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First, Fletcher‘s analysis of the three main ethical approaches will be evaluated. Second, the theoretical basis of situationism will be scrutinized. Third, the methodology of situation ethics will be questioned. Fourth, Fletcher‘s ideas concerning moral principles will be analyzed. Fifth, the relationship between situationism and the Law of Moses will be assessed. Sixth, Fletcher‘snorm of love will be evaluated.

Fletcher‘s situationism often falls prey to the same weaknesses that he attributes to legalism and toantinomianism. Fletcher (1966) condemns the logic of legalistic ethicists who derive universals from universals (32), but fails to realize that his own ethic derives the universal norm of love from the universal nature of God‘s love. There is no necessary connection between a many-norm ethic and legalism (Geisler 1989, 58). A one-norm ethic might also be called legalistic. In practice, Fletcher‘s situationism calls for absolute obedience to one moral law, regardless of circumstances (situations determine the shape of love but they do not ever allow for departure from love). Fletcher (1967a) criticizes natural law theory, but like
natural law theory situationism‘s main precept is platitudinous, it has been used to defend anything and
everything in particular circumstances (murder, adultery, lying, stealing, idolatry, etc.), it offers no consensus on what love might mean in real circumstances, and its conclusions are built into its premises which are based on faith assertions (71). Fletcher also fails to realize that there are three general positions within what he terms ―legalism‖: nonconflicting absolutism, conflicting absolutism (―lesser evil‖ ethics), and qualified absolutism (“greater good” ethics) (Geisler 1989, 58– 59). Only the first and second of these three positions are subject to Fletcher‘s criticisms of legalism.

Fletcher (1967a) categorizes Christian antin omians as those who dismiss all moral norms and who ―claim to be above any moral law (since they are “saved or guided directly by the Holy Spirit”) (30) and differentiates antinomians from situationists in this regard. But the distinction between the two groups is very subtle, for Fletcher (1966) himself claims to be above any moral law other than love, and for him love is the Holy Spirit (51), so that Christian advocates of both approaches (situationism and antinomianism) claim to be saved or guided not by any moral law but only by the Holy Spirit. The difference lies in the terminology and in their understandings of what the Holy Spirit is and does. Norman Geisler (1989) points out that situationism is a normative position (love is the norm) (54), it is absolutist in its prescription of the what, why, and who of ethics (55), it resolves conflicting norms (55), it values differing circumstances (56), and it focuses on love for persons (56). However, Geisler concludes that “situationism reduces to antinomianism, for one empty absolute moral law is in practice no better than no absolute moral law” (61). In addition, Fletcher does not prove that only one universal norm exists, nor does he disprove that many others exist; he only postulates “faith” in a singular moral law (59). We must simply believe Fletcher when he claims that situationism is the only approach to Christian ethics that is not naïve (1966, 139). The theoretical basis of situationism is highly questionable from a Christian standpoint. Fletcher (1966)asks the question: “If the end does not justify the means, what does?‖ (120). He replies that the only answer can be ―Nothing!” (120). Geisler (1989) offers a different answer: “The means justify the means”(75).

Geisler quotes Romans 6:1 in response to pragmatism: “Shall we go on sinning so that grace may increase? By no means!” (75). Situationism rightly focuses on the importance of persons (above things) in moral decisions, but improperly establishes the individual human autonomy (and his situational decision of love) above the autonomy of God and his person. Fletcher‘s (1968) personalism admits human fallibility (255), yet denies a literal fall of humanity (1966, 81; 1967b, 159). The methodology of situation ethics seems to be misrepresented by Fletcher. Situation ethics does well to take into account (at least theoretically) the importance of motives, means, ends, and results in moral decisions (Fletcher 1966, 142), but Fletcher‘s relativistic holism breaks down entirely at the point of situationism‘s methodology. No longer are the motives, means, ends, and results codependent. The motives and ends dominate the means and the results, and all four (motives, means, ends, and results) are merely intentional, not actual (i.e., no individual motives, means, ends, or results are absolutely right or wrong, they are only right or wrong as they relate to the one universal and non-substantive norm of love through their intentions).

Fletcher (1968) applauds the fact that modern pluralism, empiricism, and relativism ―have sloughed off the classical metaphysical apparatus of a priori assumptions and ontologically grounded “axioms and norms. We just do not reason deductively or syllogistically anymore”(256). It is true that Fletcher (1967b) rarely reasons deductively or syllogistically (168), but he states four a priori assumptions (pragmatism, personalism, relativism, and positivism), and grounds his axiom and norm of love in the ontology of God. The “classical metaphysical apparatus” (256) seems to still be leading his methodology, though not explicitly or consistently.

