Critically assess the view that the word ‘good’ has no real meaning. OCR G582 June 2013 Q3

My comments prefaced by PB – and are in red. I have found some students are reluctant to answer questions on meta-ethics (concerning the meaning and nature of goodness) – but in June 2013 this clearly wasn’t the case as it was the second most popular question. Meta-ethical questions really boil down to just one issue rehashed a number of ways. This issue is: are you basically a naturalist or a non-naturalist? If you want to make it slightly subtler, are you a cognitivist naturalist or a non-cognitivist non-naturalist, remembering that Immanuel Kant was a cognitivist non-naturalist as was GE Moore ‘goodness is an indefinable non-natural property of an action’. Keep it simple if you are already confused – are you siding with the utilitarians and Natural law theorists in arguing that goodness is objective, out there to be measured and assessed by empirical observation of what it means to exercise our true rational natures (Natural Law) or empirical in believing that goodness can be measured by a hedonic calculus (Bentham), or a vote (preferences of Singer) or observing which rules society generally accepts as happiness producing (Mill)? These are beliefs in objective reality of goodness – it is out there and measurable or observable. The non-naturalists generally believe that goodness is not out there but in some sense ‘up-to-me’ (exclude Kant from this point though! His argument is different and subtle). So the emotivists – unto my feelings and the intuitionists – up to my intuitions (which of course begs the question, do we all share the same intuitions or are our intuitions very different from each other?).

AO1 Analyse, explain

Candidates might consider what is meant by the word ‘good’ according to the approaches of cognitivists and non-cognitivists in meta-ethics. PB – cognitivists believe goodness can be known either empirically or by some process of observation. Non-cognitivists do not have this kind of certainty and so believe there is no objective test for goodness.

They might consider whether the word ‘good’ and so moral statements can be described as true or false, and whether they are subjective or objective. PB – always unpack the question and the key word to attack and define and discuss here is the word ‘real’ in real meaning. Does ‘real’ mean the same as ‘objective’ and what is meant by objectivity? Kant’s belief, for example, is that all knowledge is pre-filtered by a priori categories which we impose on experience – but because we all share the same access to what he calls the noumenal realm (the realm of the a priori) then as long as we are being rational and accessing that angelic part of our natures – the ability to reason a priori – then we will all arrive at the same conclusion – the same categorical imperative. So Kant’s is a form of non-empirical objectivism.

They may demonstrate knowledge of the different interpretations of ethical language. PB – in other words (!) does the word good simply describe a property of an action or a feeling (emotivism) or does it do more than this and prescribe (give a strong ought or a command)? is it inherently a mater of universalising – as Hare argued? If so it always does more than describe reality (I feel pain and so this is wrong is an example of such a description you find in utilitarian naturalism). It has a non-objective prescriptive basis which makes it unique. We could say that potentially ethical language has these two dimensions.

Some answers will probably make reference to the views of thinkers such as Moore, Prichard, Ross, and Ayer. PB – Moore and Prichard are intuitionists or cognitivist non-naturalists and Ayer is an emotivist and so a non-cognitivist non-naturalists. yes I know the language is confusing. You could avoid the cognitivist dimension altogether and by unpacking naturalism v non-naturalism still produce an A* answer. Relax!

AO2 Evaluate, extend, contrast, connect

Candidates may analyse the views of different scholars on this question and whether ’good’ means the same to all of them. PB – which it doesn’t of course. But on the non-cogntivist side (emotivism and prescriptivism) it is interesting how Hare argues for prescriptivism, because his argument essentially says “MR Ayer, you have missed a key dimension of moral language which makes it unique – this is the prescriptive dimension’. Put another way – Mr Ayer has cocnentrated, like Mr Gradgrind in Dickens’ Hard Times, on “facts. facts. facts’ and his argument is that there is no such thing a s a’moral fact’ – that ethical language spray paints an emotive gloss on the facts. If Hare is correct, the key thing to grasp is that morality may not just be talking about real facts – that is if you a re a utilitarian naturalist for example – but is adding something special to ethical language, namely a prescription. So it’s possible the shoe naturalistic fallacy attack is misconceived (as MacIntyre would argue in After Virtue).

