be the principle of the whole [of existence] and that the whole proceeds from God according to the order possessed by the whole. Due to our incapacity, however, we are unable to adopt this demonstrative method which is the method of arriving at the secondary existents from the primary and at the effect from the cause. except with reference to certain groupings of the order of existing things, not in detail.

 

AVERROES AGAINST AVICENNA
In Phy. 1 t.c. 83 (Iunt. 4.47DH):

Cum notificavit principia esse tria, duo per se, scilicet materia et forma, et unum per accidens, scilicet, privatio, et iam declaravit primam materiam esse de principiis, dicit, “Considerare autem de principio secundum formam etc.,” id est, considerare autem de primo principio formali utrum sit unum aut plura, et quae est substantia eius, est proprium primae philosophiae. Formarum enim aliae sunt in materiis, aliae non in materiis, ut declaratum est in hac scientia. Et ideo consideratio de formis est duarum scientiarum, quarum una, scilicet naturalis considerat de formis materialibus, secunda autem de formis simplicibus abstractis a materia, et est illa scientia, quae considerat de ente simpliciter. Sed notandum est, quod istud genus entium, esse scilicet separatum a materia, non declaratur nisi in hac scientia naturali. Et qui dicit quod prima philosophia nititur declarare entia separabilia esse, peccat. Haec enim entia sunt subiecta primae philosophiae et declaratum est in Posterioribus analyticis quod impossibile est aliquam scientiam declarare suum subiectum esse, sed concedit ipsum esse, aut quia manifestum per se, aut quia est demonstratum in alia scientia. Unde Avicenna peccavit maxime, cum dicit quod primus philosophus demonstrat primum principium esse, et processit in hoc in suo libro de scienta divina per viam quam existimavit esse necessariam et essentialem in illa scientia, et peccavit peccato manifesto. Certior enim illorum sermonum, quibus usus est in hoc, non pertransit ordinem sermonum probabilium. Et iam causam innuimus huius alibi.
♦ ♦ ♦
Since he has shown that there are three principles, two which are essential, namely, matter and form, and one which is incidental, namely, privation, and he has already shown that prime matter is one of the principles, he says “But to consider the principle in the sense of form, etc.” that is, to investigate whether the first formal principle is one or several, and what its nature is, is proper to First Philosophy. As has been shown in this science, some forms are in matter, others are not in matter. Therefore, the study of forms pertains to two sciences. One, namely, physics, investigates material forms, while the second investigates the simple forms separate from matter, and that is the science which investigates being as such. But note that it is only established in this science of physics that there is this class of beings, namely, separate from matter, and he errs who says that First Philosophy [i.e., metaphysics] endeavors to prove that there are beings separate [from matter], for these beings are the subjects of first philosophy. It has been shown in the Posterior Analytics that no science can prove that its own subject is, but concedes that it is, either because it is self-evident or because it has been demonstrated in another science. Thus, Avicenna committed the greatest error when he said that First Philosophy demonstrates that there is a first principle. He proceeded in this in his Book on Divine Science by a way which he thought was necessary and essential in that science [i.e., metaphysics]. And he erred by an evident error, for the more certain of the arguments which he used in this did not go beyond the order of the probable. The reason for this we have indicated elsewhere.

AVICENNA VERSUS AVERROES

avicenna averroes
No science demonstrates the existence of its own subject
Metaphysics alone demonstrates the existence of God.
∴ God is not the subject of metaphysics.
No science demonstrates the existence of its own subject.
God is the subject of metaphysics.

∴ Metaphysics does not demonstrate the existence of God.
ARISTOTLE, AVICENNA, AND AVERROES ON THE SUBJECT OF METAPHYSICS
ARISTOTLE Metaphysics IV.1
Metaphysics VI.1


There is a science which investigates being as being and the attributes which belong to this in virtue of its own nature 



First science
First philosophy
Theology
CONCERNS: 
Being qua being 


The separate and immobile
The most noble genus

 

AVICENNA: Prima philosophia 1.2

Ideo primum subiectum huius scientiae est ens, inquantum est ens; et ea quae inquirit sunt consequentia ens, inquantum est ens, sine condicione.

SUBJECT: Ens inquantum est ens est commune

AVERROES: In Phy. I com. 83

[S]ecunda autem de formis simplicibus abstractis a materia, et est illa scientia quae considerat de ente simpliciter. Sed notandum est, quod istud genus entium esse, scilicet separatum a materia non declaratur nisi in hac scientia [sc. naturali] … Haec enim entia sunt subiecta primae philosophiae …

SUBJECT: Entia separata a materia

 

II. AVICENNA ON THE PRIMARY CONCEPTS
Brown, Stephen F. “Avicenna and the Unity of the Concept of Being: The Interpretations of Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus, Gerard of Bologna and Peter Aureoli,” Franciscan Studies 25 (1965) 117-150

Druart, Thérèse-Anne. “Shay’ or Res as Concomitant of ‘Being’ in Avcienna,” Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale, 12 (2001): 125-142.

Marmura, Michael E. “Avicenna on Primary Concepts in the Metaphysics of his Al-Shifa’,” in Logos Islamikos: Studia Islamica in Honorem Georgii Michaelis Wickens, ed. M. E. Marmura and D. A. Agius. Toronto, 1984, 219-40.

The central text from Avicenna’s Metaphysics I.5 in the Shifa’ has been translated by Marmura in the article above. He has divided the chapter into the following sections (Arabic pages and lines in parenthesis, to which the edition of the medieval Latin text is also keyed):

The parallel between primary concepts and self-evident logical truths (p. 29, 1. 13 – p. 30, 1. 2);
The primacy of the concepts of “the existent” and “the thing” (p. 30, 1. 3 – p. 31, 1. 2);
The distinction between “affirmative” and “proper” existence (p. 31, 1. 2 – p. 32, 1. 15);
The relation of “the thing” to non-existence (p. 32, 1. 6 – p. 34, 1. 14);
Existence as the object of one science (p. 34, 1. 15 – p. 35, 1. 1);
The problem of determining which modal concept is logically prior (p. 35, 1. 13 – p. 36, 1. 6);
Refuting the doctrine that what has ceased to exist can be brought back into existence (p. 31, 11. 6-20).

TRANSLATIONS

Avicenna, al-Shifa’: Metaphysics I.5
Chapter: On Indicating the Existent, the Thing and Their First Division, 
Wherewith Attention is Directed on the Objective Sought.

The parallel between primary concepts and self-evident logical truths
(p. 29, 1. 13 – p. 30, 1. 2)

We say: the ideas of “the existent,” “the thing,” and “the necessary” are impressed in the soul in a primary way, this impression not requiring better known things to bring it about.
This is similar to what obtains in the category of judgment[s] where there are primary principles, in themselves found to be true, causing [in turn] assent tat he truth of other [propositions]. If these [primary principles] do not come to mind or if the expression designating them is not understood, then it would be impossible to know whatever is known through them – [this], even though the informative act striving to bring them to mind or to explain the expressions designating them is not engaged in an endeavor to impart knowledge not [already] present in the natural intelligence, but is merely drawing attention to a comprehension of what he speaker intends and upholds. This may occur through things which in themselves are less evident than the things intended to be made known, but which for some cause or for some expression have become better known.
Similarly, in conceptual matters, there are things which are principles for conception that are conceived in themselves. If one desires to indicate them, [such indication] would not in reality constitute making an unknown thing known, but would merely consist in drawing attention to them or to bringing them to mind through the use of a sign which in itself may be less known than [the principle], but which for some cause or circumstance happens to be more obvious in its signification.
When such a sign is used, the soul becomes aware that such a meaning is being brought to mind, in [the sense] that it is the [meaning] intended and not something else, the sign in reality having given no knowledge of it.
If every conception requires a prior conception, then such a state of affairs would lead either to infinite regression or to circularity.

The primacy of the concepts of “the existent” and “the thing”
(p. 30, 1. 3 – p. 31, 1. 2)

The things that have the highest claim to be conceived in themselves are those common to all matters, as for example, “the existent” and “the one thing” and so on. For this reason, none of these things can be shown by a proof totally devoid of circularity or by the exposition of better known things.
Hence, whoever attempts to place in them something as a [defining] constituent falters. An example of this is the person who says, “It is of the existent’s true nature to be either active or passive.” This, while inescapably the case, belongs to the divisions of the existent, the existent being better known than the active and the passive. The masses conceive the reality of the existent without knowing at all that it must be either active or passive. For my part, up to this point, this has only been evident to me through nothing less than a syllogism. How then would it be with the person who strives to define the state of the evident thing in terms of some quality belonging to it which (it begin with] requires proof to establish that it exists for that thing?
The case is similar with someone’s statement: “The thing is that about which an informative statement is correct.” For “is correct” is less known than “thing” and [similarly] “informative statement” is less known than “thing.” Haw then can this be the definition of the thing? Indeed, “is correct” and “information” are only known after one uses in explaining what they are [terns] indicating that each is either a “thing” a “matter” a “whatever” or “a that which”: all of these being synonyms to the word, “thing.”
How then can the thing be truly defined in terms of that which is only known through it? Yes, in this and similar things there may be some act of directing attention: but in reality, if you say, “the thing is that about which an informative statement is correct,” it is as if you have said, “the thing is the thing about which an informative statement is correct,” because the meaning of “whatever,” “that which,” and “thing” is one and the same. You would thus have included “thing” in the definition of ‘thing.”
Still, we do not deny that through this [statement] and its like, despite its vitiating starting point, there occurs in some manner a directing of attention to the thing.

The distinction between “affirmative” and “proper” existence 
(p. 31, 1. 2 – p. 32, 1. 15)

We say, moreover: the meaning of “existence” and of “thing” are conceived in the soul and are two meanings, while “the existent,” “the established” and “the realized” are synonyms. We do not doubt that their meaning has been realized in the soul of whoever reads this book.
“The thing” or its equivalent may be used in all languages to indicate some other meaning. For to every thing there is a reality by virtue of which it is what it is. Thus the triangle has a reality in that it is a triangle and whiteness has a reality in that it is a whiteness. It is that which we should perhaps call “proper existence,” not intending by this the meaning given to affirmative existence; for the expression, “existence,” is used to denote many meanings, one of which is the reality a thing happens to have. Thus, [the reality) a thing happens to have is, as it were, its proper existence.
To resume: It is evident that each thing has a reality proper to it, namely its quiddity. It is known that the reality proper to each thing is something other than the existence corresponding to what is affirmed.
This is because if you said, “the reality of such thing exists either in the concrete, in the soul, or absolutely, being common to both,” this would have a meaning, realized and understood. Whereas, if you said, “the reality of such a thing is the reality of such a thing,” or that “the reality of such a thing is a reality,” this would be superfluous useless talk. Again, if you said, “the reality of such a thing is a thing,” this too would not be a statement imparting knowledge of what is not known. Even less useful than this is for you to say, “reality is a thing,” unless by “thing” you mean “the existent”: for then it is as though you have said, “the reality of such a thing is an existing reality.” On the other hand, if you said, “the reality of A is something and the reality of B is another Thing,” this would be sound, imparting knowledge, because [in saying this), you make the reservation within yourself that the form is something specific differing from the latter. this would be as if you have said, “[this] is the reality of A and the reality of B is another reality.” If it were not for both this reservation (you make within yourself] and this conjunction, [the statement] would not impart knowledge.
This, then, is the meaning intended by “thing.” Nor does the necessary concomitance of the meaning of existence separate at all from the meaning of [the thing]; rather, the meaning of existence is permanently concomitant with it because the thing exists either in the concrete or in the estimation and intellect. If it were not so, it would not be a thing.

The relation of “the thing” to non-existence
(p. 32, 1. 6 – p. 34, 1. 14)

[This section omitted. See Marmura, pp. 227-32.]

Existence as the object of one science
(p. 34, 1. 15 – p. 35, 1. 1)

We now say: although the existent, as you have known, is not a genus and is not predicated equally of what is beneath it, yet it has a meaning agreed upon with respect to priority and posteriority. The first thing to which it belongs is the quiddity which is substance, and then to what comes after it. Since it has one meaning, in the manner to which we have alluded, there adheres to it accidental matters proper to it, as we have shown earlier. For this reason, it is taken care of by one [field of] knowledge in the same way that anything pertaining to health has one science.

The problem of determining which modal concept is logically prior
(p. 35, 1. 13 – p. 36, 1. 6)

It may also prove difficult for us to make known the state of the necessary, the possible and the impossible through ascertained definition [and we would have to make this known] only by way of a sign. Almost all of what has reached you of the sayings of the ancients [purporting] to define these involves circular reasoning.
This is because, as you have come across in the various parts of the Logic, whenever they want to define the possible, they include in its definition either the necessary or the impossible, there being no other way save this. And when they want to define the necessary, they include in its definition either the possible or the impossible; [likewise] when they want to define the impossible, they include in its definition either the necessary or the possible.
Thus, for example, if they define the possible, they would at one time say that it is that which is not necessary, or [at another], that it is that which is the presently non-existent whose existence at any supposed moment in the future is not possible. [Again], if they find that there is a need to define the necessary, they would either say that it is that which is not possible to suppose other than it is. Thus at one time they include the possible in its definition, at another, the impossible.
Regarding the possible, they would have already included in its definition either the necessary or the impossible.
Again, when they wish to define the impossible, they either include the necessary in its definition by saying, “the impossible is that whose non-existence is necessary,” or the possible, by saying, “it is that which it is not possible for it to exist,” or some other expression equivalent to these two.
The case is similar which such statements as: the impossible is that whose non-existence is necessary; the necessary is that whose non-existence is not allowable and impossible, or that which is not possible for it not to exist; the possible is that which it is not impossible for it to exist or not to exist, or that which it is not necessary for it to exist or not to exist. All of this, as you see, is clearly circular. A fuller exposure of this is something you have come across in the Analytics.
Nonetheless, of these three, the one with the highest claim to be first conceived is the necessary. This is because the necessary points to the assuredness of existence (ta’akkud al-wujud), existence being better known than non-existence because existence is known in itself while nonexistence is, in some manner or another, known through existence.

Refuting the doctrine that what has ceased to exist can be brought back into existence 
(p. 31, 11. 6-20).

[This section omitted. See Marmura, pp. 235-37.]

III. AVICENNA ON NECESSARY BEING

Davidson, Proofs, Chapters IX-X, pp. 281-335.

Druart, Thérèse-Anne, “Avicenna’s Influence on Duns Scotus’ Proof for the Existence of God in the Lectura,” in Avicenna and His Heritage. Acts of the International Colloquium, Leuven-Louvain-La-Neuve September 8 – September 11, 1999, ed. by Jules Janssens & Daniel De Smet (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2002), pp. 253-66.

Hourani, G.F. “Ibn Sina on Necessary and Possible Existence,” Philosophical Forum 4 (1972): 74-86.

Morewedge, Parviz. “Ibn Sina (Avicenna), Malcolm and the Ontological Argument,” The Monist 54 (1970) 122-40.

Marmura, M. “Avicenna’s Proof from Contingency for God’s Existence in the Metaphysics of the Shifa’,” Mediaeval Studies 42 (1980) 337-52.

What follows is the translation by Hourani in the above article of Avicenna’s proof of a necessary being as contained the Metaphysics of the Najat, an abbreviation of the Shifa’. It is roughly parallel to Metaphysics I.6 of the Shifa’ contained in Hyman and Walsh. (The articles by Hourani and Marmura contain translations of all of Avicenna’s major versions of his proof.) The Najat, however, was not transmitted to the West. It is included because it gives a more compact version of the proof which in the Shifa’ is spead out over several books.

TRANSLATION

Avicenna, al-Najat, ed. M. S. Kurdi. 2nd ed. (Cairo, 1938), pp. 224-227, 235.

[As Hourani notes, parts of these passages have been accurately translated into French by A. M. Goichon, La distinction de l’essence et de l’existence d’apres Ibn Sina (Avicenna) (Paris. 1938), pp. 159-163, 166-167. A complete Latin translation is given by N. Carame, Avicennae Metaphysices compendium (Rome, 1926). pp. 66-70, 91-93.]
[224] THE SECOND TREATISE OF THE “METAPHYSICS”.

Chapter: Explanation of the ideas of the necessary and the possible.
The necessary of existence is that existent which cannot be supposed non-existent without the occurrence of an impossibility. The possible of existence is that which can be supposed non-existent or existent without the occurrence of an impossibility. The necessary of existence entails existence. The possible of existence is that which has no entailment of any kind, i.e. either of existence or of its absence. (This is what we mean in this context by “possible of existence,” although by “possible of existence” may also be meant what is in potentiality, and “possible” is also predicated of everything that truly exists-as has been given in detail previously in the “Logic.”)
Next, the necessary of existence may be necessary by itself or not by itself. What is necessary of existence by itself is what is due to itself, not due to another thing, i.e. it is such a thing that from the supposition of its absence an impossibility follows. On the other hand, what is necessary of existence not by itself is such that if something other than it were postulated it would become necessary of existence. As examples, 4 is necessary of existence not by itself but on the supposition of 2+2, and burning is necessary of existence not by itself but on the supposition of contact of a naturally active force with a naturally passive force, I mean of one which burns with one which is burned.

Chapter: The necessary by itself cannot be necessary by another thing. The necessary by another thing is possible.
It is inadmissible that one thing should be necessary of existence by itself and by another thing at the same time. For if the other thing were removed or its existence not considered, inevitably either the necessity of its “ existence would remain unaffected and thus not be the necessity of its existence by another thing, or the necessity of its existence would not remain and thus it would not he the necessity of its existence by itself.
Everything that is necessary of existence by another thing is possible of existence by itself, because the necessity of existence of what is necessary of existence by another thing is dependent on some connection and relation, and the consideration of the connection and relation is other than the consideration of the very thing itself which has the connection and relation. Then the necessity of existence is established only by consideration of this connection. So consideration of the thing itself alone must entail necessity of existence, or possibility of existence, or impossibility of existence. But it is inadmissible that it should entail impossibility of existence, because everything whose existence is impossible by itself does not exist, even by another thing … [226]….” Nor can it be an existent that entails necessity of existence (by itself), for we have said previously that, when something is necessary in its existence by itself, the necessity of its existence cannot be by another thing. So what remains is that by consideration of itself it is possible of existence, while by consideration of the injection of the connection with that other thing it is necessary of existence, and by consideration of the interruption of its connection with that other thing it is impossible of existence; but itself by itself, without condition, it is possible of existence.

Chapter: What is not necessary does not exist.
Thus it is now clear that everything necessary of existence by another thing is possible of existence by itself. And this is reversible, so that everything possible of existence by itself, if its existence has happened, is necessary of existence by another thing: because inevitably it must either truly have an actual existence or not truly have an actual existence-but it cannot not truly have an actual existence, for in that case it would be impossible of existence, so it remains that it truly has an actual existence. And in that case its existence is either necessary or not necessary. But that whose existence is not necessary is still possible of existence [only], and its existence has not been distinguished from its absence; and there is no difference between this state of it and the first state, because it was already possible of existence before its existence, and now it is in the same state as it was. So if it is postulated that now it has been made anew, a proper question can be asked about this state [of renewal]: Is it possible of existence or necessary of existence? If it were possible of existence, and if that state were also present previously in the thing’s [pure] possibility, no new state would now have arisen. But if its existence is necessary and it is necessitated by something prior, the existence of a [new] state is necessary by this prior thing. and that state is nothing but the thing’s emergence into existence: therefore its emergence into existence is necessary.
Further, everything possible of existence either has its existence by itself or has it due to some cause. If it is by itself, it is itself necessary of existence, not possible of existence. If it is by a cause, either its existence is necessary whenever the cause exists, or else it remains as it was before the existence of the cause, but this is impossible. Therefore its existence is necessary whenever the cause exists.
[227] Thus everything possible of existence by itself is necessary of existence only by another thing.
…

[235] Chapter: Establishment of the necessary of existence.
There is no doubt that there are existents, and every existent is either necessary or possible. If it is necessary, the existence of the necessary is at once verified, which was the conclusion sought. If it is possible. we shall show that the existence of the possible terminates in the necessary of existence. First we shall set forth some premisses.
One of these is that it is not possible that all the things possible by themselves should simultaneously have an infinite number of causes possible by themselves. This is because all of them are either existent together or not existent together. If they are not existent together in infinite number simultaneously, but exist in a temporal series-we shall postpone discussion of this. If they are existent together and there is nothing necessary of existence among them, then inevitably their total insofar as it is that total, whether it is finite or infinite, is either necessary of existence by itself or possible of existence. So if it is necessary of existence by itself, but each of its units is possible, the necessary of existence would be composed of possibles of existence, which is absurd. And if it is possible of existence by itself, the total needs for existence something to bestow existence. This will be either external to the total or internal to it. If it is internal, either one unit will be necessary of existence, yet every one of them was [considered] possible, so this is absurd. Or this unit will be possible of existence and will be a cause for the existence of the total; but a cause of the total is primarily a cause for the existence of its parts, of which it is one, thus it will be a cause for the existence of itself. This is impossible; but even if it were true it would in a way be the very conclusion sought; for everything sufficient to make itself exist is necessary of existence, yet it was [considered] not necessary of existence, which is absurd. What remains, then, is that it is external to the total, and it is not possible that it should be a possible cause, for we have assembled all causes possible of existence within this total; therefore it is external to it and necessary of existence by itself. So now the possibles have terminated in a cause necessary of existence, and all possibles do not have an infinite number of possible causes.
IV. AVICENNA ON ESSENCE AND EXISTENCE AND THE COMMON NATURE

Black, Deborah. “Mental Existence in Avicenna and Thomas Aquinas,” Mediaeval Studies 61 (1999) 45-79.

Marmura, Michael E. “Avicenna’s Chapter on Universals in the Isagoge of his Shifa’. In Islam: Past Influence and Present Challenge. Ed. A. T. Welch and P. Cachia (Edinburgh, 1979), 34-56.

Owens, Joseph. “Common Nature: A Point of Comparison between Thomistic and Scotistic Metaphysics,” Mediaeval Studies 19 (1957): 1-14. [Discussion of Avicenna’s text and different reception by Aquinas and Scotus.]

Rahman, F. “Essence and Existence in Avicenna,” Medieval and Rennaissance Studies 4 (1958): 1-16.

What follows is a translation of I.12 of the Isagoge in the logic section of Avicenna’s Shifa’ contained in Marmura above, pp. 47-52. The Latins did have this section of the logical part of the Shifa’ – in fact it was the only part of Avicenna’s logic translated into Latin – and it together with the related texts on the universal in the Shifa’: Metaphysics I.5, which we have examined, and V.1-2, had an enormous impact on western philosophy.
TRANSLATIONS

Avicenna, al-Shifa’: al-Madkhal (Isagoge) I.2, p. 15 in Arabic edition.
(trans. Marmura, pp. 44-45)

The quiddities of things may exist in the real instandes of things or in conception. They will thus have three aspects: [a] as consideration of the quiddity inasmuch as it is that quiddity, without being related to either of the two [kinds] of existence, and what attaches to it inasmuch as it is such; [b] a consideration thereof inasmuch as it is in external reality, where there will then attach to it accidents proper to this existence it has; and [c] a consideration thereof inasmuch as it is in conception, where there will then attach to it accidents proper to this existence, for example, being a subject, predication, universality and particularity in predication, essentiality and accidentiality in predication, and other things that you will learn [in this book].