Fletcher‘s treatment of moral principles is unbiblical and inconsistent. Fletcher (1967a) incorrectly claims
that Christians and non-Christians alike can agree on the maxim “We ought to love people, not rules or principles; what counts is not any hard and fast moral law but doing what we can for the good of others in every situation” (137). Psalm 119 is an ode of love to God‘s laws, word, testament, and precepts, which seems to give a precedent for loving God‘s rules and principles. However, loving God‘s laws is not in conflict with loving persons, for a love of God‘s law is a love of God‘s justice (if, as Fletcher claims, love and justice are identical), and is a love for God‘s establishment of just and loving purposes with people.

Fletcher (1966) argues that “apart from the helping or hurting of people, ethical judgments or evaluations are meaningless” (60). This assertion sharply contradicts the tenth commandment which forbids coveting (an act that is entirely internal) and Jesus‘ strong words concerning the immorality of lusting after a woman (again, an act that is entirely internal, and that therefore might not naturally harm or hurt anyone in Fletcher‘s view). Jesus considers extra-marital lust a sin that will condemn a person to hell (Matt. 5:27– 30).

Fletcher‘s ethics has no room for internal sin. If situationism were consistent, Fletcher would have to say that Jesus‘ ethical judgments or evaluations of internal sins are meaningless.

Fletcher‘s inconsistency in the area of moral principles carries over into his evaluation of particular actions in relation to his conclusions regarding the Decalogue. Fletcher (1967a) states that “high-pressure advertising is an unethical form of forced feeding” (213). He later asserts that to say that God takes sides in civil wars, strikes, “or any other complex gray area . . . is plainly demonic, idolatrous, or psychotic” (1968, 254). Fletcher‘s two statements express a fundamentally intrinsicalist view of good and evil actions, yet Fletcher states elsewhere that no act is immoral in itself; it is only wrong in particular situations in which love is not followed. Fletcher allows for love-motivated adultery. Why can he not also allow for love-motivated high-pressure advertising? Or love-motivated statements of God taking sides in civil wars, strikes, or other complex grey areas?

Fletcher asks two questions concerning the seventh commandment: “Should we prohibit and condemn premarital sex? or ―Should we approve of it?” (137). ―To the first one I promptly reply in the negative. To the second I propose an equivocal answer. ‗Yes and no “depending on each particular situation” (137). For Fletcher premarital sex may or may not be immoral depending on the situation, but the prohibition or condemnation of premarital sex is always wrong, regardless of the situation. Fletcher treats the prohibition or condemnation of premarital sex in an absolutist and legalistic way. If Fletcher were to stay true to his fundamental position (nothing is wrong in and of itself) the most he could say would be “The prohibition and condemnation of premarital sex is right or wrong depending on the situation.”

Fletcher has effectively established three unalterable laws in place of the table ts of Moses: “Do not say that God takes sides, do not high -pressure advertise, and do not condemn or prohibit premarital sex”.

Fletcher‘s exposition on the unsentimental character of agapeic love is insightful, but his statements concerning love are sometimes incongruous, unbiblical, simplistic, and dubious. Fletcher (1966) draws sharp distinctions between eros,philio, and
agapeic love, yet allows that they are not exclusive of one another (102– 110).

Only agapeic love for our neighbour is commanded by God, and this kind of love is perhaps the only one of the three that is universally possible (we cannot be close or intimate with everyone, but we can choose to work for the good of everyone). Fletcher makes several incongruous remarks concerning love. Fletcher (1966) states that the only thing that is ―intrinsically good‖ is love (57), yet goes on to assert that love “is not a good-in-itself” (61). If the second statement is true, what does Fletcher mean by “intrinsically good?” Fletcher (1966) comments that love “is not a virtue at all; it is the one and only regulative principle of Christian ethics” (61). Love “is not a virtue at all” (61), yet it is the only thing that is :intrinsically good” (57). Fletcher‘s contradictory remarks continue when he declares that ―Love does not say to us, ‗
Be like me.‘ It says, “Do what you can where you are” (62).

