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Chapter 9 The ‘Theory’ of Forms

Knowledge, then, has Forms as objects, though nothing so far implies that knowledge is only of Forms. In the next two chapters we shall follow up the kind of understanding that knowledge involves, but first we need to follow up the introduction of Forms. This is especially necessary since Forms were not argued for as part of the Republic’s argument.

The idea that there are Forms was brought in from outside the discussion – a very odd procedure which turns Glaucon suddenly into an experienced philosopher. We have to look at Forms in the whole dialogue, and the roles they play, to see how dependent the Republic’s main argument is on the claim that there are Forms, and also to understand the claim, which is often made, that the Republic contains Plato’s ‘Theory of Forms’. Books on Plato often refer to Plato’s ‘Theory of Forms’, but this has to be handled with caution. Plato not only has no word for ‘theory’ ; he nowhere in the dialogues has an extended discussion of Forms in which he pulls together the different lines of thought about them and tries to assess the needs they meet and whether they succeed in meeting them.

The Republic is often treated as a major source for the ‘Theory of Forms’, but even here there is no open treatment of what they contribute to the argument. Explicit discussion of them is not very prominent : there are only three passages where we find it, though the long figurative passages of Sun, Line, and Cave, as well as some more casual references, obviously have Forms in view. One of the three passages has already been discussed – the Book 5 passage where Forms are introduced as suitable objects of knowledge because they are examples of ‘what is’ : only a 2 I 8 The ‘ Theo1f of Forms Form bears its predicate unqualifiedly, as opposed to particular instances which are not only F but also not-F. This consideration only applies to terms that have opposites, and Plato was concerned with two groups of these, moral terms like ‘j ust’ and relative terms like ‘double’ . In Book 7, 52 1 -525, Socrates discusses at length the kind of study suitable for the Guardians’ further education . There are problems on the adequacy of this passage for what it claims to support (see pp. 273-4) , but what concerns us now is the stretch of argument from 523a-525b. Some of our senseperceptions, Socrates says, do not stir up any use of the mind, because perception on its own settles them adequately ; but some do, because perception plays dirty tricks (52 3a) . Glaucon thinks that he is referring to perceptual illusions, but Socrates reaffirms that he is talking about standard cases. He illustrates this by a down-to-earth example. If we look at one of our hands, we can distinguish the three end fingers by sight with no trouble ; each is a finger and we can tell this adequately by looking. Sight is never the source of anything that leads us to say that any of the fingers is also not a finger.

But it is different with certain qualities of a finger, e.g. its size ; here we get ‘contradictions in perception’. What we see enables us to say that the finger is large, but also, and equally well, to say that it is small. So in these cases the mind is forced to reflect, and to come in to settle the problem. Plato is appealing to the same kind of consideration as in Book 5: what is large (compared with one thing) can with equal right be called small (in comparison with something else, from a different point of view, etc. ). Here this is blamed on the senses, because when the mind comes in to reason things out (524b) it declares that the contradiction � only an apparent one : ‘large’ and ‘small ‘ cannot really apply….

There is a third passage in the Republic where Forms are discussed : Book I O, 596a-597e. It is brief and problematic, and conflicts in many puzzling ways with the treatment of Forms in the body of the Republic. (This is not the only way in which Book Io is an odd-man-out in the book ; see Chapter I 4.) The passage comes in a context where Plato is claiming that art is trivial and worthless. He begins by claiming that painters have no knowledge of what they paint, and tries to show this by downgrading the status of what they produce. To this end, Forms are brought in, rather unexpectedly.

At 596a Socrates says, ‘Do you want us to start looking in our usual way ? We are accustomed to assuming a Form in each case for the many particulars to which we give the same name.’ (Grube.)

Since, he goes on, there are many beds and many tables, i.e. many particular items which we call ‘bed’ and ‘ table’, there must be a single Form of Bed, and Form of Table. The Form is what the craftsman ‘looks towards’ and tries to embody in his work when he makes beds, whereas the painter, more superficial, copies only the way particular beds appear. The painter’s product is thus of low status, ‘three removes from nature’ ; the craftsman’s bed, make looking towards the Form, is of higher status, though still lowly compared with the Form. The Form of Bed is made by God, and there is only one ( s97c) . God made only one, either because he chose to or because he had to. There can’t be more than one Form ; if there were two, then these two would have the same form, and so there would (per impossible) be a further Form of Bed in which they both partook.

This is all that is said about Forms in this short passage where they are introduced en passant; but in many ways their introduction makes for trouble if we think back to the central books….

Forms are not presented as something to be argued for from The  premises that all would accept, or to explain the phenomena that we all appreciate, because the ability to reason to such entities would not distinguish the wise from the merely sharp whose intellect might be put to bad use. Plato always connects forms with recognising and valuing what is good, not just with having the capacity to follow an argument. Forms are thus more than theoretical entities in a theory that explains the phenomena ; a knowledge of them is part of the good person’s understanding. Plato sometimes (though not in the Republic) talks of the ascent to the Forms as being one of love and desire, as though the Forms had an attractive force. But this should not be misunderstood : the Forms are not equally attractive to the philosopher and to the clever ruthless exploiter. Rather, Plato thinks that no amount of intelligence will grasp the Forms if it is directed to self-interested and narrow ends.

It is thus a change of heart more than a mere sharpening of the wits that is needed to make one realise that there are Forms.

Julia Annas, An Introduction to Plato’s Republic, chapter 9, pages 233 & 237