Avicenna, al-Shifa’: al-Madkhal (Isagoge) I.12, pp. 65-72 in Arabic edition.
(trans. Marmura, pp. 47-52)

A chapter on what among these five meanings is natural, mental, and logical -prior to multiplicity, in multiplicity and after multiplicity

It has been the custom in the endeavour to understand these five [universals] to say that some are natural, [65.5 ] some logical, and some mental. It is sometimes [also] said that some are prior to multiplicity, some in multiplicity, some after multiplicity. It is [moreover] customary to connect the investigation of this, even though common to [all] the five universals, with the investigation of the nature of genus and species. Hence, following the example of our predecessors, we say: Each thing that occurs as an example of one of these five is one thing in itself, and another in being a genus, [65.10] species, differentia, property or general accident. Let us take genus as our example of this and say:
Animal in itself is a meaning, regardless of whether it exists in external reality or is conceived in the soul. In itself it is neither general nor particular. If it were in itself general, so that animality by reason of being animality is general, it would follow necessarily that there would be no individual animal; rather, every animal would be general. If, moreover, animal by virtue of being animal were [65.15] individual, it would then be impossible for it to be anything but one individual, that individual required by animality, and it would be impossible for any other individual to be an animal. Rather, animal in itself is something conceived in the mind as animal and in accordance with its conception as animal it is simply animal. If with this it is [also] conceived as general, particular and the like, then an idea additional to its being animal, occurring accidentally to animality, is conceived with it. For animality does not become an individual to which one points [66.1] except through the association of something that renders it [a thing] to which one points.
Similarly, in the mind it would not be as such [that is, an individual] unless the mind attaches to it a meaning that makes it specific. Moreover, nothing from the outside would occur to it [so as to render it] universal [in the mind] unless there is in truth one essence that is animal, to which it has so occurred in external reality that it itself is found in many. As for [its being] in the mind, it would so happen to this [66.5] conceived animal form that relations to many things are made for it. Thus that one [form] itself would then be correctly related to several things resembling it in that the mind predicates it of each of them-as to the manner of this, it belongs to a different art. This accidentally occurring thing would thus be the generality that occurs to animality. Animal with respect to this generality would be akin to wood, for example, with respect to some accident by way of shape or the like occurring to it, and akin to the white garment where the garment in itself is one idea and white another, [66.10] the two then combined so that there comes to be another meaning composed of both. In a similar way, animal in the mind is one meaning, its being general or a genus [another] meaning, and its being a generic animal [yet another] meaning.
They thus call the meaning of [the] genus [considered simply as genus] ‘logical genus’. What this [term] denotes is the thing predicated of many that differ in species in answer to the question, ‘what is it?’, without, however, pointing to something which is [an example of a universal such as the genus] animal or something else. This is akin to ‘white’, which in itself has a concept [or ‘intelligible’] that does not require with it the conception that it is a garment or that it is wood. If [one of these] is conceived with it, then [66. 15 ] something to which white attaches has been conceived. Similarly, ‘one’ in itself has a concept. That it is a man or a tree, however, is something extraneous to [this] concept it has , [something] that attaches [later] to its being one . This, then, is logical genus.
As for natural [genus], this is animal inasmuch as it is animal, which [is such that] it is suitable to make for what is conceived of it the relation pertaining to genus. For when it comes to be in the mind as a concept, it becomes suitable for the generic to be conceived for it. But it is not suitable for what is supposed as conceived of this [particular] Zayd, nor for what is conceived of a man. [67.1] Through this accidental circumstance , the nature of animality in external reality differs from the nature of humanity and the nature of Zayd; for [the former] is such that if conceived, it becomes suitable for a generality of this description, namely, being a genus, to be attached to it. And it has nothing else externally save in some manner this suitability for it.
Hence, by their expression ‘natural genus’ they mean the natural thing suitable to become a genus [when conceived] in the mind, but which in natural things is not [67.5 ] a genus. Because, due to this idea, it differs in existence from other natural things, it is not far-fetched to give it, by reason of this idea, a special name and that such a name be derived from the name of the thing that in some manner occurs to it, namely, being a genus. As for the generic animal in the mind, it is that which is conceived of the natural thing. As for the [quality of] being a genus conceived in the abstract, inasmuch as it is something established in the mind, it is also a [mentally] conceived genus; but inasmuch as it is one of the things investigated by the logician, [67.10] it is a logical genus.
Even though that which is logical has no existence except in the mind, it does not necessarily follow that what is understood by its being mental is identical with what is understood by its being logical. For the meaning understood by its being mental is other than what is understood by its being logical. This is because the comprehended meaning that is understood by its being mental, a necessary adherent and a concomitant of the meaning that is understood by its being logical, is not identical with [the latter], since the difference between the two different ways of considering them has become clear to you.
Logical genus has thus two things beneath it: [67.15] one of them being its [various] kinds inasmuch as it is a genus, the other being the species of the subjects to which it occurs. In the case of its kinds, because absolute genus is more general than a high and a low genus, it gives each of the things below it of the established genera its definition and name, since each of them is called a genus and is defined as a genus. As for the species of its subjects, it does not give them its name and definition. [68.1] This is because [in the case of] man, a species of animal, one does not – inasmuch as he is animal – predicate of him in conjunction with animality what occurs to animality by way of the generic, either in definition or name. For it does not necessarily follow that man becomes a genus by way of predicating animality of him – either by name or definition – as it must follow that he becomes a body, in both name and definition, by way of predicating animality of him. [68.5] Thus, if one of the species becomes a genus, this is realized for it not from the direction of the nature of the genus that is above it, but from the direction of the things below it.
As for natural genus, it bestows its name and definition on what is below it inasmuch as it is a nature, that is, inasmuch as the genus that is animal is animal, not inasmuch as it is a natural genus, that is, a meaning that is suitable when conceived to become a genus – [not] inasmuch as it is such. For this is not necessary for what is below it.
In general, if they say [68.10] ‘natural genus gives what is below it its name and definition’, this is not an ascertained statement. For it gives these accidentally because it does not give inasmuch as it is a natural genus, as it also did not give inasmuch as it is a logical genus. Rather, these two [i.e., name and definition] are given by the nature subject to become a natural genus. And this nature in itself is not a natural genus, just as it is not a logical genus, unless we do not mean by natural genus anything other than simply the nature that [ 68.15 ] is subject for [the quality of] being a genus and do not mean what we have [originally] meant by natural genus. As such, it would then be correct to say that the natural genus gives its name and definition to what is below it and in which case animal would only be a natural genus, because it is simply animal [and nothing else]. Reflect, then, on whether this is correct. As for the mental, it also has a subject – what is generic and composition , the judgment of all this in the mind being similar to the judgment concerning the natural.53
It is, however, the more fitting for animality in itself to be named ‘natural form’ at one time, ‘mental form’ at another, [ 68.20] and, in being animality, not to be a genus in any manner whatsoever, either in the mind or externally, [69.1] but to become a genus only when a consideration, either in the mind or externally, is conjoined to it – we have alluded to both of these considerations. The thing, however, that is the nature of the conceived genus may exist in two ways. [I] It may be first conceived and then realized in external reality and in external multiplicity. An example of this is when one first conceives some artifact [69.5] and then manufactures it. [2] It may be realized in external reality and then conceived in the mind, as in the case when one happens to see individual men and retains [from this] the human form.
In brief, sometimes the conceived form is in some manner a cause for the occurrence of the form that exists in external reality; sometimes the form in external reality is in some manner a cause of the conceived form, that is, [the latter] would have occurred in the mind after it had occurred in external reality. [69.10] Because the relation of all existing things to God and the angels is [the same as] the relation of the artifacts we have to the productive soul, that which is in divine and angelic knowledge of the true nature of what is known and apprehended of natural things exists prior to multiplicity. Each intelligible of these is one meaning. There is then realized for these meanings the existence that is in multiplicity. [The meaning] then occurs in multiplicity but does not unite with it in any manner whatsoever; for in external things there is no one [69. 15 ] common thing – only dispersion. As for the manner of their being prior to multiplicity – whether they are objects of knowledge of one essence that does or does not become multiple because of them, or whether they are self-subsistent exemplars – [this is a question that] our present investigation does not cover. For to this there is another theoretical discipline.
[70.1] Know that what we have said concerning genus is a pattern for you to follow regarding species, differentia, property, and accident, that will guide your way to knowing their mental, logical, and natural [status] and which of them exists in multiplicity, before and after it. Know [moreover] that the things that in nature are the genera of genera are more than one and finite, as will become clear to you. As for the things that are the species of species, [70.5] those that are retained in nature are finite, but in themselves they are infinite in potency. For the species of the species of many categories to which you will be coming later on are infinite, as in the case of the species of the species of quantity, quality, position, and others. As for individuals, these are infinite with respect to generation, priority, and posteriority. But the sensible among them that are restricted within a limited time are necessarily finite.
The individual becomes an individual only through the conjunction of [70.10] accidental properties, both necessary and not necessary, with the nature of the species and the assignment to it of designated matter. It is impossible for conceived special properties, however much these are, to be conjoined to the species so that the individual thereby would become subsistent to the mind, without their having in the end [direct] reference to an individuated meaning. For if you said that Zayd is the tall person, the writer, the handsome man, and so on, [giving him] as many descriptions as you wish, Zayd’s individuality would not become specified for you in the mind. Indeed, it is possible for the meaning obtaining from the combination of all [70.15] [these descriptions] to refer to more than one individual. Rather what so specifies it [as an individual to the mind] is existence and reference to an individual meaning. This is exemplified by your saying that he is the son of a certain person, that he exists at a certain time, that he is tall and that he is a philosopher, when it so happens that no one at that time sharing these descriptions exists and when you have had previous knowledge of this coincidence, [this knowledge] being through apprehension of the kind that is referred to through the senses as in the case of referring to a specific person and a specific time. It is then that the individuality of Zayd becomes [70.20] ascertained [to the mind] and the above statement would indicate his individuality.
[71.1] As for the nature of the species alone, so long as nothing additional attaches to it, it would be impossible for multiplicity to attach to it.
Our saying ‘individual’ of Zayd and ‘Amr is not an equivocal nam[ing] as most people think, unless by ‘individual’ we mean a specific individual. As for ‘individual’ in the absolute [sense], it denotes a general meaning. For if we say of Zayd that he is an individual, we do not intend by this that he is Zayd, but that he is such that it would be incorrect [71.5] to include participation in what one understands by [Zayd]. And this is a meaning others share with him. For individuality is one of the states that occur to the natures subject for [the reception of] the generic and the specific, in the same way that the generic and specific occur to [these natures]. The difference between ‘man’ the species and ‘individual man’ that is general, not only in name but also in discourse, [lies in the fact that] our saying ‘man’ means that he is a rational animal, whereas our saying ‘individual man’[ refers to] this nature taken with an accident that occurs to this nature [71.10] when conjoined with designated matter. This is akin to our saying ‘one man’ to mean a specific rational animal, in which case ‘rational animal’ would be more general than this. For ‘rational animal’, that is, this one that is being mentioned, may be a species or may be an individual. For the species is rational animal just as the individual rational animal is rational animal. Moreover, generality may differ in general things. Thus, some of what is general is in accordance with particular subjects as in the case of the generality in terms of which animal [71.15] is more general than man. Some may be in accordance with the considerations that attach thereafter as with the generalities in terms of which animal is more general than animal, namely, when taken as a genus, [ then ] animal when taken as a species and [lastly] animal when taken as an individual.
The [quality of] being a genus, a species and an individual are not among the particular subjects that have the same rank in the order falling under animal. Rather, these are aspects that attach to it and specify it. And just as man can be found with a certain [71.20] accident, as in the case of laughing man, which is then predicated only of man among particulars posited as subjects, the same is the case with individual man. This is because unity [72.1] is one of the necessary concomitants of things – and we shall show that it does not render their quiddities subsistent. Thus, if unity is conjoined with humanity in the way [we] mentioned, there obtains from both individual man in which every individual [man] participates. But it is not for this reason rendered a species. This is because it is the sum of a nature and an accidental occurrence [added] to it that is a necessary concomitant but which does not render it subsistent. Such things are not species, just as man together with ‘one who laughs’, [72.5 ] ‘one who weeps’, ‘one who moves and comes to rest’, indeed, ‘one having the potentiality to become a sailor’, and so on, does not constitute another species. Rather, man in his substance is a species. Things then attach to [man] that are things consequent on species and are not matters necessitating a new species. This is among the things that you will ascertain in First Philosophy.

V. AVICENNA ON CAUSALITY

Gilson, Étienne. “Avicenne et lest orgines de la notion de cause efficiente.” Atti de Congresso Internazionale de Filosofia IX (1960): 121-30

——. “Notes pour l’histoire de la cause efficiente,” Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge 37 (1962): 7-31.

Marmura, Michael E. “The Metaphysics of Efficient Causality in Avicenna (Ibn Sina),” Islamic Theology and Philosophy: Studies in Honor of George F. Hourani, ed. M. E. Marmura (SUNY, ), pp. 171-87.

——-. “Avicenna on Causal Priority,” in Islamic Philosophy and Mysticism, ed. Parviz Morewedge (Delmar, N. Y., 1981), pp. 65-83

In book VI of his Metaphysics Avicenna takes up causality. In chapters 1 and 2 he sets out a number of important and influential results, including a distinction between physical and metaphysical agency, the requirement that true causes must be simultaneous with their effects, the distinction between essential and accidental or supporting causes, the restriction that an infinite regress is limited to such true essential causes, and his definition of creation.

Cause a Topic of Metaphysics: Avicenna begins by noting that the investigation of causes falls under the consideration of metaphysics since cause and effects are among the properties that pertain to what exists insofar as it exists.

The Four Causes: Avicenna next subscribes to Aristotle’s traditional analysis of cause into matter, form, end and agent. In the latter case, however, Avicenna distinguishes metaphysical from physical agency. A metaphysical agent is “a cause that bestows existence separate from itself.” This is to be distinguished from physical agency, which is “a principle of motion alone”. Avicenna makes clear that this distinction is necessary to describe the creator of the world as a cause of existence rather than just a first mover. Avicenna offers a short argument for the completeness of the four causes: something must function as a cause either intrinsically (matter and form) or extrinsically (agent and end) to its effect, and these four exhaust both categories.

Metaphysical Efficient Cause: The bulk of Avicenna’s remaining discussion in these two chapters is taken up with efficient cause.

Agent cause grants being distinct from itself, but it may be in the same subject with its effect as long as effect itself not constituitive of the agent cause. E.g., nature of wood and motion.

Agent cause only causes existence; it does not cause “coming into existence after non-existence”, since this could never be otherwise.

Argues that efficient cause not just required to bring something from non-existence to existence, and then once it exists the thing is self-sufficient and needs no further cause.

Accordingly, what ordinary people call an agent is not an agent at all, since they consider it an agent only if it was at some time not an agent (i.e., is the cause of bring something from being into non-being only). Thus, they turn an agent into something passive, since some other factor must be added to make the putative agent cause after not having caused.

The reason for this view are the obvious examples that the house remains after the builder stops building, and the son remains after the parents and the heat remains after the fire. Avicenna replies that this is an incorrect analysis. The builder does not cause the building to persist and remain. The builder is only the cause of the process of building itself, which stops when he as a cause of that process stops. The persistence of the building is caused by the light and heavy natures of the materials themselves, which the builder does not cause. These are rather caused by the “Giver of Forms” and the builder’s actions are simply facilitating causes for these natures to realize their effect.

These facilitating causes can go to infinity, while the true essential causes cannot, because the latter must be simultaneous with their effects.

Creation: If follows from the above that an effect will exist as long as the cause exists. The highest cause of this kind is one that eternally causes its effect to existence, and so absolutely and without qualification prevents something from not existing, and this is creation.
VI. AVICENNA’S EMANATION

[Diagram from lecture notes of Prof. Deborah Black, University of Toronto]


After Avicenna has demonstrated the existence of a necessary being as a primary efficient cause in Metaphysics VIII, he then proceeds in the next book to give his account of creation, which he models on a Neo-Platonic scheme of emanation in which the world is the outcome of thinking. Creation is thus necessary and eternal, so that these “stages” of the world’s emanation are not temporal but prior and posterior only in causal dependence. This is demanded by Avicenna’s previous result that true essential causes are always simultaneous with their effects, so that a cause strictly speaking cannot temporally preceed its effect.

Of particular note are the first and last stages, the generation of the First Intelligence, which governs the outmost heaven, and the emanation of forms from the Tenth Intelligence to the sublunar realm of generation and corruption.

As to the first stage, note that the relationship of the necessary being to the First Intelligence is that of efficient causality in the order being. Thus, there is a sense in which the necessary being cannot be indentified with Aristotle’s unmoved mover demonstrated in his Metaph. XII, since it has no relation in motion to the world and is an efficient and not just, as for Aristotle, a final cause. The Aristotelian unmoved mover rather corresponds to Avicenna’s First Intelligence insofar as it functions as the final cause of motion of the first heaven (but not as it functions as a an efficient cause in being of the Second Intelligence.) This is why, ultimately, only metaphysics can demonstrate God for Avicenna, since at most considerations of motion would lead to a First Intelligence. Second, note that for Avicenna the unity of the first principle dictates that it cannot immediately produce a multitude of effects according to the maxim that “From the one, insofar as it is one, only one can come” (“ex uno, secundum quod est unum, non est nisi unum;” Metaph. VIII.4, AvL 481:50-51). Multiplicity can only be accounted for once some principle of potentiality has been introduced in the first effect, in this case not matter (since it is separate) but a quiddity that is in itself possible. Thus, the rest of the universe is generated according to a triadic scheme: (1) in thinking of God as necessary in Himself, the First Intelligence causes the Second Intelligence; (2) in thinking itself as (a) necessary from another (i.e., God) it generates the soul of the Outermost Sphere and (b) as possible in itself it generates the celestial body of the Outermost Sphere. This scheme continues through the sphere of the fixed stars down through the planets until the moon, which is governed by the Ninth Intelligence.

In the last stage, the Tenth Intelligence governs not an eternal, uncorruptible heavenly sphere but the sublunar realm of generation and corruption. This Tenth Intelligence Avicenna identifies with the Aristotelian agent intellect, described by Aristotle as separate in De anima III.5. He also calls it the “Giver of Forms” (Dator formarum), indicating its decisive role both in physical change and cognition. Thus, the Tenth Intelligence produces prime matter (rather than the celestial body, as the other Intelligences) and emanates forms into matter, in the case of physical change, and into the material intellect, in the case of human cognition. This means, as we have seen, that physical, moving causes in the sublunar realm are merely preparatory for the reception of forms from the Tenth Intelligence and, similarly, the apparatus of sense and imagination are merely preparatory for the reception of forms into the material intellect.

Although the West found many of Avicenna’s metaphysical innovations highly attractive and adopted them to a great degree – the distinction between essence and existence, the common nature as a solution to the problem of universals, the distinction between physical and metaphysical efficiency, and the simultaneity of cause and effect – they could not follow him in his necessitarian emanation and its limitation to God to producing immediately one effect. The accomodation of a contingently acting God to Avicenna’s metaphysics was one of the great intellectual challenges in the West.


AL-GHAZALI (1058–1111)

Works and Translations:

(1094) Maqasid al-falasifa (The Intentions of the Philosophers), ed. S. Dunya, Cairo: Dar al-Ma‘arif, 1961. (A precise summary of Islamic philosophy as represented by Ibn Sina.)

This work was translated in the West but omitting the preface in which Ghazali stated his intent to refute it in the Tahafut. It was thus thought that Ghazali was a disciple of Avicenna. The medieval Latin translation is edited:

Algazel’s Metaphysics: A Mediaeval Translation, ed. J.T. Muckle. Toronto: St. Michael’s College, 1933.

(1095) Tahafut al-falasifa (The Incoherence of the Philosophers), ed. M. Bouyges, Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1927.

Translation: Marmura, Michael E. (ed and trans), The Incoherence of the Philosophers.; Brigham Young University: Provo, 1997.

(c.1108) al-Munqidh min al-dalal (The Deliverer from Error), ed. J. Saliba and K. Ayyad, Damascus: Maktab al-Nashr al-‘Arabi, 1934.

Translation: R.J. McCarthy, Freedom and Fulfillment: An Annotated Translation of al-Ghazali’s al-Munqidh min al-Dalal and Other Relevant Works of al-Ghazali, Boston, MA: Twayne, 1980. (Al-Ghazali’s spiritual autobiography.) Re-issued in 2002 by Fons Vitae (Louisville, KY) as Al-Ghazali: Deliverance from Error.
Studies and Articles

Alon, Ilai. “Al-Ghazali on Causality,” Journal of the American Oriental Society, 100: 4 (1980): 397-405
Abrahamov, B. “Al-Ghazali’s Theory of Causality,” Studia Islamica 67 (1988): 75–98
Courtenay, W. J. “The Critique of Natural Causality in the Mutakallimun and Nominalism,” The Harvard Theological Review 66 (1973): 77–94
Dutton, Blake D. “Al Ghazali on Possibility and the Critique of Causality,” Medieval Philosophy and Theology 2001; 10(1): 23 46
Fakhry, Majid. Islamic Occasionalism and its Critique by Averroes and Aquinas. London, 1958.
Goodman, L. “Did al-Ghazali Deny Causality?” Studia Islamica 47 (1978) 83-120.
Frank, R. Creation and the Cosmic System: al-Ghazali and Avicenna, Heidelberg: Carl Winter Universitätsverlag, 1992.
——-. Al-Ghazali and the Ash‘arite School, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1994. (A revisionist treatment which rejects the traditional reading of al-Ghazali as an Ash‘arite.)
Giacaman, George; Bahlul, Raja, “Ghazali on Miracles and Necessary Connection,” Medieval Philosophy and Theology 2000; 9(1): 39 50
Kogan, Barry. Averroes and the Metaphysics of Causation. SUNY, 1985.
Leaman, O. (1996) ‘Ghazali and the Ash‘arites’, Asian Philosophy 6 (1): 17–27.
Marmura, Michael. “Ghazali and Demonstrative Science,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 3 (1965): 183-204.
——-. “Al-Ghazali’s Second Causal Theory in the Seventeenth Discussion of the Tahafut,” in Islamic Philosophy and Mysticism. Ed. Parviz Morewedge. Delmar, N.Y.: Caravan Books, 1981.
——-. “Ghazali’s Chapter on Divine Power in the Iqtisad,” Arabic Sciences and Philosophy,4 (1994): 279-315.
——-. ‘Ghazalian Causes and Intermediaries’, Journal of the American Oriental Society 115 (1995): 89–100. (Critical review of Frank (1994) above.)
Nadler, Steven, “No Necessary Connection: The Medieval Roots of the Occasionalist Roots of Hume,” Monist . 1996; 79(3): 448 466
Wolfson, H. A. “Nicolaus of Autrecourt and Ghazali’s Argument against Causality,” Speculum 44 (1969): 234-38.

Tahafut al-falasifa (The Incoherence of the Philosophers) of Ghazali

The Tahafut of Ghazali is an extensive rejection of the falasifa by way of Avicenna. To understand its position in medieval Islamic philosophy it is necessary to keep in view the following4:

Falasifa: The ‘philosophers’ are those who have adopted Greek philosophy in a strong way, hence their designation (i.e., they were not designated by an Arabic term, but by the Greek term itself for a philosopher). In general, they sought to arrive at necessary knowledge, as compared to the theologians who dealt in dialectical or probable knowledge, and saw themselves as in a continuous tradition with Greek thought. The earliest of these philosophers were al-Kindi (801-866) and al-Razi (864-932). With the towering figure of al-Farabi (870-950), who influenced Avicenna, the view of their connection with the Greeks and the supremacy of philosophy over theology became explicit. The philosopher who is the major target of Ghazali is Avicenna (980-1037).

