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Locke’s Compatibilism:

Suspension of desire or Suspension of Determinism?[1]

In Book II, chapter xxi of the Essay Concerning Human Understanding, on ‘Power’, Locke presents a radical critique of free will. This is the longest chapter in the Essay, and it is a difficult one, not least since Locke revised it four times without always taking care to ensure that every part cohered with the rest. My interest is to work out a coherent statement of what would today be termed ‘compatibilism’ from this text – namely, a doctrine which seeks to render free will and determinism compatible. By emphasizing the hedonistic dimension of his argument, according to which we are determined by “the most pressing uneasiness” we feel, I show how a deterministic reading is possible. This was seen by Locke’s favorite and also most radical disciple, the deist Anthony Collins, whose treatise A Philosophical Inquiry Concerning Human Liberty (1717) is both a critique of Essay II.xxi and a radicalization of its contents. I argue that Collins articulated a form of determinism which recognizes the specificity of action, thanks in large part to the uniquely ‘volitional’ determinism suggested by Locke.

Voluntary opposed to involuntary, not to necessary (Locke, Essay II.xxi.11).

The common notion of liberty is false (Collins, Inquiry, p. 22).

In the chapter on ‘Power’ in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding (II.xxi),[2] Locke constructs a complex deflationary challenge to mainstream notions of free will, understood as autonomy or as a capacity associated with a distinct faculty called ‘The Will’, entirely separate from the rest of our cognitive functions. In a famous, but admittedly mysterious formulation, he says there can be no such thing as free will because freedom and will are both “powers,” and there can be no such thing as a power of a power. We are free to act or not act, but our actions are determined by our will; we are not free to will or not will. If Locke had let the matter rest there, he would have contributed an interesting doctrine to the available ‘set’ of compatibilist moral philosophies – ones which recognize the truth of determinism up to a certain point, but consider that this does not rule out the existence of goal-directed, intentional human action, and a fortiori action that responds to praise or blame, rewards or punishments, and thus is ‘responsible’. But in fact, the ‘Power’ chapter is fraught with difficulties, which render it both less coherent and more interesting. It is the longest chapter in the Essay, revised significantly for each of the four editions of the book, without earlier versions always being removed, leaving many readers – from Edmund Law, Locke’s editor in the eighteenth century, to Leibniz and today, Vere Chappell – with the feeling of incoherence or at least inconsistency in Locke’s account, something Locke himself apologizes for at the end of the chapter (§ 72).

I shall first discuss Locke’s account and its difficulties, and in conclusion present what is ultimately my chief interest: the determinist critique of Locke’s compatibilism put forth by his own closest disciple, the deist Anthony Collins,[3] in his Philosophical Inquiry into Human Liberty (1717).

Locke starts out with the intellectualist position that we are ‘determined by the Good’, the greater Good, which we know through our understanding (II.xxi.29 in the 1^st edition); this is a perfection. But in response to Molyneux’s criticism that

you seem to make all Sins proceed from our Understandings . . .; and not at all from the Depravity of our Wills. Now it seems harsh to say, that a Man shall be Damn’d, because he understands no better than he does[4]

Locke introduces a new concept in the 2^nd edition, as he writes to Molyneux; he now recognizes that “every good, nay every greater good, does not constantly move desire, because it may not make, or may not be taken to make any necessary part of our happiness; for all that we desire is only to be happy.”[5] He is now focusing on the causal mechanisms of what determines the will and thus moves us to act, in other words, the ‘motivational triggers’ of action; this will turn out to be “uneasiness.”

How could we then seek out the Highest Good? How can we “feel” or “sense” that the Highest Good is in fact, our good? Locke originally thought that the Highest Good did play a causal role in our actions, so that our desire would be “regulated” by the “greatness or smallness of the good,”[6] (“the greater Good is that alone which determines the Will” (§ 29)), but he gave up this view starting with the second edition, in which he adds the category of uneasiness: “good, the greater good, though apprehended and acknowledged to be so, does not determine the will, until our desire, raised proportionately to it, make us uneasy in the want of it” (§ 35). Thus

[Uneasiness] is the great motive that works on the Mind to put it upon Action, which for shortness sake we will call determining of the Will (§ 29)

and more explicitly,

what . . . determines the Will in regard to our actions is not . . . the greater good in view: but some (and for the most part the most pressing) uneasiness a man is at present under (§ 31, 2^nd-5^th editions)

