Another objection may reveal a way in which divine command ethics is vulnerable that is not shared by other forms of theological ethics. Its main claim
is that divine command theories make morality unacceptably arbitrary. One way of developing the objection is to note that divine command ethics conjoined
with ATHEISM implies a kind of moral NIHILISM.

If there were no God, there would be no divine commands and, in particular, no divine prohibitions. Hence, according to divine command ethics, if there were no God, nothing would be morally wrong. In other words, given divine command ethics, Ivan Karamazov was right in thinking that if there were no God, everything would be permitted. But surely, the objection goes, murder would still be wrong and would not be morally permitted even if God did not exist.

Ralph CUDWORTH (1617-1688) spells out the arbitrariness objection in a different way. He takes it to be a consequence of divine command ethics that
“nothing can be imagined so grossly wicked, or so foully unjust or dishonest, but if it were supposed to be commanded by this Omnipotent Deity, must needs upon that Hypothesis forthwith become Holy, Just and Righteous.” Consider some grossly wicked and foully unjust action, for example, torturing an innocent child to death. According to divine command ethics, if God were to command a person to torture an innocent child to death, it would be obligatory for the person to torture the child to death.

But surely, the objection in this form goes, it would not be obligatory to torture the child to death even if God were to command it.