Kalam: Kalam is speculative theology and its practitioners are called mutakallimun, which in Latin was literary translated as loquentes in the works of Averroes and Maimonides. It took two forms:

Mutazilites: This was the dominant and official brand of kalam until about the mid-ninth century. It was charactarized by an emphasis on natural reasoning in the interpretation of the Quran and held that any number of results, such as God’s existence and deduction of the attributes, could be attained by purely natural means. It was therefore closer to the falasifa than the type of kalam to which it yielded, namely:

Asharites: Named after its founder al-Ashari (873-935), this was opposed to the mutazilites and placed paramount importance on divine omnipotence, denying efficacy of secondary causes and holding for occasionalism.

Ghazali, at least in his earlier period, was an Asharite and, and as the title of the Tahafut indicates, it was written as a refutation of the philosophers, particularly Avicenna.5 This was a towering work and would elicit from Averroes the Incoherence of the Incoherence, in which he argued against Ghazali paragraph by paragraph, and his Decisive Treatise, in which he answered the charge of heresy against the falasifa on legal grounds.

The Tahafut itself consists of twenty questions or discussions that are the points on which Ghazali argues against the philosophers. Ghazali himself lists these chapters in his introduction, which is given here in the translation of Marmura (pp. 10-11) above:

Let us now, after [these] introductions, mention the table of contents of the problems wherein we show the inconsistency of their doctrine in this book. They are twenty problems.

The first problem: [On] refuting their doctrine of the world’s pre-eternity.
The second: [On] refuting their doctrine of the world’s post-eternity.
The third: [On] showing their equivocation in saying that God is the maker of the world and that the world is of His making.
The fourth: On [showing] their inability to prove the existence of the world’s maker.
The fifth: On [showing] their inability to prove the impossibility of [the existence] of two gods.
The sixth: On refuting their doctrine denying [the divine] attributes.
The seventh: On refuting their statement that the essence of the First is not divisible in terms of genus and species.
The eighth: On refuting their statement that the First is a simple existent without quiddity.
The ninth: On showing their inability to demonstrate that the First is not a body.
The tenth: On showing that upholding a materialist doctrine and the denial of the Maker is a necessary consequence [of what they hold].
The eleventh: On showing their inability to maintain that the First knows others.
The twelfth: On showing their inability to maintain that the First knows Himself.
The thirteenth: On refuting their statement that the First does not know particulars.
The fourteenth: On [refuting their doctrine] that heaven is an animal that moves through volition.
The fifteenth: On refuting what they mention regarding thepurpose that moves heaven.
The sixteenth: On refuting their doctrine that the souls of the heavens know all particulars.
The seventeenth: On refuting their doctrine that the disruption of the habitual [course of nature] is impossible.
The eighteenth: On [refuting] their statement that the human soul is a self-subsistent substance that is neither body nor accident.
The nineteenth: On [refuting] their assertion that annihilation is impossible for the human soul.
The twentieth: On refuting their denial of bodily resurrection [and] the accompanying bodily pleasures and pains in paradise and hell.

Our selection from Hyman and Walsh is that of the seventeenth question, in which Ghazali sees the causal necessaritarianism of Avicenna as violating the omnipotence of God and eliminating the possibility of miracles, which would, of course, destroy prophecy.

The seventeenth question begins the section of the Tahafut concerning the natural philosophy of the falasifa, and hence is preceeded by an introduction which has been appended from the translation of Marmura, pp. 164-168.

AVERROES OR IBN RUSHD (1126-98)

Averroes and the Aristotelian Tradition. Sources, Constitution and Reception of the Philosophy of Ibn Rushd (1126-1198). Proceedings of the Fourth Symposium Averroicum (Cologne, 1996). Ed. Gerhard Endress and Jan A. Aertsen with the assistance of Klaus Braun (Islamic Philosophy, Theology and Science 31). Leiden [etc.], 1999.

Leaman, Oliver. Averroes and his Philosophy. Oxford, 1988

Works

For our purposes, Averroes’s works can be divided into his (1) commentaries and his (2) works on religion. For a catalogue of his writings, see:

Rosemann, P. ‘Ibn Rushd: A Catalogue of Editions and Scholarly Writings from 1821 onwards’, Bulletin de philosophie medievale (1988) 30: 153-215.
Endress, Gerhard. “Averrois Opera. A Bibliography of Editions and Contributions to the Text”. In: Averroes and the Aristotelian Tradition, 339-381

(1) Commentaries

Averroes was the only Islamic Aristotelian to carry out extensive commentaries on Aristotle’s corpus in the manner of the Alexandrians. He was in the West known simply as “The Commentator”. Averroes wrote three sets of commentaries: epitomes, middle, and great. The first are summaries of Aristotle; the second are more tied to the text of Aristotle itself, including often lemma from the text and offering paraphrases and some discussion. The great commentaries carry the complete text of Aristotle itself and comment on it word for word. Here Averroes also includes extensive discussions of problematic texts and incorporates the opinions of both Greek commentaries as well as Islamic thinkers, especially Avicenna. Only the Posterior Analytics, De anima, De caelo and Metaphysics were given this elaborate treatment.

The original Arabic of several of Averroes’s commentaries is lost, including that of the all important great commentary on the De anima.

The standard edition for Averroes’s commentaries as known in the West (although this includes some that were not known to the thirteenth century) is the monumental 16th century Giunta (Iuntina or apud Iuntas in Latin) edition:

Aristotelis opera… cum Averrois Cordubensis variis in eosdem commentariis, Venice: Juntas, 1562-74; repr. Frankfurt: Minerva, 1962.

On the contents and influence of this towering achievement, see:

Cranz, F. E. “Editions of the Latin Aristotle Accompanied by the Commentaries of Averroes,” in E. Mahoney, ed. Philosophy and Humanism (New York, 1967), pp. 116-18
Schmitt, C. B. “Renaissance Averroism Studied through the Venetian Editions of Aristotle-Averroes,” in L’Averroismo in Italia (Rome, 1979), pp. 121-42.

A complete modern edition of all versions of Averroes’s commentaries – Arabic, medieval and Renaissance Hebrew and Latin translations, together with modern English translations – was planned by the H. A. Wolfson to be published by the Medieval Academy. See:

Wolfson, H. A. “Plan for the Publication of a Corpus commentariorum Averrois in Aristotelem,” Speculum 6 (1931): 412-27
—–. “Revised Plan for the Publication of a Corpus commentariorum Averrois in Aristotelem,” Speculum 38 (1963) 88-104

After the publication of a number of volumes, including the Latin versions of the great commentary on the De anima, the Medieval Academy ended its sponsorship in 1974, which was then assumed by various centers and institutes. For our purposes, the edition of the Latin versions of the great commentaries has been sustained by the Thomas Institut in Cologne, Germany, and the critical edition of the great commentary on the De caelo has just appeared. For project plan, see:

Jan Aertsen et al. Averroes Latinus: A New Edition. Leuven: Peeters, [2002] (Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales. Bibliotheca ; 4). Describes forthcoming editorial project to publish new critical editions of the Latin versions of Averroes’ Long Commentaries on Aristotle’s Physics, De caelo and the Metaphysics.

See the homepage of the Averroes Latinus project at Cologne, which contains a link to an online bibliography of Averroes: http://www.uni-koeln.de/phil-fak/thomasinst/akaaver4.htm.

The only translation into English of Averroes’s great commentaries is that on book 12 of the Metaphysics:

Charles Genequand (trans.), Ibn Rushd’s Metaphysics: A Translation with Introduction of Ibn Rushd’s Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Book Lam (E.J. Brill, 1984).

(2) Works on Religion

For our purposes, two are important, both reponses to Ghazali’s Tahafut. The first is the legal reponse to the charge of irreligion against the falasifah by Ghazali, and this is the Decisive Treatise, a work not known to the medievals:

Fasl al-ma gal (Decisive Treatise), ed. G. Hourani, Averroes on the Harmony of Religion and Philosophy, London: Luzac, 1961; repr. 1976.

The Book of the Decisive Treatise Determining the Connection between the Law and Wisdom. Trans. Charles E. Butterworth. Provo, Utah : Brigham Young University Press, 2001.

The second is his systematic refutation of Ghazali’s Tahafut itself, the Incoherence of the Incoherence. This was translated in the West, but relatively late in 1328:

Ibn Rushd (1180) Tahafut al-tahafut (The Incoherence of the Incoherence), ed. S. Van den Bergh, London: Luzac, 1954; repr. 1978.

An edition of the Latin translation of 1328 was made by Beatrice Zedler:

Zedler, B. (Ed.) Destructio destructionum philosophiae Algazelis in the Latin version of Calo Colonymos. Milwaukee, Marquette University Press, 1961.

Life

Some details of Averroes’s life are relevant. Averroes was born in Cordova in 1126, a city renowned as a center of science and philosophy into a prominent family of jurists. His father was both judge and imam of the Great Mosque of Cordova, and so Averroes had training in law, kalam and medicine. By 1153 he was in Marrakush, however, and had during this time composed his summaries or epitomes of Aristotle. While in Marrakush, he met Abu Bakr Ibn Tufayl, a philosopher and court physician to the caliph.6 In 1168 or 1169 Ibn Tufayl arranged Averroes to met the caliph, Abu Yaqub Yusuf, an account of which is preserved:

When I entered into the presence of the Prince of the Believers, Abu Yaqub, I found him alone with Abu Bakr ibn Tufayl. Abu Yaqub began praising me, mentioning my family and my ancestors, and graciously including in his description things beyond my real merits. The first thing the Prince of the Believers said to me after asking me my name, my father’s name, and my lineage, was, “What is their opinion about the heavens?” referring to the philosophers. “Are they eternal or created?” Reticence and fear took hold of me, and I began to make up some excuse and to deny being occupied with the science of philosophy, inasmuch as I was unaware of what Ibn Tufayl had decided with him. The Prince of the Believers, however, perceived my fear and reticence and turned to Ibn Tufayl. He began to speak with him about the question which he had asked me, and he mentioned what Aristotle, Plato, and all the philosophers had said about it. Along with this, he presented the objections of the people of Islam regarding it. I thus saw in him a copious memory which I would not have expected even in one of those who are occupied with this matter full time. Thus he continued his exposition until eventually I spoke, and he came to know what I thought about that subject. For when I departed, he presented me with a monetary gift, a robe of high honor, and a mount. (Quoted from Kogan, Averroes and the Metaphysics of Causation, pp. 10-11)

The outcome of the meeting went beyond the presents with which Averroes departed. The caliph appointed Averroes as a judge in Seville and commissioned from him more detailed commentaries on Aristotle, thought to be the middle commentaries. In 1171 Averroes returned to his native Cordova, presumably to take up a new appointment as judge there, and during this period is dated his writings on religion, most notably the Decisive Treatise and the Tahafut. In 1182 he was recalled to Marrakush by the caliph to replace Ibn Tufayl, who had retired as court physician. During this period of the 1180’s-90’s are dated Averroes’ long commentaries first under the patronage of the caliph, who died in 1184, and then under that of his son, who continued his father’s support for science and philosophy.

How to Read and Cite Commentaries of Averroes



In Ph. III com. 7 (Iunt. IV, fol. 88rF):
Dicit: Et declarabitur quod motus est perfectio rei potentis, secundum quod potest, ex inductione transmutabilium. Aedificatum enim non dicitur esse aedificatum quando cessat ab aedificatione, neque quando nondum aedificatur, sed dum aedificatur.

AVERROES II:

Metaphysics, God, Essence-Existence, Emanation

Davidson, Herbert. Proofs for Eternity, Creation and the Existence of God in Medieval Islamic and Jewish Philosophy. Oxford, 1987. Chapter X: “Averroes’ Critique of Avicenna’s Proof,” pp. 311-553.
Fakhry, Majid “Notes on Essence and Existence in Averroes and Avicenna,” in Die Metaphysik im Mittelalter (Berlin, 1963), pp. 414-17
Genequand, Charles. Ibn Rushd’s Metaphysics: A Translation with Introduction of Ibn Rushd’s Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Book Lam. Leiden, 1984.
Hyman, Arthur (Ed. and trans.) Averroes’ de substantia orbis : Critical Edition of the Hebrew Text with English Translation and Commentary. Cambridge, Mass. : Medieval Academy of America, 1986.
Kogan, Barry S. “Averroës and the Theory of Emanantion,” Mediaeval Studies 43 (1981) 384-404.
——. Averroes and the Metaphysics of Causation. Albany, N. Y., 1985.
Maurer, Armand A. “Esse and Essentia in the Metaphysics of Siger of Brabant,” Mediaeval Studies 8 (1946) 68-87. [Contains discussion of Averroes’s criticism of Avicenna.]
Rahman, F. “Essence and Existence in Avicenna,” Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies 4 (1958) 1-16
Wippel, John F. “Essence and Existence,” CHLMP, pp. 385-410.
Wolfson, H. A.”Averroes’s Lost Treatise on the Prime Mover,” Hebrew Union College Annual 23 (1950/51) 683-710
——-. “The Plurality of Immovable Movers in Aristotle and Averroes,” Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 63 (1958) 233-53.
Zimmermann, Albert. Ontologie oder Metaphysik? Die Diskussion über den Gegenstand der Metaphysik im 13. und 14. Jahrhundert. 2nd. ed. Leiden, 1998.

A. Metaphysics and Existence of God

As discussed in the lectures on Avicenna, Averroes vehemently disagreed with Avicenna on the subject of metaphysics, holding that according to Aristotle the first subject of metaphysics was God or the separate substances, not being qua being. At issue was where the existence of God was to be demonstrated, and Averroes placed the proof in physics rather than metaphysics. Indeed, Averroes rejected Avicenna’s proof as merely probable at best because it relied on, as we shall see, on Avicenna’s notion of something as possible in itself, necessary from another, a category Averroes argued was inconsistent with the Aristotelian doctrine of the eternity of the heavens.

The main text for the introduction of this whole debate to the medievals was Averroes’ last comment on the final lines of book 1 of the Physics. There, after having asserted that the principles of natural motion are three – matter, privation and form – Aristotle remarks:

As for the formal principle, whether such principles are one or many, and of what sort or sorts they are, are questions to be treated in detail in first philosophy, so we may leave them aside until we come to that. In what follows we shall be speaking of natural forms which can pass away. (Ph. 1.9 [192a34-b1])

In these and the related texts that follow, Averroes attacks Avicenna’s metaphysical proof and according his argument that God cannot be the subject of metaphysics.

Texts

In Phy. 1 com. 83 (Iunt. 4.47D-K):
Cum notificavit principia esse tria, duo per se, scilicet materia et forma, et unum per accidens, scilicet, privatio, et iam declaravit primam materiam esse de principiis, dicit, “Considerare autem de principio secundum formam etc.,” id est, considerare autem de primo principio formali utrum sit unum aut plura, et quae est substantia eius, est proprium primae philosophiae. Formarum enim aliae sunt in materiis, aliae non in materiis, ut declaratum est in hac scientia. Et ideo consideratio de formis est duarum scientiarum, quarum una, scilicet naturalis considerat de formis materialibus, secunda autem de formis simplicibus abstractis a materia, et est illa scientia, quae considerat de ente simpliciter. Sed notandum est, quod istud genus entium, esse scilicet separatum a materia, non declaratur nisi in hac scientia naturali. Et qui dicit quod prima philosophia nititur declarare entia separabilia esse, peccat. Haec enim entia sunt subiecta primae philosophiae et declaratum est in Posterioribus analyticis quod impossibile est aliquam scientiam declarare suum subiectum esse, sed concedit ipsum esse, aut quia manifestum per se, aut quia est demonstratum in alia scientia. Unde Avicenna peccavit maxime, cum dicit quod primus philosophus demonstrat primum principium esse, et processit in hoc in suo libro de scienta divina per viam quam existimavit esse necessariam et essentialem in illa scientia, et peccavit peccato manifesto. Certior enim illorum sermonum, quibus usus est in hoc, non pertransit ordinem sermonum probabilium. Et iam causam innuimus huius alibi. … Et forte innuit primum principium movens, quod declaratum est in fine istius libri. Omne enim de quo loquitur in hoc libro principaliter est propter illud principium. Et iste est primus locus in quo naturalis inspicit alium modum essendi ab illo de quo considerat, et apud illud cessat. Et dimisit considerationem de eo usque ad scientiam nobiliorem, quae considerat de ente secundum quod ens. Et totum hoc est quasi contrarium eius, quod existimavit Avicenna.

Having shown that there are three principles, two which are essential, namely, matter and form, and one which is incidental, namely, privation, and having already demonstrated that prime matter is one of the principles, he says “But to consider the principle in the sense of form, etc.” that is, to investigate whether the first formal principle is one or several, and what its nature is, is proper to First Philosophy. As has been shown in this science, some forms are in matter, others are not in matter. Therefore, the study of forms pertains to two sciences. One, namely, physics, investigates material forms, while the second investigates the simple forms separate from matter, and that is the science which investigates being as such. But note that it is only established in this science of physics that there is this class of beings, namely, separate from matter, and he errs who says that First Philosophy [i.e., metaphysics] endeavors to prove that there are beings separate [from matter], for these beings are the subjects of first philosophy. It has been shown in the Posterior Analytics that no science can prove that its own subject is, but concedes that it is, either because it is self-evident or because it has been demonstrated in another science. Thus, Avicenna committed the greatest error when he said that First Philosophy demonstrates that there is a first principle. He proceeded in this in his Book on Divine Science by a way which he thought was necessary and essential in that science [i.e., metaphysics]. And he erred by an evident error, for the more certain of the arguments which he used in this did not go beyond the order of the probable. The reason for this we have indicated elsewhere. … And perhaps [by principle according to form] Aristotle meant the first moving priniciple, which is demonstrated at the end of this work, since everything about which Aristotle speaks in this work is chiefly on account of that principle. And this is the first place where the physicist sees another mode of being than that which he considers [i.e., mobile being], and there he stops. He leaves consideration of this to a more noble science, which considers being qua being. And all of this is contrary to what Avicenna thought.

In Phy. 2 t.c. 22 (Iunt. 4.57B):
Primus autem motor impossibile est ut declaretur esse nisi per signum naturale. Via autem qua processit Avicenna in probando primum principium, est via Loquentium. Et sermo eius semper invenitur quasi medius inter Peripateticos et Loquentes.

It is impossible to prove that the first mover exists except through a physical effect. The method, however, by which Avicenna proceeded in proving a first principle is the method of the theologians. And Avicenna’s discussion is always halfway, as it were, between the Peripatetics and the theologians.

In Phy. 2 t.c. 73 (Iunt. 4.74L):
Cum declaravit quod oportet naturalem considerare de causis motivis, incepit inducere modos earum et dixit quod sunt naturalis et non naturalis. Et hoc intendebat cum dixit “non naturalis”. Et intendebat per hoc quod consideratio de quiditate istius motoris non est naturalis, sed solummodo considerat de hoc motore in probando ipsum esse tantum.

Having shown that the physicist considers causes of motion, Aristotle began to introduce their types, and he said that they pertain to the physicist and the non-physicist. And when he said “non physicist” he meant by this the consideration of the essence of this mover does not belong to the physicist, but the physicist considers this mover alone in proving that it exists.

In Phy. 8 t.c. 3 (Iunt. 4.340E):
Divinus enim accipit prima principia moventia a naturali, et nullam habet viam ad demonstrandum esse primum motorem, nisi accipiat ipsum pro constanti a naturali. Et quod existimavit Avicenna, quod divinus debet monstrare primum principium esse, est falsum. Et via eius quam finxit ipsum invenisse eam, qua usus est in suo libro et similiter Algazel sequens ipsum, est via tenuis, et non demonstrativa aliquo modo. Nos autem de hoc fecimus tractatum singularem super hoc. Et qui voluerit accipere quaestiones accidentes in ea, videat hoc ex libro Algazelis. Plures enim quas induxit contra alios, verae sunt.

The metaphysician assumes the first principles of motion from the physicist, and has no way to demonstrate that the first mover exists except to assume it as established by the physicist. And Avicenna’s view that the metaphysician must show that the first principle exists is false. And his way, which he imagined that he had discovered, and which he used in his book [i.e., On First Philosophy], and similarly Ghazali who followed him, is weak and in no way demonstrative. We have written a special treatise on the matter.

De substantia orbis c. 3 (Iunt. 9.9D-E), translated in Hyman (1986), p. 104-105:
This being so [i.e., that a celestial body cannot be eternal and have the possibility of being destroyed] it is not true that the term ‘necessary existence’ is predicated in two ways: necessary in virtue of itself and necessary in virtue of something else, possbile through itself. If this distinction were valid, someone might think that it applies to the celestial body, that is to say, one might think that the celestial body has in it a finite force, while it acquires necessary existence from an infinite, immaterial force, as indeed Avicenna thought. And he was under the impression that this is an opinion of Alexander found in some of his writings. And upon this assumption Avicenna built his proof of the existence of a first principle, a proof different from the one based the existence of eternal motion. But Avicenna’s proof is based on faulty premises, as you can see.

B. Existence and Essence

Given the above, it is not surprising that Averroes attacks Avicenna’s distinction between essence and existence. The accuracy with which Averroes’s depicts Avicenna’s doctrine, however, is another matter. According to Averroes, Avicenna treats both being and unity as separate accidents of the essence. Avicenna was mistaken on this because:

he reasoned from a distinction in predication or names to a real distinction of accidents;
he conflates the sense of unity as the principle of number, and hence falling under the category of quantity, with the transcendental sense of unity convertible with being and the proper consideration of the metaphysician.
his position leads to an infinite regress.

Latin Averroists, such as Siger of Brabant, tended to follow Averroes in their depiction of Avicenna’s distinction in rejecting it. The distinction between essence and existence and its relation to creation became one of the most disputed topics in metaphysics at the end of the thirteenth century.

Texts

In Metaph. 4 com. 3 (1003b28-30; Bouyges pp. 313-14); trans. Fakhry (1963), p. 415-16:
Indeed Avicenna is in serious error in that regard. For he held that one and being refer to two qualities superadded to the thing’s essence. It is puzzling that this man (sc. Avicenna) could make this mistake, while he heard the Ash’arite theologians, (with whose statements he mixed his metaphysical doctrine) saying that qualities are either intentional or mental, and that one and being refer to the essence which is thus described, and are not qualities referring to something superadded to essence, as is the case with white and black living. And this man argues, in support of his view, that did one and being refer to one concept, then to say a being is one is meaningless, similar to saying being is or one is one. This, however, would only follow were it the case that our saying of the one thing that it is and is one signified the same thing, in the same respect and the same manner. But we say that they signify the same entity in different ways, rather than refer to different qualities superadded to it. And this man did not distinguish between the modes of signification, which are predicated of an entity in different ways, without referring to qualities superadded thereto, and between the modes which refer in the same entity to qualities superadded thereto, being actually distinct from it. What has led this man astray is manifold. For instance he found that the term one is a derivative term which refers to both accident and substance. And also he thought that the term one refers to a quality in the thing which is indivisible, and this is other than the meaning of nature. Moreover, he thought the one which is predicated of all the categories is the same as the one which is the principle of number, this being an accident. And so he thought that the term one referred to an accident in things, whereas the one which is the principle of number is one of many entities of which one is predicated, notwithstanding the fact that the latter is most appropriately said to be one, as will be explained in Book IX of this treatise.
…
If a thing were one because of some thing added to its nature, just as Avicenna believes, then nothing would be one through itself and its substance but through some thing added to its substance. And that thing which is one, if it is said that it is one by some quality (intentio) added to its essence, it will be asked also of that thing through which it becomes one, and by what is it one? If therefore it is one by a quality added to it, the same question will recur, and there will be a process to infinity.