As my interest is the emergence of a determinist approach to action, Locke’s addition of a hedonistic motivational psychology is noteworthy as a recognition of determinism, if only a ‘soft determinism’. Whether or not I can rationally judge X (say, a one-month intensive course in classical Greek, in a secluded desert setting) to be a greater good than Y (large amounts of chocolate and other sweets, several glasses of Cognac, a cigar), if obtaining Y removes the greater pressing uneasiness, I will choose Y. This is Locke’s way of addressing weakness of will, confirmed by his quotation of Ovid’s “Video meliora, proboque, deteriora sequor.”[7] But in my view, uneasiness is not just an explanation for ataraxia; it is Locke’s (2^nd-edition) explanation for action as a whole. It’s quite possible for me to choose X over Y, in fact, many people do; they simply had a greater pressing uneasiness in that direction. As for responsibility, it is unaffected, since God judges all of our actions at the time of resurrection, in any case.

Locke always rejects the thesis of the autonomy of the will, according to which the will is self-determining; he holds that the will is always determined “by something without itself.”[8] This determination from “without” can either be from the Greater Good (1^st edition), the most pressing uneasiness (2^nd edition), or an interplay between this uneasiness and the last judgment of the understanding (2^nd-5^th editions), and since the Good is always defined as happiness (§ 42), and happiness is always defined as pleasure, the ‘hedonism’ that commentators see appearing in the 2^nd edition is not absent from the 1^st edition! This is why he denies the liberty of indifference (the absolute equilibrium of Buridan’s ass), as directly contradicting his hedonism (§ 48): it is both impossible to be genuinely indifferent, as we are always being swayed by one uneasiness or another, and not a good idea to be indifferent, as our ideas of good and evil, translating as they do into pleasure and pain, are ‘in us’ for the purpose of our self-preservation:

our All-wise Maker, suitable to our constitution and frame, and knowing what it is that determines the Will, has put into Man the uneasiness of hunger and thirst, and other natural desires . . . to move and determine their Wills, for the preservation of themselves, and the continuation of their Species. . . . We may conclude, that, if the bare contemplation of these good ends to which we are carried by these several uneasinesses, had been sufficient to determine the will, . . . we should have had in this World little or no pain at all (§ 34).

He also claims that the existence of genuine indifference is an impossibility. It would be useless to be indifferent with regard to the understanding, because our actions would then be like “playing the fool” or better, being a “blind agent”[9]; moreover, being determined in our choices by the last judgment of the understanding is a good idea in terms of our welfare and self-preservation!

Now, the actions of an agent who is never indifferent, and whose actions are never uncaused, are perfectly compatible with determinism. This overall ‘compatibility’ means, I think, that Locke’s vision of action and freedom can be understood simply as calling attention to our ‘reinforcement’ of certain links in the causal chain, rather than insisting on a quasi-categorial distinction like that between ‘happenings’ and ‘doings’, in which a ‘happening’ is merely a relation between an object and a property, whereas a ‘doing’ expresses a stronger relation.[10]

However, Locke is about to modify his theory of action – if not, per se, of motivation – in an important way, resulting in a new theory of freedom, and in a step away from compatibilism, the very step Collins will challenge. Recall Locke’s second (and crucial) account of what determines the will:

There being in us a great many uneasinesses, always soliciting and ready to determine the will, it is natural, as I have said, that the greatest and most pressing should determine the will to the next action; and so it does for the most part, but not always (§ 47).

“For the most part, but not always”: this is the sign of the coming modification. Hedonistic determination of our will works most of the time, but not always; sometimes we can simply stop the mechanism! I quote Locke’s new statement:

For, the mind having in most cases, as is evident in experience, a power to suspend the execution and satisfaction of any of its desires; and so all, one after another; is at liberty to consider the objects of them, examine them on all sides, and weigh them with others. In this lies the liberty man has; and from the not using of it right comes all that variety of mistakes, errors, and faults which we run into in the conduct of our lives, and our endeavours after happiness; whilst we precipitate the determination of our wills, and engage too soon, before due Examination. To prevent this, we have a power to suspend the prosecution of this or that desire; as every one daily may experiment in himself. This seems to me the source of all liberty; in this seems to consist that which is (as I think improperly) called free-will. For, during this suspension of any desire, before the will be determined to action, and the action (which follows that determination) done, we have opportunity to examine, view, and judge of the good or evil of what we are going to do; and when, upon due Examination, we have judged, we have done our duty, all that we can, or ought to do, in pursuit of our happiness; and it is not a fault, but a perfection of our nature, to desire, will, and act according to the last result of a fair Examination (§ 47).