They may analyse whether ethical statements can be simply described as subjective or objective, and whether one person’s ideas about the meaning of ‘good’ may be considered any better than another’s. PB – well this rather vague sentence takes us to the nub of the issue of how we justify the contention that morality is based on natural facts. If we can point to some common shared experience (pain, pleasure) or a consensus on what it means to be human and to flourish as human (Natural Law) then surely it might be argued, there is a way of handling whether my view of goodness is any better than yours. Put rather bluntly – let’s ask people whether pain is good (answer no) or whether a poor education leads to a flourishing life (answer “no”). Such issues aren’t just subjectively up to me! An more than the badness of genocide is ‘up to me’!

They may also discuss whether an intuitionist approach simply means that any understanding
comes from social conditioning and are no more reliable than ideas about what is good, which come from our feelings. PB – yes, I think the intuitionists have aprobelm. Revisist Moore’s open question argument and fire it back at Moore himself – ‘that may be your intuition – but is it good’?

They could assess the strength of the claim in this question, and argue it either way. They may wish to compare ethical language with other forms of language. PB – main thing is, stick your neck out and produce a clear argument backed up with examples and key authors.

Mark scheme

Better responses may begin the question by unpacking what is meant through the phrase ‘real meaning’. PB – always attack, clarify, mince and rephrase the question! Practise doing this from day one and you a re a lot more likely to get an A grade.

Candidates could also approach this question by discussing what the word ‘good’ might mean when used by differing normative theories, for example the greatest good for the greatest number or fulfilling the precepts of Natural Law theory. PB – yes, these forms of naturalism claim to have at their basis objective truth (carefully defined of course!).

Candidates may still produce a response that can access the higher levels of the mark scheme through focusing on specific concepts of ‘good’, provided that the concepts are discussed thoroughly and exemplified well.

Examiners’ report on this question

This was the second most popular question. Some candidates demonstrated a most impressive grasp of what the question required, with full and detailed knowledge and understanding of cognitivist and non-cognitivist approaches to the word ‘good’. Such responses often benefited by beginning with an outline of the problems of defining ‘good’ in the first place, with some using normative theories such as Utilitarianism and Virtue Ethics to explain the different approaches to the word ‘good’. Some candidates were also able to evaluate how the phrase in the question, ‘real meaning’, might be interpreted.

Most candidates were able to assess the meaning, or lack of meaning, in the word ‘good’ using the approaches of Intuitionism and Emotivism. It was notable that more candidates seemed familiar with the approach of Naturalism and there were a number of successful references to F.H. Bradley as one of its exponents. Increasingly, candidates are assessing the work of Stevenson, Prichard and Ross to extend their responses. Some candidates also made reference to Rachels and Mackie in developing their arguments. PB – make sure you use the extracts part of the website to illustrate your points. Learn some quotes.

As in previous years, some candidates seemed less sure of what Prescriptivism entailed beyond its being a more developed form of Emotivism. Some candidates did limit themselves to a ‘list approach’ in their answers, but it was notable that a number showed ‘engagement with the material’ and were thus able to present a holistic assessment as required. PB – i have indicated above that prescriptivism is by implication an attack on the obsession with facts, as it points to a unique logical form for moral language. This is fundamentally Kantian – ethical language universalises (but of course Hare is a preference utilitarian).

Some candidates were able to make creditable use of their knowledge and understanding of the religious language section of the Philosophy of Religion course. Such cross-referencing included useful discussion of the approaches that might be taken by Logical Positivism and Wittgenstein, and fulfilled the synoptic assessment well. PB – yes, go synoptic, meaning to bring together insights from the P of R side, why not? Also I advise you study them (meta-ethics and religious language) at the same time as the debate becomes richer and more meaningful.