In Metaph. 10, 1054 a 13-19 (Bouyges pp. 1279-80); trans. Fakhry (1963), p. 416-17:
Avicenna believes that being and one refer to an aspect (ma’na) of the thing superadded to its essence. For he does not believe the thing to exist per se, but rather through an adventitious quality, as e.g. is the case with saying that it is white, since both the one and being refer according to him to an accident supervening upon the object. And we have set forth the absurdities resulting from this thesis in numerous places. The first thing to ask him is whether that quality or that accident, through which the one becomes one and being becomes being, becomes itself one and existent through an adventitious quality or per se? If he says through an adventitious quality, then this will go on ad infinitum. If per se then he grants that there is one thing which is per se. Indeed what has induced this man (sc. Avicenna) into error are two considerations : first, his belief that the one which is the principle of quality is identical with the one which is synonymous with the term being. Consequently, he thought, owing to the fact that the one is deemed an accident, that the one which is predicable of all the categories is also an accident. Secondly, he confused the term being which signifies genus with that which signifies the true. For that which signifies the true is an accident, whereas that which signifies genus is predicable of each one of the ten categories analogically, as indeed is the case with esse (huwiyah).

C. Emanation

As Barry Kogan has shown in his two above publications, Averroes seems to have subscribed to some version of emanantion early in his career. But by the time of the Tahafut and the long commentary on the Metaphysics, he had rejected it. Averroes rejects emanation on the grounds that a first principle that does not move the universe is an absurdity in Aristotle’s system and the first movers cannot be caused since, according to Aristotle, they are fully actual.

Texts

In Metaph. 12 com. 41; trans. Genequand (1984), p. 165:
Therefore it is not correct to say that there is something contingent by itself and eternal and necessary by something else, as Ibn Sina says that the necessary is partly necessary by itself and partly necessary by something else, except for the motion of the heaven only. It is not possible that there should be something contingent by its essence but necessary on account of something else, because the same thing cannot have a contingent existence on account of its essence and receive a necessary existence from something else, unless it were possible for its nature to be completely reversed. But motion can be necessary by something else and contingent by itself, the reason being that its existence comes from something else, namely the mover; if motion is eternal, it must be so on account of an immovable mover, either by essence or by accident, so that motion possesses permanence on account of something else, but substance on account of itself. Therefore there cannot be a substance contingent by itself but necessary by something else, but this is possible in the case of motion. Every moving power which is in a body is necessarily moved by accident and everything moved by accident and imparting motion by itself can come to a standstill by itself and be moved by something else. If there is a power in a body which can never cease to impart motion, it will necessarily be moved by a mover in which there is no potentiality at all, either by essence or by accident. This is the state of the celestial body.

In Metaph. 12 com. 44; trans. Genequand (1984), p. 172, 174
The opinions of later philosophers that there is a first substance prior to the mover of the universe is false, because each one of these substances is the principle of a sensible substance as mover and end. Therefore Aristotle said that if there were substances which did not impart motion, their action would be useless. What led them to this notion is an argument the falsity of which anybody with the slightest acquaintance with this science would perceive. They say that it is clear that some of these intellects result necessarily from others just as the effect results from the cause and -the caused from the causing; the first substance must be absolutely one and absolutely simple; from the one and simple can only proceed or result a one; from the mover of the first heaven result the first heaven itself and the mover of the sphere which follows it, so that it must be non-simple and have a cause prior to it. But this argument is fallacious because in this case there is no production, no result, no action compelling us to say that a single action must come from a single agent, but there is only a cause and a caused, just as we say that the intelligible is the cause of the intellecting. If it is so, there is nothing to prevent that which is in itself intellect and intelligible from being the cause of various existents insofar as various aspects of it are intellected. Thus, these intellects form different sorts of representations of it.
…
The habit of our contemporaries to say that such-and-such a mover proceeds from such-and-such a mover or emanates from it, or follows necessarily, or similar expressions, is something which is not correct in the case of these separate principles. All these are supposed to be attributes of agents but are not so in truth; for we have said before that what proceeds from the agent merely passes from potentiality into actuality. But there is no potentiality there, so that there is no agent either. There is only intellect and intelligible, perfecting and perfected in the same way as the techniques perfect each other by deriving their principles one from the other, and each of them, in its own realm, derives all its principles from the total, comprehensive technique. This is why we see that the science concerned with the First (praised by He!) is that which first philosophy contains. The science concerned with the principles which are below it is similar to the particular sciences which are below first philosophy. … What is said on the authority of Plato’s myth, namely that the creator created the angels himself and then entrusted them with the creation of mortal animals and remained himself idle and inactive is a myth which it is wrong to take as truth. It may be that such an imputation on the creator is the cause of the obligation of the sabbath in the religion of the Jews.
AVERROES III:
The Intellect

Translations

Background in Alexander and Themistius
Two Greek Commentators on the Intellect. The De intellectu attributed to Alexander of Aphrodisias and Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle, De anima 3.4-8. Trans. F. Schroeder and R. Todd. Toronto, 1990.

Middle Commentary on the De anima
Averroës. Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s De anima. A critical edition of the Arabic text with English translation, notes, and introduction by Alfred L. Ivry. Provo, Utah : Brigham Young University Press, 2002. [Not available in the West and contains a different position on the material intellect than that of the later and apparently final solution of the Long Commentary.]

Long Commentary on the De anima III
Arthur Hyman and James Walsh (eds.) Philosophy in the Middle Ages. Indianapolis, 1983, pp. 324-334. [Comments 4-5 (excerpts) which cover the beginning of De anima III.4. Here Averroes argues for the unicity of the material intellect.]
Thérèse-Anne Druart (trans.) Long commentary on Aristotle’s De anima, III, 5. Stillwater, Okla.: Translation Clearing House, Dept. of Philosophy, Oklahoma State University, 1981. [Comments 17-20 which cover De anima III.5 containing Aristotle’s theory of the agent intellect.]

Studies
Bazán, Bernardo Carlos. “Intellectum speculativum. Averroes, Thomas Aquinas, and Siger of Brabant on the Intelligible Object”. Journal of the History of Philosophy 19 (1981): 425-446.
Black, Deborah. “Conjunction and the Identity of Knower and Known in Averroes”. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 73 (1999): 159-184.
Davidson, Herbert A. Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes, on Intellect. Their Cosmologies, Theories of the Active Intellect, and Theories of Human Intellect. New York, 1992.
Hyman, Arthur. “Aristotle’s Theory of the Intellect and its Interpretation by Averroes”. In: Studies in Aristotle. Ed. Dominic J. O’Meara (Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy 9). Washington, 1981. pp. 161-191.
——-. “Averroes’ Theory of the Intellect and the Ancient Commentators”. In: Averroes and the Aristotelian Tradition. Sources, Constitution and Reception of the Philosophy of Ibn Rushd (1126-1198). Edd. Gerhard Endress and Jan A. Aertsen. E. J. Brill, Leiden, 1999, pp. 188-198.
Ivry, Alfred L. “Averroes’ Three Commentaries on De anima”. In: Averroes and the Aristotelian Tradition, 199-216.
Zedler, Beatrice. “Averroes on the Possible Intellect.” Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 25 (1951): 164-78.

Aristotle’s De anima.

Aristotle’s De anima (On the Soul) should be broadly seen as a work in natural philosophy, accounting for the various natural movements and activities of the living being by means of the soul as an “instrinsic principle of motion and rest,” as Aristotle defines nature in the Physics. Roughly, the De anima is structured so that Aristotle considers his predecessors’ views of the soul (Book I), gives his own definition of the soul (Book II.1-2), and then proceeds to analyze the various life functions accounted for by the soul (Books II-III): nutrition (i.e., metabolism), sensation, thinking and locomotion. By no means, therefore, should Aristotle be taken to equate mind and soul, as we might be inclined to do in contemporary discussions; indeed, a central problem in the De anima is whether thinking can be assigned to the soul as it is defined as a principle of other life functions.
After his critique of his predecessors’ views on the soul, Aristotle defines the soul in II.1 as the first actuality (or perfection: entelechia; perfectio) of a naturally organized body, which in II.1 he goes on the identify as that principle whereby we live, which is the form:

That is why the soul is an actuality of the first kind of a natural body having life potentially in it. The body so described is a body which is organized. (412a27; Works, p. 656

Aristotle concludes that on this definition of soul, the soul cannot be separable from the body, since it is united to the body as its very actuality according to which it is organized for life. In one of numerous passages in the De anima, however, Aristotle raises the question of whether that whereby we think can be a part of the soul in this sense, since thinking does not seem to be accomplished through any organ. It alone would seem to be separable not just in definition, but in being as well:

From this it is clear that the soul is inseparable from its body, or at any rate that certain parts of it are (if it has parts)–for the actuality of some of them is the actuality of the parts themselves. Yet some may be separable because they are not the actualities of any body at all. (413a4; Works, p. 657)

We have no evidence as yet about thought or the power of reflexion; it seems to be a different kind of soul, differing as what is eternal from what is perishable; it alone is capable of being separated. All the other parts of soul, it is evident from what we have said, are, in spite of certain statements to the contrary, incapable of separate existence though, of course, distinguishable by definition. (413b25; Works, p. 658)

Aristotle returns to this problem when dealing with the intellect in chapters 4 and 5 of Book III. (These two chapters are reproduced below with the two passages on which Averroes comments in our readings – texts 4 and 5 in his division of the De anima – noted in the margins.) Aristotle deals with the intellect as a passive power in chapter 4 and then with it as an active power in chapter 5. The commentators and Averroes’ predecessors were unanimous in agreeing that the so-called “agent intellect”7 was a separate, immaterial substance inasmuch as Aristotle explictly says this in III.5 (See text below). Indeed, it was identified with the separate substance of Metaphysics XII and then by Avicenna with the last of the emanated intelligences of the heavens, governing the sublunar realm as the dator formarum, causing prime matter, and infusing forms in both natural and noetic change.
The status of the so-called material or potential intellect, however, was more controverted, and it is on this problem that our passages from Averroes bear. Averroes inherited disagreement over the issue from the commentators and his Islamic predecessors. At one extreme was Alexander of Aphrodisias and Averroes’ Andalusian predecessor Ibn Bajja (Avempace) who construed the material intellect as a disposition of a bodily power, while at the other extreme was Themistius who argued that it was an immaterial, separate substance. Averroes struggled with the issue over the course of his career, changing his mind between his short, middle and long commentaries. What we have in the selections from the Long Commentary is his latest view, which is a type of combination of these two extremes. Averroes, however, by no means takes it as a definitive solution. (See his description of it as the start of a solution below.)
Text of Aristotle, De anima III.4-5
(429a10-430a27; Complete Works of Aristotle, I.682-684)

4 · Turning now to the part of the soul with which the soul knows and (whether this is separable from the others in definition only, or spatially as well) we have to inquire what differentiates this part, and how thinking can take place.
If thinking is like perceiving, it must be either a process in which the soul is acted upon by what is capable of being thought, or a process different from but analogous to that. The thinking part of the soul must therefore be, while impassible, capable of receiving the form of an object; that is, must be potentially identical in character with its object without being the object. Thought must be related to what is thinkable, as sense is to what is sensible.
Therefore, since everything is a possible object of thought, mind in order, as Anaxagoras says, to dominate, that is, to know, must be pure from all admixture; for the co-presence of what is alien to its nature is a hindrance and a block: it follows that it can have no nature of its own, other than that of having a certain capacity. Thus that in the soul which is called thought (by thought I mean that whereby the soul thinks and judges) is, before it thinks, not actually any real thing. For this reason it cannot reasonably be regarded as blended with the body: if so, it would acquire some quality, e.g. warmth or cold, or even have an organ like the sensitive faculty: as it is, it has none. It was a good idea to call the soul ‘the place of forms’, though this description holds only of the thinking soul, and even this is the forms only potentially, not actually.
Observation of the sense-organs and their employment reveals a distinction between the impassibility of the sensitive faculty and that of the faculty of thought. After strong stimulation of a sense we are less able to exercise it than before, as e.g. in the case of a loud sound we cannot hear easily immediately after, or in the case of a bright colour or a powerful odour we cannot see or smell, but in the case of thought thinking about an object that is highly thinkable renders it more and not less able afterwards to think of objects that are less thinkable: the reason is that while the faculty of sensation is dependent upon the body, thought is separable from it.
When thought has become each thing in the way in which a man who actually knows is said to do so (this happens when he is now able to exercise the power on his own initiative), its condition is still one of potentiality, but in a different sense from the potentiality which preceded the acquisition of knowledge by learning or discovery; and thought is then able to think of itself.
Since we can distinguish between a magnitude and what it is to be a magnitude, and between water and what it is to be water, and so in many other cases (though not in all; for in certain cases the thing and its form are identical), flesh and what it is to be flesh are discriminated either by different faculties, or by the same faculty in two different states; for flesh necessarily involves matter and is like what is snub-nosed, a this in a this. Now it is by means of the sensitive faculty that we discriminate the hot and the cold, i.e. the factors which combined in a certain ratio constitute flesh: the essential character of flesh is apprehended by something different either wholly separate from the sensitive faculty or related to it as a bent line to the same line when it has been straightened out.
Again in the case of abstract objects what is straight is analogous to what is snub-nosed; for it necessarily implies a continuum: its constitutive essence is different, if we may distinguish between straightness and what is straight: let us take it to be two-ness. It must be apprehended, therefore, by a different power or by the same power in a different state. To sum up, in so far as the realities it knows are capable of being separated from their matter, so it is also with the powers of thought.
The problem might be suggested: if thinking is a passive affection, then if thought is simple and impassible and has nothing in common with anything else, as Anaxagoras says, how can it come to think at all? For interaction between two factors is held to require a precedent community of nature between the factors. Again it might be asked, is thought a possible object of thought to itself? For if thought is thinkable per se and what is thinkable is in kind one and the same, then either thought will belong to everything, or it will contain some element common to it with all other realities which makes them all thinkable.
Have not we already disposed of the difficulty about interaction involving a common element, when we said that thought is in a sense potentially whatever is thinkable, though actually it is nothing until it has thought? What it thinks must be in it just as characters may be said to be on a writing-table on which as yet nothing actually stands written: this is exactly what happens with thought.
Thought is itself thinkable in exactly the same way as its objects are. For in the case of objects which involve no matter, what thinks and what is thought are identical; for speculative knowledge and its object are identical. (Why thought is not always thinking we must consider later.) In the case of those which contain matter each of the objects of thought is only potentially present. It follows that while they will not have thought in them (for thought is a potentiality of them only in so far as they are capable of being disengaged from matter) thought may yet be thinkable.

5 · Since in every class of things, as in nature as a whole, we find two factors involved, a matter which is potentially all the particulars included in the class, a cause which is productive in the sense that it makes them all (the latter standing to the former, as e.g. an art to its material), these distinct elements must likewise be found within the soul.
And in fact thought, as we have described it, is what it is by virtue of becoming all things, while there is another which is what it is by virtue of making all things: this is a sort of positive state like light; for in a sense light makes potential colours into actual colours.
Thought in this sense of it is separable, impassible, unmixed, since it is in its essential nature activity (for always the active is superior to the passive factor, the originating force to the matter).
Actual knowledge is identical with its object: in the individual, potential knowledge is in time prior to actual knowledge, but absolutely it is not prior even in time. It does not sometimes think and sometimes not think. When separated it is alone just what it is, and this above is immortal and eternal (we do not remember because, while this is impossible, passive thought is perishable); and without this nothing thinks.

Averroes
Long Commentary on the De anima III

Comment 4

Just prior to comment 4 Aristotle had argued that the process or change in which thinking consists must be similar to sensation. First, the intellect, like the sense, must be a passive capacity since sensing and thinking consist in becoming in some way the thing itself which is sensed or known., namely, it becomes the thing as form. Second, the intellect, like sense, is ‘impassible’. That is, sensing is not an ordinary physical change, since the sentient subject does not itself become white in seeing the color nor does thinking subject undergo generation when it knows a substance.
The lemma itself of comment 4 centers on Anaxagoras’ famous dictum that ‘mind is unmixed’, which Aristotle appropriates to mean that, because the mind can range over all knowable objects, that it cannot have or be a determinate form of its own, for this would impede it from receiving all other forms.
From this Averroes reasons that Aristotle means that the material or potential intellect cannot be a body or a power in a body. His argument is:

The material intellect is capable of receiving all material forms (i.e., ranges over all material things)
Everything that receives something else must be devoid of the nature it receives.
Therefore, the material intellect must be devoid of all material forms.
Material forms are either a body or a power (virtus) in a body.
Therefore, the material intellect is not a body or a power in a body.
Therefore, it is not admixed with matter.

The second premise – that something must be devoid of the nature it receives – is defended on the grounds that “nothing can receive itself”. This is in turn seen to be an application of Aristotle’s prohibition against genuine self-motion, since otherwise something would be both actual and potential in the same respect.
The conclusion of this reasoning is that the material or potential intellect must itself be an immaterial substance.

Comment 5

In text 5 Aristotle concludes from his above remarks that the intellect, which Averroes construes as the material intellect, is nothing more than a passive capacity to receive forms. It is in itself not anything in actuality prior to thinking.
Averroes first distinguishes the material intellect as a pure capacity from prime matter. The difference is that as the intellect is the capacity to receive universal or intelligible forms while prime matter is the capacity to receive individual or sensible forms.
Averroes then examines in detail the competing views of Alexander, Ibn Bajja, and Themistius on the nature of this material intellect and the difficulties attending on them. This section of comment 5, which runs to some ten pages in the Latin, is omitted from your translation. (See ellipsis in the middle of p. 327). Rejecting the materialistic views of Alexander and Ibn Bajja, Averroes gravitates to that of Themistius that the material intellect is a separate, immaterial substance. This position itself, however, gives rise to several difficulties, the most notorious of which is how such a separate entity could account for the thinking of individual human beings which is both transitory and different from one to another. Averroes’ solution, with which your translation again restarts on p. 327, is to answer three problems arising from positing both a separate agent and material intellect. It is in response to the second of these questions, which Averroes himself says is the most difficult, that Averroes advances his controversial view that the material intellect is numerically one for the entire human species.

The three questions are:

How are the speculative intelligibles generable and corruptible, while the intellect producing them (i.e., the agent intellect) and receiving them (i.e., the material intellect) are eternal. (p. 327)
In what way is the material intellet numerically one in all individual human beings, not generable or corruptible, while the intelligibles existing in it in actuality (and this is the speculative intellect) are numbered according to the numbering of individual human beings and generable and corruptible through the generation and corruption of individual human beings. (p. 328)
In what way is the material intellect some existing thing, while it is not one of the material forms or prime matter. (p. 332)
AVERROES IV:
The Decisive Treatise

The Decisive Treatise (Fasl al-ma gal) has been translated several times, each of which contains extensive notes and analyses of the work:

Léon Gauthier, Averroès, Traité décisif sur l’accord de la religion et de lat philosophie. Algiers, 1942.
G. Hourani, Averroes on the Harmony of Religion and Philosophy, London: Luzac, 1961; repr. 1976.
Marc Geoffroy (trans.) and Alain de Libera (intro). Averroès, Le libre discours décisif. Paris, 1996
Charles E. Butterworth, Averroës. The Book of the Decisive Treatise Determining the Connection between the Law and Wisdom. Provo, Utah : Brigham Young University Press, 2001.

For studies on the Decisive Treatise, in addition to the introductions contained in the above translations, see:

Bello, Iysa. The Medieval Controversy between Philosophy and Orthodoxy. Ijma and Tawil in the Controversy between a-Ghazali and Ibn Rushd. Leiden, 1989.
Fakhry, Majid. “Philosophy and Scripture in the Theology of Averroes,” Mediaeval Studies 30 (1968) 78-89.
Mahdi, Muhsin. “Averroes on Divine Law and Human Wisdom.” In Joseph Cropsey (ed.) Ancients and Moderns: Essays on the Tradition of Political Philosophy in Honor of Leo Strauss. New York, 1964, pp. 114-31.
——-. “Remarks on Averroes’ Decisive Treatise.” In Michael E. Marmura (ed.) Islamic Theology and Philosophy. Sudies in Honor of George F. Hourani. New York, 1984, pp. 188-202.

The Decisive Treatise was finished by 1179/80, thus placing it before Averroes’ great commentaries on Aristotle. It is actually one part of a trilology, previously thought to be in this order: the Fasl (Decisive Treatise), the Damima (The Appendix) and the Manahij (The Uncovering). But recent research has shown that what was called the Damima or ‘appendix’ – a term coined by the editors rather than found in the manuscripts – is in fact a dedicatory letter, and was written in sequence before the Decisive Treatise. It has been argued that the letter is addressed to Caliph Abu Yaqub Yusuf, Averroes’ patron in Marakush.. The subject of the letter is the problem of how God’s knowledge can be eternal if it extends to changing things, a problem that the Caliph wanted explained by Averroes. This seems to have precipitated the general work on the relation of philosophy and religion in the Decisive Treatise. The Manahij or Uncovering – whose full title is Uncovering the Methods of Proofs with respect to the Beliefs of the Religious Community – is a sequel to the Decisive Treatise in which Averroes explains in more detail how scripture contains “all true science and practice.” The dedicatory letter is translated in Butterworth and Hourani (but under the title of Damima) and an excerpt of the Manahij is also found in Hourani.

In reading the Decisive Treatise, important concepts in Islamic theology should be keep in mind:

kufr: Unbelief: Denial of basic tenets of Islam. One guilty of unbelief would not be allowed to teach, have his books siezed and be essentially expelled from the community, having no protection of person or property under the law. The Decisive Treatise is Averroes’ legal defense of this charge levelled by al-Ghazali against Alfarabi and Avicenna. (Averroes’ philosophical defense is contained in his own Tahafut.) Rather, Averroes charges that the mutakallimun are guilty of unbelief by spreading the allegorical interpretation to the masses, which results in their abandoment of the faith and gives rise to sects within Islam.

tawil: Interpretation: This is the allegorical or non-literal interpretation of scripture. At dispute between Averroes and al-Ghazali is the scope of such interpretation and the role philosophy has in it. Averroes takes the very strong view that all allegorical interpretation must be demonstrative.

ijma: Consensus: Islam does not have a class of ordained priests or a system of doctrinal decisions by way of ecclesiastical councils. Rather, orthodoxy is determined by consensus. Averroes maintains that there can be no certain consensus on theoretical matters raised by scripture.

Although scholars vary somewhat in how the Decisive Treatise is to be divided, Hourani’s partition into three chapters, each corresponding to a main part of Averroes’ defense, is accepted:

That the Quran obligates the study of philosophy (pp. 298-302).
That Quran and philosophy do not conflict.
That theology – the kalam practiced by the Mutazilites and Asharites – is the true danger to Islam by revealing to the common believer the more sophisticated interpretations of scripture leading to an abandonment of faith and sectarianism. Such considerations should be left to the philosopher, who alone regulates the interpretation of scripture.


MOSES MAIMONIDES (1135-1204)

Works

Maimonides Treatise on Logic. Trans. I. Efrso. New York: American Academy for Jewish Reseaarch, 1938. [Maimonides’ work on logic heavily indebted to al-Farabi.]
Misneh Torah: the Book of Knowledge. Trans. M. Hyamson. Jerusalem, Boys Town Publishers, 1962. [The first book of the Misneh Torah, Maimonides’ systematization of the rabbinic code, which includes discussion of philosophy.]
The Guide of the Perplexed. Trans. Shlomo Pines. 2 vols. Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1963.