He confirms that suspension is the “hinge” on which the new theory of freedom “turns” some sections later:

This is the hinge on which turns the liberty of intellectual beings, in their constant endeavours after, and a steady prosecution of true felicity,- That they can suspend this prosecution in particular cases, till they have looked before them, and informed themselves whether that particular thing which is then proposed or desired lie in the way to their main end, and make a real part of that which is their greatest good. . . . experience showing us, that in most cases, we are able to suspend the present satisfaction of any desire (§ 52).

How did we get to suspension? Not by some casual intuition Locke suddenly remembered, about how we do stop and reflect about different goods frequently. Rather, Locke appeals to his distinction between active powers and passive powers. We know by experience that we have a power to change and a power to receive changes. In the realm of thinking, the power to receive ideas from without is the merely “passive” power, by the exercise of which we are patients and not agents. But we also have an active power, “to bring into view ideas out of sight, at one’s own choice, and compare which of them one thinks fit” (§ 72). This quote from the end of chapter, precisely in the portion that was added last, provides the conceptual justification for what may be Locke’s key moral idea, the suspension of desire.

This active power applied to the moral realm is the power to suspend the “execution and satisfaction of [our] desires” (§ 47), in other words, the “prosecution” of an action. We are not necessarily compelled to attend to a present (and pressing) uneasiness, because we can reflect on the main source of this uneasiness, in order to know which object of desire we should pursue. This “suspension” of action is “the source of all liberty” … “which is (as I think improperly) called Free will” (ibid.). An action can be suspended until the will is determined to action; the will is determined to action by a judgment on which good we pursue. In other words, this ‘moment of freedom’ occurs within a causal scheme in which we “desire, will and act according to the last result of a fair examination” (§ 48); this last result is very reminiscent of the final moment of deliberation which Hobbes compared to the feather which breaks the horse’s back.[11]

A mitigated determinism, but still a determinism, then: we can suspend the mechanism of desire and uneasiness and deliberate on a course of action, that is, we can suspend the “prosecution” of an action, but once a course of action has been chosen, we have to follow it. If we hadn’t noticed that this moment of suspension seems hard to reconcile with the rest of the hedonistic scheme, Collins will call attention to this flaw or inconsistency in Locke’s explanation, and cast doubt on the possibility of our power to somehow suspend a course of events, in other words, the possibility that in a causal chain of actions, there might be a moment which is not itself within the causal chain! With his unmistakable clarity and precision, Collins says simply that “suspending to will, is itself an act of willing; it is willing to defer willing about the matter propos’d” (Inquiry concerning Human Liberty, p. 39); and since Collins does not accept a categorial separation between desire and will, which he finds to be a traditional (Aristotelian) residue in Locke, he will consider any suspension of the will, being “itself an act of willing,” to still be determined by the causal mechanism of uneasiness.

Locke has moved from freedom as the power to do what one wills to do or not do, that is, not the freedom to will but to act (§§ 8, 23), to freedom understood as the ability to suspend desire, to keep it from provoking action (§§ 47, 52). If uneasiness turned out to be the only causal mechanism through which the Good can influence me, then for my actions to not be fully determined by this mechanism, I must be able to suspend the execution of my desires. Suspension is “the hinge on which turns the liberty of intellectual beings, in their constant endeavours after, and a steady prosecution of true felicity” (§ 52). It sounds a lot like a ‘second-order freedom’ of the sort made popular by Charles Taylor and Harry Frankfurt in contemporary moral philosophy. But freedom as suspension is still not freedom to will; it is freedom to act in accordance with the will. It’s natural to ask whether the suspension doctrine is a departure from determinism or not.[12] Indeed, in section 56 of the ‘Power’ chapter, which he added to the 5^th edition,[13] Locke says the following:

Liberty ‘tis plain consists in a Power to do, or not to do; to do, or forbear doing, as we will. This cannot be denied. But this seeming to comprehend only the actions of a Man consecutive to volition, it is further inquired,- Whether he be at liberty to will or no? And to this it has been answered, that, in most cases, a Man is not at Liberty to forbear the act of volition: he must exert an act of his will, whereby the action proposed is made to exist or not to exist. But yet there is a case wherein a Man is at Liberty in respect of willing; and that is the choosing of a remote Good as an end to be pursued. Here a Man may suspend the act of his choice from being determined for or against the thing proposed, till he has examined whether it be really of a nature, in itself and consequences, to make him happy, or no (§ 56, emphasis mine).