This not only contradicts Jesus‘ words concerning the imitation of God‘s perfection (Matt. 5:48), it also contradicts Fletcher‘s later statement that “God is love. Men, who are finite, only do love. That is, they try in obedience to obey love‘s command to be like God, to imitate him”(62– 63). Further, Fletcher claims that “agape is what is due to all others”(95). This not only contradicts the charismatic nature of love (while love is a duty because God gave his love freely, love is a gift not a reward or something that people deserve), it also contradicts Fletcher‘s later statement that
agapeic love “is for the deserving and the undeserving alike” (105– 106). If not everyone deserves love, love is not merely what is due them.

Fletcher (1967a) asserts that love is God‘s being and justice is doing God‘s will (57). Fletcher thus separates the existence and property nature of love with the purposive or predicate nature of justice. That is an unfair distinction since his thesis is that love is justice. If the two are identical they are also inseparable.Fletcher‘s views of love and justice often contradict Scripture. Fletcher (1967a) says of love and justice that “what may be said properly of either of them applies to the other” (54), but Scripture claims that while all humans deserve God‘s justice for what they have done (Rom. 6:23), no humans deserve God‘s love for what they have done (5:8). Fletcher‘s (1967a) discussion of the identity of love and justice fails to give reasons to believe that love and justice are identical instead of similar or overlapping (42– 47). If a person could show that there are areas where justice is not love, or loving is not just (or is beyond justice), Fletcher‘s whole theory of love/justice identity would fail.

This very disproof exists in the crucifixion of Jesus, the just for the unjust in God‘s supreme act of love. That is not justice (or it at least goes beyond justice), it is mercy. Justice and love are separable according to the gospel itself. Fletcher‘s (1966) argument that love and justice are identical (95) ignores the fact that God loved the world and sent his Son so that whoever believed in him could escape from justice in him (all humans deserve to perish)(John 3:16). If love and justice were identical, then either: 1. God would destroy all humans because justice demands it (and love is justice); or 2. God would not have to sacrifice his Son because his love requires no penalty for sin (and justice is love), making Jesus‘ death unnecessary. Instead, it should be said that from a biblical standpoint love is just (and merciful, gracious, etc.) and that justice is loving (and pure, and demanding, etc.). The two are separate, yet complementary. Love is a gift, not a right. Justice is a right, not a gift. Everyone deserves justice. Love is often undeserved. God loves people not because they deserve it, but because God chooses to love them. People don‘t deserve Christ‘s sacrifice, they deserve God‘s judgment. Every human has a right to claim justice from every other human, but not everyone has a right to claim love from everyone. Fletcher‘s one norm of love is overly simplistic and dubious. “Always act with love” is the one absolute, universal, formal ethical imperative, “but it is not substantive, i.e., it does not say what love is. It does not tell us how we are to do it . . . It is not prescriptive” (1968, 259– 260).

Geisler (1989) comments thatFletcher‘s norm of love is too general to be of any good (57). If love is truly without content outside of particular situations, where does the person in an actual moral situation look to tell them what to do? Not within themselves, not in nature, not in Scripture, not in reason. Geisler mistakenly argues that for Fletcher the situation itself provides the person with ethical judgment and determines the content of love instead of affecting it (58). But Fletcher holds that faith in love provides the content of love in the situation. Fletcher‘s position is difficult to understand or believe. Fletcher argues that lying is good when good ends are intended. When Fletcher tells the reader to have faith in what he says (that love is the only universal ethical norm) the reader has reason to doubt Fletcher‘s integrity (because he could be lying tothe reader to achieve some end that he perceives as good).

Fletcher gives no proof that one or many different universal norms are possible, or even defensible, and bases his own situationism purely on faith (58 – 60). Further, Fletcher implies that God canonly be loved through one‘s neighbors (57). Fletcher‘s situationism is precariously perched between the ethical approaches of legalism and antinomianism and is a pragmatic and relativistic methodology of ethics that makes moral principles or laws subservient to the one absolute moral law of love. Fletcher‘s situationism falls prey to the same weaknesses that he attributes to legalism and to antinomianism. The theoretical basis of situationism is highly questionable from a Christian standpoint, and the methodology of situation ethics seems to be misrepresented by Fletcher. In addition, Fletcher‘s treatment of moral principles and the Decalogue is unbiblical and inconsistent, and while his exposition on the unsentimental character of agapeic love is insightful, his statements concerning love are sometimes incongruous, unbiblical, simplistic, and dubious.