Studies

Buijs, Joseph A. Maimonides : A Collection of Critical Essays. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988.
Leaman, Oliver. Moses Maimonides. London ; New York: Routledge, 1990.
Ormsby, Eric L. Moses Maimonides and His Time, Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy ; V. 19. Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1989.
Sirat, C. A History of Jewish Philosophy in the Middle Ages. Cambridge, 1986.
Wolfson, H. A. “Maimonides on Negative Attributes,” reprinted in A. Hyman (ed.) Essays in Medieval and Jewish Islamic Philosophy. New York, 1977, pp. 180-215.
—————. “The Aristotelian Predicables and Maimonides’ Division of Attributes,” reprinted in H. Wolsfson, Studies in the History of Philosophy of Religion, 2:161-194

Maimonides was, like his contemporary Averroes, born in Cordoba into a family of noted scholars and rabbis. He received a deep education in law, medicine and philosophy. His family fled Spain when enforced conversion to Islam ensued under the Almohad conquest. They eventually settled in Egypt, where Maimonides produced the first ever systematic treatment of Jewsih law – his Misneh Torah – and his philosophical magnum opus, the Guide for the Perplexed.

The Guide for the Perplexed was written in Arabic (i.e., Judaeo-Arabic or Arabic written in Hebrew characters) and was translated during Maimonides’ own lifetime and with his approval by Ibn Tibbon. A slightly later and less accurate Hebrew translation was the basis of the medieval Latin version known in the thirteenth century.

According to Maimonides’s dedicatory letter he wrote the Guide for his own pupil Rabbi Joseph ben Judah who was perplexed as to how to understand scripture in view of the works of the philosophers and speculative theologians. As the letter makes clear, the Guide is not a work for popular dissemination but only for those who had proper scientific and philosophical training. In a separate letter to his translator, Ibn Tibbon, Maimonides expresses his preference for Aristotle, whose works require the commentaries of Alexander, Themistius and Averroes to understand, over Plato, who engages in myth, and al-Farabi over Avicenna, although Maimonides is heavily indebted to the latter.

The Guide is divided into three parts, whose overall and prime purpose according to Maimonides is to “explain the meanings of certain terms occuring in books of prophecy.” That is, the primary purpose of the Guide is the meaning of religious language. Our selections come from the section of the first part in which Maimonides addresses expressions that seem to introduce multiplicity into the God, which, according to Maimonides, are not merely inaccurate ways of speaking about God but constitute denial of God. At issue here are the claims that the names of God, such as “all powerful” or “ever-living” are divine attributes. Except in a narrow sense, Maimonides denies that God has attributes, holding instead that assertions about God must be negative.

Maimonides so-called ‘negative theology’ was very influential and well known in the thirteenth century. (Developments of it can be found as late as Walter Benjamin in the Frankfurt School.) Aquinas succinctly reports and rejects Maimonides’ opinion, for instance, in the Summa:

Aquinas, ST I Q.13 A.2
Whether any name can be applied to God substantially?

I answer that, Negative names applied to God, or signifying His relation to creatures manifestly do not at all signify His substance, but rather express the distance of the creature from Him, or His relation to something else, or rather, the relation of creatures to Himself.

But as regards absolute and affirmative names of God, as “good,” “wise,” and the like, various and many opinions have been given. For some have said that all such names, although they are applied to God affirmatively, nevertheless have been brought into use more to express some remotion from God, rather than to express anything that exists positively in Him. Hence they assert that when we say that God lives, we mean that God is not like an inanimate thing; and the same in like manner applies to other names; and this was taught by Rabbi Moses. Others say that these names applied to God signify His relationship towards creatures: thus in the words, “God is good,” we mean, God is the cause of goodness in things; and the same rule applies to other names.

Both of these opinions, however, seem to be untrue … .


THE ENTRY OF ARISTOTLE AND RISE OF UNIVERSITIES

TRANSLATIONS

Bibliography
Dod, Bernard G. ‘Aristoteles latinus,’ in The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, pp. 43-79.

Kenny, Anthony and Pinborg, Jan. ‘Medieval Philosophical Literature,’ in The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, pp. 9-42.

McGuire, R. M. P. and Wippel, John F. ‘Translation Literature, Greek and Arabic’, in The New Catholic Encyclopedia 14.252-56.

Muckle, J. T. ‘Greek Works Translated Directly into Latin before 1350,’ Mediaeval Studies 4 (1942) 33-42; 5 (1943) 102-114.

Translations and Translators

The century between roughly 1150 and 1250 saw the entry into the West of a substantial portion of ancient Greek philosophical treatises and the more recent Arabic commentaries and scientific works. There are two large and important exceptions: Plato (known chiefly through the Timaeus) and Plotinus. This flood of intellectual literature coincided with the rise of the university as the center of learning, the town as the center of economic life, and the mendicant orders as the center of religious life.

The translation literature of this period can be divided into (1) Aristotle and (2) commentaries on Aristotle and (3) original treatises.

Aristotle

In what follows, note that Boethius, James of Venice, Robert Grosseteste and William of Moerbeke translated directly from the Greek; Gerard of Cremona and Michael the Scot translated from Arabic intermediaries.
I. First entry (c. 520):
Logica vetus: Categories (Boethius 510-522)
On Interpretation (Boethius 510-522)

II. Second entry (1125-1200):
Logica nova: Prior Analytics (Boethius 510-522; Anon. 12th cent.)
Posterior Analytics (James of Venice 1125-1150; Ioannes before 1159; Gerard of Cremona before 1187)
Sophistical Refutations (Boethius 510-522; James of Venice 1125-50)
Topics (Boethius 510-522; Anon. 12th cent).
Libri naturales Physics (James of Venice 1125-50; Gerard of Cremona before 1187)
De anima (James of Venice 1125-50)
De generatione et corrputione (Anon. 12th cent.; Gerard of Cremona before 1187)
De caelo (Gerard of Cremona before 1187)
Meteorologica (Book IV: Henricus Aristippus before 1162; Books I-III: Gerard of Cremona before 1187)
Parva naturalia: De sensu et sensato (Anon. 12th cent.)
De memoria (James of Venice 1125-50)
De somno et vigilia (Anon. 12th cent.)
De longiaevitate vitae (James of Venice 1125-50)
De iuventute (James of Venice 1125-50)
De respiratione (James of Venice 1125-50).
Metaphysics: versio vetustissima (Books I-IV.4 only: James of Venice 1125-50)
versio media (lacks Book XI: Anon. 12th cent.)
Nicomachean Ethics versio vetus (Books II-III: Anon. 12th cent.)

III. Third Entry (1200-1260):
Libri naturales Physics (Michael the Scot 1220-35)
De caelo (Michael the Scot 1220-35)
De anima (Michael the Scot 1220-35)
De animalibus (partial = Historia animalium, De partibus animalium, De generatione animalium only: Michael the Scot 1220-35)
Metaphysics: versio nova (I.5-10, II-X, XII.1-10: Michael the Scot 1220-35)
Nicomachean Ethics: versio nova (I and fragments of II-X: Anon. early 13th cent.)
versio Grosseteste (Robert Grosseteste 1246-47)
IV. Fourth Entry:

This consisted primarily of retranslations or revisions by William of Moerbeke of earlier translations. Three important exceptions were the Politics (1260), the Poetics (1272), both translated for the first time, and the completion of the De animalibus (1260), all by Moerbeke.

Greek Commentaries on Aristotle

Categories Simplicius (Moerbeke 1266)
De interpretatione Ammonius (Moerbeke 1268)
Posterior Analytics Themistius (Gerard of Cremona before 1187)
De anima Philoponus = John the Grammarian (Book III: Moerbeke 1268) Themistius (Moerbeke 1267)
Nicomachean Ethics Eustratius = Commentator for the Ethics (Robert Grosseteste 1264-47)
Averroes

Averroes, cited by the Latins simply as Commentator, made his entry in the first half of the thirteenth century. R. de Vaux has shown that Paris, Bibliothèque nationale MS lat. 15453, dated 1243, contains the whole of Averroes’ corpus as known to the West.8 Averroes has three different classes of commentaries: epitome, middle, and long (includes the text of Aristotle). Averroes commentaries are literal and comprehensive, so that every phrase of Aristotle is explained nearly word for word. Especially important for the transmission of Averroes to the West is Michael the Scot who translated Averroes at Naples under the patronage of Frederick II.

Epitome:
Michael the Scot (1220-35): Parva naturalia

Middle:
William of Luna (13th cent): Isagoge, Categories, De interpretatione, Analytics
Herman the German: Rhetoric (1256), Nichomacean Ethics (1240), Poetics (1256)
Michael the Scot (1220-35): De generatione et corruptione, Meteorologica (Book IV)

Long:
Michael the Scot (1220-35): Physics, De anima, De caelo, Metaphysics. [Note that Arabic version of the long commentary on the De anima is lost.]

In addition to the above commentaries Michael the Scot also translated Averroes’ important De substantia orbis.

Avicenna

The most important part of the translation of Avicenna’s philosophical encyclopedia, the Kitab al-Shifa’ (The Book of Healing), took place in Toledo in the second half of the 12th century. The translation was carried out by Dominic Gonsalvus (Gundissalinus) and his partner Avendeuth (Ibn Daud, John of Spain). These translations were apparently undertaken at the request of the Archbishop of Toledo, John. According to the preface of the translation of the De anima, Avendeuth translated the Arabic into the vernacular (singula verba proferente vulgariter) which Gundissalinus then turned into Latin (singula in latinum convertente).

Iohanni reverentissimo Toletanae sedis archiepiscopo et Hispaniarum primati, Avendeuth Israelita, philosophus, gratum debitae servitutis obsequium.
. . .
Quapropter iussum vestrum, Domine, de transferendo libro Avicennae Philosophi de anima, effectui mancipare curavi, ut vestro munere et meo labore, Latinis fieret certum, quod hactenus exsistit incognitum, scilicet an sit anima, et quid et qualis sit secundum essentiam et effectum, rationibus verissimis comprobatum.
Habetis ergo librum, nobis praecipiente et singula verba vulgariter proferente, et Dominico Archidiacono singula in latinum convertente, ex arabico translatum…. (Liber sextus de naturalibus prol. [Avicenna latinus 1.3-4]).

To most reverend John Archibishop of the see of Toledo and Primate of Spain, Avendauth Israeli, a philosopher, your obedient servant.
. . .
Accordingly, I have taken care to carry out your request to translate the work of Avicenna the Philosoher On the Soul, so that by your office and my labor it will be made known to the Latins what up till now has remained unknown, namely, whether the soul exists, what it is, and what sort it is both in essence and reality demonstrated by most true arguments.
Accept this book, therefore, which has been translated from Arabic by your command to us and by me speaking each word in the vernacular and the Lord Archdeacon translating each into Latin.

Of the Kitab al-Shifa’, this pair translated the Introduction, Isagoge, Posterior Analytics (partial), Physics (partial; in Latin called Sufficientia), De anima, and Metaphysics.

Original Works

In addition to the chiefly philosophical works given below, numerous Greek and Arabic scientific treatises were translated. Most noteworthy are mathematical works by Archimides and Apollonius, medical works by Galen and Avicenna, and numerous Arabic treatises on astronomy.

Greek Originals:

Damascene De fide orthodoxa (Burgundio of Pisa before 1193 and Robert Grosseteste, both from the Greek)
Logica, De haeresibus, Introductio dogmatum elementaris (all by Grosseteste from the Greek)
Euclid Elementa (from Arabic by Adelard of Bath 1120 and Gerard of Cremona before 1187)
Proclus Elementatio theologica (William of Moerbeke from Greek. This translation enabled Aquinas to recognize that the Liber de causis, long attributed to Aristotle, was a compilation from Proclus’ Elementatio)
Ptolemy Almagest (from Greek by Henricus Aristippus before 1152; from Arabic by Gerard of Cremona before 1187)
Planisphere (from Arabic by Herman of Carinthia 1 June 1143 at Toulouse. Dedicated to Thierry of Chartres. Sole intermediary through which this work has survived.)

Arabic Originals:

Note that the Jewish thinkers Isaac Israeli, Avicebron (= Ibn Gabirol) and Moses Maimonides wrote their philosophical works in Arabic, not Hebrew.

Abu Ma’shr Maius introductorium (Herman of Carinthia 1140; John of Seville before 1157 – not to be confused with John of Spain called Avendeuth, the collaborator of Gundissalinus)
Alfarabi De intellectu et intellecto (Gerard of Cremona)
Summa philosophiae (Gundissalinus)
Algazel Metaphysics (Gundissalinus)
Al Kindi De intellectu (by both Gundissalinus-Avendeuth and Gerard of Cremona)
De quinque essentiis (Gerard of Cremona)
Avicenbron Fons vitae (Gundissalinus-Avendeuth)
Isaac Israeli Liber de definitionibus (Gerard of Cremona)
Maimonides Dux perplexorum (Guide for the Perplexed) (Arabic original translated into Hebrew and then from that version into Latin)
Ps Aristotle Liber de causis (Gerard of Cremona)
THE CONDEMNATIONS OF 1277

Bibliography

Cartularium universitatis Parisiensis. Edd. Denifle and Chatelain. 3 vols. Paris, 1887-89. [Text of Condemnations of 1277 1.543-58]. = CUP

Callus, Daniel. The Condemnation of St. Thomas at Oxford. 2nd ed. London, 1955.

Hissette, Roland. Enquête sur les 219 articles condamnés à Paris le 7 mars 1277. Louvain, 1977.

Leff, Gordon. Paris and Oxford Universities in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries: An Institutional and Intellectual History. New York, 1975. Chapter Four: Paris – Doctrinal in Intellectual Developments during the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries, pp. 187-240.

Thorndyke, Lynn. University Records and Life in the Middle Ages. New York, 1944; rpt. 1975. = Thorndyke

Wippel, John F. ‘The Condemnations of 1270 and 1277 at Paris.’ Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies 7 (1977) 169-201.

Reception of Aristotle and his Commentators

1210 The Synod of Sens under Peter of Corbeil forbids the public reading of Aristotle’s libri naturales and commentaries. [Thorndyke, 26-27; CUP 1.70]
1215 Robert Courçon, papal legate of Innocent III, confirms this prohibition in the statutes granted to the University of Paris and adds the Metaphysics to the list. [Thorndyke, 27-30; CUP 1.78-79]
1228 Pope Gregory IX urges the masters in Theology at Paris to avoid philosophical speculation and to confine their teachings to the doctrines of the Fathers.

As a result of these prohibitions, the works of Aristotle, except for the organon, remain off the prescribed curriculum of arts of Paris. Private lecturing on the works continues, however.

1231 Gregory IX becomes increasing alarmed at the spread of Aristotle despite prohibitions. In the bull Parens scientiarum, which is regarded as the constitution of the University of Paris, he prohibits reading of banned texts unless purged of error. In a separate letter to the University, he calls for a commission to correct the banned books to make them suitable for teaching. Apparently, the commission never issues a single corrected text. [Thorndyke, 35-40; CUP 1.136-39, 143-44]
1252 Faculty of Arts in the English Nation statutes ignores the prohibitions and puts Aristotle’s De anima on its curriculum. [Thorndyke, 52-56; CUP 1.227-30]
1255 The Arts curriculum now includes virtually the entire banned corpus of Aristotle. [Thorndyke, 64-66; CUP 1.277-79]
1263 Pope Urban IV renews the prohibitions of his predecessor.
1266 Averroist doctrines are being taught in the Arts faculty without regard of consequences for tenets of faith. Chief among these Latin Averroists is Siger of Brabant.
1267-68 St. Bonaventure devotes a series of conferences to theses taught in Arts Faculty.
1270 St. Thomas returns from Italy and enters the discussions. Writes his On the Unity of the Intellect against the Averroists. At the end of this work, written against the Averroists in the Arts Faculty, even the dispassionate Aquinas loses patience:
Si quis autem gloriabundus de falsi nominis scientia velit contra haec quae scripsimus aliquid dicere, non loquatur in angulis nec coram pueris qui nesciunt de tam arduis iudicare, sed contra hoc scriptum rescribat, si audet; et inveniet non solum me, qui aliorum sum minimus, sed multos alios veritatis zelatores, per quos eius errori resistetur, vel ignorantia consuletur. (De unitate intellectus 5 [43.314:434-441]).
But if there be anyone boasting of his knowledge, falsely so-called, who wishes to say something against what we have written here, let him not speak in corners, nor in the presence of boys who do not know how to judge about such difficult matters, but let him write against this treatise, if he dares, and he will find not only me, who am the least of others, but many other lovers of truth, by whom his error will be opposed or his ignorance remedied. (Trans. Zedler)
1270 In response to the growing Averroism or ‘heterodox Aristotelianism’ in the Arts Faculty, Stephen Tempier, bishop of Paris, condemns 13 propositions. All the propositions indicate an autonomy of philosophy from theology and an adherence to Aristotle and interpreted by Averroes and Avicenna. The chief representative of this movement in Arts was Siger of Brabant. Two of his more notorious positions: (1) God only directly created the first intelligence, which governs the outermost heaven, and did so necessarily and eternally. The rest of the world emanates from successive intelligences necessarily. Thus, the world is eternal and necessary, and God is limited to acting through intermediate causes. (2) The intellect is one for all men. thus, no intellectual operations proper to individuals and no personal immortality.
1273 Bonaventure holds his Collationes in Hexaemeron (Conferences on the Six Days of Creation) and attacks the Arts Faculty.

Tensions grow until intervention by the papal curia.

18 Jan 1277 Pope John XXI writes to Stephen Tempier asking him to ascertain what errors were being taught and by whom and to communicate this back to him. No reply has ever been found. Instead Tempier acted on his own and assembled a group of theologians to draw up a list of suspected propositions and issued his own condemnation.

7 Mar 1277 Tempier issues a list of 219 condemned propositions which can be taught only under pain of excommunication. Note:

1. The list of condemned propositions is not systematically arranged and is repetitious. This shows that is was simply a compilation of theses sewn together from several lists drawn up independently by different theologians.

2. Not all of the condemned theses are Averroistic but some can even be found in St. Thomas’ works. This shows that the concern of the condemnation was not just over Averroism in the Arts Facutly. It also shows concern over too much appropriation of Aristotle into the Theology Faculty, such as by Aquinas. Thus the condemnation demonstrates a twofold concern: one of the theologians over radical Aristotelianism in the Arts Faculty and another of the more conservative Augustinian theologians (e.g., Henry of Ghent) over those who brought too much Aristotle (e.g., Aquinas, Giles of Rome) into theology .

18 Mar 1277 The Dominican Robert Kilwardby, Archbishop of Canterbury, condemns a shorter list of 30 propositions at Oxford. This list includes, which the Paris list does not, the thesis of St. Thomas that there is only one substantial form in the composite (e.g., in the human being there is only one form or soul repsonsible for the vegetative, animal, and intellectual functions, not three).
UNIVERSITY CURRICULA

Bibliography

Bazàn, B., Fransen, G., Jacquart, D., and Wippel, J. Les questions disputées et les questions quodlibétiques dans les facultés de thèologie, de droit et de médecine. Typologie des sources du moyen âge occidental fasc. 4445. (Turnhout, 1985). Excellent chapters by Bazàn (disputed questions) and Wippel (quodlibetal questions).

Courtenay, William J. Schools and Scholars in Fourteenth Century England. (Princeton, 1988).

Emden, A. B. A Biographical Register of the University of Oxford to 1500 A. D. 3 vols. (Oxford, 195759).

Glorieux, P. ‘L’Enseignement au moyen âge: techniques et méthodes en usage à la faculté de théologie de Paris au XIIIe siècle.’ Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge 35 (1968) 65186.

—–. La littérature quodlibètique. 2 vols. (Paris, 1925, 1935). The second volume is a revision of the first with many additions and corrections.

—–. Répertoire des mâitres en théologie de Paris au XIIIe siècle. 2 vols. (Paris, 193334). [Always consult corrections by V. Doucet in Archivum franciscanum historicum 27 (1935) 53164.]

Little, A. G. and Pelster, F. Oxford Theology and Theologians. (Oxford, 1934).

Stegmüller, F. Repertorium commentariorum in Sententias Petri Lombardi. 2 vols. (Würzburg, 1947). [Always consult corrections by V. Doucet, Archivum franciscanum historicum 47 (1954) 88170, 40027.]

Weisheipl , J. A. ‘Curriculum of the Faculty of Arts at Oxford in the Early Fourteenth Century’, Mediaeval Studies 26 (1964) 14385; 28 (1967) 15175.
STATUTES OF THE UNIVERSITY OF PARIS GRANTED BY ROBERT COURCON, LEGATE OF INNOCENT III 1215 (Thorndyke no.15; CUP 1.7879)

Old Logic Aristotle, Categories, On Interpretation; Porphyry, Isagoge; Boethius, Topics, On Division

New Logic Aristotle, Topics, Sophistical Refutations, Prior and Posterior Analytics.

Priscian Priscianus maior and minor

Donatus Barbarismus (Ars maior)

Aristotle Ethics (Not required)

‘They shall not lecture on the books of Aristotle on metaphysics and natural philosophy or on summaries of them…’

CURRICULUM OF FACULTY OF ARTS AT PARIS 1255 (Thorndyke no.28; CUP 1.27779)

Old Logic Same as in 1215 regulations.

New Logic Same as in 1215 regulations.

Priscian Same as in 1215 regulations.

Opuscula Gilbert of Poitiers (?), Sex principia; Priscian, Barbarismus; Pseudo Priscian, De accentibus

Aristotle Ethics, Physics, Metaphysics, De animalibus, De caelo et mundo, Meterology, De anima, De generatione, Liber de causis (pseudoAristotle which was not known until Aquinas discovered it from William of Moerebeke’s translation of Proclus’ Elements of Theology from which work it derives), De somno et vigilia, De plantis, De memoria et reminiscentia, De morte et vita and De differentia spiritus et animae (Costa ben Lucca).

COURSE OF STUDIES IN ARTS AT PARIS ACCORDING TO ENGLISH NATION STATUTES 1252 (Thorndyke no. 26; CUP 1.22730)

Undergraduate Period prior to being admitted as a bachelor to determine. Must last at least four years, five if from another university. Attend both ordinary (master’s given early in the day) and cursory (bachelor’s given late in day) lectures. Must attend master’s disputations for two of these years and participate in sophismata or logical disputations. Later participation in disputation was extended to functioning as a respondens in magistral disputations and bachelor’s determinations.

Determination If all of the above requirements were met, the candidate could be presented by his sponsoring master under whom he had studied for permission to determine, which was itself a type of examination before being granted the licentia docendi. The right to determine, that is, to settle the question in a disputation, marked the student’s true apprenticeship to becoming master. Most scholars that student admitted to determine is what is meant by a bachelor. The actual period of determination lasted through Lent.

License This was the actual degree granted by the Chancellor upon completion of a further examination conducted by him.

Inception The granting of the License, an act of the Chancellor, did not make a candidate a Master of Arts, which title was conferred by the corporation (universitas) of Masters themselves upon successful completion of inception. This was a solemn ceremony in which the prospective candidate disputed the night before (Vespers) and delivered an inaugural address the next day (Principium). The new Master was then bound to host everyone at his favourite tavern.