In sum, Locke’s ‘Power’ chapter contains not one but three separate doctrines of freedom:

A: freedom is determination by the Good (1^st edition);

B: given the condition of uneasiness, freedom is the suspension of desire (2^nd edition); this allows the Good and the understanding to be ‘reintroduced’;

C: liberty with respect to willing (5^th edition), which seems to follow from suspension: once we suspend, we can choose one good over another, and once that choice is made it raises our uneasiness accordingly.

Many commentators, Chappell most prominently, have worried about how to reconcile (A) with (B): how to reconcile a notion of the Good with a hedonistic motivational psychology. My response is that if we recall that the Good always means happiness, itself definable in terms of pleasure and the avoidance of pain, and the presence of the afterlife and its potential rewards and punishments cannot be excluded from hedonistic considerations, there seems to be almost no difficulties with reconciling these two doctrines. However, the situation appears to be different with doctrine (C), liberty “in respect to willing.” The idea appears to be blatantly inconsistent with the rest of the chapter. Indeed, it’s not just § 56 which presents this difficulty; consider this statement:

Nay, were we determined by anything but the last result of our own Minds, judging of the good or evil of any action, we were not free; the very end of our Freedom being, that we may attain the good we choose (§ 48).

Now, this sentence can be simplified to read:

If our will were determined by something other than X, then it would not be free.

As Yaffe has seen, this can in turn be rewritten in this way:

If our will is determined by X, it is free.

If only in terms of Locke’s own rhetoric in the early sections of the chapter, one cannot help but point out that he had claimed to be dispensing with the notion of free will, for good … and here he is entertaining a version of it, however revised. If my account here focused solely on Locke and the overall strength and weakness of his theory, I would present a case for the ‘enduring’ status of determination in his chapter, because he never accepts freedom as indifference;[14] this leads him to an additional, important claim: the determination of our will by the last judgment of our understanding, is a “perfection of our nature” (§ 47) rather than a “restraint or diminution of freedom” (§ 48). Much like the ‘practical’ argument against indifference in terms of self-preservation, Locke thinks it is a perfection to be determined:

A man is at liberty to lift up his hand to his head, or let it rest quiet: he is perfectly indifferent in either; and it would be an imperfection in him, if he wanted that power, if he were deprived of that indifferency. But it would be as great an imperfection, if he had the same indifferency, whether he would prefer the lifting up his hand, or its remaining in rest, when it would save his head or eyes from a blow he sees coming: it is as much a perfection, that desire, or the power of preferring, should be determined by good, as that the power of acting should be determined by the will; and the certainer such determination is, the greater is the perfection (§ 48, emphasis mine).

In sum, Locke has put forth both a powerful critique of mainstream theories of freedom and the will, with his concept of ‘uneasiness’, and he seems to have retreated from the (hedonistic) deterministic implications of this concept, with his claim that there are moments when we can suspend all such determination, and be free “with respect to willing.” At the same time, partly due to the theological overtones of his moral philosophy, he thinks it is a perfection that we are in fact determined in our actions, and an unavoidable one. Based on the textual complexities and variations in the ‘Powers’ chapter of the Essay, one could defend different versions of compatibilism in Locke.

What Anthony Collins will do is seize upon the uneasiness doctrine, bolster it metaphysically with various determinist arguments drawn from Hobbes, Spinoza, Leibniz and Bayle (principally an ‘argument from experience’ and an ‘argument from causality’), and challenge any type of ‘suspension’ or ‘liberty with respect to willing’ as being inconsistent with the first doctrine. In doing so, he puts forth a powerful and original form of determinism which does not neglect the conceptual and empirical particularities of the world of action, contrary to most discussions in action theory or the philosophy of science, which tend to ignore one another – one may term Collins’ position a ‘volitional determinism’[15]; he himself speaks of “moral necessity,” taking a term from the incompatibilist, libertarian vocabulary used notably by Samuel Clarke:

I contend only for what is called moral necessity, meaning thereby, that man, who is an intelligent and sensible being, is determined by his reason and his senses ; and I deny man to be subject to such necessity, as is in clocks, watches and other beings which for want of sensation and intelligence are subject to an absolute, physical or mechanical necessity (Inquiry, Preface, p. iii).

 

It is not possible to go into further details about Collins’ doctrine, which significantly anticipates the ‘Hume-Mill’ thesis (later defended by Schlick, Ayer, Smart, etc.) according to which an agent is causally determined by her beliefs, desires and other mental states, and this is an adequate basis for a moral theory. I have simply tried to outline the complexity of Locke’s views on action and indicate how they formed the basis for a new and less-known form of determinism.