Regency The new Master had to swear to lecture and dispute in the Faculty for two years. After this, some when on to the higher Faculties of Theology, Law, or Medicine. Some very bright lights remained content as Masters in Arts without going on to Theology, such as Walter Burley at Oxford and John Buridan at Paris.
COURSE OF STUDY IN THEOLOGY AT PARIS BASED UPON STATUTES OF BOLOGNA 1364 (Leff, Paris and Oxford Universities, p. 165n93.)

Lectures Must attend lectures for at least sic years, seven if secular, four years on Bible and two on Sentences

Baccalarius
Biblicus Lecture cursorie on Bible for two years. Mendicants could lecture ordinarie. Had to respond at least once at the inception of a Master.

Baccalarius
Sententiarius Lectured on Sentences for two years, later shortened to one. This would in the later 13th and 14th centuries prove to displace biblical lectures as the chief vehicle for theological writing. Aquinas’ prologue to the first book is 4 pages; Ockham’s nearly 400. This provoke legislation that prohibited a bachelor from lecturing only on the first book.

Baccalarius
Formatus A period of four or five years residency during which the bachelor was required to participate in ordinary and extraordinary disputations at least once a year and to function as a respondent in the disputations of other bachelors, including those of inception.

Inception A complex series of disputations which marked the final step to becoming Master. Its chief elements were the Vespers, aula, and principium. See Leff, pp. 16871.

Regency Required two year period of lecturing and disputing by the new Master. Unlike the Arts faculty, the chairs for regent masters in Theology were severely limited. Thus a candidate could meet all requirements for inception and wait years before becoming Master because of the backlog created by the limited number of available chairs. Thus Ockham is called the ‘Venerable Inceptor’ because he never became Master at Oxford.
BONAVENTURE (1217-1274)

Life

Bonaventure, whose given name was John Fidanza, was born in 1217 in Bagnorea, near Orvietto and Viterbo in nothern Italy. He went to Paris in 1235 to study and became master of arts there in 1243. He joined the Franciscans the next year, taking the name of Bonaventure at his religious profession. Remaining in Paris, he studied theology, where as part of the requirement for the degree he read the Sentences from 1251 to 1253. He became master of theology in 1254, when he assumed the Franciscan chair (the Franciscans had one available chair for the their masters, the Dominicans two) as regent master in Theology at the University, a requirement of the degree. He was regent until his election as Minister General of the Franciscans in 1257, effectively ending his academic career. During his three years as regent master at Paris, he produced his Quaestiones disputatae, Commentary on the Sentences, several commentaries on scripture, his Breviloquium (a compendium of theology) and De reductione artium ad theologiam (The Reduction of the Sciences to Theology).

After a spiritual retreat on Mount Alverna in northern Italy in 1259, where St. Francis was believed to receive the stigmata two years before his death, Bonaventure composed his Itinerarium mentis in Deum (Journey of the Mind to God), a spiritual treatise widely read and influential during the rest of the the Middle Ages. While fully engaged in running the Order until 1273, Bonaventure did become involved from 1267 to 1273 in the disputes over Averroism at the University of Paris, where he delivered a series of “conferences” or sermons: Collationes de decem praeceptis (1267), Collationes de septem donis de Spiritus sancti (1268) and Collationes in Hexaemeron (1273). This last was left unfinised because of a summons to Rome to become the cardinal bishop of Albano (suburb of Rome). He was the leading figure at the Council of Lyons in 1274, especially on the reform of the Church; he died during the Council on 15 July 1274, the same year as Aquinas, who died earlier enroute to the same Council.

Works

Bonaventure was the first medieval thinker to have his entire corpus available in modern, critical edition:

Opera omnia. Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1882–1902, 10 vols.

The only significant edition outside of the above is that of Bonaventure’s Conferences on the Six Days of Creation edited by Ferdinand Delorme. Its text differs from the one in the above Opera omnia:

Collationes in Hexaemeron, ed. F. Delorme, Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1934.

Academic works while Master of Theology (1243-1257):

Commentary on the Sentences (Opera omnia I-IV)
Translation: Book distinctions 1-10 are translated on line at: http://www.franciscan-archive.org/bonaventura/sent.html

Disputed Questions (Opera omnia 5.1-115):
Quaestiones disputatae de scientia Christi
Translation: Saint Bonaventure’s disputed questions on the knowledge of Christ . Trans. Zachary Hayes. St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1992
Quaestiones disputatae de mysterio Trinitatis
Translation: Saint Bonaventure’s Disputed questions on the mystery of the Trinity. Trans. Zachary Hayes. St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1979
Breviloquium (ibid., pp. 199-291)
Translation: Breviloquium. Trans. José de Vinck in The Works of St. Bonaventure. 5 vols. Patterson, N.J. 1960-1970. Vol. 2.
De Reductione Artium ad Theologiam (ibid., pp. 317-325)
Translation: De Reductione Artium ad Theologiam. Trans. Zachary Hayes. St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1996.

Work while Minister General of the Franciscans (1259):

Itinerarium Mentis in Deum (ibid., pp. 293-316)
Translation: Journey of the Mind to God. Trans. P. Boehner; ed. S. Brown. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1993.

Interventions in the Averroist crisis at University of Paris (1267-73):

1267 Collationes de Decem Praeceptis. (ibid., pp. 505-532)
Translation: Collations on the Ten Commandments. Trans.Paul Spaeth, . St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1996
1268 Collationes de septem donis de Spiritus sancti (ibid., pp. 455-503)
Translation: Collations on the Seven Gift of the Holy Spirit. Online at: http://www.franciscan-archive.org/bonaventura/index.html#COLLATIONES
1273 Collationes in Hexaemeron (ibid., pp. 327-454)
Translation: Collations on the Six Days. Trans. José de Vinck in The Works of St. Bonaventure. 5 vols. Patterson, N.J. 1960-1970. Vol. 5.

Studies

Online
http://www.franciscan-archive.org/bonaventura/ [Very useful site, containing many texts and translations of Bonaventure.]

Collection
S. Bonaventura, 1274-1974. 4 vols. Grottaferrata, Collegio S. Bonaventura, 1973- [Massive collection of essays]
Books and Articles
Bonansea, B. ‘The Question of an Eternal World in the Teaching of St Bonaventure’, Franciscan Studies 34 (1974): 7–33.

Bougerol, J. G. Introduction à Saint Bonaventure, Paris: Vrin, 1988. [Earlier version translated into English: Bougerol, J.G. Introduction to the Works of Bonaventure, trans. J. de Vinck, Paterson, NJ: St Anthony Guild, 1964.]

Doyle, J.P. ‘Saint Bonaventure and the Ontological Argument’, Modern Schoolman (1974) 52: 27–48.

Gilson, E. (1965) The Philosophy of St Bonaventure, trans. I. Trethowan and F. Sheed, Paterson, NJ: St Anthony Guild. [Still standard study of Bonaventure. Translation is from the first, 1924 edition of the French original La philosophie de saint Bonaventure, written while Gilson was a prisoner of war. Gilson published two further editions in French, the last in 1953.]

Kent, B. Virtues of the Will: The Transformation of Ethics in the Late Thirteenth Century, Washington, DC: Catholic University of America, (1995). [See especially her discussion of Bonaventure’s attitude toward Aristotle, pp. 39-59)

King, Peter. “Bonaventure”, in J. Gracia (ed.) Individuation in Scholasticism: The Later Middle Ages and the Counter-Reformation, 1150-1650. Albany: SUNY, 1994, pp. 141-72.

Quinn, J. F. The Historical Constitution of St Bonaventure’s Philosophy, Toronto, Ont., 1973. [As dense as it is large. But much information]

Vollert, C. et al. (trans.) (1964) On the Eternity of the World (Thomas Aquinas, Siger of Brabant, St Bonaventure), Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press.

Readings

Our readings concern two of Bonaventure’s most characteristic positions: (1) that Aristotle’s theory of abstraction is insufficient for certitude and must be supplemented by a divine illumination (2) and that the temporal beginning of the world is philosophically demonstrable.

Bonaventure on Illumination (=Fairweather, Eugene. A Scholastic Miscellany: Anselm to Ockham. Edited and Translated by Eugene R. Fairweather, The Library of Christian Classics, V. 10. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1956, pp. 379-401). = Disputed Question on the Knowledge of Christ, q. 4.

Bonaventure against the Eternity of the World (=Thomas, Siger, Bonaventure, Cyril O. Vollert, Lottie H. Kendzierski, and Paul M. Byrne. On the Eternity of the World : (De Aeternitate Mundi), Mediaeval Philosophical Texts in Translation ; No. 16. Milwaukee, Wis.: Marquette University Press, 1964, pp. 105-117). = Commentary on the Sentences II d.1, p.1, a.1, q.2.

 

BONAVENTURE II
DIVINE ILLUMINATION

Text

Disputed Question on the Knowledge of Christ, q. 4. = Fairweather, Eugene. A Scholastic Miscellany: Anselm to Ockham. Edited and Translated by Eugene R. Fairweather, The Library of Christian Classics, V. 10. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1956, pp. 379-401.

Bibliography

Brady, Ignatius. “Bonaventure’s Doctrine of Illumination: Reactions Medieval and Modern.” In Bonaventure and Aquinas Enduring Philosophers. Ed. R. Shahan and F. Kovach. Norman, OK, 1976, pp.57-68.
Crowly, T. “Illumination and Certitude,” in San Bonaventura – Maestro di vita francescana e di sapienza cristiana. Ed. A Pompei. 3 vols. Rome, 1974, 3:431-48.
Everton, Troy. “Saint Bonaventure’s illumination theory of knowledge. The reconciliation of Aristotle, Pseudo-Dionysius and Augustine.” Miscellanea francescana 88:1-2, 1988, 108-121.
Gilson, Bonaventure, pp. 352 et seq.
Quinn, Historical Constitution, pp. 527-47.

Background

Illumination is one of the most recognizable ‘Augustinian’ doctrines of the thirteenth century, which together with those of the demonstrability of the temporal beginning of the world, the priority of the will over the intellect, and a greater emphasis on the role of faith in natural reasoning, comprised the later medieval complex of ‘Augustinianism’.
The medieval doctrine of illumination ultimately derives from the Platonic view argued in Republic V that opinion (doxa) and knowledge (gnome) have different objects. True knowledge can only be of what truly is, namely, that which is eternal and unchanging. True objects of knowledge accordingly cannot be sensible things, which change and therefore about such can only be mutuable opinion, but only the separately existing, unchanging, universal forms. Sensible things were only imperfect approximations of the separate forms and could not themselves be the source of knowledge. In the middle Plato, sensation functioned only as an occasion of knowledge, prompting a recollection of the transcendent objects to which they bore some relation of similarity.
This basic outlook passed into Augustine where the Platonic forms were in turn identified with the divine ideas or exemplars of things in the divine mind. Augustine makes this heritage clear in his classic statement on the Platonic ideas and their relation to the Christian God. Note that according to Augustine, as Plato had maintained for the ultimate form of the Good, the divine ‘reasons’ or ideas are causes both of truth and being:

Plato is known as the first to have named the Ideas (ideae). <…> So, in Latin we may call Ideas forms (formae) or species (species), to make it clear that we are translating word for word. But, if we call them ‘reasons,’ (rationes) we are departing somewhat from a strict translation; reasons are called logoi in Greek and not Ideas. However, if a person chose to use this term, he would not be far from the real meaning. In fact, Ideas are the primary forms, or the permanent and immutable reasons of real things, and they are not themselves formed; so they are, as a consequence, eternal and ever the same in themselves, and they are contained in the divine intelligence. And since they never come into being or go out of it, everything that can come into being and go out of it, and everything that does come into being and goes out of it, may be said to be formed in accord with them. It is denied that the soul can look upon them, unless it be rational, in that part whereby it excels, that is, in its mind and reason, as it were in its face or interior and intellectual eye. <…> Now, if these reasons for all things to be created, or already created, are contained in the divine mind, and if there can be nothing in the divine mind unless it be eternal and immutable, and if Plato called these primary reasons of things Ideas, then not only do Ideas exist but they are true because they are eternal and they endure immutably in this way; and it is by participation in these that whatever exists is produced, however its way of existing may be. (Augustine, On Eighty-Three Diverse Questions q. 46 nn. 1-2; translation from Vernon Bourke, The Essential Augustine [Hackett, 1981], pp. 62-63).

To illumination is opposed to the Aristotelian doctrine of abstraction. Aristotle denied against Plato that the forms of sensible things were separate from the material particulars. This entailed that full knowledge had to be derived from the sensible things. This Aristotle did by noting that the sensible thing was intelligible in potency, but only in act as in the intellect.

Between the poles of Augustine and Aristotle, Bonaventure holds for illumination as a supplement to Aristotle, whose theory of abstraction cannot account for strict certitude in which there is (1) immutability of object and (2) infallibility of knower. Also, despite the Platonic pedigree of illumination, Bonaventure also rejects a strict Platonism in which the sole object of knowledge would be the divine ideas or transcendent forms, as this both theoretically leads and historically did lead, to skepticism.

Disputed Question on the Knowledge of Christ q.4

The question comes from his Disputed Question on the Knowledge of Christ q. 4 held as a Master at Paris. The title of the question “Whether what is known by us with certitude is known in the eternal reasons themselves” deserves some comment. The ‘eternal reasons’ are the divine ideas, that is, the perfect and unchanging examplars of things existing in the mind of God. This is the doctrine of illumination: that certitude requires a knowledge, in some fashion, of the divine ideas themselves. The point of this question is not so much to show that some illumination is required, but to define it accurately. If we know ‘in’ the divine ideas, what does this mean.

Structure of the question: The question is very complicated. There are some 34 arguments pro and 26 arguments contra. The pro arguments 1-8 are taken first from Augustine as authority, followed others (9-16), which are roughly arranged chronologically, except for the one text of Aristotle in support of illumination, which is last. Then there are arguments (17-28) from Augustine, followed by still further arguments not from Augustine (28-34) There are then authorities against this view 1-22, followed by specific arguments 23-26 against Augustine Bonaventure answers the question, in which he takes a moderate position between two extremes, and then answers the objections contra.

SOLUTION:

Note that it is not contested that whatever is known in certitude is known in light of the eternal reasons, but only what ‘in light of the eternal reasons’ means. There are two extreme interpretations, while B. maintains his own, middle theory.

First interpretation:

The first interpretation is that the eternal reasons are the total and sole principle of knowledge. B. argues against this:

It would mean that we know all things in the Word, that is, by seeing all things as divine ideas in the second Person of the Trinity. This is clearly contrary to fact, because in the Word all knowledge is one and perfect, and thus there would be no distinction between knowledge in heaven versus in the present state, or between as unified in the Word and as different types, or between theoretical versus practical, or from nature and grace, or between from reason and revelation.

This is in fact Plato’s view (the first Academy) who held that we do not know things in the material world but only the Forms of the intelligible world. But since in fact the human mind in its present condition is limited to the material world, this gave rise to skepticism of the New Academy, who held nothing is known with certainty.

In sum, the first view holds such a strong view of illumination that it subsistutes the divine ideas for the objects of the present world, denying that they can be known, and hence leading to skepticism.

Second interpretation:

If the first view assigns to much to illumination by making the divine ideas the only objects we know, the second view is extreme in assigning too little by denying that in having full certitude the divine ideas are known at all. Rather, on this view, we do not attain the divine ideas themselves but have only a ‘influence’ from them. B. does not elaborate exactly what this ‘influence’ is but it seems to mean that the divine ideas create some quality or disposition in the mind – a habit in Aristotelian terms – which then ensures the mind achieves certitude. We thus do not have certitude by knowing the divine ideas directly but by means of some intermediate light or effect. B. rejects this also:

It is opposed to Augustine who is explicit that certain knowledge is not achieved by something of the mind’s own nature, but by seeing that which is above the mind itself, the eternal reasons.

Furthermore, this light which is an influence from God is either general, that is, a part of ordinary creation in the present state, or special, that is invernening in a extraordinary way after original creation. The first possibility is really what Aristotelians, like Aquinas, hold, namely, that illumination is just the natural light concreated in the intellect as its ability to know. B. rejects this because it would mean that knowledge does not hold a special relationship in creation to God. The second possibility is rejected because it would equate knowledge with grace or supernatural gift, and not make it a natural phenomenon at all.

Middle interpretation:

Thus, B. holds a middle view between these two extremes which holds that the divine ideas act with our created reason so that they are not the sole principles of knowledge, against the first view, but themselves are known by us in part, against the second view, and to the degree possible in our present, fallen state, which is to say, not with complete clarity. For B., it is necessary for certitude that our intellect attain in some way the divine ideas themselves: “Quod autem mens nostra in certitudinali cognitione aliquo modo attingat illas incommutabiles rationes.” As partial principles of certitude, they function to move and regulate the intellect. B. argues that this is required by both the dignity of knowledge and the knower:

Knowledge: Fully certain knowledge requires (1) immutability of the object and (2) infallibility of the knower. Now the created object is not immutably true (i.e., it can change or is defective) nor is the created knower infallible in its own powers (i.e., they change or be mistaken). Therefore, if full certitude requires both immutability and infallibility, then recourse must be had to the divine ideas or mind, both as to ‘light’ which grants infallibility to the mind and to ‘truth’ which makes the objects immutable. Thus, since the things we know exist in three ways, in material reality, in our minds, and in the divine mind, and since the first two are both mutable, certitude is only possible if we attain things as they exist in the divine mind, or the divine ideas.

Knower: Here B. appeals to the distinction Augustine makes between the inferior and superior reason, which roughly means reason insofar as it is concerned with material things (e.g., as in natural science) as revealed through sense and reason insofar as it is concerned with higher, eternal things (e.g., as in theology). Basically, B. identifies the inferior reason with the Aristotelian process of abstraction from the senses, which must be regulated by the superior part of reason that has contact with the divine ideas. To explains this, B. appeals to the common view that the human being has a threefold relation to God as vestige, image, and similitude. All of creation has a relation to God as a vestige insofar as it is dependent upon God for being. The rational creature has a relation as image since it can know God.

vestige God as creator BEING
image God as object and mover KNOWLEDGE (Note distinction between vestige = relation to God as creator insofar as put into being and image = relation to God as mover to its acts once into being.)
similitude God as savior (i.e., made Godlike in beatitude) GRACE

The argument is that if there is no illumination, then relation to God as image is eliminated. That is, dignity of human being as image of God requires illumination.

But note the lower reason in which Aristotelian abstraction functions provides us with the basic contents of things we know, for the soul is not an image of God with respect to its whole nature, but only with respect to the inferior reason. Therefore, Aristotelian abstraction in a necessary but insufficient principle of knowledge, for it relies alone on a changeable object and mind. These must be in turn regulated by the divine ideas which are eternal. The abstractions of created ideas remain as particular and distinct principles of knowledge with which illumination cooperates: “Rursus, quia non ex se tota est anima imago, ideo cum his attingit rerum similitudines abstractas a phantasmate tanquam proprias et distinctas cognoscendi rationes, sine quibus non sufficit sibi ad cognoscendum lumen rationis aeternae.”

But we as the image we only know the divine ideas in part, and as in the fallen state, we only known them obscurely.

comprehensor fully and distinctly

innocent in part but not obscurely
viator
fallen in part but obscurely

What is the epistemological function of illumination for B. As we have seen abstraction cannot result in knowledge of something as immutable, since both (1) the created mind changes and (2) the created object changes. Insofar as the general concept of traingle exists in my intellect, it cannot be known as the basis for, and the object of, immutable truth, since it changes, e.g., comes into to being, exists imperfectly, etc. both in itself and in the mind. But even to judge that this is the case, requires some knowledge of the triangle as absolutely immutable. This is only the idea of triangle in the mind of God.

ARISTOTLE sense object ⇒sense power ⇒imagination ⇒intellect (created/ non-eternal ratio as general concept of the sense object)

AUGUSTINE Illumination by the eternal ratio in the divine mind.

By admitting that the eternal ratio is the partial principle of knowledge and only known obscurely in the present state, B. can deny against the objections that illumination means knowing God, or knowing as God knows, or having only God as the object of the intellect.
BONAVENTURE III:
ETERNITY OF THE WORLD

Text

Commentary on the Sentences II d.1, p.1, a.1, q.2. in Thomas, Siger, Bonaventure, On the Eternity of the World: (De Aeternitate Mundi). Edd. Cyril O. Vollert, Lottie H. Kendzierski, and Paul M. Byrne. Milwaukee, Wis.: Marquette University Press, 1964, pp. 105-117.

Literature

Baldner, Steven. “St. Bonaventure and the Demonstrability of a Temporal Beginning: A Reply to Richard Davis.” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 71:2, 1997, 225-236.
——. Saint Bonaventure and the Temporal Beginning of the World. New-Scholasticism. 1989; 63: 206-228
Bonansea, Bernardino. “The Impossiblity of Creation from Eternity according to St. Bonaventure.” In Thomas and Bonaventure. A Septicentenary Commemoration. Ed. George E. Mclean (Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, 48). Washington, 1974, 121-135
Dales, Richard C. Medieval Discussions of the Eternity of the World. Leiden; New York: E.J. Brill, 1990.
Kovach, Francis. “The Question of the Eternity of the World in St Bonaventure and St Thomas–A Critical Analysis.” Southwestern Journal of Philosophy. 1974; 5: 141-172. Reprinted in Bonaventure and Aquinas Enduring Philosophers, pp.155-86.
Davis, Richard. “Bonaventure and the Arguments for the Impossibility of an Infinite Temporal Regression.” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 70:3, 1996, 361-380
Speer, Andreas. “The Certainty and Scope of Knowledge: Bonaventure’s Disputed Questions on the Knowledge of Christ.” Medieval Philosophy and Theology 3, 1993, 35-61.
Van Veldhuijsen, P. “The Question of the Possibility of an Eternally Created World: Bonaventura and Thomas Aquinas.” In The Eternity of the World in the Thought of Thomas Aquinas and his Comtemporaries. Ed. J. Wissink. Leiden, 1990.

Bonaventure on the Eternity of the World

The eternity of the world is one of the three main errors of Averroism identified by B.: eternity of the world, one intellect for the human race, and impossibility of personal immortality. As we shall see, B. does not think Aristotle can uphold eternity and deny either unity of the intellect or personal immortality. The texts we have are from two different periods of B.’s career. The first is from the Sentences (1250-55) and the Collationes in Hexaemeron is one of his last works, in 1273 just before he died. What is significant is that B.’s attitude towards A. changes9. He is more tolerant and charitable early in the Sentences but becomes more negative in the latter Hexaemeron. The reason for this was that A.’s views had taken hold in the Arts faculty and held to be true as far as philosophy goes.

The question over the eternity of the world of course concerns creation. The issue is whether it is possible that the world could be created and yet be eternal at the same time. In general, Avicenna maintained that the world could be both created and eternal. But B. is adamant that ‘creation’ in this sense is a weak sense and not ‘ex nihilo’ or from nothing. B. regards creation ex nihilo and eternal world to be a contradiction in terms. Thus, we must recognize two senses of creation: one in which the world, including matter, space and time, was itself produced into being from nothing, so that the world has a temporal beginning or a first moment in time; and one in which presupposing the eternity of matter and time (and thus of the world) it can be in some sense construed as created, even though it has no beginning in time.

In general, B. and Aq. will differ significantly not on whether the world is created so that it has a first moment and was not eternal – both believe of course that it is – but whether the creation of the world in this strong sense (1) is philosophically demonstrable and whether (2) an eternally created world is possible, even if not factually the case. Aquinas denies (1) and holds only that it can be shown philosophically that the world depends on God for its being, even if for an eternity.

Sentences:

Note the title of the question: “Has the world been produced in time or from eternity.” That is, has the world been so produced that with it time began, and so is not eternal, or has it been made or created for all eternity. This issue is not whether the world is created, but whether it is eternally created.

Bonaventure first gives (I) Aristotle’s arguments for the eternity of the world, (II) his own arguments against eternity, (III) and then his solution.

I. Aristotle’s arguments for the eternity of the world:

From the nature of time and movement

The arguments that it has not been produced in time – i.e., that there is no first moment of the world, prior to which, the world did not exist – are from Aristotle’s Physics. These arguments all show that a first motion or a first time are absurd. Before begin, a few reminders about Aristotle’s cosmology and physics:

Cosmos: Ummoved mover moves the outermost sphere or heavenly bodies, from which all other celestial motions derive. This motion is circular and local, since perfect.

Change: Motion and Being. Strictly speaking, physical motion for Aristotle is of three kinds: place, quantity, quality, while going in and out of being is a change of substance, or generation and corruption. The former are between contraries, the latter between contradictories. Aristotle held that all change in being required a prior a motion – that is substantial change was always preceded by some accidental change — ultimately going back to the locomotions of the heavens, which provided heat among other things.

Time and motion in the proper sense are always found together, for time is nothing more than the measure of motion. (They are not identical, however, since only one time, but many movements.) For Aristotle time without motion or motion without time is contradictory.

(1)
Prior to every movement and change, there is the movement of the primum mobile.
But whatever comes into being does so by way of a prior motion.
Therefore, the motion of the primum mobile preceeds that change by which anything comes into being.

But then if the primum mobile came into being or had a first motion, it would have to have preceded itself, which is impossible.

Therefore, it did not have a beginning.

First premise is true, because the perfect always preceeds the imperfect. But the movement of the outermost heaven is both locomotion (since motion of what is already complete) and circular (most continuous), which means it is most perfect.

(2)
Everything comes to be through motion or change.
If therefore motion comes to be, it must do so as a result of some prior motion.
Either infinite regress of motions coming to be or some motion does not come to be, i.e., has no beginning.
If motion does not have beginning, then the body moved does not, then the world is eternal.

(3)
Everything that begins to be does so either in instant or in time.
Therefore, if the world begins to be, either in an instant or in time.
But prior to every time or instant, there is time.
Consequently, there is a time prior to the world coming into being.
But such time could not exist without the world.
Therefore, no beginning.

(4)
If time is produced, then either in an instant or in time.
Not in an instant, therefore in time.
But in every time there is a past and future.
If therefore produced in time, then there will have been a time before every time, which is absurd.

B. From the nature of God as cause:
(5)
When an actual and sufficient cause is given, the effect is given.
But God for all eternity has been an actual and sufficient cause of the world.
Therefore, God has created the world from all eternity.
(6)
A cause that begins to produce after not having produced goes from potency to act
What goes from potency to acts is subject to motion and rest.
If God has not produced the world from eternity, then he begins to produce it after not having produced it.
Therefore, God would go from act to potency and be subject to motion and rest.
This is absurd, so God produces from eternity.

II. Against Eternity

Here Bonaventure gives six arguments, the first five of which are all based in some way on the denial of an actual infinite, which an eternal world is taken to imply, and a sixth that the concepts of ‘eternal’ and ‘created’ are contradictory. Bonaventure takes the first set concerning actual infinites to be based on “self-evident propositions” We examine the last two of these arguments:

(5)
An infinite number of things cannot exist simultaneously.
But if the world were eternal, there would have been an infinite number of human beings generated.
Arg: The world could not have existed without human beings, since everything in the world exists for their sake, and the life span of a human being is limited.
There have been as many rational souls as human beings.
Since the rational soul is incorruptible, there therefore actually exist an infinite number of rationsal souls, which is absurd ex hypothesi.

Objection: (1) either there is transmigration of souls or (2) only one rational soul or intellect for the human species.
Reply: (1) The first is an error in philosophy, for the soul is the act of a body and cannot be the act of another body; the second is even more erroneous since on this principle there can much less be one act for all bodies.

(6)
It is a contradiction for that which has being after non-being to be eternal.
World has being after non-being.
Arg: Everything that has being totally from another is produced from nothing.
The world has its being its being totally from God.
Therefore, the world is produced from nothing.
[Therefore, the world has being after non-being.]
Therefore, the world is not eternal.

III. Solution

Bonaventure’s position ultimately depends on this last argument: that the world world be created ex nihilo and be eternal or be eternally created is a contradiction. Bonaventure’s point is that if creation, as distinct from mere generation, is ex nihilo, then, unlike generation, it does not presuppose matter and time, but these are themselves the object of creation ex nihilo. On this point Aquinas will differ, holding that no contradiction can be elicited from the conception of an eternally created world.

If, however, matter is assumed to be eternal, then in some sense we can speak meaningfully of an eternal creation (although, again, this would not be ex nihilo.) Using Augustine’s examples of the footprint in the dust and the flame and light, Bonaventure argues that if creation were construed as the impressing of the foot (form) in the dust (matter), then if both were co-eternal, we can conceive of an eternal creation.

Aristotle either thought of eternal creation in this way or else, as some have interpreted him, (here Bonaventure follows Alexander of Hales) intended his arguments only to exclude that some natural motion could have brought about the world. Bonaventure does not adjudicate which view of Aristotle he thinks is correct, but seems to prefer the latter as at least espousing a true position.

If, however, Aristotle intended his arguments to exclude not just that the world could have come about by some natural change, but any change whatever, then Aristotle erred. Furthermore, to avoid (1) outright inconsistency, he would have to deny that the world was ex nihilo and to avoid (2) inconsistency on his own principles, namely, that there cannot be an actual infinite, he would either have to admit that the rational soul is (a) corruptible, (b) undergoes transmigration or (c) is one for the human race. In any case, Bonaventure, quoting Aristotle himself, says that Aristotle would have made “a bad beginning and an even worse ending.”

Although here in the Sentences Bonaventure reserves judgement on Aristotle, in In Hexameron VII.1-2, he seems to think that Aristotle held this latter, more erroneous view.
THOMAS AQUINAS

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Editions

The standard edition of Aquinas’s works is the Leonine edition, so called from Pope Leo XIII who established a commission in 1879 to produce reliable texts of Aquinas. The initial volumes were hastily edited without a thorough inventory of manuscripts of Aquinas works or firmly established critical criteria. For a history of the Leonine Commission, see J. P Reilly, ‘The Leonine Enterprise: An Exercise in Historical Discovery,’ in The Proceedings of the PMR Conference 7 (1982) 1-12. For a list of more recent Leonine texts, which have been produced according to the highest critical standards, see Maurer, p. 437.

Two readily available opera omnia of Aquinas are the Vivès [34 vols. (Paris, 18711880)] and the Parma [25 vols. (Parma, 18521873)].

Indices and Bibliographies

Ingardia, Richard. Thomas Aquinas: International Bibliography 1977-1990. Bowling Green, OH: Philosophy Documentation Centre, 1993.
Rassegna di letteratura tomistica. Naples, 1969-.

General Studies

Chenu, Marie-Dominique. Introduction à l’étude de Saint Thomas d’Aquin. 2nd ed. Montréal, 1954. Translation: Toward Understanding Saint Thomas. Trans. A.-M. Landry and D. Hughes. Chicago, 1964.
Davies, Brian (ed.) Thomas Aquinas: Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives, 2002.
——. The Thought of Thomas Aquinas. Oxford: Clarendon, 1992.
Gilson, Etienne. Le thomisme: Introduction à la philosophie de Saint Thomas d’Aquin. 6th rev. ed. Paris, 1972. Translation.: Thomism: the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. Trans. Laurence K. Shook and Armand Maurer. Toronto, 2002.
Kretzman, Norman and Eleonore Stump. The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas. Cambridge, 1993.
Stump, Eleonore. Aquinas. New York : Routledge, 2003. (Arguments of the philosophers)
Thomas von Aquin: Werk und Wirkung im Licht neuerer Forschungen. Ed. Albert Zimmermann. Miscellanea Mediaevalia 19. Berlin-New York, 1988.
Torrell, Jean-Pierre. Initiation à saint Thomas d’Aquin. Fribourg: CERF, 1993. [Updates and corrects Weisheipl.] Translation.: Saint Thomas Aquinas. Volume 1: The Person and His Work. Trans. Robert Royal. Washington, D. C., 1996.
Weisheipl, James A. Friar Thomas D’Aquino: His life, Thought, and Works. 2nd rev. ed. Washington, D.C., 1983. [Dated and reverential, but still useful for general institution and intellectual background to Aquinas’s thought.]
Wippel, John F. Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas. Washington, D.C., 1984.

The Existence of God

Owens, Joseph. St. Thomas Aquinas on the Existence of God: Collected Papers of Joseph Owens. Ed. John R. Catan. Albany, 1980.
Wippel, John F. The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas. Washington, D. C., 2000.

Human Nature

Bradley, Denis J. M. Aquinas On the Twofold Human Good: Reason and Human Happiness in Aquinas’s Moral Science .Washington, D.C. : Catholic University of America Press, 1997.
Pasnau, Robert. Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature: A Philosophical Study of Summa Theologiae 1a, 75-89. Cambridge, UK ; New York, NY : Cambridge University Press, 2002.
Pegis, Anton Charles. St. Thomas and the Problem of the Soul in the Thirteenth Century. Toronto, 1931.

Ethics and Law

Brown, Oscar J. Natural Rectitude and Divine Law in Aquinas. Toronto, 1981. [See Appendix I: Iux and Lex in Aquinas, pp. 164-74.]
Flannery, Kevin L. Acts Amid Precepts : The Aristotelian Logical Structure of Thomas Aquinas’s Moral Theory. Washington, D.C. : Catholic University of America Press, c2001.
Pope, Stephen J (ed.). The Ethics of Aquinas. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2002.
Westberg, D. Right Practical Reason: Aristotle, Action, and Prudence in Aquinas, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994.
Westerman, Pauline C. The Disintegration of Natural Law Theory : Aquinas to Finnis. Leiden ; New York : Brill, 1998.

THE ACADEMIC CAREER OF THOMAS AQUINAS

1252-56 Bachelor of the Sentences at Paris
Sept 1256-July 1259 Regent Master of Theology at Paris
1259- Nov 1268 Sojurn in Italy:
Naples (1259-61)
Orvieto (1261-65)
Rome (1265-67)
Viterbo (1267-68)
Jan 1269-April 1272 Second Parisian Regency
Sept 1272-Dec 1273 Regent Master at Naples

Born of noble parents about 1225 at Roccasecca, near Aquino (Italy), he spent the years 1231-39 as an oblate in the Benedictine Abbey of Monte Cassino. Going to the University of Naples in 1239, he studied arts and philosophy there until 1244, when he joined the Dominican Order. Opposing this decision, his mother (Donna Theodora) took him home and tried to change his mind, but Thomas refused to alter his decision, and so he was allowed to rejoin the Dominicans at Naples by 1245. He was sent away to complete his studies either to Paris (1245-48) then to Cologne (1248-52), or to Cologne (1245-52) where he certainly studied under Albert the Great from 1248. He finished his studies in Paris (1252-56), reading the Bible (1252-53) and then the Sentences (1253-56), becoming a master of theology there in 1256 with a chair in the Faculty of Theology up to 1259. During that time, in addition to his commentaries on Scripture and the Sentences, he produced:

De ente et essentia (1256)
Quaestiones disputatae de veritate
Quaestiones quodlibetales (7-11)

He was sent to Italy in 1259 and taught in Naples, Orvietto, Rome and Viterbo until 1268, writing the following:

Commentaries on Boethius (1258-60)
Summa contra Gentiles (1261-63)
Quaestiones disputatae:
De potentia (circa 1265)
De spiritualibus creaturis (1266)
De anima (1267)
Commentary on the Physics (1267)
Summa theologiae Ia (1266-68)

Thomas was sent back to Paris in 1269 and took an active part in the Averroist controversies; at the same time, he was commissioned by Clement IV to rectify the writings of Aristotle, a task he accomplished with the aid of new translations by William of Moerbeke. Thomas taught at Paris until 1272, some of his doctrines barely escaping censure in the condemnation of 1270, the year of his great debate on the unity of substantial form with John Peckham and other masters of theology at Easter. Thomas produced during this period the following:

Summa theologiae IaIIae (c. 1269-70)
Quaestiones disputatae:
De malo
De virtutibus in commune
Quaestiones quodlibetales (1-3, 12)
Commentaries on Aristotle (all in 1269-71):
Politics
De anima
De sensu
De memoria et reminiscentia
Peri hermeneias
Posterior Analytics
De unitate intellectus (1270)
Summa theologiae IIaIIae (c. 1270-72)
Commentaries on Aristotle (c. 1270-72)
Ethics
Metaphysics
Also in period 1271-72:
De substantiis separatis
De aeternitate mundi
Expositio super librum de causis
Quaestiones quodlibetales (4-6)

Thomas returned to Naples at Easter in 1272 to organize there a studium generale for the Dominicans. He stayed at Naples until 1274 when he wrote:

Commentaries on Aristotle:
De caelo et mundo
De generatione et corruptione
Compendium theologiae
Summa theologiae IIIa.

All of the above left unfinished when called to assist at the Council of Lyons. He died on the way to the Council at Fossanova on 7 March 1274.

THE MAJOR WRITINGS OF THOMAS AQUINAS

This list of Thomas’ Writings has been taken from James A. Weisheipl, Friar Thomas D’Aquino: His Life, Thought, and Work (New York, 1974), pp. 355-405. Weisheipl’s headings and numbering of Aquinas’ works has been maintained.

I. Theological Syntheses

1. Scriptum super libros Sententiarum (Paris 1252-56; 451 mss. +100 fragments)
2. Summa contra gentiles (Paris, Naples, Orvieto 1259-64; 184mss.)
3. Summa theologiae (Rome, Viterbo, Paris, Naples 1266-73; 959 mss. + 235 fragments)

II. Academic Disputations

4. De veritate qq. 1-29 (Paris 1256-59; 95 mss.)
5. De potentia qq. 1-10 (Rome 1265-66; 61 mss.)
6. De malo qq. 1-16 (Rome 1266-67; 70 mss.)
7. De spiritualibus creaturis (Italy 1267-68; 64 mss.)
8. De anima (Paris, Feb-April 1269; 81 mss.)
9. De virtutibus in communi, de caritate, de correctione fraterna, de spe, de virtutibus cardinalibus (Paris 1269-72; 52 mss.)
10. De unione verbi incarnati (Paris, April 1272; 53 mss.)
12-24. Quaestiones de quodlibet 1-12 (Paris 1256-59, 1269-72; 137 mss)

III. Expositions on Scripture

25-35. See Weisheipl, Friar Thomas, pp. 368-74.

IV. Expositions on Aristotle

36. Sententia super Peri hermenias (Paris 1270-72; 21 mss.)
37. Sententia super Posteriora Analytica (Paris 1269-72; 55 mss.)
38. Sententia super Physicam (Paris 1269-70; 64 mss.)
39. Sententia de caelo et mundo (Naples 1272-73; 38 mss)
40. Sententia super libros De generatione et corruptione (Naples 1272-73; 4 mss.)
41. Sententia super Meteora (Paris or Naples 1269-73; 11 mss.)
42. Sententia super De anima (Paris 1269-70; 67 mss.)
43. Sententia super de sensu et sensato (41 mss.)
44. Sententia super de memoria et reminiscentia (48 mss)
45. Sententia super Metaphysicam (Paris, Naples [?] 1269-72; 74 mss.)
46. Sententia libri Ethicorum (Paris 1271; 86 mss.)
47. Sententia libri Politicorum (Paris 1269-72; 27 mss.)

V. Other Expositions

48. Expositio super librum Boethii De Trinitate (Paris 1258-59; 19 mss. + autograph)
49. Expositio super librum Boethii De hebdomatibus (Paris 1256-59; 32 mss.)
50. Expositio super Dionysium De divinis nominibus (Rome 1265-67; 26 mss.)
51. Expositio super librum De causis (Paris 1271-72; 55 mss.)

VI. Polemical Writings

55. De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas (Paris 1270; 56 mss.)
56. De aeternitate mundi contra murmurantes (Paris 1270; 89 mss.)

VII. Treatises on Special Subjects

57. De fallaciis ad quosdam nobiles artistas (Roccasecca 1244-45;5 mss.)
58. De ente et essentia ad fratres et socios suos (Paris 1252-56; 189 mss.)
59. De principiis naturae ad fratrem Sylvestrum (Paris 1252-56; 82 mss.)
60. Compendium theologiae (Paris or Naples 1269-73; 82 mss.)
61. De substantiis separatis (Paris or Naples 1271-73; 29 mss.)
62. De regno ad regem Cypri (Rome 1265-67; 86 mss.)
AQUINAS ON THE ETERNITY OF THE WORLD

ST 1.46.1 Has the world always existed

Solution:

Nothing other than God can be eternal. Aquinas then shows that (1) this conclusion is not impossible (2) therefore it cannot be demonstratively proved that the world is eternal and (3) Aristotle’s arguments for the eternity of the world are not demonstrative.

(1):
God’s will is the cause of things.
Therefore, since the necessity of an effect depends upon the necessity of the cause, something exists necessarily to the extent that God necessarily wills it to exist.
But the divine will does not necessarily will anything except the divine nature.
Thus, it is not necessary that the world exist or exist eternally.

(2):
Since it is not necessary that the world exist, for it proceeds contingently from the will of God, there can be no possible demonstration that it does so exist, for only that which is necessarily true can be demonstrated.

(3):
Consequently, Aristotle’s arguments absolutely demonstrative, but only in certain sense, namely, that they disprove false claims of his predecessors about how the world began. This is clear from three things in Aristotle himself:

In the Physics he adduces opinions of his precedessors about the origin of the world, Anaxagoras, Empedocles, and Plato, which he then goes on to refute. I.e., Anaxagoras asserted that all things in the world had been mixed and at rest for an infinite time before they were separated out by Mind; Empedocles holds that the world is alternately at rest and motion; Plato held that time itself had a beginning.
Whenever he speaks about this topic – the eternity of the world – he brings in older authorities, which is not a demonstrative method but dialectical, since no demonstrative argument can rest on authority.
Finally in his work called Topics, which concerns dialectical rather than demonstrative reasoning, he specifically name the eternity of the world as such a dialectical matter.
ST 1.46.2 Whether it is an article of faith that the world began

Solution:

It is an article of faith that the world began in time from two considerations:

It cannot be proved from the world itself. For if it were proved from the world, it would have to be established from the nature of the world, since ‘essence is the basis of demonstration’. But the essence of a thing abstracts from the ‘here and now’ of actual existence, precisely on the basis of which the universals hold true always. Since the essence of the world abstracts from existence, it cannot be proved from its nature that it either always has or has not existed.
It cannot be proved from the cause, because the cause of the world is the will of God, which is beyond human knowledge.

Objections:

Whatever is the effect of an efficient cause has a beginning to its duration. (I.e., if it was ‘made’ then prior to this it was not.) But it can be demonstratively proven that God made the world, and even the better philosophers maintained this.

Two opinions of the philosophers on this matter acc. to Aug. One that the substance of the world not from God, and this is false and disproved. The other is that the world is eternal but still made by God. It has no beginning in time but is always created and so in a barely understandable way it is ‘made’. Footprint in the sand from eternity example. But this cannot lead to conclusion that the world has beginning in time for there are two kinds of efficient cause: one that acts through motion successively over time and such an effect exist only at the completion of the action. Such an effect will have a beginning in time and the cause precedes the effect in time. Or the action of the agent can be instantaneous with the effect and so will not precede the effect in time. But creation is not something that comes about through change over time but is instantaneous.

If the world was made by God, then either from something or nothing. But not from something, because then matter would have preceded the world. Then from nothing, and so began to exist.

Philosophers held that creation meant not after nothing but from nothing.

If world always existed, then an infinite number of days traversed. But cannot traverse infinite, so not arrived a present day.

This involves a fallacy that some point of past durations is infinity distant from the present. This is false. Even if the world eternal any point in the past is finitely distant from the present and so traversable.

If world eternal, then infinite number of generation of one from another. But the parents are the efficient cause of offspring. Therefore, an infinite number of efficient causes, which all the philosophers deny.

This is a regress in accidental not essential causes, for that this particular parent should generate is incidental. What is the essential cause are all those factors required at the moment of generation to cooperate in the production of the human being, e.g., human nature, a bodily organ, heat, etc.

If world eternal, then infinite generations, and hence infinite number of human souls, since they are immortal.

There are many answers to this argument which many philosophers held. But in the end, it only proves that the human being is not eternal, not that the world as a whole is not. E.g., angels.

AQUINAS
DIVINE ILLUMINATION

Recall that one of the main points that separate Augustinians and Aristotelians is the theory of illumination. As we saw, for Bonaventure this meant that in some sense the divine ideas had to be the objects themselves of knowledge. “Quod autem mens nostra in certitudinali cognitione aliquo modo attingat illas incommutabiles rationes.” He had rejected the view that that they were not themselves known but only exercised some influence on the human mind. Aquinas deals with this in:

ST I.84.5: Whether the human soul knows things in the eternal exemplars (i.e., reasons):

The objections are all the standard ones brought forward from Augustine. The sed contra is in fact the main text of Augustine from the De libero arbitrio in which Augustine argues that we each see an unchanging truth that is above our minds, which change.

Solution:

Aquinas answers by quoting Augustine to the effect that we accept from philosophy that which does not run contrary to the faith. Augustine by his own admission was inbued with Platonism, which is the origin of the doctrine of illumination. According to Plato, the forms of natural things exist apart from the material particular. These forms he called Ideas, and just as the sense particular has whatever being it possesses by participating in these separate forms, so our intellect knows by participating in that separate form.

But Augustine saw it as contrary to faith to posit the forms of things as subsisting eternally and of themselves apart from matter, for this seemed to make the forms of all things gods. Thus, Augustine modified Plato’s doctrine of the Forms by placing them, as they exist eternally, in the mind of God as divine ideas. Thus, it is according to these eternal Forms in the divine mind that things both exist and are known.

But then what does it mean for the human intellect to know things ‘in’ the eternal exemplars or reasons? One thing is known ‘in’ another in two ways: Either as (a) that which is known or (b) that by which we know. But (a) cannot be the case, because the eternal exemplars are the divine ideas, and hence to know the forms of things in them as if they were the objects known would be to know the divine ideas themselves. This, however, is impossible in the present state or condition, but occurs only in the beatitude of the next life in which the vision of God occurs. (b) Rather, we know things in the eternal exemplars insofar as they are that by which we know. But we know by means of an intellectual light, that is, the agent intellect of Aristotle which enables us to abstract the forms from things. Thus, the divine ideas are found in us insofar as we possess the innate capacity to know.

But the intellectual light in us is not sufficient, as the Platonist thought, to account for knowledge. Rather, we also require the intelligible species of sensible things in order to know. Notice that here Aquinas and Bonaventure would agree, albeit for different reasons, that a strong Platonic view is unacceptable whereby a knowledge of the eternal exemplars would be sufficient for knowledge in the present life.

As Augustine is clear that only in the next life is the vision of God possible in which we would see the divine exemplars themselves, this is his true position.

Summary: Aquinas agrees that there is divine illumination by which we know things in the eternal exemplars or reasons, but thinks this can be accounted for by the agent intellect of Aristotle.