[1] This is a shortened version of chapter 1 of my dissertation, “Locating Mind in the Causal World: Locke, Collins and Enlightenment Determinism,” Boston University, Department of Philosophy (2005).

[2] Unless otherwise all quotations from Locke are from this chapter and are simply given as section (§) numbers.

[3] Collins was extremely close to Locke in the last years of his life, and their correspondence is both moving and filled with provocative insights, not least on theological matters. Locke wrote to Collins that “if I were now setting out in the world I should think it my great happiness to have such a companion as you who had a true relish of truth . . . and to whom I might communicate what I thought true freely”; as for strictly intellectual kinship, “I know nobody that understands [my book] so well, nor can give me better light concerning it” (Letters of October 29^th,1703 and April 3^d, 1704 = # 3361, # 3504 in Locke, Correspondence, ed. E.S. De Beer, 8 vols. [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976-1989], vol. 8, pp. 97, 263).

[4] Molyneux to Locke, December 22^nd 1692, letter 1579 in Corr., vol. 4, pp. 600-601. (James Tully points out that the criticism was first suggested by William King, the Archbishop of Dublin, then relayed by Molyneux, who discussed it at length with Locke).

[5] Letter 1655 (August 23^d 1693), in Corr., vol. 4, p. 722.

[6] “Pleasure, Pain, the Passions,” in Political Essays, ed. M. Goldie (CUP, 1997), p. 243.

[7] Locke, Essay, II.xxi.35 (the quotation is from Ovid, Metamorphoses, VII, 20-21; it is Medea speaking, about killing her children). Descartes, Hobbes and Spinoza also quote this passage.

[8] § 29, in the 1^st edition only (p. 248n.); in the final edition, this phrase is the entry in the Table of Contents for §§ 25-27. See Vere Chappell, in Sleigh, Chappell and Della Rocca, “Determinism and Human Freedom,” in D. Garber & M. Ayers, eds., Cambridge History of Seventeenth Century Philosophy, vol. 2 (CUP, 1998), pp. 1250-1251; “Locke on the intellectual basis of sin,” Journ. Hist. Phil. 32:2 (1994), p. 201.

[9] Locke to van Limborch, August 12^th 1701, letter 2979 in op cit., p. 408.

[10] Gideon Yaffe, in his thought-provoking Liberty Worth the Name: Locke on Free Agency (Princeton U.P., 2000), a work with which I ultimately disagree – Yaffe’s Locke, aside from the anachronistic dimensions, holds that we are determined by the Good, my Locke places the emphasis on determined and is thus closer, to speak in shorthand, to Dennett and Davidson than to Susan Wolf or Charles Taylor – suggests the above distinction and appeals to it frequently, but inconsistently.

[11] Of Liberty and Necessity, English Works, vol. 4, 247 / ed. V. Chappell (CUP, 1999), p. 34. Collins uses the same image (A Philosophical Inquiry Concerning Human Liberty [London: Robinson, 1717; reprint in. J. O’Higgins, Determinism and Freewill [The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1976]), p. 49).

[12] Chappell, in Sleigh, Chappell and Della Rocca, op. cit., p. 1250. Gideon Yaffe nicely remarks that suspension is really an idea Locke takes over from the libertarian or incompatibilist position, particularly Malebranche, whereas his initial doctrine of freedom as the absence of constraint on action was more compatibilist, closer to Hobbes. With respect to Collins’ critique, this implies that, depending on which edition of the Essay one looks at, one finds a more or less determinist Locke; thus one could conceivably construct an alternate Locke who would not be (as) vulnerable to the reductionist ‘streamlining’ offered by Collins.

[13] Locke acknowledged how much he had revised the chapter in the “Epistle to the Reader”: “I have found reason somewhat to alter the thoughts I formerly had concerning that, which gives the last determination to the Will in all voluntary actions” (p. 11).

[14] I would also describe how suspension can be seen to arise out of uneasiness rather than from some grafting on of libertarian elements into a formerly compatibilist view.

[15] I take this term from Chappell’s “Locke on the Freedom of the Will,” in Chappell, ed., Locke, Oxford Readings in Philosophy (OUP, 1998), p. 86. He uses it to mean the thesis that we are not free in willing; I agree, but extend the term to mean a metaphysical thesis, a variant of determinism which focuses on volitions, and thereby action, and thereby the mind, in contrast to a ‘physicalist’ (or ‘Laplacean’) determinism which denies the existence of this level of action, or at least seeks to reduce it to a lower-level explanation.