JOHN DUNS SCOTUS
BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. Primary Sources:
A. Editions:
Scotus, J. D. (1639). Joannis Duns Scoti Doctoris Subtilis Ordinis Minorum Opera omnia. Editio Lucae Waddingi. 12 vols. Lugduni: Sumptibus L. Durand, 1639. [Known as the Wadding edition after its editor, Luke Wadding. Contains many spurious works. For which works are certainly authentic see, Charles Balic, John Duns Scotus. Some Reflections on the Occasion of the Seventh Centenary of his Birth (Rome, 1966), pp. 29-44.
Scotus, J. D. (1891). Joannis Duns Scoti opera omnia. Editio nova, juxta editionem Waddingi XII tomos continentem. 26 vols. Paris: Vivès. [Reprint of the above edition and thus is known as the Wadding-Vivès text or just Vivès edition. Adds the spurious Tractatus de perfectione statum.]
Scotus, J. D. (1950). Opera omnia studia et cura Commissionis Scotisticae ad ad fidem codicum edita praeside P. Carolo Balic. 13- vols. Vatican City: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis.
Scotus, J. D. (1997). Opera philosophica. 3- vols. St. Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute Press. [Originally planned for the Vatican Opera omnia, but now published separately.]
Scotus, J. D. (1998). Opera omnia. Editio minor. 3- vols. Alberobello: Aga.

B. Translations:
Scotus, J. D. (1975). God and Creatures; The Quodlibetal Questions. (F. Alluntis and A. B. Wolter Trans.) Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press.
Scotus, J. D. (1983). A Treatise on God as First Principle. (A. B. Wolter) Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press.
Scotus, J. D. (1986). Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality. (A. B. Wolter, Trans). Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press.
Scotus, J. D. (1987). Philosophical Writings: A Selection. (A. B. Wolter, Trans.). Indianapolis: Hackett. (Reprint of 1962 edition.)
Scotus, J. D. (1997). Questions on the Metaphysics of Aristotle. (A. B. Wolter and G. Etzkorn, Trans.) St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: Franciscan Institute Press.

II. Secondary Sources:
Cross, R. (1999). Duns Scotus. New York: Oxford University Press.
Frank, W. A. and A. B. Wolter (1995). Duns Scotus, Metaphysician. West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press.
Williams, T. (Ed). (2001) The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wolter, A. B. (1946). The Transcendentals and their Function in the Metaphysics of Duns Scotus. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press.
Wolter, A. B. and Adams, M. M. (Ed). (1990). The Philosophical Theology of John Duns Scotus. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

LIFE AND WORKS

Relatively little is known of Scotus’s life and career. Of Scottish origin, he is estimated to have been born in 1266. He began his lengthy theological training at Oxford about 1288, but was transferred by the Order in 1302 to the more prestigious University of Paris to complete his degree. His studies at Paris were shortly interrupted when he, together with much of the Franciscan convent, were ordered out of France by Philip the Fair for siding with Pope Boniface VIII in their dispute over taxation of church property. It is generally assumed that Scotus returned to Oxford during the year of exile from France. Back in Paris by April, 1304, Scotus continued his studies and was promoted to master of theology in 1305. He was regent theologian in the Franciscan chair at Paris until 1307, when he was again transferred, this time to the Franciscan house of studies in Cologne. He died there in 1308 at the age of forty-two. This means that the bulk of Scotus’s substantial writings were produced over a period of only about ten years.
Scotus’s corpus can be divided into two parts: his mostly earlier commentaries on Aristotle and his certainly later works in theology. Scotus wrote question-style commentaries on the Aristotelian logic (Categories, Porphyry, On Interpretation, and Sophistical Refutations), the De anima, and the first nine books of the Metaphysics. While these philosophical works are generally taken to be early, perhaps written as a master of arts, the dating of the Metaphysics has long been a matter of controversy. The current view is that it was revised over a period of time and some sections are late. Scotus’s reputation, however, rests mainly on his theological writings, and of these the most important are his commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, a required text for the scholastic degree in theology. From Oxford Scotus has two commentaries on the Sentences, an earlier one termed the Lectura (i.e., his preliminary lectures on Lombard), which he then greatly expanded into his magnum opus, the Ordinatio (i.e., revised lectures). His corresponding commentary from Paris survives in the reports of students or secretaries, and is hence called the Reportatio parisiensis, although one copy alleges to having been examined by Scotus himself. The chronological relationship between these latter two commentaries remains an important point of dispute, since at places the Ordinatio and Reportatio parisiensis differ significantly. The standard view has been that the Ordinatio, as Scotus’s crowning achievement, incorporated both the Lectura and Reportatio parisiensis, and thus was the latest and most mature of the three. Increasingly, however, scholars are of the view that Scotus wrote a substantial portion of the Ordinatio before leaving Oxford for Paris in 1302, which would make the Reportatio his latest commentary, at least in part. In addition to his Sentences, Scotus has two sets of university disputations termed Collationes, one each from Oxford and Paris, and a magisterial Quodlibet (i.e., a public disputation open to any topic) held during his regency at Paris. Finally, there are two treatises: the Treatise on the First Principle, which may not have been completed by Scotus, given that half of it is taken from the Ordinatio, and the Theoremata, whose authenticity has been disputed.
It should be noted that the works of Scotus have suffered more than those of any other scholastic thinker from confused transmission and damaging misattributions. In part this seems to have resulted from his early death, which left some of his works, particularly his Ordinatio, incomplete and in the course of revision. Already in the fourteenth century his texts were conflated to supply missing material. It has taken nearly a century of research to establish Scotus’s authentic canon and tease apart the various redactions of his theological works. Even at that, definitive interpretation on points remains difficult, since a large portion of his corpus still exists only in the unreliable, sixteenth-century edition of Luke Wadding.

UNIVOCITY AND ANALOGY

The thirteenth century accepted as metaphysical bedrock Aristotle’s claim that being was not a univocal predicate but an equivocal by reference (pros hen; ad unum) or, in their terminology, analogous. The scholastics generally understood analogy as a middle ground between strict univocity, where being would have the same meaning (ratio) in all its instances, and pure equivocity, in which the meanings would be totally disparate and unconnected. As analogous, being would have different but related meanings, applying primarily and properly to God and secondarily or by extension to creatures. Analogy was thus seen to strike the balance needed to ensure, on the one hand, that God was transcendent to creatures, which univocity would violate, and, on the other, that he was naturally knowable, which pure equivocity would make impossible.
In a move recognized even by his contemporaries as radical, Scotus broke with this canonical view and held to the contrary that there had to be some notion of being and the other transcendentals univocal to God and creatures, as well as to the ten categories. Scotus formulated his position in reaction to the version of analogy developed by Henry of Ghent, who brought out more explicitly the difficulties facing the doctrine in accounting for natural knowledge of God. Following Aquinas’s claim in his discussion of analogy that being did not have a single ratio or formal notion, Henry repeatedly stressed that being ultimately resolved into two separate and irreducible notions (rationes): that of infinite being proper to God and the universal concept being common to the ten categories, which was finite and proper to creatures. That is, according to Henry, there could be no third notion or ratio of being apart from these two proper concepts, for such would be univocally common to God and creature and eliminate divine transcendence.
Scotus argued to the contrary that a univocal concept of being was required to sustain the traditional claim of natural knowledge of God. In particular, he maintained that Henry could not consistently assert that being resolved only into two proper notions, having no conceptual element in common, and at the same time uphold the possibility of deducing any knowledge of God from creatures. Scotus’s most famous argument is that from ‘certain and doubtful concepts’, as his contemporaries labelled it. It took direct aim at Henry’s repeated assertion that there could be no concept of being separate from the two analogous and proper notions applicable exclusively to God and creature. An intellect certain about one concept, but doubtful about others, has a concept about which it is certain, different from the concepts about which it is doubtful. But we can be certain that God is a being, while doubting whether God is infinite or finite being. Therefore, the concept of being is different from, and hence univocal to, the concepts of infinite or finite being. Scotus takes the first premise to be evident, for a given intellect cannot be both certain and doubtful of the same thing. The second premise is true de facto, because past thinkers, such as the pre-Socratics, disagreed as to whether the first principle was finite or infinite, or even material or immaterial. Yet, in attempting to establish one of these alternatives, no philosopher ever doubted that the first principle was a being. Being must therefore have a separate, distinct concept from those that apply properly to God and creature.
The point of Scotus’s argument is that since it is a matter of doubt whether God is an infinite or finite being, this must be determined by demonstration. Yet, such a demonstration must begin from something certain about God, for otherwise it would proceed from premises doubtful in all respects. Thus, unless the concept of being is admitted as certain, apart from the doubtful concepts of infinite and finite which are themselves the object of demonstration, no reasoning about God will be possible.
Scotus applied a similar analysis to the traditionally accepted methods of reasoning from creatures to God, including Anselm’s doctrine of ‘pure perfections’ and the Pseudo-Dionysian ascent through removal and eminence, arguing that all required a common, univocal notion of being or some other attributable perfection. Indeed, Scotus claimed that in practice all the theologians took a univocal concept of being for granted, although they it denied verbally.
It is important to stress that Scotus was not rejecting altogether the doctrine of analogy. He of course admitted that the concepts of infinite and finite or created and uncreated being proper to God and creature were analogous, and that the later were related respectively as primary and secondary meanings. Rather, his fundamental point was that the concept of being could not be merely analogous. Unless some underlying concept of being were common to the analogous, proper ones, then they would in fact turn out not to be analogous at all but purely equivocal. Natural knowledge of God would thus be impossible. What Scotus did reject was reliance on the analogous relationship itself as sufficient to account for any proper concept of God on the grounds that knowledge of a relation is posterior to any knowledge of the terms related. Analogy of itself therefore cannot explain, but rather already presupposes, a knowledge of being as proper to God and creatures.

BACKGROUND IN HENRY OF GHENT

HENRY OF GHENT
SUMMA OF ORDINARY QUESTIONS A. 21 Q. 2
(ed. 1520 I. ff. 123v E-125v A)
WHETHER GOD COMMUNICATES IN BEING (ESSE) WITH CREATURES, THAT IS,
WHETHER BEING IS SOMETHING COMMON TO GOD AND CREATURE

<That it is:>
Thirdly, whatever is said of several things and has an essential concept (intellectum) different from the concepts of those things of which it is said is some real thing common to those things, for every concept is based in some real thing. Being is this sort of [common thing] because according to Avicenna, “Being is impressed [upon the intellect] by a first impression,” even before the concept of God or creature.
<…>
<Reply of the Author>
It should be replied to this that since being, as will be shown below, does not signify a single concept (intentio) common to substance and accident, but signifies in a primary way each one of the ten categories, being cannot be common to substance and accident by any real community. Whence, since creator and creature agree much less in any one real thing than any two creatures, namely, substance and accident – but rather the nature of being (ratio essendi) of the creator is much more distant from the nature of being of a creature than the nature of being of one creature differs from another – being can in no way be some real thing common to God and creature. And therefore it should be said without qualification that being is not some real common thing in which God communicates with creatures, and so if being or to be is predicated of God and creatures, this is by community of name alone and by no community of something real. And so by the definition of univocates being [is not predicated univocally of God and creatures], nor purely equivocally, according to the definition of equivocates in casu, but [it is predicated] in a middle way, namely, analogously.
<…>
<To the Initial Arguments>
To the third objection which argues that unqualified being is conceived before any concept of being which is that of God or creature, it is replied that this is not true, for never can any concept of absolute being be conceived without man conceiving some concept of either God or creature, as if man were to conceive some single simple concept common to God and creature different from the concept of either, because there is no such concept. But if man conceives something, it is either what pertains to the being of God alone or to the being of creatures alone, but either sense of being can be present together indifferently and equally in what is signified by being insofar as it taken simply as a term. And therefore wherever being is used in a statement, whether externally expressed or conceived in the mind, it always forms a statement that has many meanings which are to be distinguished. Accordingly, Aristotle in I Physics distinguishes against Parmenides and Melissus that this statement “Being is” either signifies the being which is a substance or the being which is an accident. Therefore every real concept by which something of reality is conceived when being taken absolutely is conceived either is a concept of a reality which is God or of a creature, not of anything common to both.
It seems, however, to those who are unable to distinguish the multiplicity of being and the being of the creator from that of creatures [that there is some common concept of being], as was the case with Plato, who posited being as a genus as though there were some one common thing conceived by the term being. This does not seem to be the case to those more subtle thinkers, such as Aristotle, who were able to distinguish being and discern its significates. Something common seems to be conceived by the term being because, whether the reality which is conceived is divine or created, when being is conceived without distinctly and determinately conceiving the being of God or creature, that being is only conceived indeterminately, that is, without determining the concept to either the being of God or creature. And when Avicenna said that the concept of being is prior to the concept of God and creature, he meant, if he understood correctly, that it has a relation to a distinct concept of either God or creature.
Nevertheless, it should be understood that indetermination is different in the case of God and creature, for there is a twofold indetermination: one negative the other privative. There is negative indetermination when what is undetermined cannot be determined, in the way in which God is said to be infinite because he cannot be limited. There is privative indetermination when what is undetermined can be determined, in the way in which a point is said to be infinite since it is not determined to the lines which by nature determine it. According to this twofold indetermination, however, it is necessary to understand that when the being which is God is conceived absolutely and indeterminately there is a negative indetermination, because the being of God is in no way apt to be determined, so that if after you have understood in creatures this and that [determinate] being, if you understand being absolutely through negation of this or some other determined thing, you will understand the being of God. This is what Augustine means when he says in VIII De Trinitate, “You understand this good and that good. Understand good absolutely and you will understand God.” Similarly, if you understand this being and that being, if you understand being absolutely, you will understand God, and this by conceiving being absolutely and undetermined by the indetermination of negation, as was said.
However, by conceiving being indeterminately by an indetermination of privation of those things to which it is by nature determined, the being of a creature is conceived, because the being of a creature is by nature determined by those proper natures by which they differ from one another. For what is called a being absolutely from the fact that is has an exemplar in the first cause, as was already said, is determined by a twofold nature, by which nature it is not said to be absolutely but to be something (esse aliquid), of which sort is the nature of substance and accident. For the term substance indicates something which is a being not existing in another as in a subject. The term accident, however, indicates a being which exists in another as in a subject. And accordingly substance and accident constitute the diverse genera of the categories, as we shall see, so that from the fact that a creature belongs to one of the categories [being] belongs to it in two different ways: that it has being [absolutely] and that it has the [determinate] being of something (esse aliquid). For being [absolutely] belongs to a creature from its participation by attribution to the first being insofar as it is being. To be something [determinate] belongs to it from the determination of its proper nature, according to what Boethius says in his De hebdomadibus, “Everything which is participates in being in order to be; it participates in something else in order to be something.”
Therefore in this way undetermined being belongs to God by negation and to creatures through privation. And because indetermination through negation and privation are so close, for they both remove determination, one in act alone, one in potency and act, those who are unable to distinguish between diverse things of this sort conceive absolute and undetermined being, whether that of God or creature, through the same concept. For it is the nature of an intellect unable to distinguish those things which are similar to conceive them as one, which nevertheless do not in reality make one concept. Therefore, there is an error in his concept. For a true concept [is had] by first conceiving being as absolutely undetermined, which by reason of its indetermination posits nor determines at all anything. Consequently, there is nothing in reality common to God and creature, but negative alone, and if there is something positive underlying that negation, that is [really] two diverse natures, as for example what is through its essence and what is through participation, which two natures the right thinking intellect can distinguish well enough by conceiving being as undetermined negatively or privatively.
UNITY OF ANALOGY AND UNITY OF UNIVOCITY
ACCORDING TO HENRY OF GHENT AND SCOTUS

Unity of Attribution = Common Opinion
Here being is seen to have two distinct rationes one proper to God and one to creatures, which have only a secundum quid unity by virtue of reference or relation, such that the concept of being as proper to God is primary and that proper to creatures secundary. This is the common opinion.


Unity of Confusion = Henry of Ghent
Here the two proper concepts of being are thought to be a single notion of being as absolutely undetermined, even though no such absolutely common notion exists. Both proper notions are conceived together without distinction. This was Henry’s adjustment to the common opinion.


Unity of Univocity = Scotus
Scotus replaces Henry’s unity of confusion with a truly univocity notion of being which is irreducibly simple and distinctly conceived.

 

DIVINE ILLUMINATION

I. First Soctus shows that Henry’s position leads to skepticism:

As in many other areas, Scotus’s precise target was Henry of Ghent, who had mounted an elaborate defense of illumination in the wake of Aquinas’s reduction of it to a general influence present in the Aristotelian agent intellect. As Scotus reports in detail, Henry argued against Aquinas that the Aristotelian apparatus of abstraction was insufficient to achieve infallible knowledge of truth and needed to be supplemented by a special illumination. Appealing to the accepted Aristotelian distinction between simple apprehension (i.e., conceptualization) and composition and division (i.e., judgment), Henry says that by the former we know ‘that which is true’ (verum). That is, in simple apprehension we conceive a real thing outside the mind. For this no special illumination is needed, as there is no error in simple apprehension, and abstraction suffices. But to know a thing that is ‘true’ or real is not to know its ‘truth’ (veritas), for truth is conformity to an exemplar or model, and this can only be seen in a judgment involving a comparison of one thing to another. As even Plato realized, a thing has two exemplars against which it can be compared or measured: a created exemplar, which is its form existing in the soul as the result of abstraction, and an uncreated exemplar, which is its form existing eternally and immutably in the divine mind. But Henry argues that no comparison of a thing to a created exemplar acquired through abstraction by the human mind will yield infallible knowledge of truth. First, the created exemplar cannot be immutable, since the object from which it is abstracted is itself constantly changing. Second, the intellect itself in which the created exemplar exists is mutable. Given the mutability of both the knowing subject and object, Henry concludes that no matter how much we universalize a sensible form by abstraction, it can never be a basis for infallible knowledge of truth. Since the dignity of the human being demands such knowledge, some access to the uncreated exemplar in the divine mind is therefore required. (Henry, like all illuminationists, goes to lengths to explain how this does not involve a direct intuition of God in the present life.) In rough terms, Henry was attempting to integrate Augustinian illumination with Aristotelian abstraction by having the former operate at the level of judgment and the latter at the level of conceptualization.

According to Scotus, far from ensuring certitude, Henry’s theory of illumination actually led to a deep and irremediable skepticism. Thus, even granting Henry that the thing itself from which the created exemplar is abstracted is constantly changing – a position Scotus regards as false and tantamount to the error of Heraclitus – then no amount of illumination can give us certitude about it. On Henry’s reasoning the apparent function of illumination is to allow us to see the wholly mutable thing itself as immutable. In that case, illumination results in no knowledge at all, for then the thing would be apprehended contrary to the way it really is. Similarly, if the human mind itself is so mutable that it makes the created exemplar subject to change, then for the same reason no illumination can prevent the mind from erring. Since illumination itself must somehow exist in the mind, it would be no less subject to change. Furthermore, according to Henry, illumination is supposed to occur by means of cooperation between the changeable, created exemplar and the unchanging, created exemplar. But if there are two causes cooperating in the production of knowledge, certitude can never be greater than the weaker of the two causes. For example, when one premise is necessary and the other contingent, only a contingent conclusion can follow. For Scotus, then, unless the human cognitive apparatus and the object are of their nature so constituted as to be capable of producing certitude, no intervention of illumination could render them such. Scotus was in fact following a caution issued as early as Bonaventure – that if illumination is given too large a role and made the total cause of certitude, then skepticism results – but pushed it to exclude any role whatever for illumination in natural certitude.

HENRY SCOTUS
THING IS CHANGEABLE: The thing itself from which the exemplar is taken is changeable. Therefore, the exemplar is changeable. If the thing itself is constantly changing, then no light can give us any certitude about it, for to know it not as it is in itself (i.e., as not changeable) is not certain knowledge. What is more, it is also clear that the assumption – that things in themselves are constantly changing is false.
MIND IS CHANGEABLE: The mind into which the exemplar is received is changeable. Therefore, requires some thing unchangeable to correct it. If the nature of the human mind is so changeable that it makes the created exemplar subject to change, then nothing prevent the mind from erring, for what exists in a changeable subject – in this case the mind – will be subject to change.
Furthermore, this acc. to H. is supposed to occur by means of cooperation between or the changeable created exemplar and the unchanging created exemplar. But of two factors productive of knowledge, the knowledge can never be more certain than the weakest of the two factors. E.g., a necessary and a contingent premise can never result in anything but a contingent conclusion.
EXEMPLAR ITSELF: From the created exemplar itself we cannot be certain, since the same form is found in both dreams and waking. If the created exemplar in itself deceptive, then nothing which concurs with it will make it certain.

II. Then Scotus shows that apart from special illumination certitude is possible.

We can have infallible knowledge of (1) first principles and thus all things deduced from them (2) of induction from experience (3) of our own acts (4) sense knowledge

The terms of self-evident propositions are so identical that it is evident from them alone that one necessarily includes the other. Therefore, when the intellect unites and grasps these terms it has infallible certitude that the proposition is true, i.e., that what is asserted in the proposition conforms to the nature of the terms. As Henry said, knowledge of truth is to see a conformity. From the certitude of the principles, the certitude of the conclusions follows, for the certitude of the highest form of syllogism depends solely on the certitude fo the principles and reasoning form.

Objection: will not the intellect be deceieved about the meaning of the terms if the senses are deceived? No, the meaning of the terms alone would indicate the truth or falsity of the propositions, whether they were obtained from deceived senses or not. Senses are not the cause of the truth of proposition, but only occasion for it. We do not assent because we see terms united inreality by sense, but only from the meaning of the terms.

But of course not all universal propositions are known to be true as either self-evident from their terms or as necessarily deduced from them. Some are known from experience which reveals regular connections between things, such as that a type of herb cures a certain disease or that a certain positioning of the planets results in an eclipse. Thus, Scotus maintains secondly that we can infallible knowledge of what is regularly observed by the senses. Even though we do not observe all cases of some occurrence, and even though we do not observe that it obtains in every single case, but only in most, we can have infallible knowledge that it obtains universally from the following principle: “Whatever occurs frequently from a non-free cause (i.e., not from the will) is the natural effect of that cause.” This principle itself is not known by extrapolation from sense experience, but is self-evident from its terms, for by definition a cause that is non-free cannot frequently produce an effect contrary to what it is apt to produce. In this way, Scotus sought to underwrite the standard understanding of Aristotle’s conception of scientific demonstration, according to which experience (empeiria; experientia) reveals the fact of a connection and analysis its cause.

Thirdly, Scotus argues that there is infallible certitude of our own acts, such as understanding, sensing, etc., maintaining that we are as certain as these as we are of self-evident, necessary propositions. That such acts are contingent is not an impediment to certitude about them, for Scotus argues that even among contingent propositions there must be some that are immediately evident, otherwise there would either be an infinite regress in the ordering of such propositions or a contingent proposition would follow from a necessary one, both of which are impossible.

Finally, Scotus argues that the senses are reliable, so that external objects are as we perceive them to be. He does so by applying the above principle that whatever occurs frequently from a non-free cause is the natural effect of that cause. Thus, where the senses agree in their perceptions of an object and where such repeated perceptions yield the same results, we can conclude from this principle that the perception has the object as its natural cause and hence the object is as it appears. If the senses disagree, as when sight indicates that the stick in the water is broken, Scotus says that this error can be detected by other senses in cooperation with some proposition which is true from its terms (or one deduced from it). In this case, the sense of touch together with the self-evident proposition, “A hard object is not broken by contact with a softer object,” yields certain knowledge that the stick is not broken.

To summarize, Scotus replaces the corrective function previously assigned to illumination by Henry and Bonaventure with self-evident propositions whose certitude is immune from the variability of sense knowledge.